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for

THE
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
OF
SAINT AUGUSTINE

THE
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY
OF
SAINT
AUGUSTINE

BY
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TO
the Professors and Students
in the Department of Philosophy,
Harvard University

FOREWORD

First the Christian philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, and now the Christian philosophy of Saint Augustine. Are there, then, two Christian philosophies? Indeed there are, and more than two, but it so happens that the Church has raised the Christian philosophy of Thomas Aquinas to the rank of her common doctrine. For this reason, every Christian who cares to philosophize should study it first and foremost. But this he cannot do for long before he becomes conscious of the presence in it of another form of Christian philosophy, namely that of Saint Augustine. Such expressions as "And this is the reason why Augustine says . . ." or "As Augustine says . . ." are not infrequent from the pen of Thomas Aquinas, nor are they without significance. Obviously, Thomas Aquinas is anxious to make it clear that even though their philosophical languages may differ ever so widely, when it comes to matters of faith he has nothing to say which has not been said already by Augustine or, at least, could not be said by him now.

This fundamental agreement, despite occasional verbal differences, is easy to account for. The doctrines of St. Augustine and St. Thomas represent the outstanding achievements of human reason in its attempt to understand the meaning of divine revelation. The only avenue open to them for the accomplishment of this task was to use as a means of investigation the truest philosophy known to them in their own time, for indeed, to them, philosophy was the most complete expression of rational knowledge about the highest objects of the human mind.

One reason for the difference between the two doctrines lies in the fact that the two great doctors set about their task with different philosophical equipment. In Thomas Aquinas's own words, Augustine followed Plato as far as the Christian faith allowed, while Aquinas himself employed the philosophical technique of Aristotle in his attempt to arrive at a rational interpretation of the truths of Christianity. As a result of this initial difference, one and the same religious truth was expressed in two different philosophical languages; but a deeper distinction can be observed between them.

The Christian revelation is the word of God. This means that in it,

God has imparted to man information about Himself which is different in kind from the highest and most perfect type of merely human knowledge. Scripture makes us share, however imperfectly, in the knowledge which belongs to God Himself. Owing to Scripture, we become capable of knowing God in somewhat the same way He knows his own essence and, through it, all else besides. For this reason, there is simply no proportion between the natural knowledge attainable by reason and the supernatural knowledge obtained by faith in the word of God.

The highest form of wisdom accessible to man is theological wisdom, but no single theology could possibly exhaust the truth content of Scripture. Indeed, if this were possible, it would mean that the human mind could attain a knowledge of God which would be equal in perfection to the knowledge of God Himself. Hence a plurality of Christian theologies, each of which represents a distinct attempt on the part of human reason to gain a finite view of an infinite object. These attempts are not all equally successful, nor are we left to ourselves in the task of determining their respective values. The only authority to consult in this matter is that of the Church. It is well known that the Church has singled out the theology of Thomas Aquinas as the norm of her own theological teaching, but this exceptional honor conferred upon the doctrine of the *Summa Theologiae* in no way disqualifies the other theological interpretations of Christian dogma. It means that, unless otherwise specified, the theological teaching of Thomas Aquinas is, at the same time, that of the Church. Other theologies may be right also, and no doubt many of them are. There is more than one Doctor of the Church and the encyclical letter *Aeterni Patris* mentions with honor more than one name! The long and short of it is simply that, in matters of theology, one cannot be right against Saint Thomas Aquinas.

In this respect, the position of Saint Augustine is an exceptional one. Thomas Aquinas, far from intending to do away with his predecessors, was most anxious to incorporate in the body of his own doctrine whatever truth was to be found in them. In the title of his chief work, the word "theology" did not mean "my own theology," or "theology as I understand it"; to him, *Summa Theologiae* meant the sum and substance of theology itself as set forth already in the many and varied works of the sacred writers of all times, especially the Fathers of the Church. From this point of view, the theology of Saint Thomas was intended to systematize, and to promote, the already existing theology of the Church taken in its entirety, and this is the reason why the Church has made it her own theology. Now, as Saint

Thomas elaborated the all-inclusive theology of the *Summa*, there was one Doctor of the Church whose theological authority he never lost sight of, namely Saint Augustine. Hence this remarkable feature of his doctrine: even when he thought it advisable to use a new approach to theological truth, he never opposed the language of Saint Augustine. On the contrary, even when the paths followed by the two doctrines were obviously different, he was always careful to show that there was a definite place in theology where the Augustinian approach could be justified. Not without good reason did he, in the very first article of the *Summa*, present his own undertaking as an attempt to promote the sacred learning advocated and defined by Saint Augustine in his *De Doctrina Christiana*. One could not do away with Saint Augustine without parting company with Saint Thomas Aquinas.

In the large family of great theologians approved by the Church, each and every one occupies a particular place and fulfills a function of his own. It is the eminent distinction of Thomas Aquinas that his particular specialty is that of universality. Go to him whenever you wish to say something which will not be disavowed by the Church. But not all minds find complete satisfaction in the technically precise and scientifically accurate method of Thomas Aquinas. Some of us only feel perfectly at home with the highly refined theological humanism of Saint Jerome. Others seem to be born Augustinians; but it would probably be truer to say that each of us has his Augustinian moments, his Augustinian moods.

It is superhuman for a mind to live constantly at the peak of intellectual abstraction. There are times when feeling insists on some satisfaction. From another point of view, an "angelic doctor" is certain always to please angels, but the common run of men may be excused for craving, from time to time, the company of a merely "human doctor." There is one rather unflattering reason why they feel inclined to ask Augustine for expert advice. Francis Petrarch, for example, had no use for scholasticism; his theologian was Augustine, whom he preferred, no doubt, because of the splendor of his Latin eloquence, but also because he stood in need of a director of conscience whose knowledge of human passions was derived from other sources than the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. The Church asks us to go to Thomas. This does not mean that we are not to go to Augustine. Along with the *Summa Theologiae*, the treatises of St. Augustine *On the Trinity*, the *Expositions on the Gospel of Saint John*, the *City of God* and, of course, the incomparable, immortal, unique *Confessions* will always be counted among the glories of Catholic theology. Christian philosophy simply could not do without them.

Finally, a word about the aim and purpose of this book. It is the English equivalent of *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, 2 ed., Paris, Vrin 1943. Technical expositions of scholastic doctrine are not false to the style of their models. Scholasticism itself is technical. Now, although Augustine also has his technical moments, his usual style is rather the free flow of late-classical eloquence. The philosophical themes one finds constantly recurring in the texture of his work were not gathered by him and made the object of systematic treatment. Augustine always writes as though all of his readers will be able to see precisely how the point he is making at the moment fits into the whole scheme of his doctrine. In point of fact, this is beyond any beginner. On the contrary, we know from bitter experience that those who enter the vast land of Augustinism for the first time are liable to lose their way. It has been my hope that a simple map like this book might help them to find their bearings.

*Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Toronto, December, 1959.*

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	vii
----------	-----

INTRODUCTION

I. Happiness	3
II. The Soul's Journey to God	11

PART ONE

<i>The Search for God through Understanding</i>	25
---	----

I. The First Step—Faith	27
II. The Second Step—Rational Evidence	38
III. The Third Step—The Soul and Life	44
IV. The Fourth Step—Sense Knowledge	56
V. The Fifth Step—Rational Knowledge	66
1. The Inner Master	66
2. The Light of the Soul	77
3. The Life of the Soul	96
4. Unsettled Questions	105

PART TWO

<i>The Search for God through the Will</i>	113
--	-----

I. Wisdom	115
II. The Elements of the Moral Act	127
1. The Virtues as Rules. The Law of Order	127
2. The Will and Love	132
3. Charity	136

III. Christian Liberty	143
1. Evil and Free Choice	143
2. Sin and Grace	148
3. Grace and Liberty	157
IV. The Christian Life	165
1. The Christian	165
2. Christian Society	171

PART THREE

<i>Contemplating God in His Works</i>	185
---------------------------------------	-----

I. Creation and Time	189
II. Matter and Forms	197
III. Traces of God	210
IV. The Image of God	217

CONCLUSION

<i>Augustinism</i>	227
--------------------	-----

APPENDIX

NOTES TO:

Introduction	249
Part One	259
Part Two	302
Part Three	335
Conclusion	359

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ST. AUGUSTINE	367
ANALYTICAL INDEX	384
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES	395

Introduction

Chapter I

HAPPINESS

Saint Augustine's interest in the philosophical life was awakened by his reading of the *Hortensius*, a dialogue of Cicero which has since been lost. From that day on, he was consumed with the love of wisdom, and as time went on, he thought of this discovery as his first step on the way of sorrows which was to lead him to God.¹ This is a point of prime importance if we are to understand Augustine, for in his doctrine wisdom, the object of philosophy, is always identified with happiness. He wants to find the kind of good whose possession will satisfy every desire and ensure peace. Such thorough-going Eudaemonism can be explained by the fact that Augustine always regarded philosophy as something quite different from the speculative pursuit of a knowledge of nature. He was concerned most of all with the problem of his own destiny. For him, the important thing was to strive for self-knowledge and to learn what must be done in order to be better and, if possible, to be happy.

Speculation abounds in Augustine but its aims are always practical and its term of reference is always man. The knowledge of truth may be essential to happiness, but in Augustine truth is pursued only because truth alone can make man happy, and it is pursued only to the extent that it can make him so. In one sense, therefore, the fundamental precept of Socratism is Saint Augustine's starting point, but in adopting it he gives it a new interpretation, and its depth is not apparent until the orientation of his thought becomes clear. "Know thyself" (*Nosce te ipsum*). Why this command? Only that the soul may know its true nature and live in accordance with it, that is to say, take its proper place, which is beneath Him to whom it should be subject and above that which it should rule—above the body and under God.²

Although many strive to obtain happiness through knowledge, some have the prudence to seek it early in life and the good fortune to obtain it when they are young. Others pursue it eagerly but follow the wrong path and come to realize their mistake only at the expense of cruel suffering. And there are others neither as prudent nor as foolish as these: in early life they set their course for the goal to be won and although they may drift far from it, it is never lost to sight; though tossed by the waves, they cling to the memory of that dear homeland where they will, one day, find a haven. But pride and vain glory are the shoals which block the entrance to the haven, and these prove an obstacle to every man, be he what he may. If anything can be called a "gift of God," surely it is a happy life. We must, therefore, seek it in all humility and ask to be given it. The proper way to obtain happiness is to be given it.

All men desire happiness.³ But in what does happiness consist? Those who do not have what they want are not happy, nor can we say that all who have what they want are happy. It all depends on what they want. As Cicero said in the *Hortensius*: "A malicious will causes us more evil than fortune brings us good." No one is happy if he does not have what he wants, but to have what he wants is not enough to make him happy. We must also admit that everyone who is not happy is miserable and, consequently, that the man who lacks what he wants is miserable. The problem of happiness, then, amounts to this: to know what one should desire in order to be happy, and to know how to obtain it.⁴

Now the object of our desire should satisfy several conditions. First of all, it should be something permanent and independent of chance or accident. We cannot possess a fleeting or perishable object when we like or as we like to possess it. Moreover, if we love a perishable object, we live in constant fear of losing it and this is incompatible with true happiness. Now, since God alone is eternal and therefore permanent and completely independent, only he who possesses God possesses happiness,⁵ and it follows that the desire for God is the only path which leads to happiness. Under what conditions is it possible to desire God?

Those who claim that they cannot find truth—the sceptic or Academician, for example—cannot possess God or happiness. We know that anyone who does not have what he wants is not happy. Now the sceptic is always in search of truth. He wants to find it; he would like to discover it, but according to his own teaching, this is impossible. Consequently, he can never obtain what he wants. For him, therefore, happiness is impossible. If wisdom, then, implies happiness and hap-

piness implies God, the sceptic can possess neither God, nor happiness, nor wisdom.⁶ It is true that Augustine desires truth for the sake of happiness, but he did not think happiness possible apart from truth. The possession of absolute truth is a necessary condition for happiness.

Even those who consider the discovery of truth possible are not agreed as to what is meant by the possession of wisdom and of God. According to some, possessing God means doing what God wills; others claim that it means to lead a good life; still others think that God is present in those who do not harbor an impure spirit.⁷ If we consider these opinions carefully, we see that they all amount to the same thing, for anyone who does what God wills is leading a good life, and anyone who is leading a good life is doing what God wills. Moreover, a person who does not have an impure spirit is living a life of purity, and this implies not only the absence of lust, but of every other sin as well. In this sense, true purity consists in following God in all things and in being attached to Him alone. It means, therefore, leading a good life. So when we examine the meaning of the three definitions, we see that they are one.⁸ We have yet to learn precisely what it means to lead a good life.

Since we know that God wants us to seek Him, we cannot say that a man who is seeking God is leading a bad life. On the contrary, when he seeks God, he is doing God's will and leading a good life, and yet the fact remains that he does not possess God. It would seem, then, that the possession of God is not identical with a good life or the accomplishment of God's will,⁹ and we only shift the difficulty if we try to explain and say that if a person has already found God, he possesses happiness, but if he is still seeking Him, he enjoys God's favor but does not yet possess happiness. Since we have already said that anyone who is not happy is miserable, must we consider a man miserable on the ground that he is still seeking God and therefore does not yet possess happiness? If so, a person who already enjoys God's favor would still be miserable. How are we to remove this difficulty?¹⁰

A person may be without many things and still be happy, because happiness is a good of the spirit and cannot be endangered by the loss of any material good. Besides, a wise man desires only what is possible, precisely in order that he may not see his desires frustrated. But in the realm of the spirit and of wisdom, a certain fullness is absolutely essential to happiness. Now fullness is the opposite of emptiness and want, but it is genuine fullness only if it is the right fullness, i.e. a fullness which does not fall short of the mean or exceed it, a fullness, consequently, which remains within the limits of a cer-

tain measure; "Therefore wisdom is fullness, but in fullness there is measure."¹¹ Since happiness, in these terms, is a fullness of the spirit without which wisdom is impossible, let us try to find the relationship between wisdom and fullness.

Wisdom implies a mean, as we have said. By this mean, the spirit frees itself from all excess: it escapes the excess which leads to the superfluous as well as the restriction of its powers to limits beneath its full capacity. It avoids excesses such as lust, ambition, pride and similar vices, which inordinate souls regard as sources of pleasure. It avoids defects such as pusillanimity, brutality, despondency, avarice and like vices, which bring unhappiness to man by debasing him.¹² The person who finds wisdom and holds it fast has no cause to fear any excess or defect: he never exceeds the mean; he never falls short in anything. Hence it is one and the same thing to possess the mean or wisdom, and to be happy.

But what is wisdom? Scripture tells us. It is the Wisdom of God. Indeed, St. Paul the Apostle¹³ writes that the Son of God is none other than the Wisdom of God. Now the Son of God is God. We were right then in saying that the man who possesses God thereby possesses wisdom and, consequently, happiness as well. But what is Wisdom if not Truth? For Scripture also says: "I am the Truth."¹⁴ This Truth, as we know, only exists in virtue of the Supreme Measure from which it proceeds, a Measure which itself has no measure precisely because it is the highest measure. In short, if the highest measure is a measure in virtue of the highest measure, then it is Measure itself. Now, the Supreme Measure is necessarily a true measure. Therefore, as Truth is engendered by Measure, so too does Measure make itself known by Truth. For Truth has never existed without the Measure from which it proceeds, nor Measure without the Truth it engenders. Who, then, is the Son of God? We have already answered: He is Truth; and the Measure which nothing begets is the Father. So he alone possesses happiness who attains the Supreme Measure through Truth. This, then, is what it means to possess wisdom: to grasp God through the mind, that is to say, to possess Him.¹⁵

It follows, then, that apart from possessing God in this way, there is naught for man but unhappiness. To lead a good life means precisely striving to possess God. A continuous appeal is being sent out to us, so to speak, from the source of truth, an appeal that calls to our mind the memory of God, invites us to seek Him, makes us thirst for Him. We draw all our truths from this truth, that is to say, from God Himself, although we dare not contemplate it in its essence and, in fact, cannot do so. Thus, as long as we are seeking God, we do not drink at the

spring itself; we have not yet quenched our thirst in His fullness. We might say that as long as we are seeking God we have not reached our full measure, and in spite of all the favors God shows us, we do not yet possess either wisdom or happiness. Our minds can be fully satisfied, our lives called truly happy, only in the perfect knowledge of the Holy Ghost Who leads to Truth, in the enjoyment of Truth itself, and in the union, thanks to Truth, with the Supreme Measure whence it proceeds: Spirit, Truth, Measure; they are but one substance, but one God.¹⁶

Let us approach the same problem from another angle. All men admittedly want to live happily, and happiness obviously consists in the enjoyment of what is best for us.¹⁷ But what is best for us? Well, what is best for man certainly cannot be beneath man, for to desire anything beneath us is to degrade ourselves. And if there is nothing above man which he can enjoy with the assurance that it cannot be lost, we might say that man himself is best for man. Is there then anything above man?

Man is composed of body and soul brought together in such wise that the soul confers life and movement on the body it animates. Thus the soul is superior to the body. If, then, there is a sovereign good above man, it cannot be a mere good of the body, but rather a good of the soul, for the soul is man's highest part.¹⁸ Now it is virtue which confers perfection on the soul and makes it good. Can it be said, then, that the soul seeks nothing but itself when it pursues virtue? To defend such a view would involve one in untold absurdities. Until the soul comes to possess virtue, it lacks wisdom, and if it seeks itself alone in its quest for virtue, it really seeks its own folly. Whether virtue, then, is something other than the soul, or whether one prefers to call it a kind of possession and quality of the wise soul, the soul must seek something other than itself, something which can be the source of its virtue.¹⁹ But this something else which is the source of wisdom can only be a man who is already wise, or God. Now, we have agreed that the good whose possession ensures happiness must be of the sort that cannot be lost. Who, indeed, would grant that happiness can be found in a good which the wise man might lose, not only without his consent, but even against his will? This really means that such a good cannot possibly belong to the human order. Therefore, it can only be God Himself. Happiness consists in the possession of God.²⁰

It is clear to anyone who unravels the various threads woven into this pattern of thought that wisdom consists in obtaining what Augustine calls a *bonum beatificum*, a good which confers happiness. A certain happiness, therefore, is the goal of his thought and this fact marks

it once and for all as Eudaemonism, a fact which we have emphasized above. We must, however, understand precisely what this term implies.

In the first place, it would be a serious mistake to avoid the problem by making it something which it is not. In St. Augustine, the contemplation of truth is the condition *sine qua non* of happiness, but it cannot constitute the very essence of happiness. We sometimes hear the term "Augustinian intellectualism."²¹ If it is used merely to point out the necessary role understanding plays in his thought, there is no better term. But there is a certain misuse of the phrase in applying it to a system whose end is not primarily the understanding of truth. Since it is a question here of obtaining a good, the wisdom which brings happiness cannot consist in knowledge, no matter how lofty that knowledge may be. For sight of the end is the same as attainment of the end if the end consists in the mere sight of truth. But a good is not an end if we regard it as something to be known; it is an end only in so far as it is something to be possessed. And although it is certainly true to say that knowledge of a thing means possession of a thing, we cannot say that knowledge is the same as perfect possession. The mind is quite adequate for sight but it does not suffice for love. Love is a desire, and desire does not belong exclusively to the mind, as such. There is a sensible appetite in man and it too should be directed towards the sovereign good: when it is subject to the control of reason, it enables man better to contemplate the sovereign good.²² The whole soul, then, should love what the mind alone can contemplate, and it will finally reach its goal through love enlightened thus by reason; not only know its end but in a certain sense become its end. In the case of love, the object loved reacts in some way on the loving subject so as to transform it into its own image and thereby assimilate it.²³ To love material and perishable things is to be materialized and doomed to perish; to love the eternal is to become eternal; to love God is to become God.²⁴

In spite of this, it still remains true that the beatifying joy to which Augustine invites us is inseparable from the truth of which it is the possession. The Augustinian doctrine cannot be reduced to any kind of "theoretism," for here truth is an end only in so far as it is a good, that is to say, something possessed rather than seen.²⁵ But it would be as serious a mistake to think of it as a kind of pragmatism; for even if the understanding of truth is not in itself man's end in the formal sense, it is still required as a condition necessary to the attainment of that end.²⁶ The very definition of happiness demands it. Since happiness is a perfect joy, it is free from fear and in particular from the fear of losing the object which brings happiness. But there is only one good whose

possession no fear can disturb, viz. truth, and this is so precisely because anyone who wants it has only to know it in order to have it. In this case nothing stands between the soul and its good. It is possible to know gold and desire it without possessing it, and the same is true of every other material good. But to know truth (provided it is loved as well) is by definition to possess it in some degree.

This is why in Augustinism, where happiness is joy, happiness must be a joy born of truth.²⁷ This is also the point which enables us to reconcile two very different aspects of his doctrine. Even though love is the force that is finally to grasp the beatifying good, we shall observe in his teaching a relentless struggle against scepticism and relativism in all their forms, for unless absolute truth is accessible to man, there is no happiness for him. One of the deepest roots of the Augustinian doctrine of illumination will be precisely the need of an unconditional certitude in this life, a measure of our capacity for the whole of the Truth which beatifies.

To Augustine's way of thinking, happiness is strictly inseparable from knowledge, so much so that in this sense it may be called knowledge. Nor is it left to us to call it so, for God Himself has already said: "Eternal life is knowing thee, who art the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent" (John 17, 3). And yet it is only too clear that knowledge would never attain its end if it were mere knowledge. That is why this first maxim is supplemented by a second, and without it the very nature of beatifying knowledge would remain unfathomable: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and thy whole soul and thy whole mind" (Matt. 22, 37).²⁸ For the final end towards which wisdom leads us is a knowledge which permits of, and prepares the way for the *enjoyment* of God, and in this enjoyment it is consummated although never consumed.²⁹

When Augustine set down this requirement, he placed his teaching at once on a plane which might be termed "trans-philosophical." The object of wisdom is placed beyond the limits to which man's natural powers, even with God's aid, can attain within this life's span. We follow God here below when we live as wise men; following God, however, means no more than leading a good life; to live happily, we must possess Him (*Deus igitur restat, quem si sequimur, bene, si assequimur, non tantum bene sed etiam beate vivimus*).³⁰ From this flow two important consequences: first, rational speculation, which in Augustinism is only the perfect conduct of life, will play a necessary but merely preparatory role, the role of a guide leading the soul to mystical contemplation, and even this contemplation is a mere adumbration of eternal beatitude;³¹ and secondly, since Augustine's doctrine is di-

rected entirely towards the soul's union with God, it can have no other center but God.³² Let us try to discover, then, how man moves towards God, the Supreme Good: first of all in the order of knowledge, which presents God to him as an end; and then in the order of charity, which alone will enable man to possess Him.

Chapter II

THE SOUL'S JOURNEY TO GOD

If God is the object of our beatitude, how are we to gain Him? Proof of God's existence is, from the standpoint of modern philosophy, one of the loftiest ambitions of metaphysics: no task is more difficult, so much so that some philosophers consider it impossible. However, to St. Augustine and to the men who are later to be inspired by his thought, proving the existence of God seems such a simple matter that it is scarcely worth bothering about. This attitude is characteristic of Augustinism, and must be stressed for that reason.

It is clear that in St. Augustine's view the idea of God is a knowledge shared by all and naturally inseparable from the human mind. But if we try to be more specific about it, we find that in one respect it appears to be rather contradictory: man cannot be ignorant of it, and yet he cannot comprehend it; no one knows God as He is, and yet no one can be unaware of His existence.¹ The Augustinian God appears as a God Who makes Himself so evident that the universe cannot be ignorant of Him, but allows Himself to be known only to the extent necessary to make man want to possess Him more and more, and busy himself in search of Him.

Are we to say, then, that absolutely no one is ignorant of God's existence? If we press Augustine's texts, we find that he says, not exactly that no man is ignorant of God's existence, but that no man is allowed to be ignorant of it. In other words, it is quite possible that some men actually do not know God, but it is their own fault, for God is present to them and merely asks to become known to them. Are such men very numerous? What is the reason for their ignorance?

Augustine's personal experience was not the only thing that led him to ask these questions. The Scriptures forced him to do so. In Psalm 13, 1, we read the famous words, "The fool hath said in his heart:

"There is no God." It is a fact, then, that a man may become so hardened as to deny the very existence of God, although without Him he could not exist for an instant. However, such men are so rare that it is almost impossible to find them,² and when we try to discover the cause of their blindness, we see at once that those who deny God are corrupt of heart. These senseless souls, ruined by vice as they are and leading abominable lives, deny God simply because their depravity has left them genuinely insane.³ A knowledge of God is naturally present in the heart of man, and a rational being has only to look at the universe around him to recognize God as its author. St. Paul taught this truth,⁴ and it was confirmed in Augustine's eyes by the testimony of his own personal experience. Never, not even in the midst of the worst aberrations of his mind and heart, not even when he was still ignorant of God's true nature, did he lose sight altogether of the existence of a provident God, attentive to the direction of human affairs.⁵ For a very small number of thoroughly perverted souls, it may be necessary to prove God's existence, but we must confess that it is very difficult to prove to those who do not know it for themselves.

Just as St. Augustine regards God's existence as evident to men who possess pure hearts, sound minds and a faith docile to the teachings of revelation, so does he consider God's existence difficult to demonstrate to hardened hearts and reasons which claim self-sufficiency. And yet there are fools, for the Psalm mentions them. Must they be abandoned to their blindness or is it not better to make some effort to free them from it?⁶ St. Augustine naturally chooses the second alternative, but one might well be surprised at the rational proof he offers the fool to establish God's existence.

Let us imagine a man who does not want to believe what we believe but does want to know if the things we believe are true. Contrary to what we might expect, Augustine does not try to demonstrate God's existence to him in order to convince him; he tries first to show him the truth of Scripture, which teaches that God does exist.⁷ Only after he has obtained this act of faith in God's existence will he undertake to prove to the fool the rational character of his belief. And this, as we shall see later, is quite in keeping with one of the fundamental requirements of his method and the lessons of his personal experience.⁸ Thus, no facet of Augustine's philosophy escapes the *Credo ut intelligam* (I believe in order that I may understand), not even the proof for the existence of God.

Must we conclude, then, that Augustine bases the certitude of God's existence on faith and that he does not, therefore, admit any strictly rational demonstration of this truth? That would be to misunderstand

his mind and to transfer the problem to a level that is not Augustine's. As we shall have many opportunities to observe, Saint Augustine never poses the problem of the general capabilities of reason or nature in an abstract way. Strictly speaking, reason of itself is certainly capable of proving that God exists because this truth was known to the pagan philosophers, known, i.e., without any revelation or faith. But in reality, man's condition since his sin is such that the shortest and surest path human reason can follow is the path through faith. One should feel all the less hesitant about taking this path in as much as reason, far from being lost in following faith, on the contrary, finds itself. The faith of a man who believes that God exists does not detract in the slightest from the cogency of the rational arguments he uses to demonstrate His existence.⁹ Rather, faith helps reason to see their reasonableness more clearly; a firm faith does not excuse reason from demanding evident arguments.

Augustine's desire to satisfy in full the demands of reason where proof is concerned is obvious from the very beginning of his demonstration. Let us suppose that Augustine's listener has allowed himself to be convinced. He believes that God exists, but he also wants to know that He exists.¹⁰ The first step which his reason must take will be to assert itself by proving that it is possible to know something. Before establishing the certainty of God's existence, Augustine establishes the possibility of certitude in general. This he does by seizing upon the first of all certitudes, a certitude that even the sceptic's wildest doubts cannot shake, namely, his own existence. For even though a man does not yet know if God exists or not, he does know that he himself exists. That knowledge is the clearest of all because for it to be false, the person possessing it would have to be in error, and to be in error, he would have to exist.¹¹ In placing this primary truth at the very threshold of his proof, Augustine is recalling his own personal experience in the days when he himself, along with the Academicians, thought it impossible for man to grasp any truth as certain.¹² That evidence is the cure for universal doubt, for it cannot be denied without proving it by the very act of casting doubt upon it. I am and I know that I am. This certitude defies any objection the Academician may have; for how can I be wrong in believing it, since I exist if I am wrong?¹³

Anyone who seeks to prove God's existence, then, first grasps his own existence. He does not, however, see himself as existing merely; he knows he is alive as well. And because one must know in order to know that he exists and lives, at the very beginning of our search we grasp as evident, not one term, but three. Now which of these three terms is

the highest? Of any two things, that which implies the existence of the other is to be considered the higher, and that which does not necessarily imply the existence of the other is to be considered the lower. Let us apply this principle to the three terms we have just acquired, viz. existence, life, and knowledge. A thing can exist without life or knowledge, e.g. a stone. A thing cannot have life without existence, but it can have life without knowledge, e.g. a plant. And finally, a thing cannot have knowledge without life and existence, e.g. an animal or a man. Therefore, in as much as knowledge implies life and existence, whereas neither existence nor life implies knowledge, we must admit that knowledge is the highest of the three terms.¹⁴

Let us pause on this height for a moment—after all it is only one stage in our ascent. What is knowledge? In the first place, it is sensation, i.e. perception of the qualities of things by the senses. But sense knowledge is manifold, for the perception of some qualities is proper to certain senses, whereas others can be perceived by several different senses. Thus, the proper object of the sense of sight is color, of smell odor, of taste flavor, of touch all tactual qualities, e.g. hard and soft, smooth and rough, and so on. On the contrary, qualities like large, small, round and the like, can be perceived by sight as well as touch. These, then, are not proper but common sense objects.¹⁵ Now we cannot discern what qualities various sense objects have in common through the use of any one of our senses, nor even by using all of them together, and yet even beasts are capable of feeling inner sensations of desire or repugnance at the sight of some objects even though they are not possessed of reason. So there must be an internal sense in animals and men superior to the external senses, but inferior to reason, a sense to which all external sensations are referred. In man this sense discriminates between sense objects which are common; in animals it perceives whether objects are useful or harmful to them. But we must go beyond this inner sense also.¹⁶

To know with certain knowledge means to know through reason. The senses cannot rise to the level of knowledge, and even though we perceive colors by sight and sounds by hearing, it is neither by sight nor by hearing, nor even by that inner sense common to man and beast, that we know sounds are not perceived by sight nor colors by hearing. Nothing is more obvious. The eye does see, but since the eye does not know that it sees, there is all the more reason why it cannot know that it does not understand. Knowledge, then, is placed as a third term above existence and life and is, in turn, distinguished into three terms, which form a hierarchy, namely the external sense, the internal sense and reason.¹⁷

Although the new series made up of these three terms is in some way reminiscent of the series composed of being, life and knowledge, it has its own principle of subordination. The object of the external sense is corporeal matter, and it merely exists, but the external sense which perceives it not only exists but lives, and this is the reason why the external sense is superior to its object. But it is more difficult to say precisely why the internal is above the external sense. Of course we see that in the order of being, the external sense is implied in the internal but we should like to be sure that the internal sense is superior in the order of knowing. Someone may suggest that the internal sense knows the external sense without being known by it. We cannot, however, set it down as a principle that the knowing subject is superior to the known object, for man knows wisdom and yet it is above him.¹⁸ This then is the true answer: the internal sense directs and judges the external sense. It tells sight to look at an object or turn away from it; it bids hearing to be more attentive and judges whether speech is pleasant-sounding or harsh. Now one who judges is undoubtedly superior to the matter he judges. Hence the internal sense's superiority over the external senses cannot be contested.¹⁹

The same rule can be applied to the relations between the internal sense and reason. Reason not only implies the internal sense but judges it as well. Thus, in carrying out the foregoing analysis, it was reason which distinguished the external senses from the internal sense; reason defined, classified and arranged them all, and it would have found all of these activities impossible if it had not judged them. The question we have to settle, then, is not whether reason is or is not superior to the senses or even whether there is anything in man superior to reason, for it is obvious there is no such thing;²⁰ the problem is, rather, to discover if there is anything superior to reason.

The implications of such a question are quite obvious, for in as much as nothing in man is superior to reason, to transcend reason is to transcend man and consequently to attain God. At least, one might reasonably suppose this to be the case. However, St. Augustine has observed with remarkable metaphysical penetration, that the discovery of a reality above man is not necessarily the discovery of God. Actually, our whole search is directed towards a necessary, immutable, eternal being; a being which has no superior and which is, consequently, God. It is not enough, then, to transcend man to reach such a being. We must transcend something in man which is such that only God can lie beyond it.²¹ Now only one possible path is open to one engaged in such a search, viz. that by way of truth.

We have ascended step by step from the apprehension of being to

the apprehension of knowledge, and from the apprehension of knowledge to that of reason. Let us see if there is a fulcrum in reason itself which will allow it in turn to reach out beyond itself and attain God. Some items of rational knowledge are remarkable in that they are truths. Now a truth is always a necessary and, therefore, immutable proposition. If I say that seven and three equal ten, I do not say that the sum of these two numbers has been or should be equal to ten; I say that it cannot be otherwise and, consequently, that it is eternally true that their sum is equal to ten.²²

Necessity, immutability, eternity: these are the distinctive characteristics of every truth. Let us add that these characteristics belong as much to moral as to speculative truths. If I say, for instance, that wisdom is a truth of such a kind that the knowledge of it means the possession of the "Sovereign Good," I am affirming a proposition that is as necessary as any mathematical truth. Men may disagree as to the nature of this beatifying knowledge which is wisdom, but they all agree that wisdom is a knowledge which confers beatitude. Whether it is a matter of the theoretical or practical order, of number or wisdom, truths are necessary, immutable and common to all the minds which contemplate them.²³ Whence does truth derive these characteristics?

Apparently, the most obvious answer is that truth comes from things and that our senses uncover it there. But can any truth be attained through the senses? Their objects are in constant flux, and a thing which has no stability of itself cannot provide the basis for that immutable knowledge which we call science.²⁴ Consequently, truth cannot be gained from sensible objects. Besides, it is quite clear that we do not get truth from the senses even when we appeal to them for evidence of it. Take the case of arithmetical truths, for example. One might argue, if necessary, that we have got our notion of numbers from sensible things, but no one would claim that we could derive the laws of numerical relations from things. Actually, we do not get even our ideas of numbers from things. Every number is but a sum of unities or, if you prefer, a unity taken a certain number of times. But how can sensible things give us the idea of unity when they do not have it themselves? There is no body, however small, that cannot be broken up into countless parts. But to know that any given body is multiple, I must already have the notion of unity before I perceive it. Neither bodies nor the senses can give me such an idea.²⁵ We cannot expect to find beneath reason the source of the truths apprehended by reason.

If the mind does not find truth in bodies, perhaps it draws it from itself, in such a way that truth would depend on the mind as an effect depends on its cause, and yet would not spring from a reality inferior

to the mind. But it is quite clear that truth is not the effect of any individual reason, inasmuch as it is common to every reason. We may think of it as a kind of light; a light which is neither mine nor yours nor any man's in particular; a light which is both private and public, and although possessed by each of us, is the same in all who perceive the same unchangeable truths at the same moment.²⁶

Moreover, even though truth is superior to every individual reason, it is not inferior to reason in general. If truth were inferior to reason, it would be the object, not the guide, of our judgments. The mind's attitude to truth would be the same as its attitude to the bodies it judges. We say, "This object is not as white or as round as it should be;" but we do not say, "Seven and three should make ten," or "The eternal should be above the temporal." We judge sensible things; we do not judge intelligible truths; we find them, and by them we judge everything else. Truth, then, is in no way inferior to reason. Can it possibly be its equal?

When we perceive bodies and speak of their qualities, our minds act towards them, as we have said, as the superior towards the inferior: they judge them. The mind of each of us acts as judge throughout the realm of sensible things. We might add that it acts in the same way towards itself and other minds. Thus we say of a man that he is not as capable or as gentle or as spirited as he should be. But when we try to see how the mind behaves towards the rules which give it authority to judge bodies and minds, it becomes quite clear that the mind does not judge these rules but is guided by them and submits to them. When a man says, "The eternal is above the temporal," or "Seven and three make ten," we understand him to mean, not that it should be so, but that it is so. His role is not that of the examiner making corrections, but that of the explorer rejoicing in a discovery.²⁷ Moreover, so little does his discovery depend on him that he feels very much inferior to the truth he has found, for a thing that is true is eternally true and subsists in everlasting immutability, but when the mind grasps truth, the possession of it is always temporary and uncertain.

Truth, then, is independent of the mind it rules; with respect to the mind, truth is transcendent.²⁸ But it is apparent at once that in discovering the transcendence of truth, the mind discovers God's existence. The being it perceives above man is something eternal, immutable and necessary, that is to say, a reality possessing all the attributes of God Himself.²⁹ Of course, the soul does not see God's essence when it sees truth in its own mind, for it does not at that moment reach that goal whose possession would confer beatitude upon it. But at least it sees the goal it must reach if it is to enjoy this happi-

ness and enter into its rest.³⁰ At times, it is true, Augustine states the conclusion of his proof without qualifying it in this way; he says simply that in seeing truth the mind perceives a law above itself and an immutable nature, namely God: First Life, First Essence, First Wisdom.³¹ This is not the place to bring the meaning of such terms into clearer focus. But it is clear that from now on we must distinguish between Truth and truths if we would remain faithful to the spirit of Augustine's proof. When we arrive at truths, we arrive at something contained within our reason which cannot be explained from the point of view of reason and which compels us to transcend reason and to affirm the existence of the light that illumines it, i.e. subsistent, eternal and unchangeable Truth, i.e. God. All that our mind can do is to ascend from object to object until it arrives at truth, which is its goal; but the mind is very different from Truth; the reasoning human mind seeks Truth, but Truth does not seek itself.³²

In substantial outline, this is the path followed by the Augustinian soul in its search for God. Such a method unquestionably gives the impression of being slow and tortuous, but the numerous intermediate steps it places between its starting point and conclusion are not indispensable to the mind that has once mastered it. The critical point in the demonstration is evidently the last, wherein God is said to be the only sufficient basis for the truth which is present in the mind. Any truth whatsoever might serve as the starting point of the proof, but best of all is the first of all, namely that I exist. Because, as we have seen, doubt and even error attest the existence of the doubting mind, they can with no less evidence and immediacy bear witness to the existence of God. I doubt; I know that I doubt. Thus I know at least one truth for certain, for I cannot doubt that I doubt. If I am certain of this, am I not so because there is a first truth which illumines every man coming into this world?³³ If I doubt, I exist; if it is true that I doubt, God exists. The certainty of the mind's existence implies the certainty of God's existence.

It will be better to wait until the problem of Augustinian illumination itself has been dealt with before attempting to unfold the full meaning of this proof, but perhaps it will be helpful at this point to remove at once certain difficulties which may obscure its real meaning.

From what has been said, it is quite clear that in Saint Augustine the problem of God's existence cannot be distinguished from the problem of knowledge; knowing how we comprehend truth and knowing the existence of Truth are one and the same thing. Consequently, his proof is effected entirely within the mind without having to take the

world of the senses into consideration. However, it would not be an accurate description of the proof to say that it excludes the world of the senses; the fact is that, even though it does not require it, it can make room for it in its own way, if there is need. A well-known passage of St. Paul (Rom. 1, 20) says that one may begin with an examination of the created universe and rise to a knowledge of God's invisible attributes. Augustine, like everyone else, knew this text and often found inspiration in it. Yet even as he felt its inspiration, he interpreted it in a way that remains typically Augustinian. For him the *invisibilia Dei* are God's Ideas. Thus, to know God by starting with sensible things is to ascend from things to their Ideas.³⁴ Now, as we have seen, the path leading from bodies to divine truth passes through the mind. So even when it starts with the external world, the Augustinian proof normally proceeds from the world to the soul, and from the soul to God.

Some historians have maintained, however, that Saint Augustine had fully developed proofs of God's existence which are based on an application of the principle of causality to the sensible world and that this was true especially of the proof known to the Middle Ages as the proof *a contingentia mundi*. Of course Augustine often stressed the fact that the mutability of the world of bodies bears witness to its contingency and dependence with respect to a necessary being, namely God. No one can deny that his doctrine contains all the elements necessary for such a proof and, consequently, that such a proof is consistent with the most authentic Augustinism.³⁵ Moreover, at times he expresses himself in such a way that the mere sight of order in the world seems to be for him the equivalent of a direct proof of God's existence. Now is it possible to reconcile these two methods? In the first place we should note that Augustine himself did not offer such metaphysical reflections, or flights of devotion as proofs, properly so-called, for the existence of God. All the proofs which he developed in full either pass through the mind or begin there.³⁶ The reason for this is obvious. When we question sensible things about their nature and origin, they show us that they are changeable and answer, as it were: "We have not made ourselves." We must, therefore, transcend them in order to reach their cause. Now we cannot reach the cause of their mutability and contingency, because this is non-being; we can reach only the cause of their stability, because this is being. Their number, order, and measure are their stability. Over and above their number is the number of our mind, which knows them.³⁷ If we transcend the number of the mind, we arrive at the number of Truth, which is God.

As soon as Augustinian thought develops, it finds the path of the *De Libero Arbitrio* and the *De Vera Religione*, a path leading from the exterior to the interior and from the interior to the superior.³⁸

We may ask the reason for this twofold attitude. If there is only one route for the soul to take towards God, why does he seem to say that there are two? The reason is that Augustine does not follow an abstract dialectic; he uses a dialectic which is merely the actual movement of his own thought.³⁹ His demonstration of God's existence is really a long meditation; every step must be made in its proper place and time if the mind is to arrive at the goal; but once that goal is reached, the mind is not obliged to stop there. When it turns back and stops at each step it has taken, it sees that the end of every step *could* have been discovered beforehand, but that it is actually discovered only when the steps are retraced and after the mind has already reached its goal. Only then does the proof seem to fall into parts; and each part may appear to be an independent proof, even though it can be fully justified only if it is put into its proper place in the whole scheme.

If we look at it from this point of view, it is easy to see how the Augustinian method of reaching God by way of the mind produced a symbolic mysticism of the sensible world during the Middle Ages. The fact is that there is room in Augustinism for a kind of sensible evidence for God's existence. The world proclaims its author and ever takes us back to Him. Divine wisdom has left its mark on every thing and we have but to observe things to be led from them to the soul and from the soul to God.⁴⁰ The path of philosophical reflection passes through the soul because it is obvious that the numbers of things only exist for us as numbers which are known; a devout soul or a mind which hurries on without stopping at every step, because the route is already well known to it, sees Augustine's universe as the Victorines and St. Bonaventure were to see it later,⁴¹ i.e. as a clear mirror wherein the mind sees God's reflection in everything. Let us add: not only can the soul contemplate Him there, but in a certain sense it must do so. Although it is true that the supernatural term of contemplating God in the things of nature is a direct vision of God in His splendor, yet as long as the soul is wandering far from Him, it can join Him only for brief moments in a dazzling vision wherein the soul risks blindness in uniting itself to God (*in ictu trepidantis aspectus*).⁴² Then let it return from God Himself to things of earth; let its sight find rest in the enjoyment of the reflections of that light it can no longer look upon until a new desire and new graces raise it to Him once again.⁴³

It is true to say, then, that the world's order, beauty, movement and

the contingency they imply form part of the Augustinian proof of God.⁴⁴ But let us suppose that instead of isolating this step in our journey, we isolate the step which follows it. Then the proof of God's existence dispenses with the sensible world instead of passing through it and, although it does not exclude the things it sets aside, it becomes a demonstration based on pure thought. Because it is more abstract and technical, it is the metaphysician's method; and because it is more spiritual, it is the mystic's way as he reaches out beyond proof towards union. As the first aspect of the proof prepares the way for a mediaeval symbolism of the sensible world, this second aspect clears the way for the metaphysical speculations of an Anselm as he tries to discover God's existence in the very idea we have of Him. Of course St. Augustine did not develop such a proof, but he did direct his search along a path that would normally lead to the proof of the *Proslogion*.

It is important to observe at the outset that Augustinian proofs of God's existence proceed entirely on the level of essence rather than on the plane of existence properly so-called. They do not begin by affirming existences and then proceed to find their first efficient cause. On the contrary, they first observe certain ways of being, and the final explanation of these is sought in a being whose ontological rule, if it may be so termed, is their only possible justification. Whether it is a question of the world of bodies in evolution, or of the life of the mind in search of truth, the basic fact to be explained remains the same. In both cases the philosopher is confronted by that ontological scandal, change. Faithful to the tradition of Plato, St. Augustine thinks less about existence than about being; and since he is convinced that to change is not truly to be, the contingency he tries to explain is not so much the contingency of *existence*, in the proper sense of the word, as the contingency of *beings* which, even though they are not nothing, still do not have a sufficient reason within themselves for being what they are.

Augustinian proofs for God's existence would be understood incorrectly if one tried to interpret them in the same sense as the proofs of St. Thomas Aquinas. The "ways" to God do not follow the same paths in the two doctrines because their terminal points, like their starting points, are not the same. It is true that they have the same God in view, and He is the same God with the same name, but whereas St. Thomas will try especially to prove the existence of a supreme *Esse*, or subsistent act of existing, St. Augustine wanted above all else to stress the obligation which the mind has of explaining the spurious *esse* known in experience by a supreme *Vere Esse*, i.e. by a being which fully deserves the title "being." For him, as for Plato, the *ὄντως ὄν*

is by essence that which is identical with itself and consequently, the immutable. This "really real," this *vere esse*, is what Augustine calls *essentia*, and his whole system of proofs is explained by his intention to emphasize the existence of this being, identical with itself, perfectly immutable, and therefore, perfectly existing; the being we call God.

The marked preference Augustine shows for arguments drawn from the presence of truth within us finds its explanation here. In the whole of human experience, truth, and the other transcendentals such as the one, the good and the beautiful which are spontaneously associated with it, are the surest signs of the existence of an immutable, eternal and eternally self-identical being. It is to be noted that all Augustinian meditations on the sensible world are directed towards the same kind of conclusion: "O Truth! *Thou Who truly are!* I find the past and future in every change in things, but in abiding truth I find neither past nor future: nothing but the present, even the incorruptibly present that is not found in the creature. Analyze the changes in things and you will find *it was* and *it will be*; think of God and you will find *He is*; no *was* or *will be* has a place there."⁴⁵ Every time Augustine attempts one of these mental ascents he sets out towards the God of *Exodus*, but every path leads him to that which, as far as his reason is concerned, constitutes being in all its fullness: stability in essence, immutability and finally that eternity which for him is not only an attribute of God but His very substance (*Aeternitas, ipsa Dei substantia est*).⁴⁶

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that we are dealing here, not with one aspect of Augustine's doctrine, but with, perhaps, the most profound and most constant element in his metaphysical thought. He never gave any other interpretation of the name God Himself claimed as His own in Scripture: "The angel and, through the angel, the Lord Himself said to Moses when he asked His name: 'I am who am. Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you.' *To be* is the term for immutability (*Esse, nomen est incommutabilitatis*). All mutable things cease to be what they were and begin to be what they were not. Only He Who does not change has true being, pure being, authentic being. He has being of Whom it has been said: 'Thou shalt change things and they shall be changed; but thou art always the selfsame' (Ps. 101, 27-28). What does 'I am who am' mean if not 'I am eternal'? What does 'I am who am' mean except 'I cannot change'?"⁴⁷

We cannot be mistaken here. In a doctrine wherein 'I am who am' means, at one and the same time and in exactly the same sense, to be the supreme essence, the supreme being, the supremely immutable and

the eternal, the proof of God's existence amounts to showing that the mutable demands something immutable on which it depends by participation. That is why the proofs for the existence of God which are based on the immutability of truth are at the root of all the others, even the cosmological proofs. Truth is immutable, so if we encounter truth in human knowledge, to reach the place where it dwells is to draw near to God Himself. Besides, do we not read in St. John (1, 9) that the Word, Who is God, is the true light which illumines every man coming into this world? Since truth in man is only the reflection of divine immutability, we have but to ascertain the presence of truth in the mind to ascertain God's presence there.

Since Augustinian proofs are intended to show forth God's "essentiality," it was natural that they should tend to follow a shorter route and to look for proof of His perfect essentiality in the content of the divine *essentia* alone. A dialectic quite different from that used by Augustine, one perhaps that he did not care for, made it possible to follow this shorter path. Even though Augustine did not follow it himself, he did construct the ontology on which St. Anselm and his mediæval successors were to practice their dialectic in order to establish the evidence of God's existence.

It was a metaphysical decision of prime importance to seek God by going, not only beyond man and even the mind of man, but also beyond a datum of that mind which is such that whatever transcends it can only be God. Moreover, although it is true that Augustine did not exactly recommend a direct transition from the idea of God to His existence, truth being the datum of the mind which we have but to transcend in order to attain God, whatever else may be its content, it is true nonetheless that, even in the humblest truth, he sees the reflection of the divine attributes, immutability and eternity, with the result that an Augustinian proof is essentially an act of submission on the part of the mind to the intrinsic necessity of the Divine Essence. We do not prove that God should exist but that He does exist,⁴⁸ just as we do not prove that seven plus three should make ten, but that they do make ten. Therefore, the mere presence in man's mind of a datum which obviously transcends man implies the existence of its object.⁴⁹ This deep-seated tendency to find in God alone sufficient reason for the idea we have of Him, is the bond which links the metaphysics of Saint Anselm, Saint Bonaventure, Duns Scotus and Descartes to Augustinian metaphysics. But the demonstration of it which Augustine advances far surpasses, in one sense, those it has inspired. It is neither an argument nor a series of arguments, but a complete metaphysics plus an ethics and a mysticism which crowns it. The initial doubt, the appeal

to faith, the mind's certitude, the soul's spirituality, the transcendence of truth, each successive step in the proof is the translation of a personal experience which requires meditation for its metaphysical interpretation to become intelligible. But this implicit metaphysics in turn rests on an ethics, because the moment the proof of God's existence is completed, it also becomes a problem. We seek God, but why do we seek One Who gives us the power and the desire to do so? In order to grasp the whole Augustinian demonstration—and this amounts to grasping Augustine's whole teaching and to understanding it in its profound unity—we must walk again and more slowly along the road we have just travelled, stopping at each step as long as may be necessary to justify the route we have traversed.

Part One

**THE SEARCH FOR GOD
THROUGH UNDERSTANDING**



Chapter I

THE FIRST STEP—FAITH

The first step along the path leading the mind to God is to accept Revelation by faith.¹ This is a surprising step, we must confess, and one that may very well appear contradictory, inasmuch as it means accepting at the outset without proof precisely the things Augustine wishes to prove. It is to be explained, however, by his desire to put the results of his personal experience into some order. Throughout many long years he had searched for truth with his reason, and during the period of his Manichaean convictions he even believed he had found it by that method. But then, after a depressing period of scepticism during which he was harrowed by despair of ever finding truth, he discovered that faith held possession in perpetuity of the very truth his reason had been unable to grasp. In theory, then, it seems quite logical to start from reason in order to come to faith; in practice, however, is not the opposite method the better? Is it not better to believe in order to know, rather than to know in order to believe, or even in order to know? At any rate, St. Augustine's own experience taught him that it was better, and he in turn wants to persuade us that it is so.

It is important to note at the outset that an act of faith is not a unique decision totally foreign to normal life, an act that would be required of us only when it is a question of accepting revealed truth. Belief is such a natural and necessary act of the mind that we cannot imagine a human life in which it does not occupy a very large place. Belief, in fact, is simply thought accompanied by assent (*Credere . . . est . . . cum . . . assensione cogitare*).² Now a great many of our opinions are founded solely on our assent to another's testimony. Some of these opinions do not have much effect on our way of life, for example our belief that cities we have never seen actually do exist or that historical figures long since dead did once exist; others, on the con-

trary, are so important that casting doubt upon them would entail a profound upheaval in our feelings and, perhaps, in our social life itself. If we are not to believe what we do not know, why do children treat their parents with filial devotion when they do not know as yet that they are their parents? After all, a child believes in his father only on his mother's word, and in his mother on the word of servants and nurses. May not the mother herself be deceived? Someone could have stolen her child and substituted another. Yet we believe her, and even then we believe without the shadow of a doubt things we cannot know, because here human society's most sacred bond is at stake. A man would be a criminal if he refused to love his parents on the ground that he had no proof he was their son.³ Belief, then, is such a normal step for the mind that it is a condition *sine qua non* of the family and through the family, of society.

Moreover, it is also apparent that, even though belief takes the place of a direct knowledge which is lacking, there is nothing unreasonable about it. It is based entirely on the credibility of certain testimony, and consequently its value is in proportion to the value of the rational investigation to which we have submitted that testimony. "We believe the things which are not present to our senses, if the evidence offered for them seems sufficient."⁴ In short, our knowledge might be said to be of two kinds: Knowledge of things seen, and knowledge of things believed. In the case of things we see or have seen, we ourselves give the testimony; in the case of things we believe, others give the testimony which causes our assent, whether they bear testimony in their writings to the truth of things we have not seen ourselves, or prove it by their words or by any other kind of evidence. In any case, believing is still a certain way of knowing. Belief is a knowledge possessed by the mind, like any knowledge properly so-called, and it differs from the latter only in its source.⁵ When the subject is religion, the subject is different but the problem itself remains the same. A man speaks to me, I understand him; and although I do not see his thoughts, I believe he is telling me what he thinks if I have sufficient reason for believing his word.⁶ Witnesses report the words and deeds of Christ's life to me. Why should I not believe them also, provided it is established that their testimony is acceptable?

Such a statement of the problem explains the complexity of the solution Augustine proposes. Expressed, as it is, in an unsettled terminology, his thought on the point is unwavering in its essential thesis, and yet it is difficult to follow in detail. We do know for certain that Augustine, filled with the memory of his own experience, invites us to cast off human pride and to accept the truth God offers us instead of trying

to win it. Faith comes first, understanding follows it.⁷ From the time of his conversion, even when he was still filled with enthusiasm for Platonic philosophy⁸ and relied on it to help him penetrate the mysteries of faith, the authority of Christ comes first.⁹ From that time on he will never cease to point out, with increasing insistence, the superiority and the absolute necessity of Christ's authority. However, this fact should not lead us to believe that his thought can be reduced to such a formula. In its final form the Augustinian doctrine concerning the relations between reason and faith comprises three steps: preparation for faith by reason, act of faith, understanding of the content of faith.

First, let us point out with Augustine that the very possibility of faith depends on reason. Of all the beings God created on earth, only man is capable of belief, because he alone is endowed with reason. Man exists, as do wood and stones; he lives, as the plants do; he moves and feels, as do animals; but in addition, he thinks. Moreover, the mind (*mens*), whereby man knows what is intelligible, is in his case the mark God left of His handiwork: it is in the mind that he is made to God's image. Let us say, then, that man has a mind (*mens*); that in order to acquire knowledge his mind exercises an activity proper to him, namely reason (*ratio*); and finally, that the knowledge gained by reason, or the glimpse of truth thus gained, is understanding (*intellectus*).¹⁰ In short, man is the image of God inasmuch as he is a mind which, by exercising its reason, acquires more and more understanding and grows progressively richer therein.

Reason, then, is naturally present before understanding, and before faith as well. If we were to belittle or to hate reason, we should despise God's image within us and the very source of our preeminence over all other living creatures. This would be absurd. Would not reason, then, be well advised to proceed with its task alone and to do without the assistance of faith? Here especially must we give reason convincing arguments for not doing so, because it can be asked to give way before faith only if such a step is presented as something reasonable. Augustine had many reasonable arguments: the disagreements of the philosophers, the scepticism to which these disagreements always brought them in the end; on the other hand, the spectacle of faith establishing unanimity among men wherever the authority of the Church extends. These are all so many facts which invite the mind to guide its steps by a rule of faith pointing the way. But the decisive reason for Augustine will always be his personal experience, the keen recollection of his own ambitions, and of their disappointment. Why make the same mistakes over and over again? It is eminently reasonable not to rely on reason alone.

How, then, are we to proceed? First of all, let us posit reason, because only reason is capable of belief. Then, let us ask it to see what it can do, to ascertain its failures and to look for their cause. Of course it will not be able to find the cause unaided, but it can recognize it once it is pointed out. Here we have a reason that is by nature a knowing power, a power that would like to know and yet cannot do so. It is true therefore that reason is not now in the state which is demanded by its nature. Only original sin, as Scripture reveals it and as St. Paul explains it, can account for the condition in which it finds itself. And who can restore it to the condition in which it was first made? Only God, for He made it. We have been able to deform God's image within us, but we cannot re-form it.¹¹ This is the paramount fact in the whole discussion, and even though reason alone does not solve the problem, it does pose the problem and accepts its solution. It is true that only an intelligent being can seek knowledge, but it is also true that no little intelligence is required to understand that it is better to ask God for knowledge.¹² Reason, therefore, asks help from above to do, in and for it, things it cannot do alone. Far from despising or renouncing itself, it asks God for faith to purify the heart, so that by liberating it from the stain of sin,¹³ it may enable reason to increase its light and to become whole once again. Nothing is more reasonable than this. At any rate, this is the answer to be given to anyone who desires an explanation of the point. It is to his reason we speak when we invite him to believe, because we ask him to understand that he *must* believe if he wants to understand other things as well. "Understand my word in order to believe," Augustine tells him, "but believe God's word in order to understand."¹⁴

But this is not all. Even granting that reason has decided to follow the lead of faith, it still has to know what faith is, and here too a rational effort is required. Pagan philosophers err because they have no faith; heretics, on the other hand, claim to have faith but they are mistaken, because they are in error regarding the very nature and content of faith's teaching. Prior to faith there is some understanding of the things one should and would believe, and man cannot dispense with this. But having said that, reason has done everything it can do by itself; it will owe all subsequent progress to the beneficent influence of faith.

The first step forward, the step which is so important for those that are to follow, will be to see that the attention is fastened on truth. Of course faith does not see truth clearly, but it has an eye for it, so to speak, which enables it to see that a thing is true even when it does not see the reason for it. It does not yet see the thing it believes, but

at least it knows for certain that it does not see it and that it is true none the less. This possession through faith of a hidden but certain truth is the very thing which will impel the mind to penetrate its content,¹⁵ and to give the formula, "Believe that you may understand" (*Crede ut intelligas*), its full meaning.

Let us remember at the outset that the Augustinian doctrine of the relations between faith and reason gives formal expression to a moral experience and for that reason refuses to separate illumination of the mind from purification of the heart. In its essence, Augustinian faith is both an adherence of the mind to supernatural truth and a humble surrender of the whole man to the grace of Christ. After all, how could these two things be separated? The adherence of the mind to God's authority implies humility, but humility in turn presupposes a confidence in God, and this in itself is an act of love and charity. If, then, the actual complexity of the life of the spirit is borne in mind, we see that the man who adheres to God by faith not only submits his mind to the letter of the formulas but yields his soul and his whole being to the authority of Christ, Who is our model of wisdom and Who grants us the means of attaining it. Understood thus, faith is both a purification and an illumination. It subjects the soul to that authority whereby "The lives of the good are easily purified, not through the obscurity of arguments but through the authority of mysteries";¹⁶ it busies itself with man in order to transform him completely.

This is why the human mind also is certain to be transformed in its very depths. The reward it receives from faith is precisely understanding. If faith were but a simple acceptance of divine authority, a slavish submission of the mind, so to speak, it would not receive the reward. Believing in that way is only believing God (*credere Deo*). It is required further that the will do God's will, and this is the reason why Scripture commands us not only to believe God but to believe in God. "This is the work of God," wrote St. John (6, 29), "that you believe in him whom he hath sent." Undoubtedly, you must first believe Him to believe in Him. But the man who believes Him does not necessarily believe in Him. Even the devils believe God, but they do not believe in God; on the other hand, we believe St. Paul but we do not believe in him.

What does it mean, then, to believe in God? It means that you love Him while believing Him; it means that in believing Him you cherish Him, enter into Him through love and become incorporated with His members. That is the faith God demands of us, the faith He demands and yet finds in us only because He has given it to us so that He may find it there. God, then, requires not a middling faith but, as the

Apostle says (Gal. 5, 6), a faith that works through charity. Let us have such faith within us, and it will give us understanding,¹⁷ because it does this as a matter of course.

It is true that Jesus Christ is the mediator between the Father and us, but He is a mediator only to the extent that we are in Him as He is in us, through faith and charity. This is the reason why man should set the highest value on the desire to be incorporated into the Christ who saves him. However, Christ is mediator only in order to unite redeemed man to the heavenly Father in the beatific vision. That vision is knowledge without concealment. The blessed who see God thanks to Jesus Christ, no longer *believe* that the Father sent His only Son as mediator to unite Himself to them and bring them to their perfection; they no longer *believe* that the Father is in the Son by nature even as the Son is in us by grace; they *know* it. As for us, we can only believe it because we still do not see Him. And yet the unbreakable bond of charity linking the Son to the Father exists at once, and is already at work, in those who are joined to the Son by a faith fed on charity. Through Jesus Christ, *in Whom* they believe, the just cling to the Father, Whom they will know later when they see Him face to face. Must not their faith tend at once towards that knowledge for which it prepares the way? It is the inseparable charity of the Father and the Son that makes us believe so as to move towards knowledge in our belief.¹⁸ Undoubtedly, to believe in this way means submitting reason to authority, but the authority is that of God¹⁹ and the advantage to us enormous.

It is evident that if faith is made fruitful by charity, understanding not only can but must follow it.²⁰ God says to us: "If you will not believe, you shall not understand" (Is. 7, 9),²¹ and again: "Seek, and you shall find" (Matt. 7, 7). But these precepts, far from confining us within the limits of a simple faith, invite us to expand it through understanding. If we have an obligation to accept truth, and to ask that we may receive it, it is with a view to possessing it that we do ask for and accept it. "Seek and you shall find." This must mean that the man who believes has not yet found in the fullest sense. Faith seeks, but it is understanding that finds (*Fides quaerit, intellectus invenit*).²² Understanding is the reward of faith (*Intellectus merces est fidei*).²³ Besides, God did not say that man's final end is to believe in Him. Eternal life is not belief in Him; it is knowing Him. Faith, then, is not its own end. It is merely the token of a knowledge which is vaguely sketched out here below, but will be fully expanded in life eternal.²⁴ This is the "summit of contemplation" to which faith leads.²⁵ Mystical ecstasy it-

self would certainly be contemplation, but it would not be its summit.²⁶

Conversely, if *intellectus* is the reward of faith, it is perfectly clear that a faith expanded into understanding through charity's generative influence cannot possibly be confused with so-called natural reason pure and simple. To seek a solution for the modern problem of the relations between faith and reason in the Augustinian explanation of faith's connection with understanding is to expose oneself to grave misconceptions. Augustine knew from his own experience what reason would be without faith: futile claims to the truth followed by repeated disappointments leading to scepticism (*desperatio verum inveniendi*). Whether reason can or cannot attain certain truths without the help of faith is a question Augustine would certainly answer in the affirmative, and his purely philosophical refutation of scepticism would be enough to prove it. But Augustine does not frame the question in these terms. Philosophy is the love of wisdom; the end of philosophy is the possession of beatifying wisdom. Can unaided reason lead us to this? Augustine's answer is, no.²⁷ It is not, then, the existence of pure reason nor the legitimacy of its exercise in certain domains apart from faith that are brought into question; it is, rather, the ability of reason to bring us to God and beatitude through its own resources alone. No one doubts that man can know the truth, say of mathematics, without faith. But here it is a question of deciding whether reason can go back to the ultimate basis of such truth and so arrive at wisdom without having recourse to faith. Augustinism denies that it can do so, and we cannot soften this reply nor extend it beyond the question it answers.

This explains the content of Augustinian doctrine. All the personal speculation found in St. Augustine is located on the path leading from faith to beatific contemplation; it is a transition between our reasoned belief in the testimony of the Scriptures and the sight of God face to face in eternity.²⁸ We cannot, therefore, draw up a list of truths, some of which would be, to Augustine's way of thinking, essentially philosophical, and others essentially theological, because all the truths necessary for beatitude, i.e. man's final end, are revealed in Scripture, and all of them we can and must believe without exception. On the other hand, our reason can gain some understanding of each of these truths if it tries. And if it does try, it acts as reason, because faith is not then the proof but the object. As for those rational truths which do not enter into the pursuit of beatitude to which the love of wisdom should lead us, they are by nature foreign to wisdom. Thus, Augustinian speculation sought to be and could be only a rational explora-

tion of the content of faith. All revealed truths can be known to some extent at least, but none of them can be exhausted, since they have God as their object. The difference between the various things to which our mind is applied is simply that some of them can be known clearly, others vaguely, and still others hardly at all. We give evident proof of God's existence, but it is still to our advantage to accept Him first by faith. We are almost entirely ignorant of His nature, but it is still useful to try to investigate it rationally while we wait to be given the sight of it. We believe in the existence of God which reason demonstrates; we try to get some conception of the Trinity whose existence is made known to us by faith alone. In both cases a reason which perseveres in its task is constantly enriched by the pursuit of a good so great that it is sought only to be found, and found only to be sought once more. The very delight of finding whets the appetite for seeking (*nam et quaeritur ut inveniatur dulcius, et invenitur ut quaeratur avidius*). For even though it is true that faith seeks and understanding finds, still the One it finds is such that even after finding Him it goes on seeking Him (*et rursus intellectus eum quem invenit adhuc quaerit*).²⁹ Formulae such as these apply best to cases in which human reason tries to probe mystery.³⁰ But we know of no single instance where Augustine allowed reason to dispense with faith as its starting point,³¹ or believed that reason attained its goal before the sight of God in the kingdom of heaven. This is the reason why belief in God precedes even proof of His existence: not to save us the trouble of proving it but, on the contrary, to inspire us to find Him. Wisdom guides us to God, and one does not attain God without God.

This, too, explains to what extent and in what sense we may speak of an Augustinian philosophy. We have seen that rational speculation, as conceived by St. Augustine, always makes faith its point of departure. This fact has often been used as a basis for denying that there is an Augustinian philosophy. The last act of that long inner crisis described in the *Confessions* ends with a twofold surrender: Augustine submits his mind once and for all to the authority of Plato and Scripture, and we are left in doubt as to whether "this vigorous genius ceased to be a philosopher in the fullest sense of the term on the very day he seems to have bound himself to philosophy for ever."³² Moreover, it is unfortunate that this double authority is self-contradictory because one appeals to reason, the other to faith. It is as though reason's original decision to recognize an irrational datum were not the very negation of all rationality and hence, of all philosophy.

Actually St. Augustine did not pose the problem in this way, and if we look at his doctrine from this point of view, we may fail to see how

he did pose the problem. He did not discuss our question independently. The subjects which interested his mind are clearly defined, and it is the way in which they are classified that determines his classification of our knowledge.

It is not a question of defining philosophy or theology; it is a matter of knowing things. Some things are temporal, others eternal. Among the temporal, there are present, past and future. Present temporal things we can either see or believe on the evidence of others. Past temporal things we can only believe on testimony, and we can no longer hope to see them, for example, Christ's death and resurrection. Future temporal things we can only believe; we can hope to see them, but cannot bring them to view, for instance, the resurrection of the body.

Now let us pass on to eternal things. Some of them are visible, others invisible. For example, Christ's body is immortal now and it is visible. We believe these lasting visible things (*visibilia permanentia*); we cannot see them now but we do hope to see them some day. While we wait, let us be satisfied to believe them, for there is no use trying to grasp them through reason and understanding. As for enduring, invisible things (*invisibilia permanentia*) such as 'Wisdom' or 'Justice,' that is another matter. Such things can be sought by reason and found by understanding here and now. We really see them (*contuemur*) with the light of the intellect, and this light by which we see them is at least as certain as the objects themselves. There is, then, a kind of intelligible light within us, and by this light we see, so to speak, such intelligible realities. Since these realities are unchanging, the knowledge we have of them is much more certain than our knowledge of sensible things. St. Paul intends to convey this when he says: "The invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood . . ." (Rom. 1, 20). Now this is really a matter of the "invisible things of God" and, as a result, Augustine will look at things from this point of view.³³

What questions really interest him? Every question suggested to him by the text of Scripture. Thus he proceeds, as Origen and Ambrose before him, to a rational exegesis of the revealed text. And even though we might be tempted to classify these interpretations as scriptural, philosophical or theological, Augustine himself does not so distinguish them. In all three cases he does exactly the same thing. As far as he is concerned, the only problem is this: to grasp as best he can, and in accordance with the advice of the *Epistle to the Romans*, the intelligible reality hidden in the verbal form. "Our Father Who art in Heaven": reason gives us to understand that God does not occupy a place. Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father; we understand

that the Father is not a body with a right or left. This is "understanding" (*intellectus*).³⁴ But it is also "understanding" when we see by reason how evil can exist in a world created by God. We believe God created the world, that He is perfect; and yet there is evil. Reason's investigation of free choice enables us to understand these facts.³⁵ Then, too, we believe that God exists, but to understand that He exists we have to reason, argue, prove; only then will the "understanding" of God's existence come to us.³⁶ Nor is the problem of the Trinity an exception. Of course there can be no question of the possibility of demonstrating rationally such a mystery; the Trinity is an enduring, invisible reality transcending even Wisdom and Justice. Yet St. Paul invites us to study it: "For the invisible things . . . from the creation of the world. . . ." Bodies are not the only things that exist in the world God created; there are also souls and minds. Since the mind is made to God's image, may we not expect it to help us know Him? In short, even though the Trinity is not demonstrable or even intelligible, it does not altogether elude the grasp of our understanding (*Non eam tamen a nostro intellectu omnino abhorrere Apostolus testis est . . .*).³⁷ This is still "understanding," and it is precisely what Augustine has in mind when he tells us: "Cherish understanding" (*intellectum valde ama*). The "understanding" in question is one born of strict faith, free of compromise with heresy, and granted to our prayers by God as a reward of that faith (*Tu autem, carissime, ora fortiter et fideliter ut det tibi Dominus intellectum*).³⁸ Those who receive understanding in this way, while awaiting the life to come, are simply Christians who live by faith as do all the just, and live by the same faith as all the just; but they are better (*meliores*), because along with faith, they already possess something akin to the vision which is to be the reward of their faith.³⁹

This is the usual plane on which Augustinian speculation normally moves. Although both faith and reason have an equal interest in it, the aim is not to fix a frontier between their domains nor, consequently, to guarantee to philosophy an essence distinct from theology; nor on the other hand to know how they may be reconciled. As far as Augustine is concerned, faith is the heart of the matter. Faith tells us what there is to understand; it purifies the heart, and so allows reason to profit from discussion; it enables reason to arrive at an understanding of God's revelation. In short, when Augustine speaks of understanding, he always has in mind the product of a rational activity for which faith prepares the way,⁴⁰ namely that indivisible unity which he calls "the understanding of faith."⁴¹

Mere history can go no farther. If we are philosophers, we may regret

that Augustine did not pose his problem in some other way; but he did pose it in the way we have described. A philosophy which aims to be a true love of wisdom must begin with faith, and it will become the understanding of that faith. A religion which aims to be as perfect as possible must begin with faith and strive for understanding. Thus understood, true religion is one with true philosophy and true philosophy is one with true religion. This is what Augustine calls "Christian philosophy," that is, a rational contemplation of Christian revelation,⁴² and everything we are going to study in his work, beginning with his theory of knowledge, is conditioned by this point of view.

Chapter II

THE SECOND STEP—RATIONAL EVIDENCE

The first word of advice Augustine gives those who would prove God's existence is to believe in Him. The second step in the proof (as thus understood) will consist in demonstrating that man is not condemned to scepticism.¹ Before we arrive at that truth, we must first be sure that truth in general is accessible to man, i.e. before demonstrating God's existence in particular, an answer must be given to those who maintain that nothing can be demonstrated. Refutation of radical scepticism, then, is the second stage in the proof of God's existence.²

In this instance too, St. Augustine's demonstration simply follows and formulates his own personal experience. If he stressed the usefulness of faith, it was because he recalled the long years of error during which his mind was exhausted in the vain pursuit of a truth that faith had given him at once. And if he insists now on the necessity of refuting scepticism before pressing on further, it is because he remembers his own despair of finding truth. Augustine would clear from our path the stumbling block over which he fell; the former Academician would have us escape the Pyrrhonism from which he suffered.

The essentials of Augustine's refutation of scepticism are found in the *Contra Academicos*. This work is a summary account of conversations held between Augustine and his friends in the villa of Cassiciacum immediately after his conversion. It is well worth noting that the refutation of scepticism was this new Christian's first preoccupation. The "despair of finding truth," which he had just conquered in himself, is also the first enemy he would overcome in others.³ At last Augustine possessed truths that were certain; certitude, therefore, was possible: by saving the mind from despair, the *Contra Academicos* cleared the threshold of philosophy and set its door ajar.⁴ Augustine was always to consider this first refutation of scepticism as definitive.⁵

In a sense it was, although the deepest formulation of his thought on this point must be sought in some of his later works. The error from which the youthful Augustine had suffered was the scepticism of the New Academy as Cicero had interpreted it in his *Academica*. At first he uses commonly received dialectical arguments to refute it, but then gradually develops a more profound refutation whose philosophical repercussions will make themselves felt for several centuries.

From the very first step in his argument against scepticism, we are aware that Augustine is already in full possession of his own doctrine of knowledge.⁶ However, he does not bring forward this doctrine to refute scepticism. He tries merely a series of *ad hominem* arguments, which he also considers quite conclusive in themselves. He displays an untiring enthusiasm throughout this dialectical discussion, because for him it is no mere school exercise; it involves his own life and the possibility of happiness for all mankind.⁷

The Academicians deny that man can know anything at all. They are led to this conclusion by Zeno's definition of truth, viz. a thing is understood and perceived as true when no sign of error is found therein.⁸ Whence Carneades concludes that, inasmuch as there is no such knowledge, no certitude is possible. Now these men should first recognize that theirs is a contradictory position, for they claim to possess wisdom, and at the same time teach that man knows nothing. If man knows nothing at all, would it not be much simpler to say that wisdom is impossible? It does seem strange, therefore, to apply the term "wise" to one who knows nothing and consequently does not know even if he is living, to say nothing of why he is living or how he should live.⁹ Besides, if he knows nothing, he does not know what wisdom is. Now what could be more absurd than to call a man wise when he does not know what wisdom is? It would be better simply to stop using the word.¹⁰

Contradictory, then, in claiming to possess wisdom, the Academician's position is also self-contradictory on another score: the definition of certitude he adopts implies within itself more than one certitude. For if he considers it as certain—as, indeed, it is—then by that very fact he holds for one truth at least. If, however, he considers it only as probable, then he should admit at least that it is either true or false; and this disjunctive proposition is in itself certain.¹¹ Therefore the Academicians are beaten on their own ground. We can, however, go still further.

Their fundamental principle is that one never succeeds in knowing anything at all in philosophy. But when it is pointed out that if this is true, one cannot know even whether he is a man or an ant, Carneades

prudently replies that his doubt is confined strictly to philosophical problems and to the solutions various systems propose for them. But their principle is itself a philosophical principle. It must, therefore, either be doubted—and this endangers the school's existence—or accepted as a philosophical truth—and this destroys the school. Let us add, moreover, that even in physics a great many certitudes are accessible to the mind. It is hardly necessary to be a wise man in order to be certain that there is only one world or several and, if there are several, that these worlds are either finite or infinite in number. I am equally certain that the world we live in owes its organization either to the nature of the bodies composing it, or to some providence. Finally, I know it has neither beginning nor end, or that it did have a beginning and will not have an end, or that it did not have a beginning in time but will have an end, or that it had a beginning in time and will also have an end. If left in disjunctive form, these propositions are unquestionably true. The Academician will undoubtedly urge us to choose between alternatives. We shall refuse to do so, because in choosing we affirm something of which we are not sure. One or other of these philosophical theses is true. This no one can deny, and as long as we are content with this statement we are sure we are not mistaken.¹²

Perhaps Carneades will not consider himself beaten. We affirm disjunctive propositions concerning the world's order or duration; he will ask how we know that this world exists if our senses deceive us. Let us grant that our senses deceive us. Then all that can be said against me is that things are not as I see them; no one will dare say that I see nothing. If I use the word "world" for this sum-total of things, whatever it may be, in which I live and subsist, which I see with my own eyes, and in which I see earth, or something like it, and sky, or a kind of sky, I am quite certain that I am not mistaken, because to be mistaken, I must affirm something of which I am not sure. Now I do not say that what I see is real, but only that it appears so to me. Therefore, even if I am told that what I see is nothing, I am still not mistaken. To prove me wrong, one would have to show that I believe I see nothing, and no one will try to do that. If I use the word "world" for the things I see, it is no proof against me to say that what I see is not a world. That would be only an argument over words.¹³

But some one will ask: When you are asleep, does the world you see still exist? The answer is, yes. For if I use the word "world" for the things I see, I should still see those things even if I were dreaming or were insane. Moreover, the disjunctive propositions cited above, along with many others like them, would remain true regardless of my

condition when I apprehend them. Whether I am asleep or awake, sane or insane, when I think that there are seven worlds, if there are six plus one, or that three times three make nine, or that the square of a number is that number multiplied by itself, I am certainly right; and all these things would still be true even if every man in the world were snoring.¹⁴

If we attempt a precise statement of St. Augustine's view of sense knowledge, we see that it can be reduced to two positions: sense knowledge is infallible if we consider it as simple appearance, that is to say when we take it for what it really is; and sense knowledge inevitably leads to error if it is used as a test of intelligible truth, from which it differs specifically. Regarding the first statement, it is correct, as we have shown, to call every sense datum an appearance, in as much as the senses apprehend the object perceived exactly as they see it. If an oar is in water, it appears broken. And nothing is truer. My eyes see it exactly as they should, when it is in water, and they would deceive me if they saw it as something straight. The only error I can make is to go beyond mere sense data and affirm that things actually are as they appear to me.¹⁵ This error is made over and over again and is the real origin and evident justification for scepticism. It was the possibility of wisdom as conceived by the Stoics that the Academicians rejected. Zeno is the wise man whom Carneades considers as impossible, and for Zeno knowledge is based on the testimony of the senses. But perhaps Zeno is not the truly wise man nor are all philosophers embarrassed by criticism of sense knowledge. There are, in fact, some philosophers who relegate to the realm of opinion whatever the senses give us and reserve knowledge to the intellect and mind alone. The Platonists are just such men, and the truly wise man we seek is of their number.¹⁶ And yet there is no need to go so far afield to find a way out of scepticism. The mind has at hand and within itself the means of surmounting it.

In the *De Beata Vita*, a work contemporary with the *Contra Academicos*, Augustine for the first time puts in recognizable form the argument that will lead to the *Cogito* of Descartes. In this dialogue Augustine asks his hesitant interlocutor: "Do you know at least that you are alive?" Navigius answers: "Yes."¹⁷ In the form the argument takes in the *Soliloquia*, the intuition of life is replaced by that of thought: "You who would know yourself, do you know that you exist? Yes. How do you know this? I do not know. Do you think that you are one or many? I do not know. Do you know that you move? No. Do you know that you think? Yes. Then it is true that you think. Yes."¹⁸ Certainty of the thinking subject's existence, as opposed to all further

certitude, is based directly on the certainty of the existence of thought, and that incontestable truth is also the first of all certitudes.

With this to prepare the way, the text of the *De Libero Arbitrio*, which we have already analysed, needs no explanation. It is no accident that Augustine begins his proof of God's existence with the proof of his own existence. He remembers the despair of finding truth from which he had suffered; he remembers that scepticism is the obstacle blocking the approach to philosophy. It must, then, be cleared away before pressing on. In this connection the bond uniting Augustine's thought and that of Descartes is most striking. In both doctrines the need for "orderly" thinking is emphasized; the existence of thought is presented as the first and most evident of all certitudes and it is the first of all certitudes because it remains evident even when the thought known is an error; and finally, in both doctrines this primary evidence is the basis of the proof of God's existence. "Let us search, then, in the following order, if you will. First, how can we prove that God exists? . . . To begin with what is most evident, my first question to you is this: Do you exist? I do not think you need fear making a mistake in answering, for if you did not exist, it would be utterly impossible for you to make a mistake. Let us pass on. Since it is clear, then, that you do exist. . . ." ¹⁹ The date of this text is the year 388. Two years later, in the *De Vera Religione*, Augustine proposes the fact itself of doubt as primary evidence, but he does so only cursorily, and he does not base the evidence of being on the certainty of that doubt. ²⁰

On the other hand, a famous passage in his *De Trinitate* (in 416) and another equally celebrated text from the *De Civitate Dei* (about 420) call to mind even more forcibly certain analogous theses of Descartes. After noting that even a dream or mad delusions imply life and the certainty of being alive, ²¹ Augustine formally affirms his own existence in virtue of the very fact of error. "Truths like this have nothing to fear from the Academicians' arguments. They may say: Yes, but suppose you were mistaken. Well, if I am mistaken, I exist. Certainly one who does not exist cannot be mistaken; consequently, if I am mistaken, I exist. And since I exist if I am mistaken, how can I be mistaken about my own existence when it is certain that if I am mistaken, I exist? Even in error, I should have to exist in order to be in error. There can be no doubt, therefore, that I am not mistaken when I know that I exist." ²²

Nothing is wanting in the Augustinian proof: the sceptics' arguments; the evidence, on the one hand, of their purely sensible nature and, on the other, for the purely intelligible character of the first certitude (*quia nec per oculum carnis hoc cernitur*); ²³ the appeal to aware-

ness (*intima scientia*); and finally, his "if I am mistaken, I exist" (*si enim fallor, sum*). No doubt we shall never know to what extent Descartes may have been influenced directly or indirectly by St. Augustine or the Augustinian tradition. Besides, it would be unwise to overlook the original elements in the Cartesian *Cogito*. But the similarity of the two doctrines is quite evident even to one who does not compare the texts in detail. For both philosophers, sceptical doubt is a disease which springs from the senses and for which the evidence of pure thought is the remedy; for both men, that primary certitude opens up a path which leads to a demonstration of the soul's spirituality and thence to the proof of God's existence.

Chapter III

THE THIRD STEP—THE SOUL AND LIFE

As the mind frees itself of doubt by the certainty of its own existence, it sees itself as a vital activity of a higher order. Thinking is living. Now all life has a soul as its principle; mind, therefore, comes under the head of soul. What does this mean? What new certitude does it imply?

Since mind sees itself as soul, the first question it should answer concerns the soul's nature.¹ It would appear that the role which the notion of soul plays in Augustine's doctrine is exactly the role it plays in every other Christian philosophy. For him and for every Christian philosopher, man is composed of a body and a soul; which means that there would be no man if one of these two elements were lacking.² Nevertheless two characteristic traits, both due to Platonic influence, set the Augustinian concept of man apart from that of all other Christian philosophies.

In the first place, although he considers the whole man to be a substance, Augustine insists with special emphasis that the soul also is a substance. So, for example, instead of defining the soul in terms of man, Augustine describes it chiefly with reference to itself, i.e. *a rational substance equipped to rule a body*.³ In the second place—and this is a natural consequence which Augustine never tries to escape—the definition of man becomes extremely difficult in this doctrine. It is hard to see how man, who is a substance, can result from the union of his soul with his body, when both soul and body are substances also. Are we to say that man's soul and body are one, as two horses hitched to a chariot are one, or as a centaur is one? Or are we, on the contrary, going to say that man is a soul and make the word "soul" include the body it animates, as, for instance, both the man and his mount are included in the word "horseman"? Augustine realizes that

the question is difficult, but he goes on to say that it may not be necessary to answer it. We do know that the soul is the higher part of man,⁴ and when we define man, the soul must occupy the prominent place in our definition. So Augustine concludes: to the extent it is granted to man to know him, *man is a rational soul using a body*.⁵

This definition of man, in which the emphasis is definitely placed on the soul's hierarchic transcendence over the body, is in keeping with Augustinism's deepest tendencies. We are sometimes surprised that he did not discuss or even notice, the metaphysical difficulties implied in such a definition. The reason is simply that the abstract problem of man's metaphysical structure seemed to him an idle one. It is the moral problem of the sovereign good that interests him. Now, that good is of an essentially spiritual nature; it has to be sought beyond the soul but in the same intelligible world. That is why the soul's superiority over the body has to be emphasized in his definition of man. Deny this superiority, and it is no longer clear that man should seek his good beyond the sphere of the body. Grant this superiority, and along with the proper ordering of ends, the whole problem of morality is solved.⁶

Saint Augustine's anthropology and psychology, then, are made to depend upon a morality which explains their essential characteristics. Since man is chiefly his soul, certain operations may properly be attributed to man even though only the soul takes part in them. Whence arise a theory of knowledge and a natural theology orientated away from the body and desirous at every turn to direct our attention away from the body in order to lead us back to the soul where our greater good is to be found. It is precisely this fundamental preoccupation which finds expression in the Augustinian definition of the soul as a substance. For St. Augustine, proving that the soul is a substance is above all a matter of proving that it is distinct from the body. His thoughts were always absorbed by this problem, for memories of the materialism to which he had clung in his youth never left him. If, as we have said, anything existing apart is a substance, then proving that the soul exists apart from the body it animates will suffice to prove that it is a spiritual substance. How are we to fashion such a proof?

The method Augustine adopts is essentially *a priori*. Every proof of a distinction between soul and body rests on the principle that those things must be distinct in which thought has to recognize distinct, essential properties. All we have to do, then, is to define soul and body in order to discover whether or not their essences agree. Now a body is by definition anything extended in length, breadth and thickness.⁷ Any geometrician knows this. For him a body is anything occupying a cer-

tain place according to the three dimensions of space so that a smaller space corresponds to the body's smaller parts while its larger parts occupy a greater space.⁸ Now nothing of this sort can be considered as belonging to the nature of the soul. Therefore, the soul is not a body.

Of course someone may ask how we know that extension does not belong to the soul's nature. To answer this question we have only to recall that the mind knows its own existence with immediate evidence. When it discovers itself (even in doubt), it apprehends itself as an intelligence. It knows that it exists and lives, but the life it grasps is the life of a mind.⁹ Because it knows this, it is capable of knowing what it is and what it is not. Since it is an intelligence, it certainly is what it knows itself to be, and it is certainly not what it does not know itself to be. Let us apply this principle to the problem of the distinction between body and soul.

Some men imagine their soul is a body of one kind or another, for example, air, fire or an essence even more subtle. It would seem, then, that the soul does not know what it really is. And yet, when we distinguish between the things which the soul knows for certain and those it does not know, it is quite apparent that when the soul thinks it is a body, the only thing of which it is sure is that it thinks. As to its being a body, it can believe this but it cannot know it. If the soul eliminates from the opinion it has of itself, everything it believes it is and retains only what it knows it is, it will have this certitude, a certitude no sceptic can question, as we have seen, viz. that it exists, that it lives, that it thinks.¹⁰

The only thing of which the soul is certain is that it is a mind. Consequently, it has a right to distinguish itself from all that is not itself, and a duty not to attribute to itself properties it has not. Is it possible for air, fire, brain, blood, atoms, some fifth essence or the body's organs to produce life, memory, knowledge, understanding, judgement and will? This question may be argued vigorously, and widely diversified opinions are at odds over it. Yet who can doubt that the mind does exist, live, remember, know, will and think? The man who doubts it, proves it. If he doubts, he lives. If he asks himself why he doubts, he is remembering. If he doubts, he knows that he doubts. If he doubts, it is because he wants to be certain. If he doubts, he is thinking; he knows he is ignorant, and feels that a person should not affirm anything without a reason. Therefore, everything can be doubted, but not the mind. Without mind it would be impossible even to doubt.¹¹

Because knowing is the very essence of mind, the mind grasps its substance at the very instant it knows its existence. The mind knows

what it is the moment it knows that it is. Hence, we readily feel that it also knows what it is not. We have just seen that the soul is not aware of being air, fire, a body or, in general, anything perceptible by our senses or conceivable by the imagination. Actually it is quite impossible for a thinking substance to conceive what it is in the way that it conceives what it is not. What it is, it knows somehow from within, as an inner presence real and unfeigned, for nothing is more present to the soul than the soul itself. But it can only perceive or imagine what it is not; it cannot be conscious of it; and this is how it knows the body. So if the soul eliminates from the idea it has of itself everything derived through the senses, and refrains from attributing such things to itself, there will remain to it a knowledge of what it really is, a knowledge of itself which is both intimate and clear.¹²

Since we have defined the soul as "a rational substance made to rule the body," the soul confers life on the body. There can be no doubt that Augustine attributed vital functions directly to the soul's substance as just defined. It follows from his definition alone, but it is confirmed also by his repeated assertion that, from the first moment of its existence, the soul is a rational and intelligent substance, even though reason and intelligence are at first dormant there.¹³ Precisely how an intelligent substance can be united to a material body so as to animate it is, in Augustine's eyes, a profound mystery, a mystery all the more embarrassing because in this case it is man himself whom man cannot understand.¹⁴ It would be useless to try to find the solution to this puzzle in Augustine's treatises concerning the soul, and yet we can find there a sort of instinct, confused but strong, for the direction in which it would be best to look for the solution.

In point of fact we are here face to face with one of those numerous "unsettled questions" in Augustine which exercised so profound an influence during the Middle Ages. The better Augustine understood the content of his Christian faith, the better he understood the fact that, according to the Scriptures, God did not create a soul in creating Adam, but a man: *Let us make man* (Gen. 1, 26), and that the fashioning of Adam's body was actually the fashioning of a man (Gen. 2, 7). Merely having to meditate on the dogma was enough to lead Augustine later on to a definition of man quite different from that of Plotinus: *Man is a rational substance made up of soul and body*.¹⁵ Moreover, if man were not one, how could he be an image of the divine Trinity? Unfortunately, in Augustine the fulness of Christian truth was always in advance of his philosophy. To justify Christian intuitions he had at his disposal only a Plotinian technique, and the result was that he bequeathed to the Middle Ages formidable problems for which none

but Saint Thomas found the solution. Certainly Augustine himself did not find the solution. He felt from the beginning that the body and soul together make man, but he continued throughout his life to reason as though the soul were one substance which uses that other substance, the body. Involved as he was in such a difficulty, it is easy to understand why he found man a strangely mysterious being.

Augustine was obviously aware that, as a consequence of his definition of the soul, the so-called problem of the "communication of substances" was most acutely raised in his doctrine. If the soul is a spiritual substance, how can it "use" another substance?¹⁶ To tell the truth, it is utterly impossible to conceive the nature of their relationship. Inasmuch as the soul by definition lacks extension, a part of it cannot be thought of as existing in a part of the body. Consequently, it is not present in the organs it animates by way of division or diffusion in place. Indeed, in looking for an example somewhat suggestive of the way the soul is present to the body, Augustine rejects the hypothesis of local diffusion and proposes a kind of *vital attention*.¹⁷ The soul is entirely in every part of the body as a whole, and it is also entirely in each part of the body in particular. This is proved, on the one hand, by the fact that when one spot on the body is touched, the whole soul is informed of it, even though that spot is not the whole body and is barely visible because of its size. On the other hand, if the whole soul is informed of the touch, this does not mean that an impression on the body is diffused throughout the whole body, because the soul perceives the impression at the very spot in which it is produced. Now this would be quite impossible if the soul were partially present in one member and partially present in another. Its presence, then, must be of an entirely different kind, a purely spiritual presence which consists not so much in a diffusion involving a division of the soul, but rather in exercising an omnipresent influence from which no part of the extended body escapes.¹⁸

The *vital attention* whereby the soul animates the body may vary in intensity according to the nature of the organs and the moment the attention is considered, even though the soul, being spiritual, is undivided. As we shall see presently, sensation is merely a temporary increase in the intensity of the influence by which the soul animates some one point in the body. But in order to explain the nature of the union of soul and body, it is not enough to appeal to the facts of sensation. Here we are faced with one of those instances, too numerous for the historian's liking, where it is apparent that the fundamental orientation of the whole system shows its effect on each of its parts, exactly as the influence of the soul affects the body it animates. The whole

doctrine is based upon God's Ideas, and when we get to the roots of the problem, the metaphysical reason for the union of soul and body in Augustine is simply that the soul is to serve as an intermediary between the body it animates and the Ideas of God which animate the soul.

This is not the time to enter into the question of how the soul is in contact with the divine Ideas. Let us at least agree that it is in contact with them and as closely as possible. The relationship in question is obviously not one of place but of nature. Since the soul is spiritual, nothing stands between it and the divine Ideas, which are of a spiritual nature also. The body, on the other hand, for the very reason that it is extended in space, is incapable of sharing directly in the nature of the Ideas. Some intermediary, therefore, is needed between Ideas and body, and that intermediary is the soul. A body is what it is only by reason of its form, the order of its parts and the numerical relations it obeys. It is the soul which confers all these on the body and, as a result, makes the body what it is.¹⁹ However, it confers them on the body only because it receives them itself from the divine Ideas. If the body had no share in these Ideas, it would not be what it is; but if it shared in them with the immediacy of the soul, it would be the soul. Now it is not the soul, and yet it does share in order, form and, more clearly still, in a Supreme Life that is at once a wisdom and an immutable truth. Therefore, the body must be vivified by the soul and by the soul alone.²⁰

In this way we get a better notion not only of the reason for the soul's presence in the body, but of the general nature of the activity it exercises there as well. Since the soul is joined to the portion of extended body it disposes and organizes, it is primarily its unique animating principle. The soul is not to be identified with any part of the divine substance, for that would be tantamount to denying its existence.²¹ Nor is it one in number for the whole human species, for each body obviously exercises its own proper operations in virtue of an inner principle acting within it alone.²² Since that principle is present everywhere in the body, it is, rather, the unique immediate cause of the external order which confers form on the body, of the internal order which makes it an organism, and of all the operations which that organism performs.²³ Its activity should, then, be looked upon as the beneficent and ever-vigilant presence of a spiritual substance through which the perfections of Eternal Life and Wisdom are communicated to the world of living bodies. This is the source of all the beauty, harmony and unity which shine forth in the bodies of the lowest animals and even in that of the humblest little worm. This is

the source in the soul itself of the rhythmic movements it impresses on the body, of its desires for things beneficial, of its mistrust of things harmful, of its resistance to everything dangerous. Most important of all, this is the source of that instinct for preservation which serves as a focal point, so to speak, for all the animal's activity and whose unity symbolizes the unity of creating Nature itself. In a word, this is the source of that ordered beauty which the soul imposes on the body, and which it must impose on itself in order to attain beatitude, ordered beauty which is life itself.²⁴

St. Augustine was always very undecided about the origin of the soul as thus conceived. He feels he is in the presence of a great mystery, indeed he confesses as much, but his eudaemonism comforts him. It is not what has been that interests him so much as what is still to be. What difference does it make if a traveller who has left Rome forgets his port of embarkation? The important thing for him to know is where he is going and how to avoid the dangers which lie along the route.²⁵ So too with Augustine. He is certain that the soul, like every other substance, is created by God out of nothing and, as a result, is not a detached fragment of the divine substance. "The soul is not a part of God." If it were a part of God, it would have to be absolutely immutable and incorruptible; if it were so, it could become neither worse nor better than it is. It would persist in the stability of its essence, and so would be removed from progression as well as regression. It is of no use to imagine that its present mutability is unnatural to it and the result of some accident, and especially of its union with the body. Why be concerned about the origin of the evil from which it suffers, if indeed the soul does suffer from it? The instability of its nature, whatever the cause of this may be, is enough to prove that the soul is not a part of God.²⁶

Since the soul is not God, it can only be a creature. Its origin, then, is the same as that of all other beings, i.e. the omnipotence of the divine will which caused it to come forth out of nothingness.²⁷ At what precise moment did or does God create it? That is a difficult question, and the answer will appear in precise form only when we study the account in Genesis and seek a rational interpretation of it.²⁸ In the meantime it is imperative that we avoid one dangerous error, namely, that of Origen. According to this Doctor, souls had in heaven an existence anterior to their present life; they sinned in heaven and were sent down into their bodies as into prisons of flesh, acquiring bodies more or less gross in proportion to the gravity of their sin. There is a latent pessimism in this conception of man which is fundamentally repugnant to Augustine's thought. To be sure, he always insisted on

the soul's absolute hierarchic transcendence with respect to the body, but he never admitted, in fact he rejected with abhorrence, the hypothesis of a humanity in which the body would be only a prison. In Origen's view, the sensible universe in general and the human body in particular were created as places and instruments of punishment. For Augustine, on the contrary, everything God made is good. Therefore, the body was created for its intrinsic goodness, not as a consequence of or punishment for sin. Finally, the soul could not have been sent down into the body as into a prison; in keeping with the description we have just given of it, the soul is united to the body in love, as an ordering and conserving force animating and moving it from within.²⁹

The only question left to ask is how God creates souls. Augustine has not left us a definite answer to the question. It can be said, however, that he was always tempted to concede that in creating the first human soul, viz. that of Adam, God created in it once and for all the souls of all men to come. The full significance of this answer will be clearer after we have studied the doctrine of seminal reasons, but we can see already that a traducianism of this sort makes it much easier to explain the transmission of sin from Adam to the rest of men. This is undoubtedly the reason why St. Augustine was always inclined towards this solution. Nevertheless, he did consider three other hypotheses as possible: God creates each individual's soul expressly for him; or all souls exist first in God and then are sent by Him into the bodies they are to animate; or finally, souls exist first in God and then descend voluntarily into bodies to animate them.³⁰ Augustine never wished to choose between these four hypotheses. None of them is condemned by faith and none is imposed as certain by reason.³¹

Although Augustine was undecided as to the way in which God bestows the soul on the body, he had not the slightest doubt about its future subsistence. The soul's immortality is guaranteed by its very substantiality. In the *Soliloquies* he borrows from Plato's *Phaedo* the well-known argument drawn from the subsistence of truth. Truth is naturally indestructible; therefore the soul, which is the subject of truth, must be indestructible as well.³² In the treatise which he devoted specifically to proving the soul's immortality, Augustine combines this argument with another argument of Plato based on the principle of the incompatibility of contrary essences. However, he alters both arguments drastically and seeks a common foundation for both in the Christian notion of God.

It is quite easy to uncover the reason for this transformation. Reduced to its essentials, the proof developed by Plato in the *Phaedo* amounts to saying that no essence admits anything contrary to it. Now

by its essence the human soul shares in the idea of Life. It would be a contradiction, therefore, to suppose it could admit its contrary, namely death. The soul, then, is indestructible. Taken literally, such an argument seems to assume that the soul possesses life by its very essence and, as a result, that it derives its immortality from itself, a position that is untenable in a Christian universe. This is why Augustine changes Plato's argument and makes God, rather than essences, the reason for their indestructibility.

It is quite certain that the Platonic thesis is true in principle: every essence is indestructible, if we consider what belongs to it by definition. That much is clear not only of the soul but of the body also, for the body may tend towards nothingness indefinitely, but it can never reach it. What, precisely, is a body? It is a part of the sensible world that tends to become identical with the universe the greater the place it occupies therein. The more a body approximates the universe, the greater it is; the less it approximates it, the smaller it is. Thus the more a body is diminished, the smaller it becomes; the more it is divided, the nearer it approaches to nothingness. But it tends to nothingness without being able to reach it. Divide a body into as many parts as you will, and whatever is left is always a body and consequently remains capable of division. It is always possible to take away half of the half of any body or space, and in this way to move towards a term which one may approach but never reach.⁸³

If this is true of the body, it should with much more reason be true of the soul as well, because the soul is superior to the body in as much as it bestows life upon it. The soul, like the body, can in a way tend to nothingness. It does so to the extent that it lessens itself; and it lessens itself in proportion as it turns aside from the true and the intelligible to cling to the errors of the sensible world. And yet, even though lessened, the soul always remains the soul, nor can its essence be destroyed. In order to grasp this fully, we must remember first that the permanence of essences is independent of the essences themselves, and secondly that there is something contradictory in supposing that a thinking substance can cease to exist.

Regarding the first point, it should be noted that nothing can produce itself or give itself being. For a thing to bestow existence on itself, it would have to exist to produce itself and, at the same time, not exist to be capable of being produced. It would have to exist to be able to make itself exist. And this is absurd. On the other hand, it is clear that whatever exists without being made or produced is eternal by nature. Body is obviously not of such a nature, since it never stops

changing before our eyes. The world of bodies, then, has been made and, in as much as the cause is higher than its effect, it has been produced by a cause superior to itself. But spirit is the only thing superior to body. Hence, the universe of bodies has been produced by a spirit. On the other hand, anything that does not exist of itself would cease to exist if abandoned and cut off from that which causes it to exist and to be what it is. The world of bodies would, therefore, cease to exist if its cause did not maintain it in being, and as long as its cause does maintain it, its non-existence does not depend on it.³⁴

Valid as this reasoning is for all bodies which only subsist on condition that they change constantly, it is clearly even more valid for the soul, which finds in itself everything it needs in order to subsist.³⁵ It is evident at once that the soul cannot cease to exist any more than the body. But we can go further and prove that, if the soul cannot cease to exist, it cannot cease to live. By definition the soul is life. Everything animate is alive, and everything that could be animate and is not, is dead, i.e. deprived of life. Therefore, the soul cannot be deprived of life in as much as it is the soul that gives it. Unless we are ready to face the absurdity of a life deprived of life, we must acknowledge that life cannot be wanting to itself and that therefore, the soul does not die.³⁶

Let us add that the immortality of the soul, guaranteed as it is both by its own essence and by God's conserving power, can be proved even more directly, in a way which takes us to the very heart of Augustinian metaphysics. The only reason one can have for thinking the body subject to annihilation would be to picture its destruction as the result of a division which would cut the body into pieces until it is destroyed. We have seen that this is an illusion. But perhaps the utter destruction of a thinking substance is conceivable. The soul was made for the purpose of conceiving truth, and it lessens itself in proportion as it thinks error. Can we not imagine that the soul, by thinking the false and so lessening its essence, might eventually succeed in annihilating itself?

We have only to test this hypothesis by the experience of our own existence to show at once that it is contradictory. Error can, indeed, injure our soul but, as we have said, it can do no more, because to be mistaken, we must be alive. Error then, cannot kill the soul. Truth is so invincible by its essence that even its contrary, error, cannot prevent the soul from being the soul, i.e. life, and consequently it cannot prevent its existence. This is to say that nothing whatsoever can hinder the soul from being and subsisting.³⁷

When the soul's immortality is thus related to the certitude we have of our being, it shares in the primary certitude of thought. The Pla-

tonic thesis, which bases the soul's subsistence on the indestructibility of truth of which the soul is the subject, hereby takes on an entirely new meaning and sees unfolding before it possibilities which Plato himself did not suspect. When the certitude of immortality rests on the experience of the "cogito," it ceases to be the conclusion of a dialectical formula and becomes the act whereby life is apprehended as inseparable from the mind in which it is grasped. Yet Augustine goes beyond this stage also. As the "cogito" itself was made to depend on Supreme Truth, so too is the soul's immortality eventually made to rest on the necessity of God.

Instead of considering truth as *true*, let us consider it as *being*. Truth is said to be that in virtue of which things are true in so far as they exist; that is to say, things only exist to the extent that they are true. If this is the case, then the soul's immortality is more assured than ever. Actually, no essence as such has a contrary, because *essentia* is such only in virtue of its *esse*, or in other words, every essence is an essence only because it is. Now the only contrary to being is non-being, i.e. nothing. Nothing, therefore, is the contrary of essence as such.

If this is true of *any* essence whatever, it is *a fortiori* true of Truth, for Truth is not only an essence; it is the essence of essences. Indeed, things only exist to the extent that they are true, so that Truth is, so to speak, the very basis of their essence. The result is that, in as much as nothing can be contrary to essence in general, it is even less possible for anything to be contrary to the essence of essences, Truth. Now Truth is God Himself, and we know that the soul has its being from Him. Therefore, since the soul has its being from a principle which has no contrary, nothing can cause that being to be taken away from it. Consequently, the soul cannot cease to be. But the being it received from the Substance which has no contrary is life itself. Consequently, the soul cannot die.⁸⁸

A strong link binds together the main positions of Augustinian metaphysics, so much so that the more their depths are plumbed, the more they seem to blend one into the other. In becoming aware of itself, thought frees us from scepticism. But thinking is living, and to live means to act as an animating substance, and as a result, to distinguish itself from the body it vivifies. Finally, to distinguish itself from the body means to know that it is a substance irreducible to extension.⁸⁹ But the moment the soul knows itself as life and the source of life, it knows that it is inseparable from the certitude it has of itself, and consequently, that it is indestructible also, for even error implies the irreducible truth of its existence. Finally, by penetrating deeply into its own essence with one last effort, the soul becomes aware that it has

received its being from Being itself and that its contrary, non-being, cannot take it away. So, being a substance dependent on God and on God alone, the soul knows itself to be an indestructible life through which the order of the Ideas is introduced into the body it animates. But there is soul only where there is knowledge. Now we take another step and mount from life to sensation.

Chapter IV

THE FOURTH STEP—SENSE KNOWLEDGE

In its ascent to God, the soul encounters sense knowledge immediately above the level of life itself. Augustine's doctrine of sensation is one of the theories which enable us to see rather clearly what is distinctive in his concept of man. Its apparent subtlety conceals a genuine simplicity and directness of approach, for in none of the passages in which he dealt with the problem, either expressly or incidentally, did he stray from the rigid yet tortuous line which he had chosen. Let us also try to follow this line.

In the philosophy of Augustine, there is no trace of Occasionalism or Innatism with respect to sense knowledge. All knowledge of any material thing whatever is produced simultaneously by ourselves who know the thing and by the thing itself which we know.¹ Proof of this is to be seen in the fact that the soul can have no image of objects it has not perceived.² Consequently, the form of the thing perceived must concur with the sense to produce sensation and is a partial cause of it.³ Augustine's position on this point follows from his view of the union of soul and body. For him as for Plotinus, the relationship between these two substances is that of workman to tool, or of artist to instrument. Thus for Augustine and for Plotinus, sensation must be a particular instance of the soul using its body. Moreover, this hypothesis is verified by the manner in which Augustine puts the question: *Respondeas mihi, quidnam tibi videtur iste esse sensus quo anima per corpus utitur . . .* (Tell me, what sort of thing do you think this sense to be which the soul uses through the body . . .).⁴ The nature of sense knowledge is not, therefore, a separate problem for Augustine. But when we have said this, the problem of the structure itself of sensation, though settled in principle, still demands elucidation. How are these perceptions produced? Are they the result of an action exercised by the

body on the soul, or of an action which the soul exercises on itself or on the body? These are the questions we should do well to examine.

The term "sensation" is given to any passion undergone by the body when the passion, of itself, neither remains unknown to the soul nor escapes its notice.⁵ Every part of this roundabout definition has its importance, but the last clause brings out its full meaning. To say that sensations are passions undergone by the body is simply to recall the well-known fact that there is sensation only when an influence is exercised from without on a sense organ by an object, e.g. light on the eye, sound on the ear, and so on for the other senses.⁶ But when we add that this passion, "of itself, does not escape the notice of the soul," we indicate the immediate character of sense knowledge. This clause really means that the passion undergone by the body is sufficient of itself to occasion the knowledge designated by the term "sensation," and that no additional intellectual operation is required. For instance, I see smoke and I infer that there is fire. It is true that I know of the smoke through my sense of sight, and I can even add that, in some sense, I also know of the fire through my sense of sight, but I do not know them both in the same way. In the case of the smoke, a simple change effected in my body by an external object was enough to make me aware of its existence. Here we have a passion of the body made known by itself and by itself alone. But in the case of the fire, some reasoning by the intellect, enabling me to infer the existence of fire, had to be added to the perception of smoke. In this second case, the passion undergone by my body is still the occasion of my knowledge, but it is not sufficient of itself to cause it, and for this reason, it is not a sensation. By way of interpreting our definition, we may consider the soul's state of "non-unawareness" as the genus in which sensation and intellectual knowledge are two species, in somewhat the same way as animality is the genus common to men and animals. Sometimes the soul is placed in this state of "non-unawareness" by its own cognitive powers, and then we say that it acquires knowledge; at other times it is placed there by a passion its body undergoes, and then we say that it experiences a sensation.⁷ But we still have to discover why Augustine, in defining sense knowledge, makes use of the roundabout, negative phrase "not remain unknown."

His chief concern is to dissociate the object perceived as completely as possible from the sensation we have of it. Although sensation can hardly lay claim to the title "knowledge," it has to do wholly and entirely with knowledge and the mind, whereas sense objects have to do entirely with the body.⁸ This point is fundamental, and many important consequences follow from it in two directions. In the first place,

as regards sense objects, the notion we form of their nature must exclude henceforth all sensation and even all sensibility. If we say that honey is sweet, this does not mean that honey experiences its sweetness, but that it makes us experience it when we taste it. If we say that a light is bright, we do not mean that the light perceives its own brightness, but that this physical light, which does not see, is taken in by a spiritual light which sees it and judges it to be bright.⁹ Thus sense objects have within themselves the cause of sensation, but they experience no sensation of any kind themselves. In the second place, sensation belongs entirely to the soul; the body does not experience it in any way: *Sentire non est corporis sed animae per corpus* (Sensing belongs not to the body, but to the soul through the body). This is a radical distinction. Discussion of one problem raised by it holds Augustine's attention for a long time, and his solution of it will have a profound influence on the history of western thought. It is a problem all the more difficult to solve owing to the fact that Augustine does absolutely nothing to close the gap he has made between body and soul. On the contrary, after saying that the cause of sense knowledge is the body, he attributes sense knowledge to the soul alone, and then adds that the notion of an influence exercised on the soul by the body is contradictory. All beings in Augustine's hierarchical universe have to be superior or inferior to one another for the simple reason that they are different, and in his view, it is a first principle that the inferior cannot act on the superior in any way. At the moment, we are dealing with knowledge, i.e. with purely spiritual realities, which depend directly on organic states, i.e. on purely corporeal realities. Now the body is inferior to the soul, and since we assume that the inferior cannot act on the superior, we must conclude that the passion undergone by the body cannot produce a sensation in the soul.¹⁰ Thus the problem can be reduced to this paradox: how are we to conceive sense knowledge, if it is true that sense knowledge depends on a condition of the body and the action of body on soul is inconceivable? Augustine touched on this difficulty many times, but in Book VI of the *De Musica* he discussed and solved it with extraordinary power.¹¹

Following a method quite familiar to him, a method he employed at times with signal success, Augustine tries to find the solution to the problem, not in a dialectical deduction with abstract principles as his starting point, but in a searching analysis of a fact of consciousness. Let us suppose someone recites a verse in our presence, say the verse of St. Ambrose: *Dēus crēātor omniūm*. Now it is the rhythm which makes this a verse and its rhythm, in turn, consists of numbers: a numerical relationship between its long and short syllables gives it the character of

verse. The verse is made up of four iambs. Now upon what conditions can my mind perceive them? This is the question we have to answer, a question we can settle by a kind of experiment.

First of all, owing to the distinction we have made between sense and sense object, the numbers which make up this verse exist in two different ways: they exist in the movement of air which produces the sound, i.e. in the material sound we hear, and this constitutes one class of numbers; they exist also in the sense of the hearer, and this constitutes a second class of numbers. Moreover, this verse, in the form we have it, does not have an absolute existence in itself, for even though the number of feet in it and the relationships between them remain invariable, its length depends on the manner of its delivery. Without a voice which is itself rhythmic and "rich in numbers," and therefore capable of communicating its inner harmony and rhythm to the movement of air striking our ear, the impression made on the sense can never become music. Thus a third kind of number is added to the first two, namely that of the voice which recites the verse. And there is a fourth number also. The verse just recited is the first verse of a hymn of St. Ambrose. Consequently, we recognized it. Now we were able to do so only because it was already present in our memory, where there exists an inner word capable of reciting the verse for itself alone and without striking any ear. Nor is this all. Usually we are not content to listen to the verse when recited; we spontaneously form an opinion about the manner of its delivery according as the reciter has observed faithfully or badly the relationship between the feet. This fifth and last class of numbers is part and parcel of the judgements whereby we rule that a verse was spoken too slowly or too fast, and that we like or dislike the reciter's delivery. In order to make discussion easier, let us give these various numbers names. Thus we have: sounding numbers, heard numbers, voiced numbers, remembered numbers and discriminating numbers.¹² The task before us now is to discover the order of their influence upon one another.

There can be no doubt about the most perfect class of numbers. The last mentioned is the most perfect because it presupposes all the others, whereas the others do not necessarily presuppose the last. The spontaneous impression of pleasure or displeasure we experience when we hear a verse recited properly or poorly, an impression which is prior to reflection of any kind, implies not only that numbers exist in the soul perceiving them, but that they exist there in a particularly perfect and eminent manner, because these numbers are present in the soul in such a way as to enable us to pass judgement on the others. Since they are the rule, they necessarily hold pre-eminence over the numbers which

must conform to them.¹³ In regard to the second rank, the numbers which produce other numbers should take precedence over the latter. It is true that the last four classes of numbers all come under the jurisdiction of the first class, but one of the four stands out as being the cause of the other three. These are the numbers produced by the voice, so we shall place them immediately after the ideal numbers.

It is much more difficult to assign a rank to the last three classes. Obviously, the first principle of classification will not work at this level, because all the remaining classes are made up of numbers on which judgement is passed. Nor is the second principle easy to apply here. In order to place the active numbers ahead of those which result from the action of the former, we must know which numbers produce the others. At first sight, it would seem that the sounding numbers produce the others, because the others could neither be heard by the sense nor retained in the memory without the movement of air which constitutes the sounding numbers. On the other hand, how can we place a physical movement such as sound vibration ahead of the spiritual sensation and memory we have of it? To be more precise, how can we think that a body, i.e. a material object, is capable of producing an effect on the soul and of acting upon it? *Mirare potius quod facere aliquid in anima corpus potest* (Rather, you should think it strange that the body can effect something in the soul).¹⁴ This is the paradox and we shall try to extract from it whatever truth it may contain.

Now that we have reached this point in our analysis, we meet the full force of this objection, which gives rise, in some degree, to our previous problem. We hesitate to give physical sounds a place above the spiritual sounds produced by them. However, we must be sure that they do produce them. For anyone who goes to the heart of the problem, the real question is not so much the order to be introduced among the various elements in a perception, but the very possibility of sensation itself. If the soul is really superior to the body, and if it is a contradiction to say that the superior serves as matter upon which an inferior may act so as to produce a change therein, then we cannot grant that the sounding numbers are capable of producing the heard and remembered numbers in the soul. From this it follows necessarily that when we hear, the numbers produced in the soul are not caused by the numbers in the sounds: *non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab iis quos in sonis cognoscimus*.¹⁵ But if not, where do they come from? And how can there be sensation at all?

When the question is put in these terms, it obviously goes beyond the limits of sense knowledge and becomes part of the larger problem of the relationship between soul and body. The human soul is too often

represented as a pure spirit which has fallen and become the body's prisoner. However, from the beginning, as we have seen, the soul was really created with a desire for the body it animates and for its union therewith. Scripture gives no final answer to this problem, and perhaps even reason fails to provide a convincing solution, but our inner experience tells us that we must answer it in this way. Is not our absorbing love of life really the soul's love for its body, a love which will haunt it until that body is returned to it risen and glorious?¹⁶ It is the soul's function to bestow life on the body. Scripture says: "Man became a living soul" (Gen. 2, 7). Now to vivify a body means to give it its unity by maintaining the harmony of its parts and by protecting it against all harmful influences which may threaten it from without.¹⁷ Our problem now is to find out if the soul, in order to make its protection more secure, has to perceive the changes which external objects cause in its body, with the result that sensation would become part and parcel of its function as animating principle.

If we say that animals live, whereas plants merely vegetate, we do so principally because animals have sensations.¹⁸ Thus life and sensation are inseparable, and from this it follows that sensation should be nothing more than a vital function exercised by the soul in and for the body. If this is true, then our whole difficulty arises from the fact that we forget the eminently active role played by the soul in the animation of a living being. Instead of being in the body to suffer and to receive, the soul is there to act and to give. The word itself clearly indicates its function: a soul, i.e. an animating principle, i.e. a spiritual force continually active in the body God has given it to rule.¹⁹ Thus any contradiction in the problem of sensation arises from our notion that sensation is something essentially passive. If sensation turns out to be an action of the soul, perhaps the difficulty will be solved.

In order to find out if this is the case, let us consider sensations which are of the simplest type and most obviously associated with the body, namely pleasure and pain. Their organic character is unmistakable, and the passive aspect of sensation would be difficult to ignore in their case. Nevertheless, it is still possible to account for this without attributing passivity to the soul itself. While the soul, as we assume, is on the alert to ensure the functioning of the body, the body is constantly exposed to the action of other bodies. Sometimes this action is exercised so as to facilitate the body's natural operations, at other times, so as to hinder them. When an external stimulus is harmful to the body, it constitutes a hindrance which renders the exercise of its functions more difficult. Since the soul strives constantly to ensure the exercise of these functions, it must make an effort to remove the ob-

stacle, and only with the greatest difficulty does it compel the corporeal matter subject to it to function as it should. Thus at this moment, the soul's customary role as animating principle calls for additional attention. Consequently, it goes without saying that the object of its attention cannot escape its notice; the soul cannot remain unaware of the corporeal passion which calls for this extra effort on its part, and this is precisely what constitutes the sensation of pain.²⁰ Therefore, we use the phrase "sensation of pain" to designate the act of attention exercised by the soul upon a harmful change which has occurred in its body. It remains to be seen whether this definition admits of wider application.

In the first place, the definition can, with some modifications, be extended to include sensations of pleasure and all other organic sensations. Thus hunger and thirst are merely the special attention which the soul brings to bear upon the lack of food and drink from which its body suffers at the moment. If food and drink are supplied and restore the bodily equilibrium momentarily destroyed by their need, the soul will not remain inattentive to this change and will experience the sensation of pleasure. When excess of food and drink becomes a hindrance to the body's operations, the soul is aware of this and experiences sensations of distress. The same holds true of all other unhealthy conditions of its body, nor can there be any difficulty with facts of this kind.

We can even say that there is no difficulty with any level of sensation. To limit ourselves to the examples chosen, let us consider the sensations of sound produced in us by the recitation of a verse. We all agree that the movement which constitutes the physical and material sound produces an effect on our ear. Now the ear is an organ of an animated body. Consequently, the ear also is animated, i.e. even prior to the moment when this organ undergoes the percussion of outside air which we call sound, the soul was exercising therein its function as animating principle. Are we to believe that at the moment the ear is struck by the sound, the soul ceases to maintain therein the vital motion it maintains there continually? Surely not, because the ear did not cease to be a living ear for a single instant. On the other hand, can we assume that the soul's activity in the ear is exactly the same whether the movement of outside air sets it in motion or not? If so, the soul would be unfaithful to its proper function, which is precisely to watch over all the important changes its body undergoes in order to ensure the proper functioning of its organs. Now if the same thing holds true for auditory, visual, olfactory, gustatory and tactile sensations, then our problem is going to be the other way about. We asked how the body can act on the soul, whereas something altogether

different actually takes place. It is the soul which acts and keeps constant watch in each organ of the body. That body is either in difficulty or contented, and in both cases it wants the soul to know it. The material passion which the body undergoes is, then, a call directed towards the soul by the body, rather than an action exercised on the soul by the body.²¹ It would seem that the attention of the soul is directed to all the changes, favourable and unfavourable, which the body undergoes and that its acts of attention to the unusual changes in the body are our sensations.

This is a doctrine which satisfies the requirements of an absolute spiritualism, and yet does not ignore the fact that sensation is essentially a passive state. If we compare it with the body, the soul is seen to be eminently active. Augustine's language is explicit on the point:²² *exserit attentiores actiones . . . ; quibus actionibus . . . ; has operationes . . . ;* and even the definition we are considering is carefully framed with a view to eliminating any notion of the body's action on the soul. His purpose is to make sensation an activity of the soul within the soul itself. This is really the reason why he defines it in such a roundabout way. The phrase "*non latet*" indicates precisely that the soul is a spiritual force, ever watchful and attentive. In order to sense, it does not have to receive anything from the organs it vivifies; it is enough if the changes undergone by the organs do not escape its notice, and come within the range of its attention. However, from another point of view, sensation remains a passive state, although the word "passive" is used here in a somewhat different sense. Sensation is a passion undergone by the soul as the result of an action the soul exercises on itself,²³ an action it must exercise on itself because of its union with the body. Since the soul cannot receive sensation ready-made from without, it must derive it from itself and, consequently, must give something of its own substance to form it.²⁴ Moreover, even though the soul in sensing undergoes no action but its own, it must, as it were, wear itself out and spend itself on behalf of the body in its effort to accommodate it and take proper care of it. Although the soul is superior to the body, it produces images of this inferior, abandoning itself, so to speak, for the sake of the body.²⁵ This is not the place to examine how domineering and degrading this enslavement to sensation can become.²⁶ Let it suffice for the moment to point out the metaphysical principle from which it derives its true character. It can only be the servitude of a soul which places itself in a body's service while it remains irreducibly transcendent to the body, even in the act of sensation whereby it makes itself subject.

Now that our analysis has been carried to this point, we can see one

conclusion which further analysis will render more and more inevitable, namely that without mind, there is no sensation. To be convinced of this, we have but to expose the spiritual activity involved in sensing a material sound such as the sounding number mentioned above.

In this case, as we have said, an exterior concussion sets the air in motion, the motion of the air reaches the ear and alters the state of this bodily organ. Up to this point we have neither sensation nor any trace of mind; so far, only matter is involved and we are still at the lowest level, that of stimulation. However, the soul turns toward this bodily change and produces within itself the sensation of sound, i.e. the heard sound. Now we have passed from the sphere of the body to that of the mind; in fact, we may have penetrated further than we think, for in reaching the second stage, we have, without knowing it, reached the third stage also. I may speak of hearing a verse and judging the quality of the rhythm in its recitation, but actually, my ear can never enable me to hear a verse. I do not hear even a single syllable, because a syllable is a sound of a certain duration having a beginning, middle and end. When I say that I hear a long syllable, I really mean that up to the moment the sensation ends, my memory preserves the recollection of its beginning and of all its intermediate moments, and adds them together. This is true even of the shortest syllable, because it has some duration, however short it may be. Thus we see that memory is involved even in the briefest of our sensations. Now since memory is more clearly associated with pure thought than with the elementary sensation of sound produced by the soul, the full contribution of the soul to sense knowledge bursts upon our view: it not only passes judgement on sense knowledge, it creates it. We spoke first of rhythms preserved in the memory which enabled us to judge how a verse sounds to our ear. Now we must go a step further: these interior rhythms gather, so to speak, the elementary sensations of sound at the moment when each of them is falling into nothingness, arrange them and combine them. Just as the eye brings together into one field of vision a whole host of objects and points scattered in space, so the memory, that "light of the intervals of time," makes a succession of instants, which would disintegrate without it, co-exist in the sight of consciousness.²⁷ *Deus creator omnium*. Even the perception of these four iambs would be impossible and they themselves would be non-existent as sensations, if a mind's memory did not preserve their successive elements as they appear. Thus we see that a soul transcendent to the body intervenes even at the lowest level of knowledge.

This is a theory which many psychological observations would confirm²⁸ and which is no less valid for visual than for auditory sensa-

tions.²⁹ It represents a decisive stage on the route followed by Augustine's thought. It justifies a classification of the mind's humblest operations as sense judgements, sensation properly so-called, and sense memory; but most important of all, it marks the final liberation of a soul in search of itself but prevented by so many illusions from finding itself. Even when he is expounding the truth to others, Augustine keeps before his mind's eye the image of the man he was but a short time before, the man who could not rise above the senses and so denied the soul's spirituality, granting existence only to things the senses could perceive. His Manichaean experience is not forgotten; he forgets it so little that he makes use of it. Just as his "I think" makes scepticism provide a refutation of scepticism (If I am mistaken, I am), so his analysis of sense knowledge makes Manichaean sensualism provide a refutation of materialism. "Our senses," runs the argument, "perceive nothing but bodies; therefore, everything which exists is a body." Granted! But if that sensation itself is a function of the mind, is not materialism swallowed up in its own victory? This is precisely what has happened before our eyes. Beyond the corporeal light, the only light seen by Mani's disciple, Augustine discovers in the very act which perceives its existence the presence of another light, the active cause of perception, a light which bears witness to the existence of the first: *alia est enim lux quae sentitur oculis; alia qua per oculos agitur ut sentiatur* (There is one light which we perceive through the eye, another by which the eye itself is enabled to perceive). This second light which watches within is that of the soul itself: *haec lux qua ista manifesta sunt, utique intus in anima est*.³⁰ So, contrary to all expectations, the analysis of sensation has brought us back from the exterior of things to the interior of the soul. Let us penetrate more deeply there, because the road which takes the soul to God passes there.

Chapter V

THE FIFTH STEP—RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE

The analysis of sense knowledge has shown that the soul and pure thought exist; analysis of pure thought will show that God exists. Of course this will not be a dialectical demonstration of God's existence by means of abstract concepts; it is rather an experimental verification of it effected by isolating those features of human thought which God alone can account for. The path which lies open before us offers to take us further, so we shall continue up the stream of thought in our endeavour to reach its source. Bodies do not cause sensations; the soul derives them from itself. Now, is the soul likewise the cause of its ideas?

1. The Inner Master

At first sight there seems to be no indication that the soul is the cause of ideas. They seem to come into the mind from without rather than rise from within. To begin with, a man's ideas are not his private property but are held in common with other men. Consequently, they must be exchanged, conveyed; must pass from one mind to another, and this implies that they can be communicated. Moreover, there is one case, of common occurrence, in which such a transfer of ideas from one mind to another is effected, so to speak, before our eyes, namely in the case of teaching. The teacher speaks, and the pupil, who understands his language, acquires the master's ideas through the medium of the spoken words. Here the pupil's soul does not produce its ideas; it seems content to receive them.

Now is this a satisfactory explanation of commonplace facts? If so, we must be prepared to maintain that ideas come to us enclosed in words. This in turn implies that there is a close and invariable agree-

ment between language and thought. But there is no such agreement, and this is easy to prove.¹

Without doubt, one of the first things we learn is that language is the commonest means of transmitting ideas. This is the normal function of language, for whether we speak to others or converse inwardly with ourselves, we use words to express ideas or to designate objects. In short, words are essentially signs.² But let us add that they are not the only signs: words are auditory signs, gestures are visual signs. If someone asks me what a wall is, I can answer by pointing to a wall. By this kind of sign, we can signify things even beyond the world of visible objects, these last being the easiest things of all to designate. A deaf-mute talks, as it were, with the aid of gestures; he asks questions, answers them, makes known to others everything, or almost everything, he wishes to make known. Finally, when we wish to signify an action which we cannot or prefer not to describe in words, we always have one last resource, namely to perform the action. If someone asks me what walking is, I can show him merely by walking; and if I want to learn from a fowler the art of bird-catching, I can do so merely by watching him do it.³ These are the facts, nor do we wish to dispute the fact that things are made known to us both by signs and by the things themselves. We are interested to discover the precise role the word or gesture plays in the act by which they indicate things.

First let us note that the content of the mind is not necessarily determined by the presence of words which seem to convey its ideas. This is proven by the fact that a person who uses words and phrases to indicate what he has conceived mentally is not always successful in getting his hearer to accept what he thinks. The hearer is always the judge of what he hears; in fact he is often a better judge of it than the speaker himself. Let us suppose, for instance, that a man is convinced of the truth of Epicurus' teaching and certain, therefore, that the soul is mortal. This man may have occasion to expound for his hearers the proofs for the soul's immortality as developed by philosophers more clear-sighted than Epicurus. Although he expounds them, this professor does not know if they are true; in fact he is convinced that they are utterly false, and yet this circumstance does not prevent one of his hearers, whose mind is less fettered by the senses and better able to grasp spiritual truths, from understanding that these proofs are true. Here, then, we have a teacher who, in the act of teaching, does not know that the soul is immortal and yet uses the same words he would use if he did know it; and a student who knows that the soul is immortal because his teacher uses words which he (the teacher) thinks are incapable of proving it. Are we going to maintain that the teacher can

teach something he doesn't know?⁴ The fact of the matter is that the same formulas do not have the same truth-value for different minds.

We can go further. There are occasions, and they are of frequent occurrence, when discussion sets adversaries at odds over the same formula simply because they both give it a totally different meaning. In this case, the difficulty is not the truth of the thoughts signified; it is the meaning of the signs themselves that provides the occasion for misunderstanding. Let us take an example. In the course of conversation, my companion points out that animals are superior to man. The paradox angers me and I hasten to object. But it soon becomes apparent that my companion had in mind certain marks of physical superiority which animals actually possess, whereas I was thinking of man's unquestioned pre-eminence in the spiritual order. Can we maintain, then, that words really cause ideas in us, when the same words are understood by different minds in different ways?⁵ The fact is that identical formulas do not necessarily have the same meaning for all who hear them.

Let us go further still. Arguments are not always caused by the fact that different meanings are given to the same words; they arise sometimes because a meaning is given even to words which have not been spoken. We often hear badly, and yet readily enter into long disputes about something we have not heard correctly. For instance, you claim you have been told that in Punic a certain word means "pity"; I claim that you do not remember what you were told, and insist that the word means "mercy." Actually, I thought I heard you use an entirely different word, namely the word "faith," although it bears no resemblance to "pity." I reproach you for not remembering what you were told, and at the same time I do not know what you said. The fact of the matter is that, if I had heard you correctly, I should not have been surprised that the word could mean both "pity" and "mercy,"⁶ but it does happen frequently that a dispute arises over things even though the words for them have not been used.

Thus Augustine saw clearly that conversations are often reduced to parallel monologues. We think we are exchanging ideas, and in reality it is only words. Nor do the words we hear always convey the ideas of those who use them; they merely awaken our own ideas within us; we are only given what we already have.

Someone will object that these are misapprehensions, which are, after all, neither intrinsic to speech nor the rule in conversation. Augustine shows that he was aware of this when he said: "I grant that to hear the words correctly and to know their meaning is to know the thought of the person who uttered them."⁷ However, once this is

granted, the question raised remains untouched. Since we have established that there is a definite lack of agreement between language and thought in certain cases, perhaps at other times their agreement is not as close as we imagine. Let us see what happens when two speakers use the same words in the same sense. When a teacher instructs a pupil, does he put into the pupil's mind the ideas signified by the words he uses? In short, is there such a thing as teaching?

To answer this question, we must examine all the cases involved by considering the various types of instruction a teacher can give his pupil. If it is a matter of instructing someone about the nature of sense objects, or in other words of teaching him about certain material objects he does not know, the problem is easy to cope with. Experience which is both unvarying and decisive enables us to set down the rule that we never put into a mind other ideas than those which things have already put there. For example, a student studying the text of Scripture reads in Daniel (3, 94): *Et saraballae eorum non sunt immutatae*, and asks what the young men's *saraballae* are, which remained unharmed in the midst of the flames. His teacher tells him they are head-dresses. Now he is informed, provided however that he knows what head-dresses are, i.e. provided he has seen men's heads and the article of clothing used to cover them. But let us suppose that the student wants more precise information and asks what sort of head-dress is called a *saraballa*. Then the teacher can describe it for him, provided he uses words or gestures which correspond to things the student has already seen. He can also draw it for him or show it to him, but in this case it will be the sight of the thing and not the words that tells him what it is.⁸ In any case, the teacher alone will not put into the student's mind any idea which was not there already, or whose component elements were not there beforehand.

But the case is entirely different, or apparently so, when the teacher has to teach the meaning of an idea rather than the nature of a thing. Everyone knows how teachers go about it: they use a sentence which embodies a definition of the idea and their hearers understand it. We conclude from this that the teacher has put a new idea into the minds of his hearers. Actually, we are utterly mistaken, because experience should lead us to the opposite conclusion: if it proves anything at all, the fact that a student understands his teacher proves that the teacher teaches him nothing. Any meaning which words are to convey to the minds of hearers must be present in those minds beforehand; these minds clothe the words they hear in the meaning they have beforehand, and only so do the words they hear become intelligible. Then there is the classic example given by Plato in the *Meno*. Socrates questions an

ignorant slave about certain problems in geometry and establishes that the slave is capable of discovering the truth for himself. Since this ignorant man can answer questions when asked, he must have been able to answer them before they were asked. Consequently, what more absurd than to claim that his questioner taught him anything? Of course it does happen that a person may say that a certain proposition is false and, on being questioned further, see at once that it is true; but this is due entirely to imperfect vision, which prevented him from seeing the whole problem at a glance. In order to have him see clearly the inner light which illumines him, we must ask him partial questions until he does see the whole. But these questions which serve to guide him are not asked in order to implant in him truths he does not know; they merely invite him to enter into himself that he may acquire knowledge of the truths already there.⁹

Consider moreover the attitudes a hearer may have in the presence of his teacher; these are not passive merely, but active. Sometimes the teacher's instruction fails utterly to convince the hearer and to produce certitude in him. The student believes or does not believe, forms an opinion or remains indifferent. In any case, he does not know anything with certain knowledge, and consequently has been taught nothing. At other times, the student realizes that the teacher is mistaken and that what he says is false. In this case also he has been taught nothing. Finally it may happen that the teacher is right and that the student is aware of this. But since the student sees that what is said is true, he must know it already, and know it of himself, because no one can discern the truth for him or in his stead. Consequently in this case also, the teacher has taught him nothing.¹⁰

Thus, from whatever angle we approach the problem, we are forced to the conclusion, at once inevitable and paradoxical, that we never learn anything. But this *nusquam discere* (to learn under no circumstances) does not mean that teaching is a waste of time; it means rather that the two acts of teaching and learning consist in something very different from what is commonly believed. From now on our task will be to determine their true nature.

When we try to explain how the mind acquires its knowledge, we are struck at once by the exact parallel which exists between the problem of the acquisition of ideas and that of the acquisition of sensations. Our analysis of the act of learning has brought to light a twofold fact, namely that we cannot be taught an idea unless we discover it within ourselves, nor a thing unless we are shown it. If we compare this conclusion with those reached in our study of sensation, we see that they agree exactly. Whether we know an intelligible or a sense object, our

knowing is effected within and from within, without the introduction of anything from the outside. Thus in both orders of knowledge, Augustine's doctrine seems to find the same law, which we might call the law of the mind's innerness. Outside the soul there may be, and indeed there should be, things to warn and advise, or signs to invite the soul to enter into itself and consult the truth there; but its own spontaneity remains inviolable, for even though it seizes upon such signs in order to interpret them, it is always from within that it derives even the substance of what it seems to receive. It remains to determine what the soul finds within itself, and what enables it to draw it forth.

When considered in relation to the world outside, the soul appears endowed with an indomitable spontaneity, but when we examine this spontaneity, we find that it can be explained in different ways. If the mind gets from itself what it seems to receive, this may be due either to the fact that the mind finds it formed within beforehand, or that it finds itself capable of producing it, or that it receives from within what it cannot receive from without. Thus further analysis is needed to enable us to choose between these hypotheses.

At first sight, the simplest solution to the problem seems to be Innatism, as it is called. In its strict sense, the term means that the ideas of things are present in the soul from birth. Plato gave the doctrine its most logical form. If the soul is to possess all ideas at the time of birth, it must have contemplated them before birth, its union with the body must have made it forget them, and stimulations from without must be so many occasions for reviving this obscured knowledge. In such a doctrine, nothing enters the soul from outside and everything is found within: to learn is to remember.

Augustine never says anywhere that the soul exists before the body. On the other hand, he does use the term "forgetfulness" and "reminiscence," apparently in the sense these terms have in the Platonic doctrine of the soul's pre-existence, and this is especially true of his early writings. Consequently, it is very difficult to decide whether Augustine, during his early period, adopts the Platonic view, or whether he uses these terms even then in the Augustinian sense of reminiscence without pre-existence, a reminiscence we shall have to define later. In view of the unmistakable language he uses during the years 387-89,¹¹ and the manner of his subsequent retraction,¹² I am inclined to think that at first Augustine accepted the genuine Platonic doctrine. This opinion seems all the more probable if we bear in mind that he never rejects as certainly false the notion that the soul may exist before the body.¹³ Thus it is possible that during the early days of his conversion Augus-

tine combined the theory of the soul's pre-existence with its natural complement, the doctrine of Platonic reminiscence. But at the same time we can be absolutely certain that in fully developed Augustinism, Platonic reminiscence is completely freed from the hypothesis of the soul's pre-existence. How, then, are we to explain the constant recurrence of this Platonic formula in Augustine's writings? In what sense does it remain true to say that learning is remembering?

It is decidedly not true in the sense that learning is a kind of recollection of the past. If the soul had contemplated the ideas previously so that it has merely to recall them, then it would have to possess all knowledge accessible to man. Now this is not the case. The experiment Socrates tries in the *Meno* succeeds only if it deals with purely intelligible knowledge, i.e. knowledge accessible to the intellect alone. This would apply to geometric truths and to truths relating to the nature of the soul or of God, but it does not apply to knowledge of the sensible order. Every practical art and technical skill presupposes an experience of things which nothing can replace. In this order observation of facts reigns supreme, and we know that no one coming into this world brings with him a knowledge of astronomy or medicine. Take a simple example: if our sight distinguishes white from black, it is obviously not because it distinguished them before it was created in our body by God. Why suppose that it is different with the mind? No matter what the hypothesis, the fact remains that there is no reminiscence in the realm of sense objects. People like Pythagoras of Samos, who believe that in this life they remember experiences of a former life, are simply victims of memory's illusions and false recollections, as we all are in our dreams.¹⁴ We must, therefore, find some other solution.¹⁵

The second solution proposed assumes that the soul is capable of producing its own knowledge. Here we shall not be detained by objections such as those raised against pre-existence and reminiscence, but there will be new difficulties which reminiscence avoided. No matter how we choose to explain the experiment recorded in the *Meno*, the fact remains that when an ignorant person is asked the proper questions, he finds within himself the intelligible truths about which he is questioned. Plato may have been mistaken in admitting a prior existence wherein the soul knew such truths, but he was certainly not mistaken in recognizing that every human reason discovers these truths within itself if it turns its gaze towards them. Now finding is not making. For this reason, even though we must reject reminiscence, at least to the extent that it implies pre-existence, Platonism provides us with one undeniable fact, and the doctrine of the *Meno* with one definite truth, namely that the manner in which the mind arrives at truth does

not allow us to assume that the mind is the author of truth. From the year 387 onwards, Augustine emphasized the contradiction involved in the notion of a temporal soul engendering eternal truths by itself.¹⁶ Thus the mind, in conceiving truth, gets more from itself than it contains. Whence come such riches? The abiding truth in Platonism, a truth which should survive the rejection of a reminiscence of ideas known in the past, is that man does not make truth; he finds it. He finds it, moreover, under those circumstances in which truth commands attention, always in the same way and to the same effect, of individuals totally different and complete strangers to one another, regardless of differences of race, language or temperament. How is this remarkable fact to be explained?

Let us take any truth upon which minds agree, e.g. a simple numerical proposition such as "seven plus three equals ten," or a moral or philosophical truth like the definition of wisdom as "a science whose mere possession can confer happiness on those who have it." We have but to formulate such propositions and others like them to have their truth flash immediately upon every mind. How is this possible? This is the first question to discuss if we are to provide a sound solution for the problem of knowledge. If we assume that the mind of man is capable of creating its own ideas, this whole array of facts becomes unintelligible and agreement between minds becomes a profound mystery. It is true that there are as many minds as there are men (*tot sunt mentes hominum quot homines sunt*), and that none of us can see anything of another's mind, nor another anything of ours (*nec ergo de tua mente aliquid cerno, nec tu de mea*), and yet these minds which are hermetically closed to one another find that they have identical contents. If then there are laws of numbers, for example, or an idea of wisdom, which you can see without my knowing it and I can see without your knowing it, and which neither of us can teach the other (since nothing is ever learned from without), and which is found, none the less, to be identical in both of us, how we can assume that such truths are made by both of us?¹⁷

To think that such agreement is the work of our own minds is to forget the conditions under which the agreement is possible and to give up any attempt to explain the concurrence of minds in the acceptance of a common truth. In the sensible order, we see at once that if colours, sounds and touches are the same in different individuals, it is to be explained by the fact that sense objects exist independently of the senses which perceive them.¹⁸ There is one sun and one light for all to see, and if two persons can see the same thing, it is simply because that thing is distinct from them both. In the intelligible order

also, the truths seen by different minds at one and the same time are distinct from those minds.¹⁹

This fact is both the cause and cure of our mistaken notion regarding the role of language. Undoubtedly, if we take language in itself, its usefulness is no small thing, but we are mistaken regarding its true role. We call some men masters because they speak and, as a rule, with practically no perceptible lapse of time or no lapse of time at all, we understand them. We learn inwardly as soon as their words are uttered outwardly, and conclude from this that they have taught us something. And yet it is not their thoughts we learn. We do not even try to learn their thoughts. Who would be foolish enough to send his boy to school to learn what the master thinks? Masters merely explain, with the help of words, the disciplines they profess to teach; then those who are called students search within themselves to see if the things their masters tell them are true. To the extent of their abilities, they conduct this examination with their eyes fixed on the truth within and in this way are instructed, establishing for themselves that the things told them are true. Who then is the real master? Is it the teacher? As far as the truth is concerned, the teacher is in the same position as his student: he is not so much "teaching" as "taught." The real master is that Truth which belongs neither to teacher nor student but is common to both and present in both; the Truth which instructs them both in the same way and thus brings them necessarily to agree.

In Augustine therefore, God receives the title of inner master because He is the source of agreement between minds. This doctrine is sketched in the conclusion of the *De Beata Vita*,²⁰ proposed in the *Soliloquies*,²¹ developed throughout the *De Magistro*, and explicitly stated in its conclusion. In everything we learn we have but one master, namely the inner truth which presides over the soul, i.e. Christ, the unchangeable power and eternal wisdom of God.²² Every rational soul seeks His counsel, but His truth is revealed to souls according as their will is good or evil. When I speak or am spoken to, it is He who reveals one and the same truth to the mind of speaker and hearer alike.²³ This is what God tells us in the Gospel: *Unus est magister vester, Christus* (One is your master, Christ).²⁴ Philosophy accepts this on faith and makes us understand it. No matter what subject they try to learn, all men are in the same school and fellow students of one and the same master: *in una schola communem magistrum in caelis habemus*.²⁵ The Word is the inner master and through Him the union of men in one and the same truth becomes possible.

Thus in Augustine's system, exhaustive analysis of all true knowledge ends in proof of God's existence. Owing to this, the Platonic doc-

trine of reminiscence undergoes a profound transformation when it becomes a part of Augustinism. Such truth as is enduring in the doctrine of the *Meno* indicates that the mind discovers the intelligible rather than creates it. Plato's error was to conceive some sort of pre-existence in order to account for this fact. Actually Plato was right in saying that the soul finds the truth within itself, but he was wrong in concluding from this that the soul remembers truth as one remembers knowledge of the past. The fact is that truth is always within our grasp, thanks to the inner master who teaches it to us,²⁶ if we but pay attention to his teaching. Thus if Saint Augustine continues to use the terms "remembrance" and "reminiscence" in the explanation of his thought, we are to understand them in a sense quite different from that of Plato. The Platonic recollection of the past gives way to that Augustinian memory of the present whose role becomes more and more important.²⁷ Over and beyond our knowledge and our thoughts, there are things of which we do not think as yet, but which we can know for all that because God ceases not to teach us. To learn these things of the Word is what Augustine terms indifferently "to learn," "to remember" or even simply "to think." In Augustinism, thought (*cogitatio*) is merely the movement by which the soul gathers, assembles and collects all the hidden knowledge it possesses and has not yet discovered, in order to be able to fix its gaze upon it.²⁸ Really, therefore, thinking, learning and remembering are all one to the soul.

At the same time we can judge from this in what sense and within what limits it is proper to speak of an Augustinian Innatism. This sense excludes any sort of Platonic pre-existence, as we have seen already, but it also excludes the notion that God has deposited in us, once and for all, ideas ready-made, and that we have but to look for them there in order to find them. As we have indicated already, all our knowledge of the external world presupposes sensation. Undoubtedly, sensations come, in a certain sense, from within,²⁹ but if we consider their respective content, they contain nothing which does not reach the soul through the senses. On the other hand, in regard to the knowledge which represents spiritual realities, in order to account for the fact that we have such knowledge, it is unnecessary to assume that God has bestowed on us in advance the ideas of this knowledge. In the case of the soul, for example, the mere fact that we have a soul enables us to know the soul; we make use of our intellect and thus discover what it is; we explore the content of our consciousness and thus form our ideas of charity, joy, peace, patience, i.e. our ideas of all the virtues which bring us nearer to God and of all the vices which take us further from Him. Finally it is in the mind that we discover God Himself as

the source of the truth which He teaches us there and which we contemplate there.³⁰ We are justified, therefore, in saying that "nativistic" Innatism has no place in the doctrine of St. Augustine, because in Augustinism it is through the senses that the soul knows things relating to the body, and through itself that it knows things relating to the mind: *mens ipsa, sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum rerum per semetipsam, ergo et semetipsam per seipsam novit, quoniam est incorporea*.³¹

Although we have eliminated Innatism understood in the sense of a congenital gift, two important connotations of the term remain applicable to the doctrine of St. Augustine. In the first place, it is legitimate to attribute to him a certain Innatism in the sense that the term indicates an opposition to Aristotelian empiricism, which derives all our knowledge from sensation. As we have seen, Augustine requires sensation only to account for the content of our knowledge of the corporeal; incorporeal realities such as the soul and God, we know through the soul. Here we have the basic reason why proofs for the existence of God, in their finished form, must proceed by way of the soul in Augustine's system. In a doctrine in which the spiritual is known only by analogy with the sensible, it is legitimate to rise directly from the sensible world to God. Such a method is not applicable in Augustinism, because here the mind knows God through the soul.

Secondly, in a more general sense, we can say that in Augustinism any knowledge, whether its object be corporeal or incorporeal, implies an innate element to the extent that it is a truth. Here also, the Innatism of which we speak is not an original gift bestowed on the soul once and for all; it means merely that in any true knowledge, there is an element which comes neither from things nor from ourselves, but from a source which is more intimate to us than our own inner selves. We might be tempted to substitute "Intrinsicism" for "Innatism" in an effort to indicate the radically "non-exterior" character of our true knowledge, but this would be simply to substitute one metaphor for another, and one false conception for another. The truth is not born in us nor with us, although it precedes our birth and has attended us from birth; nor does it come from within, although it is there that we find it and through there that it must pass. Truth comes from God and since it is truer to say that we are in God than that God is in us, the Augustinian soul passes through itself, so to speak, on its way to meet the divine master and thus passes through itself only to go beyond. Now what is this unique relationship which we can call neither "extrinsic" nor "intrinsic"? Perhaps we shall be in a better position to give an answer after we have examined the Augustinian doctrine of illumination.

2. *The Light of the Soul*

God is the interior master. How does He make Himself understood by us, and what, precisely, is the nature of His teaching? In order to make his thought clear on this difficult point, Augustine usually makes use of another metaphor, namely *illumination*. Illumination is rightly considered such a distinctive feature of his philosophy that we commonly call his theory of knowledge "the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination." Now what does this metaphor mean?

In the first place, it assumes that the act whereby the mind knows truth is comparable to the act whereby the eye sees a body: *menti hoc est intelligere, quod sensui videre*.³² Moreover, it assumes that as objects must be made visible by light before they can be perceived by the sight, so scientific truths must be made intelligible by a kind of light before they can be grasped by the mind. Finally, it assumes that as the sun is the source of the physical light which makes things visible, so God is the source of the spiritual light which makes the sciences intelligible to the mind.³³ Thus God is to our minds what the sun is to our sight; as the sun is the source of light, so God is the source of truth.

As is the case with most of Augustine's metaphors relating to knowledge, illumination is presented with perfect clarity in the *Soliloquies*. It takes shape at the point where a philosophical doctrine and texts of Scripture meet and mingle in an effort to find a formula for it. First we find Plato's comparison of the Good, the sun of the intelligible world, with the corporeal sun which lights the world of the senses.³⁴ The comparison came to Augustine by way of Neo-Platonism. It is one of the themes which recur most frequently in his teaching, and Augustine remarked on many occasions that it came from the writings of the Platonists. He commends them again and again for understanding and teaching that the spiritual principle of all things must be at the same time the cause of their existence, the light of their knowledge and the rule of their lives. Now it must be the light of their knowledge because it does for them what the sun does for objects. According to Plotinus, God has the same relationship to the soul as the sun has to the moon, which reflects the sun's light.³⁵ Thus there can be no doubt in this case about the source whence Augustine draws his inspiration. On the other hand, he is satisfied with this philosophical doctrine only because it agrees with the teaching of Scripture. In Augustine's own words, the Plotinian philosophy of illumination is "consonant with the Gospel" (*consonans Evangelio*), and in a very special way, in harmony with the Gospel of St. John,³⁶ although many other sacred texts give it the support of their divine authority.³⁷ Thus, in Augustinism, God be-

comes the Father of intelligible light (*pater intelligibilis lucis*), and the Father of our illumination (*pater illuminationis nostrae*).³⁸ Let us try to discover what ideas these images suggest.

The comparison between God and an intelligible sun serves first of all to point out the difference between a thing which is intelligible of itself and a thing which must be made intelligible if it is ever to become so. The sun exists, it is bright, and it makes bright the objects it illumines. There is a great difference, then, between something naturally visible, such as the light of the sun, and something visible only because of a borrowed light, such as the earth when illumined by the sun. In the same way, we must distinguish between God considered in His own Being, the intelligibility of God which is independent of everything but itself, and the sciences which derive their intelligibility from that of God.³⁹ Thus the comparison allows to truths perceived by the soul no more light of their own than that possessed by things when deprived of the sun which illumines them. However, we must remember that this is only a comparison and that even so, it is the intelligibility of the sciences rather than their comprehension by the mind that is here traced to the divine light. This last is one of the points we shall have occasion to take up again.⁴⁰

Moreover, there is evidence to show that the doctrine of illumination is a mere metaphor and that it remains a metaphor even when Augustine refrains from taking it in a figurative sense. Actually, the doctrine stands in contrast to Manichaean materialism which imagined God a physical and sensible light.⁴¹ Now it would be impossible for Augustine to confuse intelligibility with mere material visibility after Plotinus had pointed out the radical difference between the sensible and the intelligible light.⁴² In his endeavour to dissociate himself as completely as possible from his earlier errors, he even goes so far as to maintain that in the strict sense God is light, and that He is everything else only in figure. On the one hand God is light in the strict sense, in contradistinction to those expressions of Scripture which speak of Him as stone and such like, because, in the strict sense, He makes us know as light makes us see.⁴³ But on the other hand, it is obvious that if we apply the term "light" to anything which causes knowledge, it will not do to say simply that God also is light; we shall have to say that He alone is light truly and essentially, far more truly and essentially light than that of the sun, which illumines us but is only a sensible imitation of divine intelligibility.⁴⁴ By a kind of inversion of the metaphor, the divine influence becomes the positive term and the visible light the image derived therefrom: God does not act like the sun, it is the sun which acts like God. In any case and regardless of our

interpretation, the formula assumes that one of the terms is taken in a figurative sense. It must therefore remain a comparison.

The real difficulty begins when we try to specify what is due to God in the act of knowing and what is due to man. To begin with, it is well to note that divine illumination, far from relieving man of the necessity of having an intellect of his own, rather takes it for granted. Thus there can be no fusion between the human mind and the divine light; on the contrary, a light which illumines is one thing, the thing which that light illumines is another: the eyes are not the sun. On this point therefore, we cannot be mistaken.⁴⁵ It is a point on which Augustine gave precise details over and over again in his endeavour to remove all uncertainty as to his real meaning. Even if all the texts adduced in support of this interpretation fail to prove it,⁴⁶ there are still enough left to show undeniably that the existence of a *mens intellectualis* distinct from the illumination it receives cannot be questioned. Occasionally Augustine gives it the technical term *intelligentia* or *intellectus*,⁴⁷ and states explicitly that the intellect is a creature distinct from God, as the created and the contingent are distinct from the uncreated and the unchangeable.⁴⁸ On this point therefore, there can be no difficulty.

We must go further. The intellectual mind which Augustine assigns to man as his own and which is, therefore, created, can be called a *natural light*, if we may be allowed to use a phrase which Augustine does not employ but which does no violence to his thought. The result of divine illumination is not, normally at least, a supernatural illumination; on the contrary, to be the receptive subject of divine illumination belongs by definition to the nature of the human intellect. There is here no fusion with the supernatural order nor emanation therefrom: *potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente Conditore, subjuncta, sic ista videat . . .* (We should rather think that the nature of the intellectual mind was so constituted as to be subject to intelligible things in the natural order, as the Creator disposed, and to see these things as . . .).⁴⁹ The insistent repetition of the terms *natura* and *naturalis ordo*, as well as the affirmation that this nature and natural order were created by God prove beyond doubt that the whole cognitive process moves within the limits of nature. Thus God does not take the place of our intellect when we think the truth. His illumination is needed only to make our intellects capable of thinking the truth, and this by virtue of a natural order of things expressly established by Him. This doctrine gives a precise meaning to countless texts in which Augustine says that the divine light shines for all men,

whether sinners or saints; that it is present in every man who comes into this world, and that it is never absent from us even if we neglect to turn to it. In as much as man is endowed with an intellect, he is by nature a being illumined by God.⁵⁰

How is divine illumination brought to bear on the mind? It is here that our real difficulties begin and we shall not be rid of them unless we distinguish two cases, namely that in which we know created objects by means of the divine light but without seeing the divine light itself—this is the normal case; and secondly that in which we do see the divine light—this is a case of mystical experience. In the first case, the chief characteristic of illumination is its immediacy, i.e. it acts on the soul directly without passing through any intermediary. It is in this way that God presides over the human mind: *nulla natura interposita praesidet*.⁵¹ Augustine gives expression to the same idea when he reminds us that although the soul is not God, there is nothing in creation as near to God as the soul. On the other hand, the soul, by being subject to God, is subject to certain "intelligible realities" (*res intelligibiles*), which are the divine ideas themselves. Augustine uses various terms for them, such as *ideae*, *formae*, *species*, *rationes* or *regulae*.⁵² In any case, the ideas are the archetypes of every species or of every individual created by God. Everything was created in conformity with a certain model, and the type to which man belongs is obviously not the same as that of the horse. Thus each thing was created according to its proper model and since everything was created by God, the models of things, or ideas, cannot subsist anywhere but in the mind of God. Now if we bring these two conclusions together, we obtain a third, namely that in its operations, the human intellect is immediately subject to God's ideas.

Since the ideas subsist in God's intellect, they must share in His essential attributes. Like God Himself, they are eternal, unchangeable and necessary. Indeed, they are not formed as creatures are: they are rather the forms of everything else. They have no beginning or end and are the causes of everything which does have a beginning and an end. Thus, when we say that the mind is immediately subject to the divine ideas, we make it subject to the unchangeable and the necessary. Now in what way is it subject to them, and to what degree?

One interpretation of Augustine's reply to this question would have us say that the subjection of the human mind to the divine ideas means simply that the mind sees the ideas. There is no lack of texts to support this interpretation. Augustine sometimes speaks of the mind as seeing the ideas: *eas intueri posse . . . oculo suo interiore atque intelligibili* (can see them with its inner, intelligible eye).⁵³ He says explicitly that

we see the truth not only through God but in Him as well,⁵⁴ and this amounts to saying that we see the truth in the divine truth itself and that it is our sight of the divine truth which enables us in turn to conceive truths in ourselves.⁵⁵ The question, then, is whether Augustine really concedes us a direct view of God's ideas and the knowledge of things in God which would necessarily follow from this view. When the question is put in these terms, we must reply that in the order of normal, not mystical, knowledge, he grants us neither the intuition of the eternal reasons nor the sight of God's light itself.

Let us remember first of all that Augustine's metaphors, however expressive they may be, are still metaphors. If we examine his language carefully, we shall see that he has a sense of mystery and that he is consciously trying to find words for the ineffable. In this context, to see means to see without eyes (*invisibiliter videre*); to adhere to the truth means to have contact with the truth but not by way of bodily contact, which is after all the only type of contact we know by experience (*incorporaliter* or *miro quodam eodemque incorporali modo adhaerere*). Comparisons taken from the world of the senses to express something which transcends the intelligible itself are of no great importance. Fundamentally, we say that there is a direct contact between God and the mind and that we have no means of representing it adequately.

If the phrase "see the ideas" fails to explain how we do see them, may we not hope to find the explanation in the passages where Augustine says that we see the truth in the truth of God? Here also we have to do with a comparison and nothing more. Scripture says (Acts 17, 28) that in God we have our life, our movement and our being (*in illo enim vivimus et movemur et sumus*),⁵⁶ and in fact we exist, act and live only in virtue of His omnipotence. Therefore, just as we subsist because we are immersed, so to speak, in the divine power which makes us to be, in like manner we think the truth only in the light of God's truth. However striking these formulas of Augustine's may be, they express merely the complete ontological dependence of the human intellect with respect to God from whom it derives its being, activity and truth. If God's action ceases, His creatures cease to act and to be;⁵⁷ if the illuminating presence of the truth is withdrawn from man, his mind is plunged at once in darkness.⁵⁸ On this point, Augustine's texts can tell us nothing further.⁵⁹

Finally, it is certain that knowledge in the divine ideas is in no wise a knowledge of things in these ideas. To see the ideas of God would be to see God. Now it is only too evident that we do not see Him, because we find it difficult to fashion proofs for His existence which direct sight

of Him would render unnecessary. Moreover, to see things in God's ideas would be to know them without having to see them. God knows all things, even material things, *a priori* because they are merely copies of His ideas. Thus if we had full knowledge of God's ideas, we should know material things without having to perceive these things themselves. Now it is evident that illumination does not dispense with the knowledge of the senses, at least as far as the material universe is concerned. Sensations do nothing more than call us back to the inner light, but they are needed to do this much for us. A person who lacks one of the senses lacks thereby the knowledge which depends on that sense: *nec idonea est ipsa mens nostra, in ipsis rationibus quibus facta sunt, ea videre apud Deum, ut per hoc sciamus quot et quanta qualiaque sint, etiamsi non ea videamus per corporis sensus* (nor is our mind capable by itself of seeing them [i.e. creatures] in God, in the ideas by which they were made, so as to know by this vision their number, magnitude and qualities, even though we do not see them through the senses of the body).⁶⁰ Thus, from whatever point of view we consider it, Augustinian illumination cannot be interpreted as an intuition of the content of God's ideas.

Clear as this conclusion is, it raises as many problems as it solves. From what we have said it follows that the human intellect, illumined by God, is capable of forming true knowledge of things perceived through the senses. There is, therefore, a necessary cooperation between divine illumination, human intellect and bodily senses in our knowledge of external things and of truths relating to them. But what share should we assign to each of these causes in the formation of our ideas? Does Augustine see in sensation only an occasion of remembering the idea, as did Plato; or does he see in it a kind of matter from which our intellect extracts the idea, as did Aristotle? In my opinion, he sees neither.

It is quite evident that Augustine did not teach Platonic reminiscence, because, as we have seen, we discover truth not in memories deposited previously in the soul, but in the divine light which is constantly present there. Although he used Platonic language at first, he restricted its meaning later on and, in a way to remove all doubt, made it serve to express his own doctrine of illumination.⁶¹ To see things in God's light implies, not Platonic memory of the past, but Augustinian memory of the present, and this is something altogether different.

Are we to say, on the other hand, that Augustine holds for an abstraction of ideas which begins with the sensible, after the manner of Aristotle? In my opinion, the postulates for the problem differ too widely in the two doctrines to have their solutions coincide.⁶² In the

first place, while it is true that in both systems man is unable to form any idea of material things without the help of sensations, sensation in Augustinism is something very different from sensation in Aristotelianism. As we have seen, according to Augustine, sensation is an action exercised by the soul; according to Aristotle, it is a passion undergone by the soul. Thus the point of departure is different in the two doctrines and this initial divergence regarding the matter on which the intellect carries out its operation cannot but have some effect on their notions of that operation itself. By definition, Aristotle's abstraction has its beginning in the sensible, and to his way of thinking, the sensible implies that there is a level common to the soul and things which makes it possible for things to act on the soul and to change it. In Aristotle, the sensitive soul, considered as sensitive, is not above the sensible body, considered as sensible and thus it is possible for the body to act on the soul by placing in it the species from which the soul derives the intelligible by way of abstraction. Now in view of the absolute transcendence Augustine concedes the soul in relation to the body, he cannot grant that the soul receives the sensible from the object, and consequently sensation and image must be produced directly by the soul. Thus, in strict terms, the Aristotelian sensible order exists in nature as Augustine conceives it, but it does not exist in the soul.⁶³ Consequently, there is nothing for abstraction to deal with, nor is it needed to make the sensible intelligible, since the mind, once installed in its own domain, works from the start on the purely immaterial.⁶⁴

It seems clear, therefore, that authentic Augustinism has no need of an agent intellect with functions more or less like those assigned it later by Thomas Aquinas, but the question can be settled more directly and, if we may be allowed to entertain such high hopes, definitively. As a matter of fact, Augustine took care to state in explicit terms that divine illumination deals with intelligibles to the exclusion of sensibles. In the well-known and widely discussed passage where he says that our mind sees the intelligibles in a light *sui generis*, i.e. in an incorporeal light, as the eye sees the visible object in a corporeal light, these two questions follow almost immediately: "Finally, why does it happen only in the case of intelligibles that a person, when questioned properly, finds answers which belong to any given discipline even though he does not know the discipline? Why is it that a person cannot do the same with sensibles unless he has seen them while living in this body, or believed them on the information of others who made known by word or writing what they themselves had experienced?"⁶⁵ Thus in Augustine's view, the fact that there is no knowledge of the sensible without previous sense experience condemns Platonic reminis-

cence beyond hope of appeal. In other words, if there were reminiscence, it would supply us at one and the same time with a *science* of the sensible and a *wisdom* of the intelligible. Now we have no science which comes to us from within, consequently we must replace the Platonic notion of reminiscence with that of illumination, which deals only with the purely intelligible. And this is precisely the reason why science, the rational knowledge of temporal things, is so inferior to wisdom, the intellectual knowledge of eternal things.⁶⁶ The result is that Augustine deliberately removes from divine illumination any knowledge which our intellect might abstract from the sensible and even denies that our intellect can have the sensible as its object. Only reason has dealings with the sensible; as for the intellect, it busies itself only with the intelligible order and has nothing to abstract from material things. The divine light it receives is not given it for that purpose. But, if illumination does not abstract, what does it do?

Of this question we can say without any exaggeration that it has tested the acumen of many generations of historians. The most obvious postulate for the problem is that there are no postulates. Augustine tells us neither how the intellect operates nor what it does. Some historians say simply that this is a serious lacuna;⁶⁷ others, while admitting that Augustine said nothing of the sort,⁶⁸ do their utmost to fill the lacuna by attributing to Augustine's thought an abstractive activity such as we have mentioned. And why should it not be legitimate to complete his teaching on this important point by placing the missing piece in the space left for it? However, it seems to me that there is a simpler hypothesis to consider, namely that there is no lacuna here provided we look at things from Augustine's point of view and refuse to base our arguments on principles he did not accept. Actually, in Augustine there is no problem involving an *Umsetzung* (transformation) of the sensible into the intelligible. If he did not solve this problem, the reason was that he had no such problem to solve. If we insist that he solve it, then we do not fill a lacuna in his doctrine but change it into something else and in doing so take on ourselves the responsibility of foisting it on him.

Let us remember first of all that Augustine's interest lies not so much in the formation of a concept as in the formation of a knowledge of truth. In his teaching, everything happens as if there were no need to account for the general character of general ideas. Instead of finding fault with him for this or remedying the situation more or less arbitrarily, we might do well to see why he was not struck by the importance of the problem.

Augustine thinks of the universe as matter in which the divine ideas

have implanted the intelligible.⁶⁹ Everything in it is order, measure and number, the forms of bodies being reduced to certain numerical proportions, and even the operations of life taking place according to the intelligible laws of numbers. Strictly speaking, the universe is intelligible to a mind that is capable of knowing it as such. Now it is very true that the world of things, by reason of its corporeity, cannot enter the mind, which is hierarchically superior to it, and for this reason abstraction properly so called is impossible in such a doctrine. There is no communication between substances in the direction of body to soul, but owing to the superiority of the soul over the body, there can be communication between substances in the direction of soul to body. The inferior cannot act on the superior, but the superior can act on the inferior. Because of this, the Augustinian soul can decipher directly, in the numbers of the changes undergone by its body, the numbers of the exterior bodies which produce these changes. Malebranche saw this clearly and for this reason also claims the right to complete Augustine's doctrine in his own way but in a different direction, and in doing so he destroyed its equilibrium. In order to have Aristotelian abstraction in Augustinism, we should have to find a place for the action of body on soul, and there is no place for it. In order to have in Augustinism a vision in God such as Malebranche proposed, we should have to do away with its direct communication of soul with body, and this is a power which Augustine always accorded the soul by reason of its transcendence alone. Between these two opposing conceptions, Augustinism remains what it was: a doctrine in which the mind can read the intelligible directly in the image and consequently need do nothing more than discover where the source of truth is to be found.⁷⁰

All the inextricable difficulties which have been raised around this question stem directly or indirectly from a fundamental misunderstanding: the Augustinian doctrine of illumination is compared to the Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction, as if it were possible to find adequate justification for the concept in a doctrine whose aim is the justification of truth. A great source of trouble for mediaeval Augustinism was the need felt to insert abstraction into illumination or the attempt to find it there, this last being the more difficult undertaking.⁷¹ All avenues were tried: God as agent intellect, suppression of the agent intellect in favor of the possible intellect, fusion of the two intellects, identification of the agent intellect with divine illumination itself, all the solutions which could quote Augustine as their authority precisely because he advocated none of them. The modern historian is in a much less difficult position and perhaps he is not obliged to aban-

don it voluntarily; but this is precisely what he does if he undertakes to prove that Augustinian illumination contains something which Aristotelian abstraction alone has a duty to supply.⁷² Do the texts themselves justify such an interpretation?

In the first place, the interpretation has the advantage of removing an odd contradiction. Those who maintain that Augustinian illumination has a content find texts to support their interpretation, and those who deny that Augustinian illumination transmits ideas ready-made to the human intellect quote texts in support of their interpretation. We cannot deny that Augustine speaks of a vision in God, and on the other hand, no one doubts that we have no vision of things in God. As a matter of fact, what our intellect sees in the light of illumination and not by its own light is the truth of its own judgments,⁷³ not the content of its ideas. Whenever an Augustinian speaks of an intuition in the divine ideas, the Aristotelian quotes the texts of Augustine which recall the necessary role of sensation, whereas sensations serve for the concept of the sense object, but not for the truth of the mind. On the other hand, when an Aristotelian ascribes to Augustinism a doctrine of the agent intellect, the Augustinian replies that in that case the agent intellect must be God, whereas the Aristotelian agent intellect produces concepts and Augustinian illumination produces truth. As an historian, and he could be a good one, Saint Thomas saw clearly that, if we introduce an agent intellect into Plato's universe, it cannot have the same functions there as it has in Aristotle's universe. In an Aristotelian world, an agent intellect is needed to effect the intelligible, and this is the task of abstraction. In a Platonic world, on the other hand, an agent intellect is not needed to produce intelligibles because the human intellect finds them ready-made in its images; it is needed only to bestow the intelligible light on the understanding subject.⁷⁴ Illumination of the mind by God in Augustinism, in Aristotelianism illumination of the object by a mind which God illumines; here is the difference between illumination-truth and illumination-abstraction. No doubt, Aristotelian illumination of the sensible by the human intellect may presuppose an illumination of the soul by God, but the mere fact that such a reconciliation is theoretically possible gives us no authority to conclude that Augustine brought it about, or that those who bring it about understand illumination in exactly the same sense in which Augustine understood it. When the reconciliation is made, the question remains whether man receives from God a Thomistic intellect which is able to produce the truth of its judgements, or an Augustinian intellect which has no power of its own to read in itself the truth.⁷⁵

Secondly, the interpretation suggested has the advantage of giving

equal attention to the texts which imply a real activity on the part of the human intellect, and the texts which imply a real passivity on its part. Both activity and passivity must be maintained, though not in the same respects. The Augustinian mind is active, first of all, in regard to the body; it animates it and produces sensations on notice from it. Secondly, it is active in regard to the particular images engendered by sensation; it gathers, separates, compares them and reads the intelligible in them. But then something appears in the mind which cannot be explained either by the objects which the mind ponders or by the mind itself which ponders them, and this is the true judgement and the note of necessity which it implies. The judgement of the truth is the component the mind must receive because it lacks the power to produce it itself.

In order to understand Augustine's mind correctly, we must concentrate our attention on this formal element of necessity, because it seems to be precisely at this point that divine illumination comes into play. I listen to a man speak and tell me his ideas; I understand him, form concepts as a result and even believe him; but I do not know if he tells me the truth because I have no means of verifying what he says. Divine illumination has no role to play in this type of knowledge where the truth cannot be seen. But then my friend begins to talk about the ideas of men in general, and at once my point of view changes; I know that what he says is true and agree, or I know that it is false and disagree. It is precisely at this point that divine illumination intervenes, because here truth is at stake. It is no longer merely a question of believing the fact that so-and-so has this or that idea; we must know what men in general ought to think. Now what is the source of our certitude as to what men ought to think? It cannot be experience, because we have not seen with our eyes a certain number of minds in order to form our idea of what the mind ought to be; and besides, experience, whether external or internal, can account for the formation of the idea, but it cannot account for the necessity of the idea.⁷⁶

Let us take another example. I recall the walls of Carthage which I have seen, and I picture those of Alexandria which I have not seen; my mind can do this without the help of divine illumination. But then I think that the memories which recall Carthage to mind are superior to the images which represent Alexandria; this judgement of truth is based on rules at once incorruptible and inviolable, and comes from something higher than my mind: *viget et claret desuper iudicium veritatis* (the judgement of truth shines from above strong and clear); with the necessary truth of the judgement, divine illumination had to

intervene.⁷⁷ Thus there is an essential difference between the image of an object perceived, or the remembrance of it preserved in the memory, or in short any fiction of the mind conceived in the likeness of this object and the judgement I make as to what the corresponding object ought to be. If I have seen a certain arch in Carthage, it is perfectly natural that I should have an idea of it; but the fact that I like the sweep of this arch and consider it beautiful is something that cannot be explained by experience alone. In order to form a judgement as to what things ought to be, our rational mind has to be subject to the action of their ideas,⁷⁸ and this, once again, is what is called illumination.

I am prepared to admit that there is much to be said against my interpretation of Augustinian illumination. One might justly say that it oversimplifies both texts and doctrine in order to explain it more easily. However, I propose it only to the extent that the facts warrant its acceptance, and, in short, as a psychological rather than an historical solution to the problem. Now, in brief, what are the facts?

Most evident of all is the fact that, regardless of our interpretation of his doctrine, Augustine did not distinguish clearly between the problem of the concept and that of the judgement, nor between the problem of the judgement in general and that of the true judgement in particular. There is no doubt that when he refers to ideas whose source cannot be the sensible, he brings in *numerorum dimensionumque rationes et leges innumerabiles* (innumerable reasons and laws of dimensions and numbers);⁷⁹ from this one would be led to believe that, in Augustine's own mind, he is solving the problem of the origin of the *leges* along with that of the origin of the *rationes*. Moreover, it is actually difficult to see how, given Augustine's doctrine, the solution of one of these problems could be different from the solution of the other. Man has a whole range of ideas which are completely independent of any sensible source, such as number, the good, the true, the beautiful, equality, likeness, wisdom. Now since Augustine not only denies these any empirical origin⁸⁰ but also rejects the doctrine of Innatism, in the strict sense of the term, and the pre-existence of the soul which it entails, can we think of any other origin for the content of our concepts except divine illumination? Thus William of Auvergne would be right, *de jure* and *de facto*:⁸¹ the Augustinian doctrine of illumination would explain the origin of our ideas as well as the origin of principles: in a word, it would take the place of a doctrine of abstraction, and make its way, independently as it were, to the place of meeting where, in the 13th century, it joins the doctrine of Avicenna.

We must admit that, if we consider the texts themselves,⁸² Augustine

sometimes used language which would suggest that one of the directive and regulative functions of the divine ideas is that of impressing ready-made notions on our minds.⁸³ But the question still remains what he means by a *notio* and whether this corresponds or not to the reality we call a concept. Now whenever Augustine speaks of knowledge impressed on us by divine illumination, the context enables us to conclude that by this knowledge he means the foundation of this or that class of possible true judgements. What is the *notio impressa boni* (impressed notion of the good)? It is the notion of that *secundum quod et probaremus aliquid et aliud alii praeponeremus* (according to which we should approve of a thing and prefer one thing to another). What are the "impressed notions of happiness or of wisdom"? They are the notions in virtue of which *scimus fidenterque et sine ulla dubitatione dicimus beatos nos esse velle* (we know and say with assurance and without any hesitation that we wish to be happy), or *per quam unusquisque nostrum, si interrogetur velitne esse sapiens, . . . se velle respondet* (by which each one of us, if asked whether he wishes to be wise, answers that he does). In a word, it would appear that Augustine regards the concept only as the subject of the apodictic judgements to which it gives foundation and that the chief function of divine illumination is precisely the explanation of this aspect of the concept. This is the reason why the *notio* of Augustine cannot be reduced to any sense origin, because from the observation of a fact we can infer only a fact, i.e. simple empirical concepts, and for the formation of such no special concurrence of divine illumination is needed; but when we go beyond sense experience to reach the intelligible, we pass from the definition of the fact to that of the idea; we set down what things ought to be rather than observe merely what they are and at this moment also, illumination comes into play to account for anything in the *notio impressa* which transcends the empirical. Augustine goes much further in this direction than one might suspect. For instance, it matters little to him whether a notion is general or particular; the moment the notion assumes the character of necessity, it implies the intervention of divine illumination, because no matter how many observations have gone to form our idea of what men are, we cannot deduce from this idea what one single man ought to be in order to satisfy his own definition.⁸⁴ Likewise, it is one thing to reckon up sensible unities empirically, another to conceive intelligible unity with the mind, nor can the latter be reduced to the former, because every sensible body is divisible and thus actually multiple, whereas intelligible unity tells us what true unity *ought to be*, namely the complete absence of multiplicity.

To summarize the preceding remarks, we may say that in any case Augustine excludes from illumination any concept of empirical origin or at least anything in the concept which may have an empirical origin. When he gives examples of notions which depend on divine illumination, the first which occur to him are: justice, chastity, faith, truth, charity, goodness and the like,⁸⁵ all of which have to do with pure intelligibles. Whenever the intellect applies divine illumination to sensible concepts such as that of arch or man, it does so not to form the notion of it but to formulate the law of it or to define its necessary type, which no sense experience could give us. Experience and not illumination tells us what an arch or a man is; illumination and not experience tells us what a perfect arch or a perfect man ought to be. This is one point at least on which Augustine's authentic doctrine seems hardly capable of misconception unless we deliberately set out to alter it from some ulterior motive.

There is another important point and unfortunately it is impossible to interpret it in such simple fashion. The question is whether the intelligible "notions" which we owe to divine illumination are concepts properly so-called or simple rules which are applied formally to concepts. Against the latter view, one excellent interpreter of St. Augustine has urged that we cannot grant that illumination gives us concepts which are thought of as foundations of certain judgements without according to illumination a role which is something more than regulative and formal. In a word, to maintain that illumination has to do less with the power to conceive than with the power to judge would still be to admit that it has to do with the power to conceive.⁸⁶ And perhaps we should go no further than this and not claim that Augustine has given us more detailed information than he has. We can be sure, and no one has yet uncovered a single text to the contrary, that none of the "notions" which we owe to illumination contains, in so far as we owe it to illumination, one single empirical element. It is certain also that all these "notions" have no other content than the judgement which makes them explicit, for example justice is giving to each his due, wisdom is preferring the eternal to the temporal, charity is loving God above all things, and so forth. Finally it is equally certain that Augustine himself frequently calls these notions "rules" by which we judge. When we have reached this point, we have gone as far as the texts themselves allow us to go, and if we go further, it is unfair to make Augustine himself shoulder the responsibility. Should we say, for example, that illumination gives us no notion properly so-called but principles only? Or should we say that these principles themselves are "notions"? Or should we go so far as to say that God illumines us with

"notions" which are different from the rule of judgements in which the notions are made explicit? It is difficult to decide in Augustine's name, whether our answer is affirmative or negative. From Augustine himself, all we know is that illumination gives us "notions" of non-empirical origin and that their content for us is restricted to the judgements which give them expression; he did not tell us whether these intelligible "notions" are something apart from the rules or judgements in which they are made explicit. Thus if we insist on the regulative and formal role of Augustinian illumination, we are on safe ground; and we are on safe ground also if we refuse to see in illumination a substitute for abstraction, because even supposing that it gives us "notions," we can be certain that it does not give us abstract concepts of the sensible; if we go further and decide whether illumination gives us a "notion" distinct from the rules or principles of judgement which the terms "justice," "wisdom," or "charity" designate, we should be aware that we have gone beyond the texts known to us at the present time, for since Augustine gives us no information as to what such notions might be in themselves, he says nothing to justify either their acceptance or their rejection.

Thus it seems true to say—*salvo meliore iudicio*—that illumination as Augustine saw it has as its exact point of application not so much the power to conceive as the power to judge, because in his view the intelligibility of the concept resides rather in the normative character which its own necessity bestows on the concept than in the general character of its extension. It is this which distinguishes men from beasts, because it is possible for this or that sense to be stronger in this or that beast than it is in us: *sed lucem illam incorpoream contingere nequeunt, qua mens nostra quodammodo irradiatur, ut de his omnibus recte judicare possimus; nam in quantum eam capimus, in tantum id possumus* (but they cannot attain to that incorporeal light with which our mind is somehow irradiated so that we can form right judgements of all these things; for our power to judge is proportioned to our reception of this light).⁸⁷

Thus when we look at the problem from Augustine's own point of view, there is no need to do violence to his texts in order to have them make sense and to harmonize them. They say exactly what the author wanted to say. Although the action of the divine ideas on the mind is direct and therefore intuitive, it does not imply ontologism because the action is essentially regulative and involves no content. This is the reason why Augustine, as we have seen, calls the divine ideas rules: *regulae numerorum, regulae sapientiae*.⁸⁸ It is also the reason why they can remain outside man in spite of the directness of their action and

why their action can be compared to the imprint produced by a ring in soft wax which retains the form of the ring,⁸⁹ for the divine idea is not knowledge which passes ready-made from God into the mind of man; it is a law which binds him—*lex incommutabilis*⁹⁰—which constrains him by its own necessity and in doing so bestows this necessity upon him.

In the doctrine of St. Augustine, as in any philosophy worth the name, the fundamental positions correspond and balance. Perhaps we can foresee already that the human mind which is submissive to the divine rules of truth corresponds to a human will which is submissive to the divine rules of the virtues in the moral order and to the saving influence of grace in the supernatural order. We should be mistaken if we thought that in the present case Augustine confounds the two orders, because illumination of truth and that of moral virtue involve the supernatural order in no way. Moreover this is the reason why Augustine can begin with the deficiencies nature discovers in itself and construct natural proofs for the existence of God based on his analysis of the mind. *Sufficit sibi oculus ad non videndum, hoc est ad tenebras* (The eye suffices for not seeing, i.e. for darkness). This is the true formula of Augustinism in so far as it is radically opposed to human claims to self-sufficiency: *ad videndum vero lumine suo non sibi sufficit, nisi illi extrinsecus adiutorium clari luminis praebeatur* (but it can see with its own light only if the assistance of clear light is furnished it from without). What Augustine will say of grace against Pelagius⁹¹ is precisely what he always said of illumination, as we can see from the formula he uses.

Clear interpretation of St. Augustine's texts has been hindered in large part by repeated failure to distinguish between the texts which have to do with natural knowledge and those which have to do with mystical knowledge, and we must deal with this difficulty. The fact that Augustine himself, on the hierarchic levels he saw fit to multiply, often goes from one to another without transition does not prove that they were not clearly distinguished in his mind. On the contrary, we can be sure that he did distinguish them and all the more so in view of the fact that his doctrine regarding the divine, not human, character of the intelligible light compelled him normally to keep this light beyond the reach of the mind. We can rest assured that when he speaks of knowledge *by* or *in* the eternal reasons, he speaks of natural knowledge, but when he speaks of knowing or of seeing the eternal reasons and the divine light, he speaks of mystical knowledge.

In order to make this point clear, let us first recall an explicit text where, after speaking of the virtues, some of which will continue even

in the future life, such as piety, while others such as faith will cease, Augustine adds this comment: "Even these virtues are seen by the intellect, for they are not bodies nor do they have species like to bodies. But different is the light itself by which the soul is illumined that it may see everything it apprehends with truth through the intellect, either in itself or *in this light*; for the light is God Himself, and the soul a creature although made rational and intellectual in His image, and whenever it tries to look upon that light it struggles feebly and fails. Nevertheless from this light comes all that it apprehends by the intellect as well as it can. Therefore whenever it is transported thither and, withdrawn from the senses of the flesh, is placed in clear sight of that vision not through any change of place but in a manner all its own, it sees above itself also the light with whose help it sees everything it sees in itself through the intellect."⁹² This text, so rich in content, establishes at once, nor would other proof be needed, that the light in which we know the truth intellectually (*in illo veraciter intellecta*) is precisely the divine light or God Himself.

When we prove that Augustine grants us an intellect and natural knowledge, we do not thereby prove that he regards the light by which the intellect knows truth as a property of man. God alone is that light and our intellect is only the recipient of truth. Moreover, in the text above, Augustine mentions two instances of knowing, and these he always distinguished at the core of natural knowledge, namely that in which our intellect apprehends truth in ourselves and that in which it apprehends it in the divine light. Now in the second case, we are as far as ever from seeing the divine light itself. The just or charitable man can know justice or charity in himself, but the unjust or spiteful man who knows what these virtues are but does not possess them, *knows them only in the divine light*. Thus there are gradations of illumination. In some cases the rules of justice are impressed on the heart, like the form of the seal on wax, and in that case the just man knows them both *in himself* where they are as unstable and transitory as his own heart, and *in the divine truth* where he knows them as something unalterable and necessary. But there are cases where the rules are not impressed on the heart and merely "touch" the mind. This is the case with the wicked who know what justice is, but do not possess it. The fact that they can speak about it if questioned skilfully shows that they know what it is. Thus the wicked are men whose intellects can know the eternal rules of the virtues only in the light of God.⁹³ We can see at once the limited extent to which the expression "see in" may be said to contain a mystical sense or to imply an intrusion of the supernatural into the natural and human order.

The case is entirely different when the intellect tries to see the eternal rules and the divine light themselves. In this case a divine *raptus* is needed, and it may transport the soul to various heights. When St. Paul was raised to the "third heaven," he may have been taken as far as the divine substance itself and as far as the creating Word in the charity of the Holy Ghost;⁹⁴ but beneath this extraordinary transport of St. Paul's, Augustine leaves room, not only for spiritual "visions" accompanied by images, but even for mystical intuitions of the purely intelligible of lesser degree. Quite apart from vision of the "divine substance" or of the Word, the intellect can be raised to the vision of the divine ideas and the divine light, and this too is a vision of God. Thus in St. Augustine, intellectual contemplation becomes mystical whenever it no longer sees in the divine light which illumines every man in this world, but rises *above* the effect of this light in man to reach the light itself: *supra mentem*. This explanation would apply especially to the mystical transports recorded in the *Confessions* and above all to the famous "ecstasy of Ostia," for there is no doubt that this last ends on a plane which is distinctly mystical.⁹⁵

There is no question, then, that in authentic Augustinism there is, on the plane of mystical knowledge, a vision of the divine ideas and a vision of God in the divine ideas. As regards the order of natural knowledge, at least three points seem certain. Firstly, the intelligible light by which we perceive truths does not belong naturally to our intellect; it touches our soul but remains a gift of God because it is God Himself. Secondly, God, the intelligible light, causes us to know the truth by creating a light in us; this created light is that of our intellect,⁹⁶ but since it is neither unalterable nor necessary in itself, we cannot think of it as containing the proximate reason either of the immutability or the necessity of true judgements. Where then do the wicked see the eternal rules? Not in their own nature (*neque enim in sua natura*), nor in their mind *cum . . . eorum mentes constet esse mutabiles* (since it is clear that their minds are changeable);⁹⁷ it must be that truth, even though created in man, is never known *in man* but only *in God*. Thirdly, apart from the mystical order, knowledge in God is never a vision of God, or of the divine light, or of the divine ideas. To uphold the contrary, even when done with great skill, is to set one's self in open opposition to one of the most consistent elements of Augustine's thought. There can be no doubt that in his view, contemplation of the ideas belongs to the mystical order. If we insist that we see the ideas whenever we form a true judgement, then we must agree to place every man, even the most wicked, in a mystical state which is practically continuous.

In his remarkable study of this question, J. Hessen tries to prove that although Augustine taught the direct vision of the divine ideas and of the intelligible light, he is still no ontologist, because the intuition of God's ideas is not an intuition of God.⁹⁸ The stratagem will not work, because in Augustine's doctrine, the ideas of God are God. They were not made (*ipsae formatae non sunt*),⁹⁹ therefore they are not creatures, and therefore they are the Creator, i.e. God. But this is really not the point. If Augustine was an ontologist, we shall have to say that he was, and we shall never prevent him from being one if he does not teach that the ideas were created by God, a doctrine which Scotus Erigena for example will put forward, but does teach that every true judgement implies a vision of God's ideas.

If we agree with J. Hessen and regard ontologism as incompatible with the fundamental orientation of Augustine's teaching, then we must find another interpretation for the texts which seem to imply a direct vision of the divine ideas. The two texts quoted are from *De Trinitate* IX, 6, 9 and IX, 6, 11;¹⁰⁰ and it is certain that, few as they are, they seem to support the thesis put forward by the scholarly historian. But it remains to interpret them. In the first Augustine says in a passage where there can be no question of anything mystical: *intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscujusque mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat* (we gaze upon indestructible truth, from which we may define perfectly, as far as we can, not of what sort is the mind of every man, but of what sort it ought to be according to the eternal reasons). In the second text, he adds: *Itaque de istis secundum illam* (i.e. *formam aeternae veritatis* or *ideam*) *judicamus, et illam cernimus rationalis mentis intuitu* (We judge therefore of these things according to that [form of eternal truth or idea], and discern that form by the intuition of the rational mind). J. Hessen thinks that in using this language Augustine does not intend to say anything new or different from what he said a few lines above where he speaks of *intueri in ipsa veritate* (seeing in truth itself).¹⁰¹ By this he evidently suggests that "vision in truth" should be understood as "vision of truth." Of course this view is tenable, but the contrary is tenable also and seems even more probable. Are we to interpret all the other texts by these two, or these two by all the others? As a writer, and especially when dealing with philosophy, Augustine was not so meticulous that we should hesitate to blame him for inaccuracy in two phrases, and in more if there is need. But perhaps there is no need, for Augustine would doubtless be surprised at so much attention paid to verbal details.¹⁰² For him, to see in the truth means, in a way, to see the truth, but it is the only way

in which we can see the truth naturally. Although we do not see the divine truth of the Word, still we do see *in it* at least and therefore we cannot say that we do not see it at all: *unde (i.e. vis interior animae) nosset ipsum incommutabile, quod nisi aliquo modo nosset, nullo modo illud mutabili certa praeponeret* (whence it [i.e. the inner power of the soul] knew the unchangeable itself, for if it did not know it in some way, it would have no ground for preferring it to the changeable with such assurance). The phrase, *aliquo modo nosset*, describes exactly the kind of knowledge of eternal truth implied by every true judgement, because the presence of such judgements in us makes it impossible for us to maintain that we do not know the unchangeable in any way at all. But at the same time this well-known text from the *Confessions* reminds us that even though the soul may be so illumined by God as to cry out without hesitation that the unchangeable is superior to the changeable, it still does not know the unchangeable itself. There is one last step to be taken, and it is the mystic who takes it: *unde nosset ipsum incommutabile . . . et pervenit ad id quod est in ictu trepidantis aspectus* (whence it knew the unchangeable itself . . . and in the blinding vision of a moment saw that which is).¹⁰³ Thus we can accept all of Augustine's texts without disrupting the general unity of his teaching, and when an historical interpretation yields this result, it would be wise, not to regard it as final, but to be satisfied with it at least.

3. *The Life of the Soul*

Whatever the nature of the intellectual operation performed by man, its goal is always the discovery of an unknown truth. Our lot is the lot of ignorant creatures in search of the unknown, with the result that the life of the mind is essentially an inquiry. Now let us suppose that this inquiry itself becomes the subject of the mind's inquiry, and let us ask what conditions must be present before the mind can proceed in search of the unknown.

At first sight, this seems to be an easy question to answer. Ignorance of a thing seems to be the first condition for learning that thing. If we know a thing, we have no desire to learn it, and no one will dispute this fact. What is not so evident, and yet true, is that before we can wish to learn a thing, we must not be wholly ignorant of it, but in a sense, know it already. To enforce the truth of this, let us consider a few simple examples.

It often happens that a person wants to learn some science or art, like rhetoric, for example. The fact that he wants to learn it shows that he

does not know it; but it also shows that he thinks rhetoric worth having and therefore has some idea of it already. To begin with, he knows that it is a science or art and that knowledge of any science or skill in any art is a thing worth having for its own sake. In this case, therefore, the nature and value of the thing desired are not wholly unknown. But the person in question probably knows more than this. Unless he has made his choice of rhetoric merely because he likes the word, he wants to learn it because he wants to learn to speak well and to acquire the art of persuasion. He wants it only to the extent that it will enable him to attain this useful goal and he knows that this is its proper function. Thus if he were wholly ignorant of its nature and function, he could neither want it, nor love it, nor try to learn it. The same thing can be seen in an example which is even simpler.

Suppose someone uses a word whose meaning we do not know, say *temetum*. The mere fact that it means nothing to us makes us want to find out what it means. Thus the fact that we want to learn the word shows that we do not know it. This is true, but we do know, or assume at least, that it is a word and consequently a sign, i.e. a group of syllables which has a meaning. And we know something more. We know how eagerly everyone seizes upon the meaning of a new word, for after all, language consists of words, and language, being the medium of thought, is absolutely necessary for communication between minds. It is because we know this fact, vaguely it may be, that we allow no word to remain unknown and are eager to learn their meanings. Furthermore, when we finally discover that *temetum* is an obsolete word meaning wine or a fermented beverage of that type, we say, no doubt, that it is not worth learning and that there is no need to remember it. This means that the word does not give us the kind of knowledge we looked for and expected to find when we first considered the word.

No doubt there are examples which seem to contradict these. One may claim that sometimes we can assign no definite motive for the love of a particular study, nor presuppose any knowledge of the subject of that study. Indeed are there not men who pursue no particular subject to the exclusion of others, but who study merely for the sake of study? These are the curious. The curious, unlike the studious, are moved merely by the desire of discovery. Therefore it is not their knowledge of a subject which seems to draw them on, but the unknown itself. Yes and no. The curious, or as we should say today, the dilettantes, are certainly attracted by the unknown. The moment they see something they do not know, they are interested. But we should be wrong if we thought that ignorance itself caused their interest. The man who wants knowledge for the sake of knowledge does not love the unknown for

its own sake; on the contrary, he detests it, cannot put up with it, wants no part of it. In the unknown he sees an opportunity to learn, and he is drawn thereto by a desire to know: *non ipsa incognita, sed ipsum scire amat*. At least, he knows what it is to know and this is shown by the fact that he readily distinguishes what he knows from what he doesn't. It is the pleasure of learning that he pursues in his continual quest of things unknown. Thus, even here some knowledge precedes the desire for knowledge and makes it possible. We know of no exception to this rule.

We are, therefore, forced to admit that we never love the unknown. Whenever the soul moves toward an object, it must create a likeness of that object beforehand and it is this representation that it loves, whether it be true or false. It is as though the soul held a picture before it and was quite prepared to accept this as the reward of its efforts. Nor can there be any doubt that it is this image that the soul loves, for if the object does not measure up to it or even surpass it in excellence, the soul may turn from it in disappointment when it is found. What we find is not always what we looked for, and our disappointment shows that the object of our search was not the thing, once unknown and now real, which we have found, otherwise we should love it no matter what it was; the object of our search was rather the image we formed of the thing beforehand. But if our expectations are fulfilled and the object corresponds to the image our soul kept in view, we do not say to it: "I can love you at last," but rather: "I loved you long ago." *Jam te amabam*. How true it is that the unknown itself is never the object of our love!¹⁰⁴

Let us apply the results of this inquiry to the two realities studied in philosophy, namely God and the soul. When we search for a thing we do not know, we are led to do so most often by what others have said of it. The same holds true of the soul. We form our own idea of the soul's nature, but to do this we use the information given us by others. This is what Augustine did when he advocated Manichaeism. And we do something more. We see what the soul is in others and we guess what it is from this. Finally, we go even further and try to understand what the soul is, not by hearsay or conjecture, but by experience which is both direct and sure. If we agree with the results of the preceding inquiry, we must say that we do not know the soul when we try to find it, but on the other hand, we must also say that we are not entirely ignorant of it. Indeed, this case is exceptional and quite unique, because it is difficult to see how the soul can be ignorant of itself. To look for itself it must think; and since it cannot look for itself without knowing that it does so, it cannot look for itself without

knowing itself.¹⁰⁵ In fact, it cannot look for itself without knowing itself thoroughly, because it knows what knowing and living are and the soul is by nature knowledge and life.¹⁰⁶ The question here is not so much whence the soul derives that first knowledge of itself which prompts it to look for itself, but how it can be ignorant of itself and find it necessary to look for itself.

Since the soul must know itself and yet looks for itself, the reason may be that it does not think of itself. To be ignorant of something is one thing, to have knowledge of it and to have forgotten it for the moment is another. No one will say that a person is ignorant of grammar because he does not think of it, or that a person does not know medicine because his attention is directed elsewhere. Thus it may be that when the soul looks for itself, this desire may originate in a memory of itself, hidden and unnoticed, which recalls it to itself and tries to make it find itself. But could it forget itself? The soul must know itself as long as it lives in accordance with its nature and remains where it belongs, i.e. beneath God and above bodies (*sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea quae regere debet*). Thus if the soul seeks the good and the beautiful only in God and is satisfied to be good and beautiful by resembling the divine ideas which govern it, it keeps its proper place and runs no risk of forgetting itself. But as soon as it claims to be self-sufficient and to be responsible itself for the perfection it can receive only from God, it turns away from God towards the corporeal. The more it claims to grow in perfection the more it decreases, because once separated from God, its sole sufficiency, it cannot find sufficiency in itself, nor can any other thing satisfy it. Indeed, the moment it is deprived of the only good capable of satisfying it, the soul lives in a state of constant need and unrelieved indigence. Although aware that the knowledge of the sensible will not meet its needs, it busies itself therewith, becomes dissatisfied even with the pleasure it derives therefrom, looks for other things which also fail to satisfy and which leave it rather hungrier than before and exhausts itself in a giddy pursuit of things which excite desire but fail to satisfy it. Are we to say that after years spent in this sort of life the soul becomes materialized? Not at all; its essence is pure thought and it cannot lose its essence. However, in line with the theory of sensation we studied earlier, the soul becomes so overlaid with material images that it is forced to produce sensations and thus fails to distinguish itself from the sensible. Since it must draw on its own substance for the content of the material images it produces (*imagines . . . rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa; dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae*), it finally comes to identify itself with what it finds it has to have in order to think of itself (*hoc se putat esse sine*

quo se non potest cogitare). Consequently, if the soul looks for itself, this does not mean that its presence is not felt or that it is unknown. It is present and vaguely known; it sees itself dimly through the veil of sensations which hide its true nature and simply tries to see itself more clearly.¹⁰⁷

However, when we say that a latent memory of its own spiritual nature can move the soul to look for itself in this way, we assume that it is possible for a forgotten memory to subsist and even to exert influence. Thus the problem raised by the foregoing analysis is the problem of the memory, and with it are raised metaphysical difficulties far more profound than we could imagine at the start.

In the Gospel (Luke 15, 8) we are told that a woman lost a piece of money and lit a candle to look for it. The fact that she looked for the money shows that it was hidden from view, and yet it was present to her memory because she recognized it when she found it.¹⁰⁸ We not only look for lost objects with the help of the memory; there are times when we look for an object lost in the memory itself. This is what happens when we try to recall something. We do not know what the lost object is, because we look for it. It must be forgotten therefore, and yet as various recollections come to mind, the mind discards them until it has the recollection it wants and then it says: "That is it." But to say this, the mind must recognize the object and to recognize the object, it must remember it. Consequently the recollection was both forgotten and present; partially forgotten, so that the memory, having lost part of itself, wandered, so to speak, like one maimed, in search of what it had lost.¹⁰⁹ Is not the activity of the soul in search of itself something of this sort?

It is this and something more. We said that the soul tries to see its own nature through the covering (*glutinium*) of sensations with which it has become overlaid. Since it tries to find it, it does not know what its true nature is; but since it tries to discover it, it knows at least that it would be good and desirable to know it. Now where did it learn this? As yet it doesn't know itself, so how does it know that it would be a good thing to know itself? No doubt, hidden somewhere in the memory must be the assurance that unless it knows itself, it will never reach a certain goal which it ought to reach, a goal consequently of great excellence, namely peace, perfect security, in a word, happiness.¹¹⁰ Should we admit, therefore, that when the soul seeks a purer image of itself beyond sensations, it is moved not only by the appeal of its hidden presence but by a latent ideal of perfect peace and well-being? Let us try to find the answer to this question in what we have already said touching happiness.

We said that whatever the definition of happiness, it presents itself at once to the mind as something everyone desires. Everyone desires his well-being and there is no one who does not desire it. As soon as happiness is mentioned, and regardless of the language used to speak of it, everyone knows that it is something excellent of itself. Consequently, everyone must have some knowledge of it and be at least vaguely aware of what it is.¹¹¹ In fact, as soon as we reflect on the meaning of this idea, we find that it is inseparable from another idea, namely, that of truth. There is nothing men prefer to knowledge of the truth, so much so that the idea of a happiness in which we should enjoy well-being and yet be in error seems to us a contradiction in terms. Someone may object that many men seem satisfied to live in error and stubbornly maintain that it is the truth. But it is precisely because they loathe error that they declare it to be true. Men love truth so much that they want everything they love to be the truth.¹¹² It may be argued further that some people delight in deceiving others and consequently pursue error on purpose. No doubt this is true, but they want error for others, not for themselves. We could find many who wish to deceive others, but not one who would like to be deceived himself. There can be no doubt that there is a close relationship between the idea of truth and that of happiness.

On the other hand, it seems equally certain that although happiness implies truth, not every truth suffices to produce happiness. There are many kinds of true knowledge and yet not one of them can satisfy us. Hence that restlessness of the human spirit which drives it on from object to object as if it were possible to find in the knowledge of yet another thing the full satisfaction it has found so far in none, for as long as the search lasts, and even supposing it leads from truth to truth, there will be no peace for the spirit and therefore no happiness. This restlessness which disturbs and moves the human soul without interruption would never end were it not for the attainment of one truth which makes further search unnecessary because it makes any other truth unnecessary. Only then does peace follow upon restlessness and repose upon movement. But peace with repose is happiness possessed at last: *beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate* (for a happy life is joy in the truth).¹¹³ Thus when our soul tries to know itself, what it really pursues is a truth which can be desired and sought only for itself; it is a truth which is an end and compared with it, every other truth, even the knowledge of the soul, can only be a means. The desire of the soul to know itself shows therefore, not only that the soul is present to itself but that beyond it there is present to the soul the ultimate truth whose possession is happiness.¹¹⁴ How can this truth be

present to the soul? We must have recourse to the notion of memory to explain it.

If we confine ourselves to the usual meaning of the term, the word "memory" denotes our ability to store up our remembrances of the past and to produce them when needed. Even if we limit the memory to this modest function, it is still an astonishing phenomenon. It is an aptitude belonging to a purely spiritual mind and consequently alien to extension of any sort, and yet it can retain in itself the representation of objects possessing measureless spatial extension; these are all together there nor does one interfere with another. The sense memory is particularly remarkable in that it already displays the distinctive mark of all memory, namely the ability to hold in readiness, subject to the call of the mind, knowledge which the mind possesses without being aware of it. What we find particularly mysterious about this lowest form of memory is precisely this hidden store of knowledge of which the mind is unaware. It is as though the mind were more spacious than it imagines, and when it goes beyond itself, so to speak, finds itself unable to take in all that it contains. Sometimes it tries to recall a thing and the memory will not come; at another time it makes no effort to recall and the memory is there demanding attention.¹¹⁵ When we think of it, even at the level of sense knowledge, there is something terrifying about the vastness of the memory.

The memory seems even more remarkable when we consider the intelligible order. We are surprised at the number of recollections we have retained. It is as though the objects themselves were deprived of their bodies and transferred to our minds. Now we know whence all this knowledge has come, because we have perceived these objects through our senses. But when I look and find in my mind knowledge that is wholly abstract, such as the idea of essence or that of cause, how am I to say this knowledge found entry to the mind? It is obvious that it did not come through the senses, and yet it is in the mind. Thus we see that in order to make room for knowledge of this sort, and in general for all knowledge we have described as in some sense innate, we must extend the concept of memory to include anything the mind learns from the inner Master, sees in the illuminating light of the Word, or can discover in itself by direct apprehension. Consequently, association with the past ceases to be an essential characteristic of the memory. Since the soul remembers everything present to it even though unaware of it, we can say that there is a memory of the present which is even far more vast than the memory of the past.¹¹⁶ Everything we know without being aware of it can be ascribed to the memory,¹¹⁷ so that here too, and with greater reason, the soul finds itself unable to sound its own depths.¹¹⁸

Thus we have broadened the memory so as to have it include the present as well as the past, ideas as well as things; and to have it include even itself. Can we broaden it still more so as to have it include God? In one sense we can, nor should this involve us in difficulty. As soon as man knows the existence of God, whether taught by the faith or demonstrated by reason, this knowledge becomes part of his memory, as does all knowledge of the sort, and he remembers it.¹¹⁹ But if the question asks, not simply whether our idea of God is to be found in the memory but whether God Himself is to be found there, then it is much more difficult to answer. It is true that since God is not a body, He cannot be in our memory of corporeal things, nor can He be in our memory of ourselves because He is not our mind but the Lord of the mind. He cannot be in any memory we have, because we could not remember Him until we knew Him. But on the other hand, it is not impossible, perhaps it is necessary, to broaden our notion of memory once more in order to account for some facts shown by our analysis. If God is really present to the soul as the teaching Master and the illuminating light even when the soul does not listen to His teaching nor turn to see His light, have we not here another example of those memories of the present which we spoke of above?

In order to make this last step, Augustine is led to extend memory beyond the limits of psychology to metaphysics. If we think of the soul as a sort of receptacle where we would have God along with many other hidden objects, it goes without saying that God cannot be found there. God is not in our mind as something contained there nor even as a profound memory which the soul sometimes loses and at other times finds again. In short, we find God not in ourselves but only in God. In another sense, however, owing to the fact that we find God in Himself only if we pass through what is most profound in ourselves, we must allow a sort of metaphysical background to the soul, a retreat more secret than the others, which would be in some way the very abode of God. This is the sense in which all the metaphors we have used should be understood, because they signify nothing more or less than this transcendent presence of God in the soul which He teaches and illumines. To become aware of this presence, which is continuous but rarely felt, is precisely what Augustine calls "remembering God": *quando autem bene recordatur Domini sui, Spiritu ejus accepto sentit omnino, quia hoc discit intimo magisterio . . .* (but when it rightly remembers its own Lord, having received His Spirit, then, because it is so taught by an inward teaching, it becomes fully aware . . .). To remember God means, therefore, not to apprehend Him as an image of the past, but to be attentive to His continuous presence: *Domini autem Dei sui reminiscitur. Ille quippe semper est*

. . . (And it remembers the Lord its God. For He always is . . .). To remember Him means to turn again towards His unfailing light which strikes the eye even when it turns away from it: *commemoratur, ut convertatur ad Dominum tamquam ad eam lucem qua etiam cum ab illo averteretur quodam modo tangebatur* (it is reminded to turn to the Lord as to the light by which it was somehow touched even when turned away from Him). Thus the memory of God in the soul of which Augustine speaks is only a particular example of God's omnipresence in things: *Et ubique totus est, propter quod ista in illo et vivit et movetur et est* (Act. 17, 28), *et ideo reminisci ejus potest* (And He is whole everywhere, wherefore it lives and moves and is in Him; and for this reason it can remember Him);¹²⁰ it is, however, unique in that only here does a creature become intimately aware of the divine presence. God is *with* all things; only man, if he so desires, can *be with* God because only man experiences and knows God's universal presence in His creatures.

This and this alone reveals the real meaning of Augustine's theory of knowledge and the proof of God's existence which is based thereon. We misunderstand them if we see them as a chain of abstract concepts artificially linked together to evidence God's existence. On the contrary, Augustine's point of view assumes that this chain of concepts and even the activity of the mind in linking them together can be made intelligible only by the presence of God moving the mind towards Himself. When the soul seeks itself and, beyond itself, the truth whence springs the happiness all men desire, it is God it seeks without being aware of it.¹²¹ It strains towards Him at the furthest limits of the memory¹²² and strives to reach Him in His subsistent truth,¹²³ but it moves towards Him only because He is there to vivify it from within as the soul itself gives life to its body: *ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est*.¹²⁴ Since God is the source of the soul's happiness and the soul itself the source of life, God is life of our life: *vita vitae meae*.¹²⁵ God is within the soul and the soul is our most intimate possession; He is above truth and truth is the mind's highest attainment; He is, therefore, more intimate than our most intimate selves and superior to our highest excellence: *interior intimo meo et superior summo meo*.¹²⁶ Thus God is the light of our heart, the bread that nourishes our soul and the power that brings our mind and innermost thoughts to fruition: *Deus lumen cordis mei, et panis oris intus animae meae, et virtus maritans mentem meam et sinum cogitationis meae*.¹²⁷ Our task is not so much to prove Him as to find Him.

In my opinion, this is the summit from which Augustine's metaphysics and ethics descend, as it were, along the two opposite sides of

one and the same mountain. As a creature drawn from nothingness, man inherits a radical insufficiency. Since he is not self-sufficient in the order of being, he cannot be self-sufficient either in the order of knowledge or in that of action.¹²⁸ However, the very deficiency from which he suffers leads him to God, who alone can supply for it. Whence that fruitful restlessness which torments man constantly but serves to save him because, being made for God, it will not allow him to find peace and repose except in God.¹²⁹ This is the fundamental truth, the fruit of his own painful experience, that Augustine tries to show in every sphere of the interior life. In order to express it, he uses metaphors of the most varied sort, such as Master, Light, Life, but at the same time he is acutely aware of their inadequacy and trusts that one will complement the other. However imperfect these metaphors may be, they all serve to direct our attention to the same focal point, namely the void which is natural to the creature, God's chosen waiting place, where His influence is ever active as He calls man back to Himself. Thus if we understand Augustinian illumination correctly, we must say that the illuminating action of God is a vitalizing action: *illuminatio nostra participatio Verbi est, illius scilicet Vitae quae lux est hominum* (our illumination is the partaking of the Word, namely of that Life which is the light of men).¹³⁰ However, in order to reach the one source of all divine influence, we shall have to expand our search beyond the order of knowledge to the field of action.

4. Unsettled Questions

No matter how hard we try, there remain unsettled questions in any exposition of Augustinian noetic. The reason may be that there are unsettled questions in Augustinism itself and one source of them would seem to be Augustine's use of the doctrine of Plotinus. If we are to believe Augustine himself, there can be no doubt that he used Plotinus, because he says, and seems always to have thought, that he owed, among other things, his whole theory of knowledge to him.

It is easy to be convinced of this when we read the extraordinary things he has to say in the *City of God*, which was written at a period when his Neoplatonic fervor had cooled: "These philosophers, then, whom we see deservedly exalted above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that God is not a body, and therefore they have transcended all bodies in search of God. They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in search of the most high God. . . .

These men, whom we justly rank before all others, have distinguished that which is seen by the mind from that which is attained by the senses, neither taking away from the senses anything to which they are competent, nor according them anything beyond their competence. Lastly, they have said that there is a light in minds which enables them to learn all things and that this light is the same God by whom all things were made."¹³¹ This is a great deal to say, but there is another text, quoted again and again, which shows him even more generous. In this he attributes to Plotinus not only illumination by God the Creator but also illumination by the Word: "And therein I read, not indeed in the same words but to the selfsame effect, enforced by many and varied reasons, that in the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made. That which was made is life in Him and the life was the light of men . . . ; and that the soul of man, though it bears witness to the light, yet itself is not the light; but the Word of God, God Himself, is the true light that enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world."¹³² In short, Augustine found in Plotinus his own doctrine of illumination by the Word, the Creator.

These texts seem to indicate that Augustine attributed to Plotinus the Christian doctrine of creation by the Father and the Word. On the face of it, there is nothing to prevent us from taking him at his word. This would agree with the hypothesis advanced several times already, that Augustine never clearly distinguished between the Christian notion of creation *ex nihilo* and the Neoplatonic notion of an emanation, irradiation, or generation of things from the One. But if he understood creation as Plotinus did, why did he not attribute the notion of creation to Plotinus?

I shall not discuss here a problem to which we shall have to return later, but it is well to point out that Augustine was not unaware of the discrepancy between himself and Plotinus on this point. He stated it himself in a text which, in clarity, leaves nothing to be desired: "Apart from the fact that He assumed human nature and became flesh, the Word, the Son of God, is different (*alius*), but not a different thing than the Father (*aliud*), that is, He is a different person but not a different nature. Now why is this if not because He was not created from another or from nothing but was born of the Father?" In other words, the notion of generation implies that begetter and begotten are of the same nature and this in spite of the personal distinction between begetter and begotten. This is why the Son, though distinct in person from the Father of Whom He is born, is "of one and the same nature

with the Father; equal, coeternal and like to Him in every way; unchangeable, invisible, incorporeal, God as the Father is; He is what the Father is, except that He is the Son, not the Father" (*unius ejusdemque naturae, aequalis, coaeternus, omni modo similis, pariter immutabilis, pariter invisibilis, pariter incorporeus, pariter Deus; hoc omnino quod Pater, nisi quod Filius est ipse, non Pater*). Inversely, but for the same reason, as soon as we have to do with something inferior to God and hence of a different nature from His, we can be certain that this is not born of God, nor begotten by Him, but created *ex nihilo*. The idea that God can create of His own substance, or that something inferior to Him can emanate from Him, is an illusion we should be careful to dispel (*Si autem . . . de seipso diversum aliquid in deterius creat, et de incorporeo Deo corpus emanat, absit ut hoc catholicus animus bibat; non enim est fluentum fontis divini, sed figmentum cordis humani*).¹³³

This is an interesting text from two points of view. First of all, it shows that Augustine understood clearly how the notions of generation and emanation differ from the notion of creation. All that is God is begotten, and nothing that is God is created. Everything that is different from God is created, and nothing that is different from God is begotten. From this we can see also how fundamentally Plotinus differs from Augustine. In Plotinus, generation and emanation are the only relations mentioned; the Judeo-Christian notion of creation never enters in. Consequently we find nowhere in his system that ontological gulf between creature and Creator which is so fundamental in Christianity. The One begets Intelligence, Intelligence begets Soul, and Soul begets souls. As long as we keep to this order of generations, everything is divine. Thus in Plotinus, it is possible to get much further away from the first principle without leaving the divine than it is in Augustine. On the other hand, but for the same reason, the perfection of the first principle is lost much sooner in Plotinus than in Augustine. In Plotinus, the One begets Intelligence, and since Intelligence is begotten, it is still divine and yet inferior to the begetter. In the Christian Trinity, the Father begets the Son, but the Son is God and still equal to the begetter. Similarly, Soul is inferior to Intelligence, but the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father and the Son. In Plotinus, ever increasing inequality at the beginning and throughout the whole series of generations; in Augustine, continual equality as long as there is generation, and then a sharp break the moment actual inequality demands the notion of creation.

It seems to be beyond question, therefore, that Augustine's idea of the doctrine at stake was clear enough to enable him to point out the

difference between his teaching and that of Plotinus. The text we have just considered was directed against one Vincentius Victor, who regarded bodies as emanations from God, and if it had been directed against Plotinus instead, we should have had to say that Augustine was also very much aware of the difference between himself and Plotinus. But the fact is, we have no ground for saying that he was ever aware of the gulf between them. To the best of my knowledge, on this point he always speaks without reservation. When he commends the Platonists, it is for having known that God made the world's entire body, its shapes, its qualities, its ordered movement, the life of trees, animals, men, angels, and that everything was made by Him to whom life, knowledge, happiness and existence are all one: *Propter hanc incommutabilitatem et simplicitatem intellexerunt eum et omnia ista fecisse et ipsum a nullo fieri potuisse . . . atque ibi esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset, et ex quo facta cuncta essent* (From this unchangeableness and simplicity, they understood that all these things were made by Him and that He Himself could have been made by none . . . and they believed most rightly that the principle of things was in that which was not made and from which all things were made).¹³⁴ If Augustine had had the slightest doubt about the purity of Plotinus' notion of creation, he would have had to reveal it when saying things of this sort. However, he did not do so, either here or in the *Confessions*, and this leads one at least to assume that, from the outset, he read the *Enneads* as a Christian.¹³⁵ It is certainly not true, therefore, that Augustine ever understood the Christian notion of creation as Plotinian emanation; on the contrary, everything leads us to believe that he always mistook Plotinus' emanation for the Christian notion of creation.

Now if this is a fact, as the evidence seems to show, it is of first importance for the understanding of Augustinism in general, and of Augustinian epistemology in particular. When Augustine interpreted Plotinian emanation in terms of Christian creation, he had no idea that he was adding something to the noetic of Neoplatonism and was even less aware of the changes which would have to be made in it before it could be transferred to a Christian system. We are further from Plotinus than Augustine was, and if we read him with less pleasure and enthusiasm than Augustine did, the illusions allowed him are forbidden to us. It is true to say that in Plotinus, the One is the "Father of lights," as God is described in the Epistle of St. James.¹³⁶ In Plotinus, as in Augustine, our mind can see objects only in an intelligible light which comes from this source, and it is possible for the mind to see this light itself and through it its principle.¹³⁷ To be sure,

Augustine made no mistake when he thought that he found a doctrine of divine illumination ready-made in Plotinus, and yet he had no idea how far removed from it he was himself.

The Christian view of the relationship between the mind and the intelligible light is quite different from that of Plotinus. In the latter, the soul of man is the result, not of a creation, but of a generation. This is the reason, as we have seen, why the soul is divine. Now since the soul is produced in the divine order, the light which illumines it can remain divine even though it becomes the light of the soul. Consequently there was no problem here for Plotinus, nor did he mention one. Augustine, on the other hand, should have mentioned the problem. He certainly had some inkling of it, and yet he did not try to solve it, because in Plotinus he found no mention of it and *a fortiori* no solution. From Plotinus Augustine inherited the positive conviction that the intelligible order is inalienably divine. Everything that is true, i.e. eternal, unchangeable and necessary, belongs exclusively to God. However, man is a creature and this fact places him outside and below the divine order. Consequently, in Augustine the relationship between the created mind and the divine light which illumines it must be different from the relationship between the begotten mind and the light of Intelligence and the One in Plotinus. In Plotinus, the soul belongs to the divine realm of the intelligible and has every right to be there; it is at home there. Hence, as Plotinus forcefully puts it, the soul finds in itself the light which illumines it, for the soul is the light itself. In order to escape to "his beloved homeland," i.e. to the abode whence we come and where the Father is to be found, man has but to become aware of his true nature. "If you have become . . . within your whole being a veritable light . . . entirely incommensurable because it transcends all measure and quantity; if you see that you have become such, then, *having become sight itself*, have confidence in yourself; you have already ascended thither and need a guide no longer; fix your gaze on it and see."¹³⁸

Here the difference between Augustine and Plotinus is not only one of tone but of teaching. In Plotinus, because the soul can, of itself, discover the light within, it must possess the light, whereas in Augustine, the soul must rely on God to give the light and therefore cannot, of itself, possess it. In short, the light of the Christian soul is a created light because the Christian soul is a creature: Augustine's doctrine of illumination presupposes the Christian notion of creation. How it is possible to have truth which is both divine and created in us, is therefore a problem for which Augustine's teaching must try to find a solution.


Even if Augustine himself, as it appears, was not aware of introducing this difficulty into the system of Plotinus when he brought in the idea of creation, the fact remains that the difficulty was there. And at least one indication could have made him aware of it. Even if we are ready to grant that Augustine is indebted to Plotinus for the essentials of his noetic, why does it happen that the same doctrine of true knowledge never ends in proof of God's existence in Plotinus and always does so in Augustine? No doubt the reason is that in Plotinus, the soul is itself divine, is never cut off from the divine order and abides permanently therein by reason of its highest part. To such a soul, the idea of proving God's existence is meaningless. A god needs no proof of the existence of divinity. But with a creature it is an entirely different matter. The intelligible light which the soul sees in itself was created in it, and the soul can affirm that God exists only after a process of induction from effect to cause, i.e. by means of a genuine proof. In Plotinus, the soul turns toward its own light and principle; in Augustine, the soul is raised gradually to the transcendent source of its truth. Between these two conceptions there is an essential difference, not merely one of degree.

Unfortunately, this is something which Augustine's enthusiasm for Neoplatonism did not allow him to see. To have truth, which is divine by essence, dwell in a soul which is also divine involved no problem for Plotinus, but to explain how truth, which is divine, can become the truth of a creature was a difficulty Augustine could not escape. He did not see that he was responsible for introducing the problem into Plotinus, and for this reason was neither aware of it nor in a position to work out a solution for it. This unsettled question follows from the first and is the source of some of the most serious difficulties faced by the Augustinian school in the thirteenth century and even by interpreters of Augustine at the present day. In fact, it was impossible to escape the difficulty except by forsaking Plotinus in favour of Aristotle. To St. Thomas Aquinas goes the credit for this stroke of genius.

Actually, the Augustinian position is difficult to defend because it is based on the idea, inherited from Plotinus, that the truth is too good for man. As soon as there is truth, there is God. How then can truth become ours? As long as it is God's truth, it is unchangeable and necessary, i.e. truth itself. As soon as it is created in us, it must be changeable, temporal and contingent, like the intellect which receives it. In this case, is it still the truth? Since we have assumed that God gave us, not a Thomistic intellect which can produce truth, but a mind which is limited to receiving it, how can the divine light be brought to our minds and still remain divine? If the light which shines in us

is divine, all our knowledge must be strictly supernatural. If the light is created, how can it have the divine attributes which are essential to truth? Augustine's only answer was a metaphor: the divine light "touches" us, whereas he should have explained the nature and especially the possibility of this contact.¹³⁹

The root of these difficulties is to be found in the fact that Augustine thought he could give the doctrine of Plotinus a Christian orientation without introducing the modifications demanded by the inclusion of the idea of creation. Indeed, if it is true that he introduced creation unconsciously, then we can readily believe that he had no intention of modifying Plotinus. From this point of view, his doctrine is like one of the pagan temples in which his contemporaries were sometimes content to set up a Christian altar. We should not be surprised, then, if the Platonism which harbored this Christian thought sometimes showed a tendency to drive it forth. Plotinus had not fashioned his teaching to give it shelter. To be sure, there is no ontologism in the thought of Augustine, but there is a great deal of it, and of the most typical kind, in the thought of Plotinus which he used. This is the ontologism which comes to life from time to time, and when it does so, seldom fails to invoke the authority of Augustine's name. Perhaps it would be well to look in this direction for an answer to the question: *Why St. Thomas?* In any case, the historian should keep in mind these unsettled questions as well as their cause, if only to avoid finding answers to questions which Augustine himself did not ask.



Part Two

**THE SEARCH FOR GOD
THROUGH THE WILL**



Chapter I

WISDOM

Augustine's metaphysical analysis of the inner life has shown us a mind whose awareness of God's hidden presence within moves it to try to see Him more clearly, and it is here that we must begin as we try to understand his organization of life or his rules for action.

The first subject which claims our attention, a subject which has universal relevance, is Augustine's conception of human knowledge. It is not a metaphysical theory of knowledge which we consider here, but a practical rule having to do with the manner in which man should make use of his ability to know. What, how and why must man know?

We already know from what has been said that happiness is both the motive for knowing and its end: *nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit* (Man has no reason to philosophize except with a view to happiness).¹ To seek knowledge means primarily to seek an object which will satisfy our appetite for knowledge and thereby place us in a state of happiness. Now a statement such as this is all that is needed to effect a change in the character of the mind's activity. There are, as we know, two possible conceptions of knowledge: the first is knowledge for the sake of knowledge, i.e. a search without end, a search which derives sustenance, as it were, from itself, because if we know merely in order to know, there is never a time when we know enough; and the second is knowledge with a view to happiness. In this second case, our quest has an end, and consequently limits, and a method calculated to assist in reaching these. Here, the mind does not wander aimlessly; it makes its way towards a definite objective and in doing so follows routes chosen beforehand. When we decide that our minds act because of a secret longing for that knowledge which will ensure happiness, then we have made our choice in favour of this second conception of human knowledge.

When we recognize this fact, simple and obvious as it may seem, we actually give the word "philosophy" its full meaning. We have but to bear in mind the different schools of philosophy in all their puzzling variety. In a work entitled *De Philosophia*, which has since been lost, Varro divided the schools into three classes according as they placed the sovereign good in the soul, in the body, or in the soul and body together. Next he made a list of all the schools, both actual and possible, and arrived at the number 288. In other words, 288 schools disagreed on the means to be employed, while 288 agreed on the end, because all agreed that man's primary concern was the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil.² Now such agreement is no accident. God may have allowed man to err as to the means, but He did not allow him to stray so far afield as to lose sight of his end: . . . *philosophiam, quae se docere profitetur aliquid, unde fiant homines beati*. . .³ Philosophy therefore teaches men how to be happy.

If we go a step further and ask what philosophy is, we are told that it is the love of wisdom. This definition is derived from the etymology of the word itself and is accepted by everyone. Now if human knowledge, to the extent that it is directed towards the attainment of happiness, is philosophy and philosophy is the love of wisdom, then we can say that the knowledge which brings happiness and which is sought for by philosophy must be wisdom. What then is wisdom?

The first answer which comes to mind is that wisdom is a kind of science. Since we apply the term "science" to any knowledge which is certain and indisputable,⁴ wisdom will qualify as science only if it shows evidence of absolute certitude and is, therefore, scientific knowledge. Now it is true that, strictly speaking, wisdom is a species of the genus science, but when St. Paul says that wisdom is given to some and science to others, he apparently asks us to distinguish between them.⁵ Actually, failure to distinguish genuine wisdom from science would be fatal to the notion of wisdom. Whatever its object may be, wisdom itself must be a type of knowledge which calls into play the noblest operations of the mind of man, because it is the task of wisdom to guide us to happiness as our final end. Consequently, if we are to discover the classification of knowledge to which wisdom belongs, we have first to be clear as to the nature of the noblest operations of the mind. Now there are in us, so to speak, two men: the exterior and the interior. To the exterior man belongs everything we have in common with the animals: material bodies, vegetative life, sense knowledge, images and recollections of sensations. To the inner man belongs everything we possess in our own right and do not share with the animals: we pass judgement on our sensations and make comparisons between

them, we apply ratios and numbers to bodies and forms and thereby take measurements of them. In every operation of this kind, as we have seen already, the eternal and divine "reasons" come into play, and these can be perceived only by the mind itself: *mens*. Man, then, is essentially his mind, or in other words, the *mens* is the inner man.⁶

When restricted to *mens* in this way, the mind is a unity and must always be so, nor can analysis of any sort make a simple spiritual essence the subject of spatial division. Still, in spite of this unity, the mind exercises rather different functions. If it were left to itself, it would, no doubt, devote all of its attention to knowing intelligibles, because it is especially at home there, in the exercise of its proper function, viz. pure contemplation, unhampered by any thought of action. But the mind is always the mind of a man, i.e. it belongs to the being we have defined as "a soul made to govern a body." To govern a body means to live and therefore to be involved in action. It follows that man must make use of things and to do this he must know things, i.e. he must use his mind for other purposes than contemplation. Of course, when the mind is used in this way, it does not cease to be the mind; it retains its identity always and is merely applied here to interests other than its own, employed for purposes of a lower order. Now one may ask what reason there can be for assigning this twofold task to the essential part of man. Would it not be simpler to leave the mind free to follow its own bent and to entrust the care of lower needs to some other faculty of man? We must remember that for Augustine, the mind, in the highest sense of the term, is man himself and therefore a natural unity. To enable us to see the underlying reason for this duality of function on the part of a single nature, he makes use of a comparison which brings out clearly the eminent position occupied by human kind. According to the account given in *Genesis*, man is unique among living creatures in that God found a helpmate for him only by taking her from his side; hence the union of man and wife, the only instance in creation of two who are one, of two in one flesh. In the same way, the mind of man, being given naturally to contemplation, needed an assistant to provide for life's temporal necessities so that it might devote all its attention to its important duties; and here too the assistant had to be taken from the mind itself, is in fact the mind itself, but discharging now a different office. We do not speak of these two functions as two in one flesh, but as two in one mind: *duo in mente una*,⁷ and to make our analysis clearer, it will be helpful to assign separate terms to them. Let us call them *superior reason* and *inferior reason*, but we are not to forget the all-important fact that they are one, that they are merely two *offices* discharged by the single reason.⁸

Our next step will then be to discover in which of these offices wisdom is to be found.

Wisdom implies the possession of happiness; by definition therefore, wisdom is an end. Consequently, if one of the mind's two activities serves as a means to the other, wisdom must be the other activity or that to which the former prepares the way and guides our steps. Now we have seen already that the mind concerns itself with action only with a view to making the practice of contemplation possible. Its duality of function will, then, find expression in two fundamentally different kinds of life, namely the active and the contemplative, symbolized by the contrast between Lia and Rachel or between Martha and Mary. The active life means movement, work, exertion, conflict. It is carried on amid the things of this world and strives to achieve a purpose which can be fully realized only in the world to come. The contemplative life is the recompense for the exertion of the active life, the guerdon won in its conflict. It is the repose which attends the realization of the end, the imperfect vision of the truth which ensures happiness here below while we wait for its fulfillment in the world to come.⁹ This complete subordination of the active life to the contemplative makes itself felt at every level of the life of the spirit. In general, one might say that our whole life on earth is spent in action with a view to the contemplation of heaven; but even if we consider only our life on earth, we can say that all our moral activity, along with the acquisition of the virtues and the doing of good works which it implies, is merely a preparation for the mystical contemplation of God enjoyed by few men and those the most perfect.¹⁰ Farther down, below these heights of the mystical life, on the lower level occupied by rational knowledge, is to be found the practical life of the citizen with all its various demands, and this life also is subservient to the free exercise of contemplation. Here however, the difference between the two lives is most marked, precisely because we are now at the lowest level of the life of the spirit. Within the cognitive operation itself, this difference takes the form of genuine opposition between a knowledge which is still nothing more than a sort of action, and a knowledge which is already a sort of contemplation.

Owing to the fact that the mind has two possible offices or functions, there is a choice to be made. Two attitudes or directions are open to man and he must decide between them. This decision affects our whole personality, and the reasons for our choice are hidden in the deepest recesses of the human heart. If the mind decides in favor of the repose found in contemplation, it turns necessarily towards the source of all knowledge, the divine Ideas; it forms its opinion of everything in ac-

cordance with them, it subjects itself to them so as to be able to judge everything else in the light of them. This is wisdom. The exercise of superior reason is essentially the submission of the individual to something beyond him, and the adherence of the mind to the source of light which illumines every mind. On the other hand, if man decides to devote himself to the exercise of lower reason alone, he turns, not to the Ideas themselves, but to their changing reflections, that is to say, to sensible things, and these he tries to secure for his own enjoyment and manipulate to his own advantage. This is science. Briefly then, wisdom asks us to face the divine Ideas and in doing so directs us to the divine and universal; science makes us turn towards things, and in doing so subjects us to creatures and restricts us to the limits of the particular.¹¹

Is there a word for that action of man whereby he clings to things for his own enjoyment as though this were his only end? Once again Holy Scripture is helpful and suggests *avarice*, which it calls *radix omnium malorum* (the root of all evils—1 Tim. 6, 10). Avarice is the state of soul which refuses to hold in common or to share; it wants and hoards for itself; it seizes things and makes them its own, as if the satisfaction of its own greed were the only reason for their existence. But there is also an avarice of the mind. It is the state of mind which has observed the power it has over things and acquires such a taste for this sort of domination that it clings to it as an end. This kind of avarice springs from pride, which Scripture calls *initium peccati* (the beginning of sin).¹² Man sees and acknowledges that he is a part of the universe governed by God. He knows that he is called to take his place in a universal scheme of things, that it is his duty to take a subordinate position therein and refer everything, not to himself, but to the common end. Now let us suppose that he refuses to accept this scheme of things and, considering himself the end of things, prefers the part to the whole. Such behavior is insensate, no doubt, but at the same time understandable, for in this case the part which man prefers is himself. Now what are we to say of such behavior?

It is a kind of apostasy, or repudiation of God, and it is rooted in a pride which becomes avarice at once. From the fact that the mind prefers itself to the whole, we know that it can and must make use of the eternal reasons, for only in them can it know any truth, but it makes the universal ideas serve its own particular ends. It enters into open warfare against them, appropriates what belongs to all and arrogates everything to itself. In this warfare, the weapon it has at its disposal is the body. This the mind possesses in its own right and the body lawfully belongs to the mind, but now the mind makes use of it in its

attempt to monopolize everything to which it has no claim. Once it has turned to the forms and movements of material things, it produces their sensations in itself and stores their images away in order to have control of things, feed on them inwardly and keep them for itself. When its store of sense forms is filled, the soul loses itself in them, wallows in them as in a slough of sensual pleasure. This is a natural, inevitable result when the mind prefers itself to the whole, because once it does this, it wants everything for itself, and since the intelligible is universal and the body the only thing it can call its own, all the mind can do is take what the body can fasten upon. By doing this, it commits a kind of spiritual fornication, which is caused and abetted by the imagination;¹³ and since it is within man, this becomes a constant source of danger almost impossible to avoid.

Of course, this debasement of the mind cannot be identified with science, but we can say that science is misused whenever it is pursued as an end, and in that case the same spirit and, fundamentally, the same causes are responsible. If our purpose in knowing things is the enjoyment they can give, if we insist on making the means our end, we are undoubtedly guilty of that grasping avarice of spirit which selfishly prefers the part to the whole. In either case, pride is to blame, and it is accompanied by an avarice which makes the body its tool as well as the recipient of its favors, so that when science is pursued for the sake of science, the mind becomes continually more subject to matter and turns away from the Ideas.¹⁴ Now let us see what line of conduct is dictated by wisdom.

Let us suppose that we have chosen the other alternative, or better still, let us suppose that, by use of our reason, we are beginning to free ourselves of the corporeal and are in the act of choosing the other alternative. Once the soul begins to recover, it turns away from matter and towards the eternal reasons, i.e. towards God's immutable and necessary Ideas. Now it is not an act of greed if the soul strives to reach the Ideas, because the Ideas are universal and common to all minds. Nor can it be called an act of pride; it is rather an act of humility, because the Ideas remain beyond reach to all save those who subject themselves to them. In short, when we defer to the Ideas in forming our opinions of things, we do not put the part above the whole, because we cannot acquire knowledge in the eternal reasons without reaching God, and once we reach Him, the place of everything is determined in relation to Him. This is the way of wisdom: contemplative rather than active; orientated to the eternal, not the temporal; open to all, not restricted or monopolized by avarice; subjecting the individual to the whole, not using the whole for the good of the in-

dividual. As we can see, pure science and pure wisdom are at opposite poles; the characteristics of the two ways of knowing reveal their utter disagreement at every point.¹⁵

This point of view is definite, but still limited. So far, our inquiry has shown that wisdom is out of reach for one who casts in his lot with science and chooses it as his end. To this extent, the two are totally opposed and irreconcilable. But is this necessarily the case if one decides in favour of wisdom? Does the choice of wisdom as an end mean that one must forego science?

First of all, it is clear that wisdom needs science in order to achieve its own purpose. Knowledge of the eternal must control and direct the temporal, but it cannot bring its action to bear upon the temporal unless it knows how this is done. The virtues, for example, are good ways of acting and therefore presuppose that we already know how to act.¹⁶ When science is subordinated to wisdom in this way and becomes its tool, it remains distinct from wisdom, but now it is good, legitimate, necessary. This is especially true when we realize that science may serve, not only as a tool to wisdom already acquired, but even as a means to acquiring it. As we know, wisdom achieves its purpose when it grasps the eternal Ideas and, beyond them, God Himself. Once we have gone thus far, we are in the realm of the eternal, the incorporeal, and our minds touch the Ideas, so to speak, as our hands touch bodies in the material space which envelops us. But how difficult it is for man to transcend the corporeal world in this way! And once risen to the intelligible world, how difficult to remain there! The very brilliance of the pure Ideas dazzles the mind and forces it away: *et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio* (and the thought of that which passes not away passes away). Still, even after we have suffered such disappointment, all is not lost; and it is here that science is particularly helpful. Science takes this experience and entrusts it to the memory, and once there, it becomes food for the mind's meditation. By careful reflection, we recall what paths the mind followed to reach the intelligible and thereby become capable of finding it again. It is very like hearing a beautiful, excellent melody: the melody is heard in time, but we perceive its measure in the quiet stillness of the soul; there also is it preserved, and it is there for us to find again after its strains have died away. In the same way, science takes in the experiences we have of wisdom, prevents our losing all recollection of them, and thus makes it unnecessary for us to begin our quest of wisdom anew each time we have experienced it.¹⁷

The way to keep anything from being lost is to put everything in its proper place. It is obvious that wisdom should be held in higher

esteem than science,¹⁸ and this is not only the surest way to safeguard wisdom, but science as well. To confuse the two means to put high and low on the same plane. If wisdom is sacrificed, man's dignity is surrendered, because his dignity consists in making the best use of his higher part. If science is sacrificed, dangerous and useless injury is done to wisdom itself. It is true that it is not always given to the same men to be both knowledgeable and wise, as St. Paul says in the passage referred to above (1 Cor. 12, 8); but the Apostle adds that wisdom and science both come from the same divine Spirit. We are allowed therefore to strive to remove the opposition between them and, without obliterating the fundamental distinction between them, strive to bring them into close harmony.

This specifically Augustinian view of the relationship between science and wisdom rests on two series of corresponding similarities, and these must be kept in mind if we are to understand the texts in which his view is expressed, for the texts themselves are generally very complicated. On the one hand we have the knowledge of the intellect or superior reason¹⁹ orientated towards the divine Ideas, a knowledge in the order of contemplation and based upon an act of submission to God, a knowledge which ensures happiness: this is wisdom. On the other hand we have the knowledge of inferior reason orientated towards sensible things, a knowledge in the order of action and based upon greed, a knowledge which is degrading: this is science. In Augustinism, therefore, these two terms have definite moral and religious connotations which at times make it difficult for us to interpret them accurately. The logical criterion, infallible certitude, is not enough to define Augustinian science as such because science shares this characteristic in common with wisdom, and yet we have seen that it is distinct from wisdom. The real difference which sets the one against the other derives from the nature of their objects. The object of wisdom is such that, by reason of its intelligibility alone, no evil use can be made of it; the object of science is such that it is in constant danger of falling into the clutches of cupidity, owing to its very materiality. Hence the double designation we may give science according as it is subservient to appetite, as it is whenever it chooses itself as its end, or is subservient to wisdom, as it is whenever it is directed towards the sovereign good.²⁰ When science is put in its proper place, it finds its lawful field of activity between the sense knowledge of bodies and the pure intuition of the divine Ideas.²¹ Consequently, it is not accurate to define wisdom as the ancients did: *Sapientia est rerum humanarum divinarumque scientia* (Wisdom is the knowledge of things both hu-

man and divine),²² because the knowledge of things divine is the concern of wisdom alone, and the knowledge of things human should be reserved to science. It is still true, however, that science may share, in its own way, the characteristics of wisdom, and may do so to such an extent that in becoming subservient to wisdom, it becomes, like wisdom itself, a gift of the Holy Ghost.

In point of fact Augustine never tried to construct this edifice of Christian wisdom systematically, nor did he attempt to realize the synthesis of contemplation and science, although he often voiced the need of it. He set down the basic elements involved in the problem and left to the middle ages the task of working out a solution. Thus, Augustine did not bother to fix the exact number of steps to be taken in attaining wisdom. He sees no objection either to having each person reckon these as he likes or to reckoning them himself in several different ways. Whether we favor three steps or four or seven,²³ by and large their arrangement remains fairly constant and may be reduced to two main types. If the levels of the spiritual life are reckoned from the moment the life of wisdom begins, every step will be taken under the supernatural influence of grace and then we have, for example, the classification given in the *De Doctrina Christiana*, namely fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of wisdom (Eccli. 1, 16; Ps. 110, 10), piety, knowledge, fortitude, counsel, purity of heart, wisdom. But if we reckon the steps in the soul's life from the first beginnings and prior to grace, we have as its lowest level the life we have already described, i.e. the soul's activity in so far as it organizes and conserves the body, the life by which living matter shares in the number and order of the ideas. The second step is sensation, which is simply a higher form of life (*evidentior manifestiorque vita*). With sensation, however, there appears the danger of the soul's becoming too subservient to the body it animates. The third step—proper to the human soul even though we remain in the natural order—is art and science properly so called. Here we see the devices of every sort man has invented to cultivate land, build towns, frame languages, write books, organize family, city, states, create works of art and systems of ideas. Great things these, and they belong to man alone; but they are still common to good and evil, wise and ignorant alike, because from one point of view all of this science is still mere ignorance. Only with the fourth step do real good and, consequently, real merit begin. At this point the soul makes a decision which introduces it to wisdom, and begins to turn away from lowly things towards the higher. It proclaims itself superior not only to the body but to the whole world of sense, and considers worthless all goods

which belong, not to itself by right, but to the material order alone. This is a big step for it to take. First the soul will strive patiently to purge itself of any stain, to make itself pure and spotless so that it may lay itself bare to the rays of the divine light. It will begin with fear of the Lord, i.e. with fear of death and of our future lot; then will come piety, i.e. submission to Holy Scripture and acceptance of its truth by faith.²⁴ Once our science has been transformed by faith, it is subject to the workings of wisdom and benefits from the help of grace; what was once but vain curiosity lacking both beginning and end becomes now a legitimate desire to understand revealed truth. This is the genesis of Augustinian knowledge in the proper sense of the term, with the characteristics it will retain for the thinkers of the Middle Ages.

The saving truth to which we adhere by faith is made known to us through the Scriptures. We must, therefore, be able to read and interpret them, and this presupposes a knowledge of three languages: Latin, Greek and Hebrew.²⁵ But it is not enough to understand the letter of the Scriptures; in addition we must know the natures of all the things mentioned therein: minerals, plants, animals. The symbolism of the Sacred Text is unintelligible to anyone who does not know the things themselves in which he tries to find symbols.²⁶ Whence the need for an extensive knowledge of the natural sciences including geography, mineralogy, botany and zoology. And even though the mechanical arts and astronomy have only minor interest from this point of view, they ought to be added to the others because they cannot be considered altogether useless.²⁷ Dialectic is absolutely indispensable because it enables us to expose and refute sophisms in any question relative to the Scriptures. Besides, it teaches the art of defining and dividing the matter in question, and without this no exposition of truth is possible.²⁸ Let us add eloquence, since eloquence enables us to make the truth convincing once we have discovered it;²⁹ the science of numbers, because it leads us so easily to contemplate the eternal reasons;³⁰ and finally history and law, for among the disciplines relating to human societies they can hardly be overlooked.³¹

Now if we adhere to the principle of making knowledge subordinate to wisdom, we shall observe that, the more closely the problem is studied, the more problematical becomes the possibility of fixing precise limits for the use we are to make of the sciences. Undoubtedly Augustine first tried to make a distinction between the knowledge of human institutions, which are of secondary importance, and the knowledge of divine institutions, which are fundamental, but the former could not be ignored completely, with the result that any fixed formula

becomes ultimately impossible. Christians should renounce pagan superstitions; they should avoid learning anything, even truths, which are of no service to salvation; but otherwise, they should not despise what is true or useful in the profane sciences.³² When the Hebrews went out of Egypt they lawfully appropriated the gold and silver vessels, raiment and other objects which they destined for a better use. In the same way, Cyprian, Lactantius, Hilary, all the Greek Fathers and even Moses before them, who received instruction from the Egyptian sages, did not hesitate to take possession of any knowledge useful to the true religion.³³ In principle, therefore, nothing is clearer than the Christian's right and duty; as regards the application, however, nothing is more uncertain or indefinite. In the Middle Ages everyone will interpret this according to his own temperament, without ever discussing the problem itself. Those who favor scientific research will be able to make all known sciences subserve the study of the Scriptures and demand their intensive cultivation for the benefit of the Faith, while those who feel a mistrust of and a disdain for the sciences will appeal to the same principle in order to limit their use. What will never vary is the ideal of a Christian wisdom gathering the various sciences unto itself, and the ideal of a system of human knowledge organized under the hegemony of the Scriptures, which are themselves depositories of the saving truth revealed to men by God.³⁴

Beginning with this fourth step, the soul's decisive conversion to God is completed. Now the only thing left to do is to persevere in the state of purity it has attained. This is the fifth step. The soul moves towards God, i.e. to the contemplation of truth, with unbelievable confidence and feels it is near the exalted and rich reward for which it has laboured so much. Then comes the sixth step in which the soul directs its gaze towards God, Whom the pure of heart alone can contemplate. Finally, the seventh step, the vision and contemplation of the truth discovered at last, and this is wisdom. In the strict sense, wisdom is not so much a step as the term to which all preceding steps lead. We do not go beyond it, we remain there. How express the joy, the possession of the supreme and true good, that emanation of peaceful eternity? Only great, peerless souls like St. Paul, who have seen such things as these and see them still, have said what they thought proper to say of them. As for ourselves, we can be sure it will be given us, with the aid of divine grace, to attain the Highest Cause, the Sovereign Author and First Principle of all things, provided we enter upon the path He has prescribed for us and follow it faithfully to the end. Then also will the vanity of all else be fully revealed. In this

contemplation of truth, imperfect as it is, there is a profound pleasure, such purity, such clarity and a certitude so complete that in comparison nothing else seems longer worthy of the term "knowledge." So great is the whole soul's thirst for adherence to the whole of the truth that from that moment the death it feared but a short time ago seems like a mere flight and escape from the body which separates it therefrom, or in other words, like the most precious of all goods.³⁵

Chapter II

THE ELEMENTS OF THE MORAL ACT

The mind is directed to its own end when it submits to wisdom, and by doing this it too becomes capable of directing man's actions to that end and of conferring upon them their moral character. When the mind has found its proper place, it knows how to put all things where they belong, and how to act towards them. The first effect of this initial step is that henceforth the mind is subject to the controlling action of the Ideas and judges everything from God's point of view.

1. *The Virtues as Rules. The Law of Order*

For anyone to be surprised at seeing morality spring spontaneously thus from true knowledge, he would have to fail to recognize the fundamental identity which exists between the essences of things and the rules of action. This identity itself follows from the universal character of divine illumination such as we have already described it.¹ The definitions of circle and sphere are eternal, necessary, compelling truths for the mind, and it can only recognize them and submit to them in order to judge everything else by them. But there are truths, not only in the order of knowledge, but in the order of action as well, and in as much as the latter are truths also, they should present the same characteristics and have the same origin as the former. Nothing is more evident to philosophical reflection, nothing more certain to anyone who knows how to read the Scriptures and to acquire some understanding of them. As we know, it is said in the Book of Wisdom: *Circuivi ego et cor meum ut scirem et considerare et quaererem sapientiam et numerum* (I and my heart have gone far and wide that I might know and ponder and search out wisdom and number. Eccl.

7, 26). Here we see wisdom placed on the same plane as number. We have now but to deduce the consequences of this important fact.

Wisdom is the truth in which man sees and possesses the sovereign good. There may be disagreement as to the paths to follow in reaching it, but not as to the goal to be attained. Even before we are happy, there is impressed on our mind the notion of what happiness is; and before we are wise, we have before our mind's eye a clear notion of what wisdom is.² With this truth, wherein the first principle of all morality resides, the situation is the same as that with the truths of mathematics; I do not see it either in my own mind or in the minds of others, nor does anyone else see it in my mind either. There is not a wisdom for each man; there is but one single wisdom common to all men, and it is their common sovereign good as well.³

This remarkable agreement among minds is not confined to the principle of morality; it necessarily extends as well to all the consequences which follow from it. Just as men see in common what wisdom is, so too do they see clearly that they must strive to acquire it.⁴ In the same way, each person sees that justice must be respected, the lower subordinated to the higher, equality maintained among things which are equal, and everyone given what belongs to him. This list of truths common to all could be lengthened indefinitely, e.g. the incorruptible is superior to the corruptible, the eternal to the temporal, the inviolable to the violable, indeed all the necessary propositions each mind finds in itself and which do not belong exclusively to any one mind. Of course we know the source of this fund of knowledge: it comes to us as *rules* or *lights* taught our minds by the Inner Master or revealed to the soul's gaze by the light which illumines every man coming into this world. Thus, just as there are unchangeable laws of number whose nature and certitude are grasped immediately by the minds which consider them, so too are there true and immutable rules of wisdom⁵ both evident to the mind which turns towards them and common to everyone. Now are these two orders of law of the same nature, or should they be considered irreducible?

It would be very daring to say that wisdom comes from number or is reduced to it. Many people count well, but there are very few wise men or, to put it more accurately, there is not one single wise man. Wisdom, then, appears to be much rarer than the science of numbers, and consequently seems to be of a higher nature also. But when we ponder the immutable truth of mathematics within ourselves, it seems that in order to discover it we have to go into a kind of inner retreat, into a secret region, whatever we may call it, where numbers make their home, as it were. They are only found far removed from bodies,

like something conceivable but so difficult to put into words that out of weariness we return at once to the world of bodies, and in order to express ourselves, speak, not of the numbers intelligible in themselves, but of objects before our eyes, just as everyone does. Now precisely the same thing happens whenever we give our whole mind to the rules of wisdom. If, then, wisdom and number, which Scripture also joins closely together, both reside in the same secret region of intelligible truth, how is it that to men the science of numbers seems inferior to wisdom?

In point of fact, to find an answer to this difficult question, we have but to examine the text of Scripture more closely. We read there that wisdom *attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter* (reacheth from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly. Wis. 8, 1). Now number is undoubtedly the power which reaches mightily from one end of the world to the other; and it is wisdom, in the proper sense of that word, which orders all things sweetly. Inasmuch, then, as wisdom does both of these things, number and order obviously derive from the same wisdom. The only difference between them is due not so much to their origin as to the nature of the objects to which they are applied. God has bestowed number on every thing, even on the meanest, on things to be found on the lowest level of creation, namely on bodies: these are the last entities, but they have their numbers all the same. Wisdom, on the other hand, does not belong to any body; it has not even been granted to every soul, but only to those rational souls in which it resides. This is the reason why we have less esteem for numbers, for we judge bodies by their rules, and bodies are beneath us and obey the laws of number. Since only a few men are wise and any number of fools can count, men admire wisdom and despise numbers. But as soon as we lift our minds up to the laws of number, we become aware that they transcend our minds and subsist unchangeable in truth itself. Those who know and reflect discover that unity of nature which makes of number and wisdom one and the same intelligible reality. Sensible number is of a lower order, realized in matter; but numbered things are not numbers, and for a purified mind which has succeeded in attaining numbers in themselves, there is no longer any difference between the numbers wisdom bestows and the wisdom which bestows them. Numbers constitute the only participation in wisdom possible to bodies: although these are incapable of knowing and hence of possessing wisdom, they are capable at least of receiving it. Just as one and the same fire heats things nearby and gives light to things too far removed to be warmed, so too does the same source heat minds with the warmth of wisdom and cast the light

of numbers on bodies whose materiality separates them from it.⁶ In any case, it is one and the same wisdom which pervades the whole of creation and subjects both the world of bodies and the world of minds to the same laws.

In Augustinism, then, there is a physical illumination as well as a moral illumination, both comparable in every respect with intellectual illumination and resting on the same metaphysical foundation. What is self-sufficient neither in the order of being nor, as a result, in the order of knowledge, is not self-sufficient in the order of action either. In dealing with the order of action, the problem of man's relation to God is raised once more, and its solution is exactly the same as in the other two orders.

As a being endowed with knowledge, man receives a natural light from God; as one subject to the necessities of action, he receives a moral conscience (*conscientia*) from God. Moreover, in both of these orders, man derives the necessity of his judgements from God. There is a law in God which, in Him, is simply God Himself, and to this law everything which is not God is subject. We call it the *eternal law*. Its content is a prescription of the divine reason or God's will ordering the preservation of the natural order and forbidding its disturbance.⁷ This immutable law illumines our conscience as the divine light enlightens our understanding. What the first principles of knowledge, seen in the eternal ideas, are to our reason in the order of knowledge, the first principles of morality are to our conscience in the order of action. There is therefore a kind of law in us also, consisting of the imperative commands of conscience; its rules are so many primary certitudes. We call it the *natural law*.⁸ It derives its certitude from the fact that it is simply a kind of transcript in our souls of the eternal law subsisting immutably in God.⁹ Consequently, all the detailed commands of our moral conscience, all the changing acts of legislation governing peoples spring from one and the same law. It is constantly being adapted to meet various changing needs. But in itself it never changes. Everything lawful in the individual and in the city is derived from it. It is truly the law of laws.

The fundamental demand the eternal law imposes on the universe in general and upon man in particular is that everything be perfectly ordered (*ut omnia sint ordinatissima*).¹⁰ Now in all places and at all times order would have the lower subject to the higher.¹¹ There is no doubt that, generally speaking, everything created by God is good. From rational creatures to the lowliest of bodies, there is nothing man cannot use lawfully. His difficulty consists in distinguishing between things, all of which are good, but not equally good: he has to weigh

them, estimate their proper value, subordinate external goods to the body, the body to the soul of man and then, within the soul, make the senses subject to reason and reason to God.¹²

Divine illumination not only prescribes rules of action for us by making our conscience submit to the natural law; it also gives us the means of putting these rules into practice. In Augustinism therefore, we should speak of an illumination of the virtues which matches the illumination of the sciences: just as our truth is only a participation in Truth and our beatitude a sharing in Beatitude, so every man becomes virtuous only by making his soul conform to the immutable *rules* and *lights* of the Virtues dwelling eternally within the Truth and Wisdom common to all men. The four cardinal virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice, have no other source but this;¹³ and inversely, the common root of all vices is the movement of the will as it turns away from these realities intelligible and common to everyone and turns towards bodies in order to appropriate them. Now what are the functions of these four fundamental virtues?

Temperance holds carnal desires in check and keeps them from dominating the mind; it prepares the way for the acquisition of wisdom by preventing desires opposed to the spirit, but it does no more than prepare the way, because no one here below is so wise as to have risen above every conflict of flesh with spirit.¹⁴ Prudence distinguishes between good and evil; it enables us to avoid mistakes in choosing what is to be done or avoided. It is prudence which shows us, for example, that it is bad to consent to sin and good not to yield to the allurements of desire. It is the role of justice to give every one his due. Through justice, a kind of order is set up in man with the result that the body is subject to the soul and the soul to God. However, this ordering of nature is very imperfect in us and usually becomes established gradually, with the help of the virtue of fortitude. Man thinks himself naturally capable of attaining his sovereign good and happiness even in this life although we are borne down by countless evils from which more than one would-be wise man has thought he could be delivered only by death. Fortitude enables us to bear these woes while we wait for that true happiness which alone will free us from them.¹⁵

Only when this stage has been reached does the Augustinian doctrine of illumination take on its full meaning. We concluded our study of it by saying that its most significant expression is to be found in the formula: God is the very life of the soul. Now it is precisely by bestowing the virtues on the soul that God bestows life upon it, for even if the soul is neither wise, nor just, nor pious, it is still a soul when

stripped of these virtues; but it is, so to say, a soul that is dead, a soul deprived of life. It is capable of giving life to the body, but it also needs to be given life. God vivifies it by granting it wisdom, piety, justice, charity and thereby, all the other virtues.¹⁶ In this sense He really plays the same role in the soul that the soul itself plays in relation to the body: He bestows order upon it, and this is the very law of the universe. Under what conditions, then, will man be perfectly ordered?¹⁷

2. *The Will and Love*

If, from the point of view of their origin, there is no difference between moral truth and any other truth, the same cannot be said of man who is charged with putting truth into practice. The sum-total of all the eternal essences and of the temporal things participating in these essences forms a hierarchy of higher and lower realities, and the relationships born of this hierarchy constitute what is called order. Nature is ruled by this order perforce because God Himself has imposed it. As a part of nature, man also is subject to the divine order, nor can he escape it. But there is an important difference in the case of actions which depend on the human will. These are not performed under the compulsion of the divine order; they have a purpose of their own, and this purpose is to realize the divine order. With them it is not a matter of being subject to the law but of willing it and collaborating in its fulfillment. Man knows the law. Is he going to will it? Henceforth, that is the question.¹⁸ Everything depends on the decision man will or will not make to allow the order he sees imposed by God on nature to reign within himself.¹⁹ Without doubt, we are now at the crossroads.

The power on which this important decision rests is none other than the will. The role this faculty plays is a leading one. Not only do all the resolutions and decisions we make in the practical order depend upon it, but every operation of our cognitive powers in the theoretical order is under its immediate control as well. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that as the will is, so is the man, so much so, in fact, that a will divided against itself is a man divided against himself.²⁰ It is important to explain clearly this dominant role of the will because the entire Augustinian psychology bears its stamp. We shall describe it first in the order of feeling and then in the realm of knowledge itself.

All of the soul's sensible movements can be reduced to four fundamental passions, namely desire (*cupiditas*), joy (*laetitia*), fear (*metus*),

and sorrow (*tristitia*). To desire is to consent to the movement whereby the will moves towards a thing; to rejoice is to take delight in the possession of a thing obtained; to fear is to yield to the will's movement in shrinking from a thing and turning away from it; to experience sorrow is to refuse consent to an evil actually being endured. Thus, every movement of the soul is directed either towards a good to be acquired or retained, or away from an evil to be avoided or removed;²¹ but the soul's free movement to acquire or to retain a thing is the will itself.²² Every movement of the soul, therefore, depends on the will.

Proof of this does not appear so easy where the order of knowledge is concerned. However, any of the soul's cognitive operations we choose to consider appears also to be subject to the will. In sensation, which is the lowest of these operations, attention, i.e. the will itself, intervenes to keep the sense organ fixed on its object as long as the act continues.²³ Consequently, the will plays the part of an active force in every sensation, and without it sensation would not take place because the sense organ would not be applied to the sense object.²⁴ Once this force ceases to function, the organ may remain fixed on the object and the object may continue to inform it with its image, but the sensation will be perceived no longer and everything will be as though the object were not there. How many things impress their image upon our eyes in this way of which we take no notice! But if the will to feel should grow in intensity, the result will be no mere sensation, but a love, a desire, a veritable passion for feeling, and the whole body may be affected by it.²⁵

The case of an unperceived impression may seem simple, but it is really much more complicated than it seems. When our will fixes one of our sense organs on a sense object, it simultaneously intervenes in two different ways: it keeps the sense organ in contact with the object, but it also impresses the recollection of the sensation upon the memory while the sensation is in progress, and it is chiefly because of this second operation of the will that sensation is something conscious. If a person says something in our hearing while we are thinking of something else, we claim that we have not heard a thing. But this is not exactly the case. We have heard, but we do not remember anything because our will was distracted and did not fix the sounds in memory as they struck our ear.²⁶ By showing, therefore, that sensation falls under the control of the will, we have established the will's dominion over the memory. Now what is true of memory is equally true of all the internal senses, and particularly of the imagination. The will retains sensations and impresses recollections, but it also joins

together and separates the images thus received and stored away so as to use them again as it likes in the most diversified combinations. Thus, it combines as it likes elements borrowed from the knowledge of the sensible world to create an imaginary world according to its own fancy. We must add that this is the source of any number of errors into which we are led by the will, the *conjunctrix ac separatrix*,²⁷ when it would have us accept its own fabrications as a faithful representation of reality.

Is it possible to go beyond the sensible order and still find the will's dominant influence even in the operations of pure understanding? There can be no doubt of it. If the will is the active force which calls forth sensation, it is also the force which causes rational knowledge. In our study of man's intellectual activity, we have seen that it ends in the conception of truth engendered therein. But before we produce knowledge in ourselves, we have to desire it: we know because we want to know, and we only seek knowledge because we want to find it. If the desire for knowledge becomes strong, we call it research, the word itself denoting precisely that passion for knowledge which leads to science.²⁸ But whatever the degree of knowledge we attain, it is always determined by an impulse to investigate which has its origin in the will. Since, therefore, all of the soul's operations depend on our voluntary decisions, it is true to say that the will is the man himself. Now what is the principle of the will?

According to Greek physics, and particularly the physics of Aristotle, every body is drawn to a given place in the universe by a kind of natural weight. If we imagined the physical elements of which the world is composed mixed and mingled together in a kind of chaos, they would sort themselves out spontaneously and each try to find the place where it belongs, and once there, would come to rest: fire above air, air beneath fire, earth below, water above earth. It is the natural tendency possessed by physical bodies which causes fire, when left to itself, to rise, and a stone, when left to itself, to fall, provided that the fire has not reached the upper region of the world nor the stone the center of the earth. If, in thought, we did away with weight in bodies, the universe would immediately become inert, utterly immobile, dead. Now St. Augustine thinks of man and his will in somewhat the same way. In every soul, as in every body, there is a weight drawing it constantly, moving it always to find its natural place of rest; and this weight we call love. "My weight," says Augustine, "is my love" (*pondus meum amor meus*); *eo feror quocumque feror* (by it am I borne whithersoever I am borne).²⁹ From this follow consequences of great importance touching the nature of our voluntary action.

First of all, it is obvious that, if love is the inner force which moves the will and the will denotes the man, we can say that man is essentially moved by his love.³⁰ To man, then, love is not something accidental and superadded, but a force within his essence, like the weight in a falling stone. Moreover, since love is by definition a natural tendency towards some good, it will strive to reach its goal until it has attained it. Can we imagine a love that is lazy and idle? *Da mihi vacantem amorem et nihil operantem!* It is a myth. Man's love never rests. What it does may be good or bad, but it is always doing something. Crime, adultery, homicide, lust; love causes all of these as well as acts of pure charity or heroism. For good or ill, its capacity is un-failing; for the man it drives, it is an inexhaustible source of action.³¹

Now if this is so, it is the height of folly to expect to cut man off from his love or to forbid him to make use of it. This would mean separating him from himself and forbidding him to be what he is: take from a man the love which leads him from one thing to another towards some goal vaguely conceived and he will be worth less than a material body, which at least yields to the pull of its own weight. The moral problem is not *whether* one should love but *what* one should love. "Are you told not to love anything? Not at all! If you are to love nothing, you will be lifeless, dead, detestable, miserable. Love, but be careful what you love."³² Virtue, then, means to will what we should will, i.e. to love what we should love.

One of the first effects of giving love such a leading role is that the value of the love will determine the value of the will and ultimately the value of the act which results therefrom.³³ Indeed, we have said that man acts according to his passions, and these in turn are simply direct manifestations of his love. Therefore, if his love is good, his passions and his will will be equally good; if it is evil, they also will be evil (*recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor et voluntas perversa malus amor*).³⁴ On the other hand, since the quality of the love determines the quality of the will and the will determines the act, we can say that as the love is, so is the act. It is a mistake to think that there are passions which are good or evil in themselves independently of the intention which prompts them. All men, good or bad, experience all of the passions, but good men have good passions and evil men evil. Hence, there is a righteous anger, a justifiable pity, a salutary fear, a holy desire: it all depends on the love which inspires them.³⁵ In the same way, it is a mistake to think that there are some things good in themselves and others evil. All things can be occasions for good or evil wills and consequently occasions for praiseworthy or blameworthy acts. If greed is evil, it is not gold that is at fault, but

the man who loves gold with a perverted love and violates order by preferring a bit of matter to justice, which is incomparably superior. Lust is not a vice attributable to bodily beauty, but to the soul which, for want of temperance, perversely prefers bodily pleasures to spiritual realities, whose beauty is more lasting and whose enjoyment is purer. Vainglory cannot be a reproach to glory, nor pride to power, but rather to the love of praise gained contrary to the voice of conscience or to the love of a power in excess of one more lawful. Thus, the malice of the act is never due to the goodness of its object but to the perversion of our love for this good. In such cases, our error is not in loving what is good, but in violating order by not preferring what is better.³⁶

Another effect of the leading role played by the will is this: just as all the passions are one in the love from which they spring, so too are all the virtues one in the love which rectifies the passions and directs them to their lawful end. Whence the mutual dependence and inseparability of the virtues.³⁷ Everyone agrees that virtue is the only road to happiness, the goal of the moral life. Therefore, if love is the will itself, the highest virtue is also the highest love (*quod si virtus ad beatam vitam nos ducit, nihil omnino esse virtutem affirmaverim nisi summum amorem*).³⁸ As for the virtues subordinated to this highest virtue, these may be reduced to love quite easily. Temperance is love bestowed wholeheartedly upon the thing loved; fortitude is love which easily endures anything for the thing it loves; justice is love serving the object loved alone and consequently dominating everything else; prudence is love wisely discriminating between what helps and what hinders it. Hence, if we said that two men are equal in fortitude but one excels in prudence, this would mean that the fortitude of one is deficient in prudence and by that very fact deficient in fortitude itself. But if the love of the supreme end were perfect, no discord or inequality among the virtues would be possible. Temperance is a love which saves itself wholly for God; fortitude bears everything with ease for the love of God; justice serves God alone and for that reason rightly holds sway over everything subject to man; prudence is a love which can distinguish between what binds man to God and what separates him from Him.³⁹ Thus, we have reached the central idea of morality and find it to be the love of the highest good, that is to say, charity.⁴⁰

3. Charity

Charity is the love whereby we love what we ought to love.⁴¹ Since charity is love, we should be able to compare it to one of those weights which draw the will to its object. In a certain sense, charity is also like

the weights which draw physical bodies towards their place of rest,⁴² and we should be even more justified in saying that, in the final analysis, divine love moves physical things as well as human wills. However, in addition to the difference between physical movements and free, voluntary actions, charity moves towards God, Who is a person, whereas a body moves towards its natural place, which is a thing. Now we do not love a person in the same way that we love a thing: we love things for our own sake, but we love persons for themselves. Hence, to the extent that a body can be said to love its natural place, it desires its own good;⁴³ but to the extent that a man loves God, what he wills can only be God's good.

This difference serves only to emphasize an ambiguity essential, as it were, to the very notion of love. We have looked upon this feeling as a kind of weight moving the will towards something in which it takes delight. Hence, love seeks its own enjoyment, and if it moves the will, it does so for its own sake and advantage. This point is so obvious that we have seen Augustine attributing to enjoyment precisely the same influence over the soul as he does to the will.⁴⁴ On the other hand, since love for a person strives for that person's good, how can the same will move towards two different goals at the same time, i.e. towards its own good and the good of its own good?

To remove the difficulty, let us first consider the comparatively simple case of one man's love for another, i.e. charity for one's neighbor. In such cases, it is obvious that the man who loves another in charity does not cease to love his own good simply because he wills the good of another. Loving another with one's whole soul does not mean disowning or sacrificing oneself; it means loving another as oneself, on a basis of perfect equality. The one I love is my equal and I am the equal of the one I love. This is why I love him as myself, in the manner God has enjoined.

This relationship of equality between the person loving and the one loved stands out clearly, for example, in the case of charity for the poor. Scripture says that the poor will always be with us, but it simply states a fact, nothing more. We should not hope that there will be poor people merely that we may be able to practice the works of mercy. If you give bread to the hungry, that is excellent; but it would be better if there were no hungry people at all and we had no one to give to. We clothe the naked, and so we must. But would to heaven that everyone had clothes and it were no longer necessary to clothe anyone! Such acts of charity are necessary because of the needs they relieve, but do away with poverty and you make the works of mercy unnecessary. And are we to think that the fervor of charity would then die or even diminish? Not at all. We love best a man who is contented,

one to whom we can only give. The affection we have for him is free of any ulterior motive, for if we give to a poor man, we may do so out of a desire to humiliate him, dominate him, and place him under an obligation. For the person we love, we should wish that he be our equal (*opta aequalem*), and that we both be subject to Him to Whom nothing can be given.⁴⁵

Inversely, all charity for another's person seeks its own good as well. This is self-evident because the definition of love implies desire for a good we want to possess, and if a person sacrificed himself in favor of the object of his love, he would possess nothing. Experience also confirms this. All love between persons obviously tends to be reciprocal: the lover expresses his feelings by certain signs, in the hope that he will be repaid love for love. If he should happen to be successful in love, he is set on fire, especially because he sees love enkindled in the soul of the one he loves. This is another way of saying that all love between persons would eventually die if it were not requited at all: such a feeling cannot remain alive if reciprocity is wholly lacking.

Nor is this all. Love does more than arouse and demand a similar feeling in two different persons; it unifies them and, to a certain extent at least, makes them cease to be two. Since each experiences a feeling which makes him wish for the other what the other wishes for him, the two loves of those in love steadily tend to become one: *quid est ergo amor nisi quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans vel copulare appetens* (what then is love but a kind of life which joins, or seeks to join, some two things).⁴⁶ This is why the problem we have been trying to solve must ultimately appear illusory. To love another as oneself cannot be a contradiction because love tends to unity and there can be no division within something which is one.

Is it clear, however, that this solution to the problem can be applied to the love of God? To love another for his sake means to love that person with an equality so perfect that one becomes, as it were, identical with him. He is a good in himself and a good for us; hence, his good and ours are embraced by one and the same love. But in the case of God, we no longer love a good but *the* Good, whereas we are not *the* Good but merely one good among many. How, then, could we possibly treat Him on a basis of equality? To love such a good as it deserves to be loved, we must love it unreservedly, without equality; indeed we must, on the contrary, love it with utter inequality. That same justice which, in love between men, demands equality between ourselves and the object of our love, demands that God be the object of an unqualified love even though our own good cannot be compared with

Him. In this case, the measure is to love without measure (*ipse ibi modus est sine modo amare*).⁴⁷ It now remains to be seen whether this can be reconciled with the notion of love, and whether that term can be applied to a relationship in which we are subordinated, minimized, reduced to nothingness.

Here especially there can be no doubt that the best way to gain all is to renounce oneself; to lose one's soul is to save it. When a person loves another to ensure his own happiness, it is absurd for him to abandon the idea of reciprocity and do away with himself for the sake of his beloved. And the reason is quite clear: no finite good is worth what we should destroy within ourselves if we did away with ourselves to have it take our place. But it is altogether different when we are dealing with the absolute Good. To possess it is to possess everything; hence, it is useless for one who possesses it to have anything else besides. In fact it is not only useless but harmful and, as it were contradictory, because if anyone hoped to possess the Absolute Good *plus* something else, he would actually have that Good *minus* what he hoped to keep of the rest. The finite good he would try to keep in addition would only serve to draw him away from the Good and prevent him from clinging to it. There is, then, one case and one only in which the soul's happiness demands that it forget itself entirely and renounce itself, and that is the love of God. This is the only love which wants to be completely gratuitous so that it may be fully requited; a love which gives itself without reserve and in so doing secures the possession of the Supreme Good, and this is precisely the love we call charity.

In St. Augustine, this doctrine does not correspond to the passing enthusiasm of the mystic's overflow; it expresses rather the most indispensable requirement of the Christian life, and this is the reason why Augustine was so eager to preach it to all his people: "Examine yourselves, my Brethren; search the hidden recesses of your hearts; see and note carefully what charity you have, and increase what you find. Guard that treasure so as to possess wealth within you. When we speak of anything of great price, we say that it is dear, and we are right. But think of what you say: 'This is dearer than that.' Surely, 'dearer' means 'of higher price.' If everything of higher price is said to be dearer, my Brethren, what is dearer than charity itself? What, do we think, is its price? Where does one find the price of it? The price of wheat is your coin; the price of a farm, your silver; the price of a pearl, your gold; the price of charity, you. You try to find the where-withal for a farm, a jewel, an animal; you look for the means to buy a farm, and you look in your purse. But if you would have charity, look

for yourself and find yourself. Now why are you afraid to give yourself? Is it because you may lose yourself? Indeed, if you do not give yourself, you lose yourself. Charity speaks by the mouth of Wisdom and tells you something that will make you have no fear of the words 'Give yourself.' If a man wanted to sell you a farm, he would say to you: 'Give me your gold'; and if someone wanted to sell you something else, he would say: 'Give me your money, give me your silver.' Hear what charity tells you by the mouth of Wisdom: '*Son, give me thy heart*' (Prov. 23, 26). It says: '*Give me.*' Give what? '*Son, thy heart.*' Things were bad when it belonged to you, when it was yours: you were wasting yourself on vanities and wanton, ruinous debauchery. Take it away from that.' Where take it? Where put it? Charity says: '*Give me thy heart.* Let me have it and you will not lose it.' See if He Who says to you: 'Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind,' wanted to leave in you any means of loving even yourself. What is left of your heart to use for love of self? What is left of your soul, of your mind? He says: 'Whole.' He Who made you demands the whole of you."⁴⁸

Totum exigit te qui fecit te. If charity requires something as unconditional as this, then it has no special place in man's moral life; it is the moral life itself. A love of God which is just beginning is the first step in the soul's justification. If its love increases, justice grows within it accordingly; if its love becomes perfect, the soul's justice becomes perfect as well.⁴⁹ Let us grasp the full significance of this doctrine: a perfectly realized love of God is identical with a completely actualized moral life. Is not loving the Supreme Good absolutely and, consequently, possessing it without reserve the happiness and goal of the whole moral life? So true is this that a love of God which has reached the height of its perfection would take possession of and fill the whole soul completely. By definition, there would no longer be any room in that soul for anything else whatever; everything it did it would do out of pure charity; each of its acts, no matter what it was, would spring from a perfect and absolute love of God, so that everything it did would be good with an unfailing goodness. *Dilige, et quod vis fac.*⁵⁰ St. Augustine tells us: "Love, and do what you will."

This proposition is true and its truth is absolute, but it only holds for perfect charity. If it is a matter of imperfect charity—and who would dare pride himself on loving God with a love that is altogether pure?—it is true only relatively and in direct proportion to the degree of that charity. In this life, who would claim to have mastered cupidity so thoroughly that his soul is completely filled with charity alone?⁵¹ Far from sanctioning an easy surrender to that inclination towards self

which causes even the best of souls to go astray, Augustine's precept remains the expression of an ideal which is unattainable in its purity; but it does make us aware of the duty incumbent upon us to see to it that our souls become more and more imbued with charity which, to the extent that it prevails over the cupidity within us, enables us to abandon ourselves to the movements of a will sanctified in its very roots, and is henceforth capable of producing nothing but good fruits.⁵²

A second consequence of this doctrine is that in placing charity at the very beginning of the moral life, we do not advocate the abolition of morality, i.e. the abrogation of the moral precepts in favor of one of them, nor even the suppression of the virtues for the sake of one of them. Charity consummates the virtues, it does not consume them; and if it is true that it is enough to possess charity to the full to have all the other virtues, it is because charity implies them and takes them for granted rather than exempts us from them.⁵³ For the same reason and in precisely the same sense, we should be making a mistake if we sought justification in Augustinism for any kind of quietism in which love would excuse from works: it is a radical condemnation of that position. As Augustine conceives it, love is essentially active, a principle of motion and action; thus, since charity is love, we have but to posit it to see it expand spontaneously in meritorious and productive works: *caritas . . . ubi fuerit, necesse est ut operetur*.⁵⁴ Thereby, an intimate relationship is easily established between what is most abstract in the moral life, namely pure love, and the most concrete aspect of our daily activity. The love of God spontaneously blossoms forth in acts which give it expression, and this is the reason why all morality must inevitably flow from it.

Now that we have reached this point, we uncover at last the deep source from which the moral life springs in all its perfect unity. What is God? He is the Absolute Good, object of perfect love and consequently of charity. But still, what is God? He is the perfect love He has for His own supreme perfection and hence, once again, Charity. That is the very definition Scripture gives of Him: *Deus caritas est*.⁵⁵ But then a new development becomes plain to see: God is charity, the moral life is charity; God, then, must be within us. He must circulate, so to speak, within us like a living water from which flow both our virtues and our acts. To live by charity, we must do two things: move towards God, i.e. towards charity, and possess charity even now as a pledge of future happiness, i.e. possess God. Indeed, charity is not only the means whereby we *shall* obtain God; it is God already possessed, obtained and circulating, so to speak, within us through the

gift He has made us of Himself.⁵⁶ Thus, charity is like the pledge of the possession of God, and yet it is something more than a pledge, because a pledge is taken back. God's charity, on the other hand, is given once and for all, and will never be taken back. Let us not say, then, that in charity we have the pledge of future happiness but rather an installment on it: an installment, i.e. a gift which will not be taken back, like a pledge, but will be completed and made perfect. We have charity now; later we shall have Charity itself.⁵⁷ Only the doctrine of grace enables us to explain how this possession of God in love, incomplete though it may be as yet, is possible for man even here below.

Chapter III

CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

THE rôle of grace is only understood in terms of the evils it is to cure. There is a radical deficiency in man as well as a disorder made possible by that very deficiency; in a word, evil exists. The existence of evil raises a problem over which Augustine worried for a long time even before his conversion.¹ If the word 'God' has any meaning, it can only signify a perfect being who is the author responsible for all things. But to say that there is evil in man is to admit the imperfection of the universe. How are we to reconcile the work's imperfection with the workman's perfection? And how are we to find a remedy for it?

1. Evil and Free Choice

The problem belongs essentially to metaphysics, in that the human will is but a fragment of the universal order. To solve it, therefore, we have to begin with a consideration of being.

By definition and in keeping with the proofs establishing His existence, God is the sovereign good. Now in as much as He is the supreme good, no good exists above or apart from Him. God, then, cannot change; not having any good to acquire, He has nothing to gain or lose. This is what is meant by saying that God is immutable and eternal. Creatures, on the other hand, only exist *through* Him, but they are not *of* Him. If they were, they would be identical with Him, i.e. they would no longer be creatures. Their origin is, as we know, quite different: they have been created and so were brought out of nothingness by Him. Now a thing which comes from nothing participates not only in being but in non-being as well; hence, there is a kind of fundamental deficiency in a creature which in turn gives birth to the necessity of acquiring and, consequently, of changing as well.

This is the metaphysical root of their mutability.² Plato's philosophy sought to express this by saying that things cannot in any absolute sense be said either to be or not be (*nec omnino esse nec omnino non esse*).³ The difficulty is to specify the relation of being to non-being in each separate case.

To overcome this difficulty we have but to consider the universal attributes which make created things good. No matter what kind of substance we consider, whether spiritual or corporeal, God has bestowed on it measure, form and order (*modus, species, ordo*). If these three perfections are of high degree, the creature possessing them will be a great good; if they are mediocre, the creature will be only a mediocre good; if none of them are there, the creature will be no good at all. Nature, however, is in proportion to the good. Hence, higher measure, form and order imply a higher nature; lower measure, form and order imply a lower nature; no measure, form or order at all mean no nature at all. Now *nulla natura* means either "a worthless nature" or "no nature at all," as you prefer. In any case, it is nothing. Since, then, every nature is made up of three perfections, by definition every nature is good.⁴

If this is goodness, evil can only be the corruption of one or other of these perfections in the nature possessing them. An evil nature is one in which measure, form or order is vitiated, and it is only evil in exact proportion to the degree in which they are vitiated. If the nature were not vitiated, it would be all order, form and measure, i.e. it would be good; even when vitiated, as nature it is still good, and evil only in so far as it is vitiated.⁵ This relation between the evil and good in a subject we express by calling evil a *privation*. Evil is the privation of a good which the subject should possess, a failure to be what it should be and hence, a pure nothingness.⁶

In keeping with this doctrine, it is not enough merely to admit that the Manichaeans are wrong in considering evil a being, because it is a pure absence of being; we have to go further and say that, since by definition evil is nothing, it could not even be considered apart from some good. For evil to exist, there must be a privation; hence, there must be a thing which is deprived of something. Now the thing as such is good, and it is only in so far as it is deprived of something that it is evil. What does not exist has no deficiencies. Thus, whenever we speak of evil, we implicitly assume the presence of some good which is not all that it should be and is therefore evil. Evil is not merely a privation: it is a privation residing in some good as in its subject.⁷

Augustine was not satisfied to state this thesis in general terms; he applied it specifically to the voluntary evil which is sin. The volun-

tary, free act may be compared to any substance endowed with measure, form and order. If these perfections are not what they should be in a determined act, that act is thereby imperfect and therefore, bad. But in this case also the malice of the act is to be found only in that of which the act is deprived. If the act were nothing, it would not be deprived of anything; hence, an evil will is one which is good as will, but falls short of being quite the thing it should be. In this case as in others, evil cannot exist apart from some good.⁸

Once these principles have been set down, it becomes possible to account for the presence of evil in the world. These principles reveal the purely privative nature of evil and by so doing free God from the reproach of having created it, because what is nothing cannot have been created; they even prove that since God did create, evil was inevitable, because to create means to bring out of nothingness, and a thing which comes from nothing is corruptible; and lastly, they enable us to settle this knotty problem: if creation *ex nihilo* was necessarily accompanied by evil, would it not have been better to create nothing at all? In discussing this question, it is advisable to distinguish between natural and moral evil; consequently, the question falls into two: why create corruptible natures? Why create fallible wills?

As regards natural evil, it will be enough to recall that, in so far as things exist, they can only be considered good. It is true that they are born, corrupt and die; the universe is the scene of constant destruction and, in the case of living things and of man in particular, this is accompanied by the cruelest suffering, anguish and sorrow. We must not forget, however, that all of the beings which replace one another in this way are themselves good, so that it is always good things which follow one another endlessly on the stage of the universe. Moreover, there is a certain beauty and perfection even in their succession, and one may find a satisfactory reason for the violent destruction of many of them. However insignificant the perfection of each thing may be, it only exists because of the good it has, and it is to God that it owes the possession of it. He has so disposed all things that the weak give way to the strong, the less strong to the strongest, and earthly things to the heavenly bodies superior to them. In fact, in following one another as they disappear only to be replaced by others, things display a kind of beauty different from the beauty our eyes behold in space. It is, so to speak, a beauty which unfolds in time. A thing which dies or ceases to be what it was, neither mars nor impairs the order or balance of the universe. Quite the contrary; for just as a well-ordered speech is beautiful even though the syllables and sounds of which it consists slip by and die away, as though each dies to allow the next to be born, so too does the

universe roll on, like a poem whose very movement makes it a thing of beauty.⁹

As for moral evil, the problem seems more difficult to solve. If man's actions are not always what they should be, his will is responsible for it. He makes his decisions freely and it is in virtue of this freedom that he is capable of doing evil. The question, then, is this: how could a perfect God endow us with free choice, i.e. with a will capable of doing evil?

When the problem is stated in these terms, it amounts to determining whether and to what extent free will may be numbered among the things which are good. The answer cannot be other than that given in the case of corporeal things. In the world of bodies, there are many things which we can put to bad use, but this is no reason for saying that they are evil and that God should not have given them to us, because, considered in themselves, they are good. Now why could there not be good things like this in the soul, i.e. things of which we can make evil use but which, being good, could only have been given us by the author of every good? Being deprived of its hands is a serious loss to the human body, so hands are good and useful things; but the man who commits criminal or shameful acts with them makes bad use of them. A human body without feet would obviously be very imperfect, but a person who uses his feet to go and injure another or to disgrace himself makes bad use of them. What is true of these members is true of all the other parts as well, of the eyes, for example; and this is the reason why the same may be said of the will. In itself, the will is good, because without it no one could lead an upright life. It comes to us, therefore, from God, and we should find fault with those who use it badly, not with Him Who gives it to us.¹⁰

Perhaps some will be inclined to object to this conclusion as being purely dialectical and abstract. Furthermore, by giving us a will capable of doing evil, did God not give us something so dangerous that, of itself, it constituted a real evil? It is true that in all liberty there lurks a danger; nevertheless, our liberty is the indispensable condition for the greatest good which can fall to our lot, namely our happiness. In itself, free will cannot be an evil; nor is it an absolute good like fortitude, temperance or justice, things we cannot use for evil without destroying them in the process. Free will is an intermediate good: its nature is good, but its effect can be good or bad according to the way man uses it.¹¹ Now the use to be made of free choice is under the control of free choice itself. Reason, the source of all knowledge, knows itself; memory, the storehouse of all recollections, remembers itself; free will, the master of everything else—for it is all at its free disposal—

is also master of itself.¹² Hence, it rests with free will, and free will alone, to put to evil use the good that it is.

On the other hand, the possibility of the evil use of free will was the necessary condition for the goodness and happiness brought about by its good use. When our will clings to that immutable and universal good, truth, in order to find its joy in it, it possesses the happy life, which is man's supreme good. Now, that happiness is not identical with Truth; it is only the individual possession of it. It is by adherence to one and the same Truth, to one and the same Wisdom, both common to us all, that all men become happy and wise; but one person cannot be happy with another's happiness any more than he can be prudent, just or courageous through another's prudence, justice or fortitude.¹³ This is the reason why man must have a will that is personal and free; and since the will itself is an intermediate good, it remains free to turn towards the supreme good and to possess it in happiness, or to turn away from it to enjoy itself and lower things, which act constitutes moral evil and sin. Turning away from the Sovereign Good, turning to secondary goods: these are, in brief, the two free acts which decide our eternal happiness or misery.¹⁴

Agreed, you will say, but how does it happen that the will chooses sin? God is the cause of everything; hence, He is the cause of the act whereby free choice turns away from the supreme good to fasten on lower goods, and since that act is unquestionably a sin, God is therefore the cause of sin itself. Or, if that act does not come from God, where does it come from? The only honest answer that can be made to this question is that we do not know anything about it; not, to be sure, that we do not know where the real responsibility lies, but rather, because we cannot know a thing which is nothing (*Sciri enim non potest quod nihil est*). What is the metaphysical significance of this reply?

Every good comes from God; every nature is a certain good; therefore, every nature comes from God. This strict conclusion applies to sensible as well as to intelligible things. Whenever we see a being in which measure, order and number are to be found, let us not hesitate to acknowledge that God is its author. But if we strip that being of the order, measure and number it has, and remove them altogether, absolutely nothing will remain. As long as a rudiment of form remains, however crude and imperfect it may be, there is still a seed of goodness, and like a kind of matter, it can be brought to its perfection step by step. If an adumbration of being is a certain good, the complete deprivation of good is by definition equivalent to an utter destruction of being. Consequently, it becomes quite inconsistent to imagine a posi-

tive cause like God at the origin of the act whereby free will turns away from Him. It is true that He has made the will master of itself and capable of adhering to the sovereign good or of turning away from it; but once so made by God, it was in its *power* to separate itself from God, it was its *duty* not to do so. Its fall—for that is what it was—was not the natural and necessary fall of a falling stone, but rather the free fall of a will letting itself go.¹⁵ And since it was a deficiency, a lack of order, and consequently a lack of being, the original fall had no other source but nothingness, i.e. non-being. But if sin is nothing, how could it have an efficient cause? Here we can only speak of a deficiency in the cause. To look for the cause of a deficiency or of a lack of being, is like looking for a positive cause for silence or darkness. Silence is merely an absence of sound; darkness is simply an absence of light;¹⁶ in the same way we might say that sin in our will is merely an absence of the love for God. Our will is changeable because it was created from nothing, and is therefore imperfect; it had only to sink from Creator to creatures to introduce the initial disorder of sin into itself and the universe.¹⁷ But, let us add, God helps us bring order out of the disorder for which He is in no way responsible; He extends His hand to fallen man to raise him from his fall and, through grace, restores the original order destroyed by sin.¹⁸

2. *Sin and Grace*

Since God is the sovereign good, He is self-sufficient; hence, all His gifts are given freely and gratuitously, and in this sense every one of His works is a grace. Man did not have to merit existence, because to merit it he would first have had to exist. Now although he did not exist, he was made, and made, not only like a stone or animal, but to his Creator's image. In this improper sense, even nature itself must be a grace,¹⁹ but a universal grace, so to speak, and common to everything. Above this is another grace, one altogether different: not the grace by which the Eternal Word has made us all men, but that whereby the Incarnate Word has made some men His faithful.²⁰ This is grace properly so-called. It is important to know both kinds of grace, to grasp the necessity for them and to describe their effects.

Since God was absolutely free in His creative act, He could have created man in the state in which we now find him if He had so willed. It would have been no discredit to Him to make souls such as ours actually are, benighted souls, to be sure, but endowed with a natural light enabling them to free themselves step by step from the darkness of ignorance, and with a will capable of acquiring every virtue.²¹ But

God has not willed it so. The state in which He did create man was much superior to his present condition; before he sinned, man led a life whose very essence was his peaceful love of God. Loving God with ease, man committed no sin; and since he committed no sin, he was not subject to any evil, pain or sorrow; hence, he was incorruptible and immortal.²² Besides this state of perfect peace—*summa in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas* (perfect health of body, perfect peace of soul)—the mind of the first man was blessed with clear light. We should be justified in making this conjecture merely from the fact that Adam was created without natural imperfections, but Scripture also tells us explicitly that Adam gave every species of animal its name, and this is an unmistakable sign of wisdom.²³ Lastly, since the first man possessed extensive knowledge and had no need to toil in order to acquire it, he spontaneously avoided error. The labor involved in the conquest of knowledge, the ignorance and error to be found in knowledge mastered with difficulty, these have no connection with our nature's original condition; they are both punishments for sin.²⁴

What, then, does the state of nature mean in such a doctrine? As far as one can judge after analysing the texts, it does not imply any right on the part of the creature, whether moral and based on his merits—this is evident—or metaphysical and based on the definition of his essence—this is at least probable. As we have just seen, Augustine has definitely settled the first point; he has settled the second by taking no notice of it, either because he did not see clearly the nature of the problem, or because he deliberately transferred it to a different level than ours. To the best of our knowledge at least, a definition of what man's metaphysical essence could have implied as belonging by right to his nature is not to be found in Augustine. The point of view he takes is always, so to speak, historical and purely factual. God created man in a certain state of nature. If He had created him in another state, even a lower one, it would have been simply another state of nature,²⁵ both states being in the long run but gratuitous gifts of God.

We should not be surprised, then, to see St. Augustine attributing to grace all the gifts which constitute the original condition of nature. Man was created by God in a state of rectitude, as Scripture also says (Eccl. 7, 30), but only possessing the complete subordination of body to soul as a gratuitous gift of the Creator. Even the love (*amor imper-turbatus*), by which man clung closely to God as his good and from which all his other privileges flowed, only belonged to him in virtue of a free and generous divine dispensation. What is today called sanctifying grace, God's adoption of man which makes His creatures become His children, was only the most precious and most magnificent of His

gifts.²⁶ In fact, the immortality man enjoyed in the state of nature, as we have described it, belonged to him in virtue of another grace²⁷ which did not flow of necessity from his state of original justice.²⁸ His immortality did not consist in the impossibility of death, but only in the power he had of not dying by refusing to cut himself off from the tree of life, from which he actually did cut himself off by sin. At any rate, since nothing which man possessed belonged to him by right, we should not be surprised that he lost so much by sinning.

Overwhelmed as he was with gifts like these, man had only to persevere to remain in possession of them, and nothing was easier for him than perseverance. Although Augustine makes no explicit distinction between sanctifying grace and actual grace, as we call them today, there can be no doubt that he attributes the latter to man as God created him. To persevere in good, Adam possessed a grace such as we have to free us from evil. Without any inner struggle, without temptation from within, and without trouble, he lived peacefully in his abode of happiness.²⁹ If man preferred himself and by doing so turned away from God, his fall must be ascribed to a simple failure on the part of his free choice, for God had given him everything needed to enable him to avoid it.

The precise nature of the traitorous act which changed man's state so profoundly is very complicated. Seen from the outside, it was essentially the violation of a command which was easy to respect. God had forbidden man to eat a certain fruit, thereby prescribing obedience, a virtue which in a rational creature is the mother and guardian, so to speak, of all the other virtues. That command had obviously been given simply to ensure obedience, for nothing was easier than doing without that particular fruit in a paradise where there was an abundance of every kind of food. Moreover, we will recall that man's desires and his will were not yet at variance; since that discord is a result of sin, it could not have been the cause of it.³⁰ Hence the source of evil is not to be found in the difficulty of the precept nor in any insubordination in the human body; it is to be found in man's will alone, and especially in his pride. And what, in turn, is pride if not a desire for excessive rank and independence? The desire to raise himself to a dignity not his own was, on the part of man, that conceit which led him to abandon the principle to which he should have clung and to take delight in himself that he might please himself and be, in a certain sense, a principle unto himself.³¹ It was the spontaneous movement of a nature drawn out of nothingness by God, one which preceded even the temptation by the devil, because the promise of being like God would not have led man astray if he had not already begun

to take delight in himself. This was the hidden evil which the external act merely uncovered:³² his proud ambition to be his own light; his refusal to remain turned towards the true light, even though it would make a light of him. It is a sin so deep-seated that it is, as it were, unaware of its true nature, for instead of detesting itself, it immediately seeks refuge in excuses: "The serpent deceived me, and I ate the fruit." Pride tries to saddle someone else with the crime for which it is responsible. The voluntary violation of the command accuses itself as soon as it tries to excuse itself.³³

This is why Augustine always insists that the original sin was a result of man's freedom of choice and should, therefore, be imputed primarily to his will: *quia vero per liberum arbitrium Deum deseruit, justum judicium Dei expertus est*, (but because it was through free choice that he abandoned God, he was visited with God's just judgement).³⁴ Now we see clearly how true it was to say that God has done nothing but good, and that the act which cut man off from his end had no other source but man himself. Human nature could fall, otherwise there would have been no sin; but it did not have to fall, otherwise the act it committed would not have been a sin. By voluntarily turning away from God, i.e. by refusing to will Him and love Him, all of us have, in Adam, chosen the greedy and proud possession of creatures in preference to submission to the universal Good. We have overthrown the divine order by setting the work above the Worker. This is what was done, or rather undone, for sin has produced nothing but disorder.³⁵ Now we must consider its results as well as its cure.

The two consequences of original sin Augustine always associates whenever he mentions them are concupiscence and ignorance.³⁶ Inasmuch as these two vices had been excluded by God from human nature as He had fashioned it, it may be said without exaggeration that human nature was changed by the first man's evil will.³⁷ Instead of the knowledge Adam enjoyed without having to acquire it, there is our present ignorance from which we are trying laboriously to emerge; instead of mastery exercised over the flesh by the soul, there is the body's revolt against the spirit. These disorders are sins, as was the act from which they flow; they are original sin itself, carried on in the effects it has caused, effects which, in this sense, are still original sin.³⁸

After such disorder, what remains of the nature fashioned by God? Evil was only the evil of sin in Adam, but in its propagation down to our own day it became the evil of nature. A vitiated and vicious nature took the place of a good nature thenceforth.³⁹ Yet we must not think that the original nature willed by God was completely destroyed by Adam's sin. That nature was a gift of God; hence, if God took away all

He gave it, it would cease entirely to exist.⁴⁰ But we know that this is not the case, because over and above animal life, with the order it implies and its ability to multiply in succeeding generations, man still has a mind. Although darkened, the mind is still capable of knowing truth and loving goodness as it gradually and through patient practice acquires the arts, the sciences and the virtues.⁴¹ For there are natural virtues even in fallen man. Certain Romans, for instance, have given evidence of fortitude, temperance, justice or prudence. In this we should recognize so many vestiges of an order overthrown, ruins whose continued existence makes a restoration possible, and which God maintains to that end. In any case, whether it is a matter of the remnants of an habitual disposition to virtue or of exceptional fortitude in performing an heroic act, these are gifts of God in the man who performs them or gives evidence of them. For just as He bestows on nature the whole of its being and operation, so He maintains in fallen man the ability to perform whatever virtuous actions he performs.⁴² Hence, every good use made of free choice without exception comes to man from God;⁴³ left to himself, man would have in his own right only the power of doing evil, deceit and sin.⁴⁴ We must add that the evidence for the being and efficacy maintained by God in nature after the fall should not make us blind to the fact that none of the perfections God maintains therein has now the slightest value as regards salvation. The rare and precarious virtues which remain can regain their original supernatural value only if God grants it to them by means of a special assistance adapted to the needs of fallen nature, namely by grace.⁴⁵

Considered from this new point of view, grace takes on a meaning quite different from that we first attributed to it, for if it is not clearly distinguished from nature before the fall, it is very radically different from it in the state of fallen nature. We have said that this second meaning of the word 'grace' is its proper signification, and henceforth we shall understand by it the sum-total of God's free gifts, the purpose of which is to make man's salvation possible in the state of fallen nature. The common element in the word's improper and proper meanings is the absolute gratuitousness of the gift whereby God institutes nature or bestows grace. What is proper to the second meaning is this: since grace deals with a perverted nature, it no longer has as its object the founding of God's work, but rather its restoration through the correction of a disorder for which man is wholly responsible.⁴⁶

The essential characteristic of grace, as we have defined it, is that it is supernatural by definition. For this reason it is radically different from the general concursus which God gives to the being of creatures and to each of their operations in particular. We may, if we like, apply

the term 'grace' to all of God's gifts, since they are all gratuitous: this is the first meaning of the word we have considered. In the present instance, however, we are dealing with the special gift whereby God restores to fallen man what he has lost by his fall. Man became an adopted son of God and brother of Jesus Christ at his creation, but he lost that status through sin. From then on, nothing he does, even with God's general concursus—and without this he would cease to exist—has the slightest value in the eyes of God. Before his acts can have any meritorious value again, God must restore it to them. This He does by grace, in virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ.⁴⁷

To justify the supernatural character of the gift which is to restore nature, Augustine constantly appeals to one of the fundamental principles of his metaphysics: every being is a good; every good is a work of God, since He is at once Supreme Being and Supreme Good; but every defect is the result of non-being, because everything which is not God takes its origin from non-being. Therefore, in view of man's nature alone, it is possible to give an adequate reason for the introduction of evil into the world, for, as we have seen, the original sin was a simple defect. But how could the restoration of a good he had destroyed be ascribed to man? To institute man's nature, nothing less than God's creative power was needed; to restore it, a veritable recreation becomes necessary. When we come to study the relations between grace and liberty, we shall see the errors to which a failure to recognize this principle may lead. But for the moment, it is enough to point out the need of it, and in that way, to lay the foundations for any doctrine of Christian liberty. To fall, man has but to will it; but a mere desire to rise from that fall is not enough to enable him to do so.⁴⁸ Although man was created by God in His image and likeness, he lost these superlative gifts through his own fault. To restore them to himself he would have to be God Himself, Who bestowed them upon him in the first place.⁴⁹ In what measure and to whom does God dispense this gift?

Let us first consider man after the fall but before the Law had been promulgated to the Jewish people. The generations which followed one upon the other lived in sin even without being aware of it. Blind to the good as a result of Adam's sin and not yet warned by the Law, they followed after evil without knowing it.⁵⁰ The specific result of the Law promulgated by God was precisely to make men conscious of their culpability. Hence, the Law came neither to introduce sin into the world, because it was already there, nor to root it out, for grace alone can do that; it came simply to point it out and at least to give man both a sense of his sin and an appreciation of his need for grace. Sin

remained hidden before its prohibition, but it becomes suddenly evident to all the moment it becomes a breach of duty.⁵¹ But it is a far cry from knowledge of the Law to its observance: far from doing away with concupiscence, we may say that the Law increases it by making it a violation of the divine commandments.⁵² The man who lives only under the reign of law is still a slave to the concupiscence sin has caused: he realizes he is dominated by it and he knows it is forbidden; he even knows that it is justly forbidden, and yet he gives in to it.⁵³ Only those sustained by the efficacy of grace can do more than know the Law, i.e. can carry it out.

Hence, the gaining of grace is a necessary requirement for man's salvation. Some think they acquire it through their good works, but that is to misuse the terms involved. If it were possible to merit grace, it would not be gratuitous, i.e. it would no longer be grace. Now the beginning of grace is faith. Faith comes before works, not because it dispenses with them and does away with them, but rather because they flow from it. In other words, no one should think that he has received grace as a result of the good works he has performed, but rather that he cannot perform good works unless he has received both faith and grace.⁵⁴ Man begins to have grace when he begins to believe in God as the result of a warning which comes to him either from within or without. First conceived and then born in the soul, this new life makes a new man of the one in whom it is henceforth to grow.

If grace, then, precedes works and their merit—and this is tantamount to saying that we could not acquire it—the only thing left is to say that it is the result of an election.⁵⁵ But what is the cause of the election? The problem is all the more difficult to solve in as much as every election is a choice. Now a choice presupposes certain motives, and in this case we admit that before God's choice, there is not and cannot be any reason in creatures for being chosen. The utterly gratuitous character of grace seems to rule out even the possibility of an election. The only way out of the difficulty, then, is to grant that in as much as the divine election cannot be based on a justice which does not yet exist, God first confers justice before He chooses the one who will receive grace. In other words, since election cannot precede justification, justification must precede election.⁵⁶ But then the problem seems to have been shifted rather than solved. What is the motive for this justification?

When the question is asked in this way, we should first be tempted to answer that it is faith. But we have just seen that faith is the beginning of grace; hence, it is already grace, and for that reason pre-

supposes the justification we expect it to account for.⁵⁷ Shall we say that God justifies some and reprobates others because He foresees the good or evil works they will perform? But then we have the same difficulty in another form: future merits cause grace, although grace is the only conceivable cause of merit.⁵⁸ Shall we look for a way out in the hypothesis of a concurrence between God calling and the good will answering that call? It is quite true that in this case the good will could do nothing without divine justification, but it would be equally true to say that God's justifying decree could do nothing without our will's consent.⁵⁹ God's choice and that alone causes the will of the elect to become good. So instead of finding its solution in such a hypothesis, the question becomes more complicated. The problem is no longer merely to find out why God justifies this man rather than that, but to see how it happens that some of those God calls do not answer His call, or, according to the words of Scripture, that many are called but few are chosen.

Actually, if God wanted to do so, He could call all men in such a way that none would refuse to answer His call; He could even call them in this way without doing any violence to man's freedom of choice. Every will, as we know, acts and decides in virtue of certain motives. Now because of His infinite knowledge God knows in advance the motives and influences under which any particular free will would give or refuse its consent.⁶⁰ Two paths lie open to Him for ensuring the execution of His plans without doing violence to our liberty. If God creates circumstances in which He foresees our free choice will decide in one way rather than another, He infallibly gets from us the free acts His justice and wisdom seek to obtain from our will without changing the will at all. But even if He subjects our will to the influence of graces to which He knows it will consent, God does not thereby cause it to stop being a will nor to cease being free. As far as the will is concerned, the delight grace brings is an incentive to which it consents just as freely as it would consent to the delight of sin if grace were lacking. When God wants to save a soul, to have it consent to His saving grace He has but to choose either some external circumstances with which the soul is to find itself surrounded, or graces to which its will is to find itself submissive. As for other souls, He could call them in the same way, but He does not do so, and this is why few are chosen, although many are called.⁶¹ Thus, in Augustine, grace can be irresistible without being constraining, because it is either suited to the free choice of those it has decided to save, or, by transforming from within the will to which it is applied, it causes it to delight freely in

things which it would otherwise find repugnant. Divine predestination, then, is but the infallible prevision of future works whereby God arranges circumstances and saving graces for His elect.⁶²

In this attempt to find in divine foreknowledge a reconciliation between human liberty and predestination,⁶³ Saint Augustine is fully aware that he is putting off once more the answer to that troublesome question: why does God justify this man rather than that? For if God knows in advance every possible response we are going to make, He must know which graces to offer us in order to have us accept these infallibly.⁶⁴ The fact is that we have no answer to this question. God is merciful to those He wants to save, and He justifies them; as for those on whom He does not choose to have mercy, He hardens them by not offering them grace in the circumstances in which they would have accepted it. We can be sure, however, that there is no injustice in God. Therefore, if He has mercy on whom He pleases and hardens whom He pleases, it is in keeping with His secret and inscrutable justice. We can know of its existence but we cannot fathom its motives. In contracts between men, the party who claims his due is not accused of injustice, still less the party who cancels the debt owing to him. But who is competent to decide whether it is advisable to cancel a debt: the party who owes the debt or the party to whom it is owed? The latter, undoubtedly, and he alone. Now since the fall, mankind is simply a sinful throng, liable to the supreme justice for the penalty it must pay. Whether God remits the penalty by justifying the culpable or exacts it by abandoning him, no injustice is done. As for deciding who is to pay his penalty and who is to be let off, we are debtors and it is not our place to make that decision. God does not compel some men to sin because He justifies others from sin, and He only justifies some men in virtue of an inscrutable justice, whose motives escape our judgement.⁶⁵

Augustine's last word on this obscure problem is, therefore, an admission of ignorance. Man bows before a mystery he cannot probe. However, we should note the terms in which he describes that mysterious power which presides over our destiny. It is not a blind power nor yet an arbitrary will but rather, a justice and a truth: *neminem damnat nisi aequissima veritate: aequitate occultissima et ab humanis sensibus remotissima judicat*. These phrases and others like them show that, according to St. Augustine, the secret which escapes us only conceals a perfect justice. Moreover, it is clear that in such a doctrine the precise foreknowledge God has of human acts in no way alters their freedom. Divine grace becomes what it has to be in order to elicit from man the free act it wants to obtain and by so doing reconciles in-

fallibility in the performance of acts foreseen by God with the will's free choice in performing them. At this point, however, a new difficulty appears, a difficulty not of the moral, but of the psychological order. Even granting that divine predestination is just, do the inevitable acts man performs under the influence of grace still possess the quality of liberty?

3. *Grace and Liberty*

Among the problems raised by the Augustinian doctrine of grace, that considered most formidable is the problem of the reconciliation of grace with free choice.⁶⁶ It is literally true to say that, from St. Augustine's point of view, the problem does not exist. When I examine myself and probe the content of my mind, I ascertain that I exist, that I am, that I think and that I live. So much is clear. But the fact that I *want* to live is no less evident.⁶⁷ My will is presented to me as a fact beyond dispute. In St. Augustine's view, willing means making use of free choice, for in Augustine the definition of free choice is always identical with that of the will.⁶⁸

The first point to be borne in mind as we approach the problem of grace is this: the *fact* of free choice is not under discussion. Moreover, since free choice is identical with the will and since the will, at any time and in any form, is an inalienable good in man, man's free choice could not be called in question. To be sure, voluntary choice is never without motives, and some motives can even bear upon it with irresistible force, but free choice is precisely a choice exercised on the strength of motives. A falling stone does not fall without cause, but it does fall without motive: it does not have free choice; but a will which would will without motives would be a contradiction and an impossibility. We cannot do away with free choice without at the same time destroying the will.

If we would understand Augustine's solutions to *his* own problems, we should avoid confusing his problems with our own. What does Augustine want to know? Surely, not whether we have a will; he knows we have one. Nor whether we have free choice; he identifies free choice with the will. Nor is it even what that will or free choice *should* will; their end is to will God and to love Him. What St. Augustine would like to know is not whether love of God is within the scope of our free choice, but whether it is in our power. Now the power to do what we choose to do is something more than free choice; it is liberty. In St. Augustine there is no problem of grace and free choice, but there is a problem of grace and liberty. In what terms is the problem stated?

To understand the exact nature of the problem, it is well to recall the teaching of Pelagius, for although it was not the cause of Augustine's doctrine of grace, it was the occasion for most of the treatises he has left us on the subject.

Reduced to its essential elements and as St. Augustine understood it, Pelagius' doctrine defines sin merely as the evil use of free choice. Sin lessens neither the liberty of free choice nor its natural goodness, nor, as a result, its ability to do good. Now if this is the case, the assistance of grace does not have to do with the will, for, since the will is not vitiated, it does not need grace. Consequently, the assistance amounts to the forgiveness of the offence committed against God by performing the evil act. God does not give the grace to do good to a will which has become powerless; He grants pardon as a judge does when he pardons and remits the crime committed.

Whence follows a profound transformation in the general economy of the doctrine of redemption. Since free will is intact after the fall, the will of the first man must have remained so; and since his nature was not vitiated, every man comes into the world in the same state of liberty in which Adam came from the hand of God. Consequently, owing to the fact that it has not fallen, humanity no longer needs justification, except for the remission of sin. Christ's sacrifice, apart from the fact that it was a striking demonstration of God's infinite goodness and a powerful incitement to good intended for the whole of humanity, accomplishes in every man the remission of sin alone, without touching the will itself (*sola remissio peccatorum*).⁶⁹ There is no need to reform what the fall has not actually deformed.

This being Pelagius' doctrine, can we be surprised that Augustine rose in protest against it? There can be no denying that on this point, Augustine's thought has a history of its own. His ideas are not expressed in the same way before and after Pelagius. When he has to do battle with a definite opponent, he becomes the polemicist, the orator, the rhetorician, the pleader; he tries to find terse formulae, which are always so dangerous; sometimes he will try several of these, and although one is meant to improve on the other, at times they fall short of his true thought, at others go beyond it. Interesting though a study of these variations, or rather these modulations, may be, for us it must remain secondary to the constants in Augustine's attitude. For his doctrine has one element of unwavering constancy due to the fact that he had refuted Pelagius even before knowing him. The point which dominates the whole history of the controversy is that Pelagianism was a radical negation of Augustine's personal experience, or, if we prefer,

Augustine's personal experience was in its essence and even in its most intimate details the very negation of Pelagianism.

To what conclusion did Pelagius' doctrine actually lead? It led to the conclusion that grace does not have to intervene before sin so as to anticipate it, but only afterwards, to wipe it out. Since the will is free to carry out or not carry out the law, it is always capable of carrying it out. On the other hand, to what conclusion did Augustine's own experience lead him? It led to this, that for many long years he had known the law without being able to carry it out. And not only did he know the law; before his very eyes he saw it carried out by others, and although he longed with his whole soul to imitate them, he had to admit that he was unable to do so. Only St. Paul, with his luminous doctrine of sin and grace, had been able to dispel the inner contradiction in which he struggled vainly for years. Since the will desires the good, it is by nature destined to accomplish it; since it is still unable to carry out the good it desires, there is something damaged within it. Let us call the cause of that damage "sin," and let us prescribe its remedy, namely, man's redemption by God, along with the grace of Jesus Christ which flows from it. Once this is done, the economy of the moral life, impenetrable to the philosophers, becomes transparently clear because this is the only doctrine which takes into account all the facts, and especially the following: as long as a will relies on itself to do good, it remains powerless. The solution to the enigma is that here as elsewhere, we must receive what we would have if we cannot provide it ourselves. Thanks to Christ's sacrifice, from now on there is a supernatural, divine assistance through which the law becomes something realizable for the human will, and failure to recognize the necessity of this assistance is the very essence of Pelagianism.

The extent to which the reading of St. Paul proved to be a decisive illumination for St. Augustine may be seen from the passage of Scripture he recalls in his account of this discovery. It is from the *Epistle to the Romans* (7, 19-25): "For the good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do. Now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that when I have a will to do good, evil is present within me. For I am delighted with the law of God, according to the inward man. But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members. Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord."⁷⁰ When we bear in mind what a revelation this was for Augustine—for by showing him the meaning of

his own distressing helplessness, it revealed him to himself, as it were—we are inclined to consider useless the discussion of Pelagius' influence on his doctrine of liberty. How could his task of opposing Pelagian error possibly lead him to exaggerate the rights of grace and jeopardize free choice, if it is true that he never questioned free choice and if, moreover, he ascribed everything to grace since the day he read and understood St. Paul? St. Augustine was never to go any further because he went at once as far as one can go: man can only do what God gives him the strength to do; *Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis.*⁷¹ "Give me what you ask, and ask what you will." This is one of the main themes of the *Confessions*; and if Augustine wrote it in the year 400, we wonder what he could have added after 410 to improve upon it.

When we have grasped this essential idea, it may not enable us to understand the details of Augustine's polemic, but we have the clue which allows us to wander about in that labyrinth and always feel sure of finding our bearings. Augustine repeatedly urges the following thesis in opposition to that of Pelagius: "Neither knowledge of the divine law, nor nature, nor the mere remission of sin constitutes grace. Grace is given us by Jesus Christ, Our Lord, that through it the law may be fulfilled, nature liberated and sin overcome."⁷² Let us, therefore, abstract from the details of the controversy and retain only the main points of Augustine's thought; it will then stand out in all its strength and simplicity.

Copying St. Augustine himself, let us first recall that the elevation brought about by grace leaves free choice absolutely intact. We have already seen why reason demands this; we may add that Scripture itself bears testimony to it.⁷³ At any rate, it would be impossible to do away with free choice without causing the will, and hence grace as well, to disappear because grace would no longer have a subject to work upon. The difference between the man who has grace and the man who does not lies not in the possession or lack of free choice, but in its efficacy. Those who do not have grace are recognized from the fact that their free choice is not used to will the good; or if they do will it, they are unable to carry it out. On the contrary, those who have grace want to do good and succeed in doing it.⁷⁴ Grace then, may be defined as that which confers on the will either the strength to will the good, or the ability to carry it out. Now this two-fold strength is also the definition of liberty. On what conditions, then, is it granted to us?

Some men, Pelagius among them, think that free choice is the condition of grace. By striving, struggling, and searching for God, man's

will gains merit, and grace is merely the gift of God which crowns that merit. Such a notion, however, is contradictory to the very idea of grace. By definition and even by name, grace is a free, gratuitous gift. A merited grace would be something *due* and not a genuine favor. Besides, we have only to observe what happens to see that when God confers grace He does not return good for good, but good for evil: St. Paul, converted by the divine light after he had persecuted the church, and Augustine himself, whom God's grace searches out in his wildest aberrations and deepest misery—these are on hand to give evidence. God's grace is not given us according to our merits, because we not only see that there are no good actions to which it can be ascribed; we actually find it given every day even where actions are manifestly evil. The reverse is true: merit begins the moment grace is given; if we happen to be without grace, our free choice, although always intact, does nothing but go from one fall to another.⁷⁵ Such a thesis must be accepted in its strictest sense. *Bonum certamen certavi* (I have fought the good fight), says St. Paul. To fight the good fight he had to have some idea of it: grace inspired it. To succeed, he had to have the strength to do so: grace bestowed it. Having succeeded, he gained the victory: once more, it was grace which crowned it. Hence, if God crowns him for such a victory, He does not crown human merits but His own gifts: *si ergo Dei dona sunt bona merita tua, non Deus coronat merita tua tanquam merita tua, sed tanquam dona sua*.⁷⁶ This is the fundamental theme of the *Confessions* reappearing in a new form: we can offer to God what He asks of us only if we have been given it beforehand.

What becomes of the human will when made so directly dependent upon grace? The answer is contained in very few words: it retains its free choice, and it gains liberty. In the first place, it retains its free choice because, even granting that grace gives everything to free choice, free choice must still be there to receive it. "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" asks the Apostle (I Cor. 4, 7). But *who* would receive if our will and, hence, our free choice as well were not there to receive? For receiving means accepting, consenting, acting; it means acting by willing, i.e. as a will should act, and following its own nature. But a will which acts like a will thereby bears witness to its free choice. Hence the well-known words, *quid habes quod non accepisti?*, do not deny free choice, but imply it.⁷⁷ Even when God enables the will to will, and bestows on it the assistance it needs to do what He orders, it is still the will which wills and does what He commands; *adjuvat ut faciat cui jubet*.⁷⁸ God comes to the assistance of the

man who acts, not to dispense him from acting but to enable him to act; therefore, free choice must always be there, even beneath the conquering pressure of grace.⁷⁹

Does the choice remain free even if it is true that God always chooses the grace needed to have the will of the one He wants to save give its consent? By reason of the psychology of will, as we have described it already, our answer must be yes. Will is essentially love or, as Augustine says, delight.⁸⁰ A kind of inner weight draws the will to some objects rather than to others; and this movement which bears it towards different ends is actually its liberty. Therefore, no matter what the object may be in which the will takes delight, it takes delight in it freely, and whatever the source of the attraction it feels for one end rather than another, the attraction cannot endanger its liberty because the attraction is the choice itself in which that liberty finds expression. What effect, then, does grace have on liberty? It substitutes delight in the good for delight in evil. The law which is impossible of realization by the will of fallen man becomes, on the contrary, an object of love and delight for man in the state of grace, because charity is nothing more than a love of God and His justice inspired in the soul by grace and causing man spontaneously to find his joy henceforth in things he formerly found repugnant.⁸¹

There is nothing, then, to prevent grace from working triumphantly on the will without thereby impairing its liberty; we readily grant that man acts freely when he spurns the divine gift of grace to rush headlong into sin. But what actually takes place in such a case? He hears the call of grace; it even appears to him as a good which would be desirable to some extent; concupiscence, however, gives him greater delight and since delight is merely the will's movement towards its object, the man in whom passion holds sway unfailingly prefers sin to grace. In this sense, it is strictly true to say that we always necessarily do whatever gives us greater delight: *quod enim amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est.*⁸² But it would be a mistake to think that the predominant delight abolishes free choice; it is, on the contrary, but a manifestation of it. The sinful delight which tempts me is not something added to my will to draw it towards something base; it is my mind's spontaneity itself finding expression in the movement which draws it to evil; nor is the delight in the good which grace substitutes for delight in evil a force which does violence to the will from within; it is the spontaneous movement of a will which has been changed and liberated, a will which henceforth tends wholly towards God. Man is truly free when he sees to it that the object of his delight is precisely liberty.⁸³

In spite of Augustine's repeated assertions, we are generally slow to recognize precisely how his doctrine guarantees the rights of free choice. Some think it helpful to stress the fact that Augustinian liberty is not the volition of the animal but a volition which always supposes a known object and, consequently, implies a choice.⁸⁴ This is unquestionable, and we have seen how Augustine demonstrates that the unknown is never willed. Nevertheless, he leaves the real question untouched. In his system, liberty is certainly not identified with animal volition; but it is unquestionably identified with free choice pursuing its own enjoyment, be it good or bad. We must understand that grace, in acting upon the will, not only respects free choice but confers liberty upon it as well. Indeed, liberty (*libertas*) is merely the good use of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*). Now if the will always remains free—in the sense of free choice—it is not always good, and consequently not always free—in the sense of liberty.⁸⁵ If our will wills the good and carries it out, whatever the source of its willing and power may be, it will be both in a state of liberty and of free choice. But the fact is that it often wills evil or, although willing the good, cannot carry it out. Now what is the reason for this lack of liberty in the free choice? It is sin, which, St. Paul tells us, is a fundamental failure of our will. Hence, when we ask whether free choice is henceforth capable of loving God through its own strength, we really ask whether man's will is equal to the task of restoring the order created by the divine omnipotence. Pelagius, without grasping the significance of his own doctrine, teaches that man can do something which a divine power was needed to create. The order of creation no longer exists; to restore it, a new creation is needed. Now the re-creator can only be a creator, i.e. God Himself. We can always fall without help, but we cannot always get up again without it. We can never get up again when our fall is an infinite one, unless, of course, God Himself extends His hand and lifts us up again.⁸⁶ This is precisely what He does when He bestows grace on us. In restoring to us that love for God of which our first will was capable, grace restores to it its dominion over the body and things material; far from destroying the will, grace makes a good will of it once more and liberates it; free choice always remained essentially intact, and grace makes a liberty of it once more.

Only when the notion of liberty is seen thus in its properly Augustinian sense can the right meaning be given to a whole series of apparently paradoxical formulae which have aroused curiosity and provided food for centuries of controversy, at times because they were not restored to the precise meaning St. Augustine himself gave them. Since liberty is identified with the efficacy of a free-choice orientated

towards the good, and since the proper function of grace is to bestow that efficacy, not only could there be no opposition between liberty and grace in such a doctrine, but, on the contrary, it is grace alone which confers liberty on man. Hence, the more the will is subject to grace, the healthier it is; and the healthier it is, the freer it is also.⁸⁷ Consequently, if we were to imagine a free choice subject to God alone, for that free choice this would be its greatest possible liberty (*illo solo dominante, liberrimus*),⁸⁸ because true liberty consists in the service of Christ (*libertas vera est Christo servire*). These are words which re-join those of St. Paul (Rom. 6, 20, 22): "For when you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice. But now being made free from sin and become servants to God . . ." Augustine puts them into an even more concise formula: *Eris liber, si fueris servus: liber peccati, servus justitiae* (You will be free if you are a slave: free of sin, slave of justice).⁸⁹

By identifying liberty and grace Augustine did not simply reconcile free choice with the supernatural life; he also cleared up the difficulty with which our study of Christian charity ended, namely, how are we to attain beatitude, which is God, if we can only reach it by charity, which is also God?⁹⁰ How are we to reach God if we must already possess Him in order to reach Him?

The point is this: if liberty is reduced to grace, then charity leads us to grace as well: *lex itaque libertatis, lex charitatis* (therefore the law of liberty is the law of charity).⁹¹ Charity is the love of God.⁹² Now this love is the very thing sin destroyed in us and grace restores. Hence, we are not surprised that the Pelagians ascribe to man the merit of charity, just as they ascribe to man the merit of grace. But nowhere do they stray farther from the truth, precisely because, of all the graces, charity is the highest. Whoever wins the debate on this point, wins the debate on the whole doctrine of grace.⁹³ Now according to St. John, charity is so pre-eminently a gift of God that it is God Himself.⁹⁴ How, then, are we to maintain that we have not received it? But if, in receiving it, we receive God, why should we be surprised that we can possess the pledge of our future happiness even here below? God is within us by that grace just as He is in heaven;⁹⁵ through that grace, He gives us a love which makes us want to love Him even more;⁹⁶ in fact, we only love Him because He has loved us first: *nos non diligemus Deum, nisi nos prior ipse diligeret*.⁹⁷ Here more than anywhere else, it is from within that God confers movement and life upon the soul. Let us now try to see the law this life of the soul will follow in its development, and also the works which will spring therefrom.

Chapter IV

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

Once divine charity has entered a soul, it shows itself to be boundlessly and indefatigably fruitful, as it is natural for love to be. It manifests itself outwardly in a life of which it is the hidden source, and in doing so realizes itself in a whole host of individual actions, each of which is, ultimately, merely a certain attitude man adopts towards various objects or beings. To describe the Christian life is, therefore, to show the attitude taken towards things by a soul in which the love of God reigns supreme.

1. The Christian

When the different ways in which man conducts himself towards things are reduced to their simplest forms, they are found in the final analysis to be but two: man either enjoys things or uses them. Enjoying a thing means fixing one's will upon it out of love for the thing itself; using a thing means utilizing it as a means of obtaining something else.¹ We enjoy what we think of as an end; we use what we look upon only as a means.

We must have a distinction between the objects of human acts to balance this difference in the nature of those acts. If it is true that we only enjoy ends, and ends are subordinated one to the other so that all are embraced under a single end, which is the last, there is really only one single object worthy of the name, that is to say, the object which constitutes our final end or, in other words, beatitude. All other objects, on the other hand, are subordinated to this as means to their end. To enjoy beatitude and to use everything else with a view to obtaining it is, then, the first rule of the Christian life; all of our offences derive from the fact that we wish to enjoy things we should

only seek to use.² But we already know what beatitude or the final end is: it is the sovereign good, i.e. something so good that nothing better can be imagined, or in other words, God Himself.³ The rule we have arrived at can, therefore, be put in more concise form: *solo Deo fruendum*.⁴ We must enjoy God alone, and merely use everything else with a view to enjoying God.

Before this principle can be applied to the problems raised by the various contingencies of the moral life, man must be able to evaluate things properly and to conform his will to this evaluation. To love what should not be loved, not to love what should be loved, to love unequally what should be loved equally, to love equally what should be loved unequally: this is evil. The good, as we recall, means loving things with a love which is in keeping with order: *ille autem juste et sancte vivit qui ordinatam dilectionem habet* (now the man of just and holy life is he whose love is not misplaced).⁵ Now moral evil, considered as the disposition of the will which causes it, is vice; moral good, or the good disposition of the will, is virtue; whence the terse definition Augustine gives of virtue: *ordo est amoris*;⁶ virtue is love's submission to order. As for the order to which the will should be subject, this can be determined by the hierarchy of ends.

Of all the ends, the lowest in the scale are external and material goods: food, clothing, gold and silver. Taken in themselves, these are genuine goods. Since they have been created, it must be that God wanted them to have a definite place in the universe. We cannot, therefore, consider them evil in themselves without falling into the error of the Manichaeans. What is evil is not the use of them but the enjoyment of them, wherein we forget the words of Him Who said: "The silver is mine and the gold is mine" (Agg. 2, 9). On the other hand, it is good to use such things to achieve spiritual ends and to subordinate them entirely to God.⁷

Above these secondary goods we have our neighbor, i.e. other men. In as much as they are God's creatures, they too are good and may, consequently, serve as ends for our will. Nevertheless, it should be noted that here too there is an order. If we had wealth to give away and saw no reason for giving to one man rather than to another, we should draw lots to find out who was to receive it. Now this drawing of lots has been made for us by nature as God established it: our relatives and especially our close relatives are clearly indicated as the first recipients of our charity.⁸ After them come our friends, and then people we do not know or have no interest in, according as circumstances and the extent of their needs indicate. But how must we love our neighbor? Scripture gives us the answer: "Thou shalt love thy

neighbor as thyself." We must, then, know how we are to love ourselves before we can determine how we are to love others.

This new problem seems simple, but it is actually twofold because man himself is twofold: he is body and soul. Man's body is a good, and to each person in particular it is even a great good. Moreover, it is a fact that every man loves his body and that, according to the words of Scripture, no man hateth his own flesh (Ephes. 5, 29). It goes without saying, then, that such love is legitimate. But since the body is not the best there is in man, our love for ourselves should not prefer the body if it is to be an ordered love. Man is a great thing, to be sure (*magna enim quaedam res est homo*), but to what is his greatness due? It is due to the fact that God made him in His own image and likeness, and we know that God is not a body. Therefore, if man is God's image, he cannot be so because of his body, but only because of his mind and soul. Consequently, every man should love his body in view of his soul. In other words, we should only use external goods for the sake of our body and our body itself in view of our soul. Then we may ask whether the soul itself is to be used or enjoyed?

It must only be used. Good and noble though our soul may be in itself, it is still not the sovereign good but merely a finite, limited good, and in as much as it is not the sovereign good, it cannot be the final end towards which all our desires should be ordered. On the other hand, there being nothing between the soul and God, the man who uses his body in view of his soul should, in turn, use his soul for the sake of enjoying God. This is the teaching of Scripture as well: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, with thy whole soul and thy whole mind (*tota mente*), i.e. with absolutely nothing remaining in you as an end which you have any right to retain for your own enjoyment. Man—and this is what constitutes his greatness—is a being who should be given up wholly and entirely to the service of God.⁹

If we now return to the problem of love of neighbor, we see that it has been solved. Man should love his body for the sake of his soul and his soul for God. If, then, we are to love our neighbor as ourselves, we shall have to love his body only in view of his soul, and his soul only in view of God. Herein Augustine arrives at the notion of a moral and a social life erected on one and only one foundation: the virtuous man uses everything, himself included, for the sake of God; and he wants a universe in which all beings use themselves, as he does, only in view of God.

Once man has attained the degree of virtue in which the will disposes each end according to its true value and loves it as it deserves, he

is leading a moral life which is as perfect as possible. Hence, it will not be surprising to see that his life consists entirely of charity and liberty. The man who loves God in all things and all things in God clearly participates in that divine life which grace alone confers on man, but in as much as grace draws his free choice away from the body to fix it upon its final end, the man who uses everything for God's sake thereby enjoys perfect liberty. In this case we have, over and above the technical and abstract definition of Christian liberty, what might be called its spirit.¹⁰ We know that there is a law prescribed and maintained by God;¹¹ man is to follow it and, since he is only a finite creature in his Creator's hands, he cannot escape it in any way. Nevertheless, it is also true that man has two very different ways of submitting to the law to which he must submit: he may do so either through fear of the punishments which sanction it, or out of love for the God Who imposes it. He who revolts against the law at the risk of being subjected to it later by punishment, or who submits to it already but solely through fear of punishment to come, obeys like a slave. His free choice remains unimpaired, but he accepts God's law as a constraint and an enslavement. On the other hand, if grace comes, along with charity, the law is no longer a burden but is desired and embraced, out of love for God. It is then, too, that the spirit of slavery makes way for the spirit of liberty. To be sure, even when the spirit of liberty animates him, man is still led; but he runs of his own accord wherever God leads him: *ducimini, sed currite et vos* (you are being led, but do your part and run). God leads him, but he does not allow himself to be pulled along; he follows (*ducimini, sed sequimini*). He is still a stone in the divine edifice, but this living stone does not permit itself to be raised like an inert mass and passively set in place by the builder. It goes, so to speak, of its own accord to take the place it knows was meant for it (*lapides vivi*).¹² Then both fear and slavery disappear: the will joyfully embraces its end, and in accepting it is freed from everything else. Since it enjoys that end alone, it submits to it alone; since it uses everything except that end, it is master of all else, i.e. soul, body, other souls, other bodies, riches, and material goods of every kind subordinated to it. The Christian who lives thus the life of grace is master of all things, and because he knows how to refer all things to their only end, he peacefully enjoys the liberty of the children of God.

Let us not imagine, however, that this attaining of virtue and Christian liberty is accomplished in a moment. The first requirement is an effort on the part of the will, for no one is born to the Christian life who does not want to be. That life may even be looked upon as a

series of steps forward and backward, all of them due to our will.¹³ When the will turns away from things towards God, it progresses; when it turns away from God towards things, it falls back.¹⁴ But these very movements, whereby the Christian life constantly grows or withers within the soul, in turn depend on grace, for concupiscence diminishes in man only to the extent that charity grows in him.¹⁵ Final liberation, if it is to occur, will be merely the consummation of a victory bought at the price of a struggle as long as life itself, a victory this life does not know.

The Christian life is, in fact, an essentially transitory state; on the one hand it is different in nature from human life as it was before or under the Law and, on the other, from life as it will be in eternal glory or eternal misery. As we have seen,¹⁶ before the law man followed concupiscence even without knowing that he was living in sin; under the law, sin remains, since man is then living without liberating grace; indeed his culpability increases because, in violating a law which did not exist before, his sin is made worse by a breach of trust.¹⁷ These states have followed one another in the history of humanity and they follow one another even today within the same man;¹⁸ like the Jews of old, the man who is familiar with the law and does not live by grace, knows that he must not sin. Perhaps he may even want to avoid sin, but he cannot do so (*etiamsi nolit peccare, vincitur a peccato*),¹⁹ and the battle he fights invariably ends in defeat. The state of a man in whom grace is alive is no less a struggle and an engagement than the second state, but it is an engagement in which the fighter is not condemned to defeat. If man has complete faith in his liberator and attributes no merit whatever to himself, he can overcome the pleasure of concupiscence when it tempts him to evil. Whence derive the distinctive characteristics of the third state, a state which properly constitutes the Christian life.

The effect of grace is not, indeed, to destroy concupiscence; both before and after grace, it is still there to tempt us. Even though it is not set down against us as a sin, it remains ever present and active, like an adversary with whom we must always struggle and to whom it is a sin to yield.²⁰ Nevertheless, there is an important difference between the reign of the law and the reign of grace: under grace, concupiscence is not extinguished in us, but we are not handed over to it without recourse.²¹ This is the reason why the Christian life is a constant struggle which knows no true peace, but prepares the way for it.²² To go beyond this stage, wherein divine charity checks concupiscence more or less successfully without destroying it, we must pass beyond the boundaries of this life. As long as we are in this tainted body, our

soul can obey God's law, but our flesh remains under the law of sin. Only in another life after the resurrection, when the glorified body will be completely subject to the soul, will perfect peace reign in man, thanks to the perfection of charity.²³

The Christian life, like the life of the body, has different ages corresponding to the body's various periods. Let us first consider the purely natural man as he is at the moment of his birth. The first period in his life, entirely taken up as it is with the care of the body and especially with food, will be completely forgotten by him later. Next comes childhood, when memory begins to awaken. After that comes adolescence when a man becomes capable of reproducing and of being a father. Youth follows adolescence, the period during which we enter upon public duties. From this moment on, the constraint of law begins to weigh heavily; the fact that sin is forbidden quickens, as it were, the pulse of passion and aggravates the sin itself, because now it is not merely evil that is done, but forbidden evil. After the troublesome period of youth, the adult comes to know at last a period of comparative peace. But old age follows hard upon it, and ailments as well as increasing feebleness, lead steadily onwards to death. This is the life of man when he lives by the body, and clings to temporal things; it is the life of the old man (*vetus homo*), of the outward, earthly man. Although it is not the highest type of human life, it has a beauty of its own. It must, therefore, be subjected to a certain order, if we would have those who live it attain the kind of well-being kings, princes or well-framed laws can guarantee to our cities. Only at this price can there be well-organized peoples even in the order of purely earthly life.²⁴

Many men remain satisfied with the life we have just described; and among them all we find only the earthly, outward man, or in a word, the old man. Some men carry on their earthly lives in great disorder, others spend it in orderly fashion; in fact, some rise above the demands of a purely servile justice and learn to embrace the law out of love for the law itself; but from the day of their birth to the day of their death, they all remain confined within the limits of the earthly life. On the other hand, a kind of second birth takes place in the case of certain men, even though they have necessarily begun by leading this same common, earthly life. From the moment they receive grace, they are reborn, as it were, from within; a new life develops within them and as it steadily grows it gradually eliminates the earthly life and proceeds to take its place until, after death, it finally replaces it altogether. This second man is the new man (*novus homo*), the inner, heavenly man. His life periods are not marked off in terms of years but rather

by the spiritual progress he makes. During his first period, he is nursed by the examples found in the Scriptures and receives his nourishment therefrom. Then, like the child who forgets his early years, this new man grows and rises above human authority; he forgets such authority and strives to attain the highest law by relying on his reason.²⁵ The third spiritual age, that corresponding to adolescence, is the period in which the soul, impregnated by intellect, and carnal appetite, made fruitful by reason, accept out of love the requirements of an upright life. If they avoid sin, it is not through fear but rather because they no longer feel any inclination to sin. The fourth age is the time of youth when the inner man, now completely formed, can withstand and victoriously repel all of this world's assaults. Then comes the period of adulthood with its peace and tranquility, replete with the treasures of the kingdom of wisdom. The sixth age is the period in which the temporal life is completely forgotten and the soul passes, through the death of the body, to life everlasting. Finally, the seventh age is eternal life itself, in which there are no longer any periods or stages; it constitutes, rather, the fixed and permanent end of the spiritual man, even as the death of the body is the end of the earthly man. Born of sin, the old man ends his days in death; born of grace, the new man finds his way to life.²⁶ In any case, it is clear that man can lead the first of these two lives from beginning to end without the second, but not the second without the first. We shall also have occasion to show in the pages following that the whole human race, whose life may be viewed as the life of a single man, from Adam to the end of the world, falls into two classes: that great host of the impious who lead the life of the earthly man from creation to the end of time, and a people composed of spiritual men, born of grace and called to live in the City of God for all eternity.²⁷

2. Christian Society

It is a remarkable feature of St. Augustine's doctrine that it always considers the moral life as something interwoven with social life. In his eyes, the individual is never separated from the city. To find the basic reason for this, however, we must return once more to the root of all moral life, i.e. to love and therefore, to the will.

To understand the origin of social life, let us look at it in the process of formation in a public spectacle, let us say, a theatrical presentation. When the spectators gather to attend the performance, they are unknown to one another and do not form a society. But if one of the actors plays his role with great talent, those who like his acting are

completely carried away and even find in it the greatest pleasure the theatrical art has to offer. But they do more than love the actor who gives them such pleasure; a kind of mutual sympathy grows up at once between those who admire him. If these spectators love one another, they obviously do so, not for themselves, but because of the actor whom they love with a common love. The proof of this can be seen in the fact that the more we like an actor the more we applaud so as to induce the other spectators to admire him. We want to add to the number of his admirers, so we arouse the indifferent; and if anyone should dare to disagree with us, we hate the contempt he feels for the object of our affections. Hence, love of an object spontaneously gives birth to a society which embraces all those whose love is centered in that object and excludes all who turn away from it. This conclusion—and its application is universal—is verified in a peculiar way in the case of love for God. He who loves God is, by that very fact, brought into a social relationship with all those who love Him; he wants them to love the same object as he does, but wants them do so with an infinitely more powerful will because what is involved here is not a mere theatrical pleasure but Beatitude itself. This is, moreover, the force which makes the just man love all men in God even though they may be in other respects his enemies. How, indeed, could he be afraid of them? They cannot take his good away from him. He merely pities them, knowing that if his enemies turned to God more completely, they would embrace God as the only Good which brings happiness, and would necessarily love him too, because he would then be associated with them in the love of the greatest of goods.²⁸

The result, then, of this new characteristic of love is that it becomes the bond of a society which springs up spontaneously around it. If we give the name "city" to any group of men united by a common love for some object, we say that there are as many cities as there are collective loves. Now we have only to recall our previous conclusions to see that since there are two loves in man,²⁹ there should also be two cities to which all other groupings of men are reduced. The scores of men who lead the life of the old man, the earthly man, and who are united by their common love for temporal things, form the first city, the *earthly city*; the multitude of men who are joined together by the bond of divine love form a second city, the *City of God*.³⁰ Once we have grasped the nature of these two cities, moral philosophy will expand into a philosophy of history, and beneath a multiplicity of peoples and events, will see how the two cities have persisted from the beginning of the world and will extract a law permitting us to forecast their destiny.

A group of men living together in one city is called a people. Hence, if we give the name "city" to any group of men united in their love for a common object, we learn what a people is: it is the assemblage of a large number of rational beings linked together by the desire for and common possession of something they love. It is obvious that they have to be rational beings, for otherwise they would be unable to recognize their common object and perceive the oneness of their love, and their being associated in common possession is, in our view, the origin itself of any society. Now what we have already said of men, we should be able to say of peoples as well. Men, we claimed, are their wills, i.e. their loves; we might also say that as its love is, so too is a people, for if love is the bond which constitutes a city, i.e. a society,³¹ then we have but to find what a people loves to tell what sort of people it is (*ut videatur qualis quisque populus sit, illa sunt intuenda quae diligit*).³² Let us apply this method of discrimination to the two cities.

A society loves a common end which all its members are associated together to obtain. Now there is at least one end common to every society, no matter what it may be, and that end is peace. Someone will undoubtedly object at once and say that the contrary seems just as evident: civil wars and wars among nations apparently do not support such a thesis. Actually, such facts only appear to contradict it. There are no societies without wars, that much is clear, but why do societies wage war if not to establish peace? The fact is that the peace sought by societies is not just any peace at all, nor is it merely a peace already present, maintained at all costs and without regard for the foundations on which it rests; true peace is one which completely satisfies the desires of all, so that after obtaining it, they desire nothing further. In this sense, it is true to say that men do not wage war for the sake of war, but for peace. When men do battle, they hope, not that there will be no peace, but that the peace will be the peace they hope for.³³

Every society, then, wants peace. But what is the fundamental condition without which peace is only provisional and apparent? It is order. For a number of parts—and *a fortiori* a number of wills—to work together simultaneously in the pursuit of an end, each must be in its proper place, and perform its own function precisely as it should be performed. This is quite evident in the internal functioning of a physical organism like the human body, but it is no less true of the interior of the human soul and consequently, of the interior of a society. A body's peace consists in the well-ordered balance of all its parts; peace in animal-life is the ordered agreement of the appetites; the rational soul's peace is the harmony of rational knowledge and will; domestic

peace is harmony between members of one and the same household in giving commands and obeying them; the city's peace is the same harmony extended from the family to include all citizens; and finally, the peace of the Christian city is a perfectly ordered society of men who enjoy God and love one another in God. In every case, then, peace is the tranquility of order.³⁴ Now are there two orders around which two cities can be organized?

Two such orders do, indeed, exist. We already know them because they are identical with the two spiritual races we described above: one living by the body, the other living by grace. On one side we have the impious who bear the image of the earthly man from the beginning to the end of the world: they constitute the first city, which is constantly occupied with its own organization in accordance with an order of its own and is ever bent on gaining the mastery over material things and the enjoyment of them. To be sure, the order of this city is fundamentally nothing but a mockery of the true order against which it is in permanent revolt, and yet if thieves and even wild beasts obey some kind of law and keep some sort of peace, it is all the more reasonable to expect that rational creatures could not live without developing some sort of society. Bad though such a society may be, it does exist, and in so far as it exists, it is good.³⁵ Let us not be surprised therefore, if it retains a semblance of beauty even in its depravity.

Let us add, however, that the peace of the impious is a false peace, and that in comparison with the peace of the just, it is not even worthy of the name. Its apparent order is fundamentally nothing but disorder: the tyrant who tries to establish it by making all the members of the city subject to himself really usurps the office of God. The heavenly city, on the other hand, orders everything with a view to guaranteeing its citizens Christian liberty, i.e. the use of everything conducive to the enjoyment of God. Hence, we can think of its order and unity as being a simple extension of the order and unity reigning in the soul of every just man. This city alone is founded on true order; it alone enjoys true peace. It is, therefore, the only abode of a people worthy of the name; in short, it is the only true city.³⁶ The two cities, then, are different and opposed one to the other, like the ends themselves towards which they are ordered.

These conclusions raised a considerable problem in as much as they introduced a fundamental ambiguity into the very notion of the City of God, and even though Augustine knowingly accepted it as such, it has often led his commentators astray. On the one hand, if the distinction between the two cities is carried to its ultimate conclusion, the result is that the City of God alone has a right to exist. It is the only

city because it alone is what a city should be. Therefore, it would not be enough to say that the Roman republic was unjust, because it was actually not even worthy of the name "republic." The same conclusion would apply in all strictness to the republic of the Athenians, or to the empires built by the Assyrians and Egyptians.³⁷ On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Roman republic was properly speaking a true republic because, in accordance with our own definition of what a people is, it was a group of rational beings associated together in the common enjoyment of what they loved. In was an evil people, but it was a people, i.e. a true city, although lacking in justice and consequently, without genuine virtues.³⁸ If, then, the first meaning of city is admitted, the antithesis between the two cities disappears because only one remains; if the second meaning is allowed, how can the two antagonistic cities subsist side by side? What relations will exist between them?

There is no doubt that in Augustine's view the only city worthy of the name is the heavenly city, for every city rests on peace and only the heavenly city enjoys true peace. It was the second problem, however, which attracted his attention even more, because its premisses presuppose that the earthly city is in some sense deserving of the name "city." The long account in the *De Civitate Dei*—and its influence on the theology of history, and even on history itself, was to be decisive down to the time of Bossuet and beyond—is nothing more than an answer to the question.³⁹ Thanks to the light of revelation unveiling the hidden origin and end of the universe, in this work a human reason dares attempt—perhaps for the first time—a synthesis of universal history. Here, more than anywhere else in the Augustinian system, reason can only advance by following faith, because it is a matter of forming one organized whole of the knowledge of what is seen and the knowledge of what is yet to be. Only revelation tells us of Adam's creation by God and of the creation in him of the two cities between which the human race, his progeny, is divided.⁴⁰ It tells us of the birth of Cain, who was a member of the earthly city, and of his success in founding a city (Gen. 4, 17), as though to indicate more clearly that his kingdom is of this world, while Abel, a member of the City of God, did not found one as if to insist that this life is merely a pilgrimage which is to end in a happier abode.⁴¹ Again, it is revelation which enables us to follow the gradual formation of the heavenly city throughout history, and to foresee its completion. Indeed, the final end is the establishment of the perfect City of God in an eternal happiness which the people of the elect will enjoy. The deepest meaning of history lies in the gradual formation of this city in accordance with the designs of

Providence; it gives each people its reason for existence, assigns its role and reveals its destiny.

By their definitions alone, the two cities are incompatible. Augustine did not think that they could ever agree, and yet they must at least co-exist and, consequently, find also a *modus vivendi* which will give the City of God a chance to develop. Now when we examine their respective positions, we see at once that there is one level on which the two cities do meet and lead interwoven lives, as it were, namely the level of the earthly life. Here below, inhabitants of the City of God seem to be identified with those who dwell only in the earthly city. How, indeed, could they help this? They are men like the others: their bodies need their share of the material goods for which the earthly city has been organized. They share, then, in its order and peace and, along with other men, benefit from the advantages that city provides and bear the burdens it imposes.⁴² And yet, in spite of an apparently common life, the two peoples dwelling together in the same earthly city never really mix. Citizens of the heavenly city live *with* the others but not *like* them. Even though they perform actions which are outwardly the same, they do them in a different spirit. Those who live only the life of the old man look upon the goods of the earthly city as ends to be enjoyed; for those in the same city who lead the life of the new man born of grace, these same goods are merely means which they use and refer to their true end.⁴³

Numerous problems, all of them having to do with the relations between the spiritual and the temporal, spring from these fundamentally different attitudes towards the same objects. One such problem is the oft-debated question of the right of ownership. Augustine solves it in the light of principles which have just been set down.⁴⁴ Some think that all ownership is bad, impious and contrary to the teaching of Scripture, while others only live to amass riches and are prey to an insatiable craving for possession. Both are mistaken, although for different reasons, as to the true meaning of ownership. Possession can be lawful because everything depends on the mode of possession.

Those who tirelessly amass perishable goods with a view to enjoying them as so many ends, misunderstand the essential relationship between creatures and God. Actually God possesses all the works of His hands because He is their Creator, and He is the only one Who is in possession of them. Everything belongs to Him because He has created all of it.⁴⁵ In a sense, then, it is true to say that man owns nothing and that all ownership, taken as founded on man's rights alone, is merely a kind of usurpation. On the other hand, if we come down from this

plane to the level of human relations, a right of ownership clearly does exist, not a right of men before God, but of one man with respect to another. Lawful occupation, purchase, exchange, gift, inheritance, all these are so many titles to just possession. To use any other method of securing a good possessed by another is merely to substitute theft and usurpation for lawful possession.⁴⁶

When these two points of view are borne in mind, various texts in Augustine, which have often been subjects of controversy, take on a satisfactory meaning. Nowhere in his writings has he ever considered human ownership unlawful, or recommended its abolition. However, if we consider the relations between man and God, it may be true to say that goods possessed legally in the temporal order are unlawfully possessed in the spiritual order. From this new point of view, the lawful owners of earthly goods are not always those who actually possess them, and Scripture is right when it says⁴⁷ that the faithful possess the riches of the whole world while the infidel has not so much as a farthing. Indeed, ownership is constituted not only by a title of acquisition but also by the use made of a thing once it has been acquired: to use a good thing badly is to possess it badly; to possess it badly is not to possess it at all. In theory, therefore, we may say that all things belong by right to those who know how to use them with God and beatitude in view, and this is their only legitimate use. Redistribution of this earth's goods in accordance with this principle would mean radical upheaval, but it is neither possible nor desirable. Indeed, where are we to find just men, however few, to receive the goods now badly possessed?⁴⁸ Moreover, even supposing that they were found, they would have no desire for the goods they were to receive, because the less one's love of money, the better his possession of it. Things must stay as they are. The fact that property is distributed and held in keeping with the rules of civil law is no guarantee that those who hold it will use it as they should. Nevertheless, this evil situation should be tolerated because the rules of civil law do at least hinder those who, in their own interest, make bad use of goods held unlawfully from using them badly against others.⁴⁹ Justice in its perfect form will reign in another life, in that heavenly city wherein the just will have everything they can use, and where they will use it as it should be used.⁵⁰

When we reflect on the various factors involved in this solution to the problem, we see that it sheds clear light on the Augustinian conception of the heavenly city's relation to the earthly city. To transfer the rules obtaining on one level to the other is to confuse and upset everything.⁵¹ The earthly city has its own order, rights and laws; organized as it is to bring about a certain state of harmony and peace, it

should be respected, defended and maintained, the more so because citizens of the City of God live in it, share in the goods it guarantees, and enjoy the order it produces. It is true none the less, that this relative order far from coincides with absolute order, and that it is opposed to it on many points. For temporal law prescribes things which guarantee order and social peace, while eternal law commands that the temporal be subjected to the eternal.⁵² No doubt it is desirable and even, to a certain extent, possible that the two orders coincide; nevertheless the latter belongs essentially to an ideal order whose perfect realization will occur only in the world beyond.

If this is true, then the difficulty is to know what the City of God can legitimately expect and, if need be, demand from the earthly city in such matters. Since their citizens are partly the same individuals and since each city has its own order and rights, and since, in spite of all, conflicts between the two orders are inevitable, how are we to determine the Christian's rights and duties in case such conflicts arise? Will he have to reform everything, or put up with everything?

To begin with, it will not be beside the point to remark that the earthly city has nothing to fear from the City of God. Quite the contrary. To be sure, the principles by which their citizens act are very different, but the principles which govern the Christian life only demand, and that more effectively, what the laws of the city seek to obtain. At first sight this may not seem evident because the Gospel preaches non-resistance to evil; it even teaches that we should return good for evil. Now how are we to admit that the State can agree not to defend itself against its enemies?⁵³

This objection may be plausible, but it is not very serious. What is really the end of civil society? It is harmony and peace. To safeguard these more effectively the laws forbid revenge, and this is nothing more than forbidding the return of evil for evil. No doubt the Christian law goes even farther, but in doing so it only helps to establish the dominion of good over evil within the city, and this is the surest foundation of order. Actually, no opposition can arise between the two cities as long as the earthly city is subject of its own accord to the higher laws of justice. A State which could have soldiers, officials and, generally speaking, citizens in accord with the ideal of Christianity, would surely have nothing more to ask for.⁵⁴

When the earthly city breaks its own law and the laws of justice, what happens? Simply this: citizens of the heavenly city, who are members of the earthly city as well, continue to observe the civil laws which the earthly city professes to forget. Amidst all the disorder which results from the general disregard for the laws, the just have much

to suffer and forgive. Things round about them which they can correct, they correct; things they cannot improve, they patiently endure; beyond that, they continue to observe the law which the others choose to disregard. At this precise point, in the very midst of their agreement, the radical difference between the two cities stands out clearly. As long as civil society observes its own laws, members of the City of God, who form part of that society, apparently observe these in the self-same way; everything goes along as though the aims of both were solely the order and peace of the earthly city they inhabit. Even then, however, their manner of observing the laws is very different: the citizens of the earthly city consider it as an end, while the just strive to preserve it merely as a means to attaining the City of God. Hence, in the decay of an earthly city which is coming to grief, we see clearly that when the just observed the laws along with everyone else, it was not the earthly city that they served, for even when that city no longer exists, so to speak, when it loses interest in enforcing the laws, the just go on observing them. Consequently, if citizens of the City of God continue to practice moderation, continence, good-will, justice, harmony and all the other virtues in a city which dispenses them from so doing, it is simply because they never practiced these virtues with that city itself in view, although they did practice them to its advantage. The Christian is the staunchest observer of the city's laws precisely because he only observes them for higher ends than those of the city.⁵⁵

What limits then, can be set to the conflicts between Church and State in such a doctrine? God Himself has laid down the rule defining these limits: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." When Caesar demands his due, the Christian gives it, not out of love for Caesar, but for love of God. The wicked ruler, like the worthy sovereign, holds his power from God; God confers it upon him for ends whose nature is unknown to us, but whose existence is certain. For the Christian nothing happens by chance.⁵⁶ When Caesar claims something due to God alone, the Christian refuses it, not because he hates Caesar, but because he loves God.⁵⁷ Here again, the earthly city has nothing to fear from the Christian: as a humble citizen he will prefer to submit to injustice rather than arm for violence, to endure undeserved punishments rather than forget the divine law of charity.⁵⁸

In keeping with these principles, St. Augustine never advocated the adoption of a particular form of civil government. The history of Rome, ever present to his memory, was enough to convince him that, depending on circumstances and especially in view of the nature of the

people to be governed, one constitution may be better than another. If a society is composed of well-balanced men who are vigilant guardians of the common good, each of them making his personal interest subordinate to that of all, there is no objection to its authorizing the choice of magistrates who are to be entrusted with the administration of public affairs. But if the same people happens to become more and more depraved with the result that its citizens prefer their own private interests to those of the public, elections will become venal and the government will pass into the hands of the worst criminals. In that case, would it not be lawful for a good and upright man to come to the fore, deprive the people of the rights to confer public responsibilities and reserve this either to a small number of magistrates or even to one man?⁵⁹ Eternal law alone is immutable, temporal laws are not. So, too, when Augustine praises the success of Christian emperors, he is careful not to confuse the temporal order with the spiritual: he makes their success consist less in their worldly prosperity than in the justice of their administration and their obedience to God.⁶⁰

We might, therefore, be tempted to think that in St. Augustine's doctrine the radical heterogeneity of the two domains guarantees their complete independence. This is not so. In practice other considerations come in to re-establish relations which theory seems to sever. It is a fact, for instance, that after a long period during which he loathed it, Augustine gradually inclined to a closer and closer collaboration between religious and civil authority. The spectacle of his own town being won over to the Catholic Church simply through fear of the imperial laws had made a strong impression on him, and to the end of his life he admitted with fewer and fewer scruples the legitimacy of recourse to the secular arm against heretics and schismatics.⁶¹ Should we look upon this attitude as a repudiation even of the ideal of the celestial city and an attempt to make it coincide with the earthly city?

The difficulty in which we find ourselves when confronted by the divergent texts involved, stems from a confusion which spontaneously arises in our minds between two pairs of opposed terms: State and Church, on the one hand; the earthly city and the City of God, on the other. Now from St. Augustine's point of view these two pairs do not coincide: the earthly city is not the State; indeed, every member of that city is predestined to final damnation, and yet the future elect are necessarily part of the State in which they are born and live. Hence, we must not confuse the earthly city, which is a *mystical* entity according to Augustine's own expression, with this or that city actually realized in time and space. And on the other hand, the Church is not

the City of God, surprising though this may seem. The City of God is the society of all God's elect, past, present and future. Now there were obviously just men among the elect prior to the establishment of Christ's Church, and even now there are, outside the Church and perhaps even among her persecutors, future members of the elect who will submit to her discipline before they die. Above all, in so far as the City of God is the Church, there are many men in it who will not be numbered among the elect: *Dei civitas habet secum, quamdiu peregrinatur in mundo, connexos communione sacramentorum, nec secum futuros in aeterna sorte sanctorum*. (As long as the City of God is a wayfarer on earth, she has associated with her through the bond of the sacraments some who will not be associated with her in the everlasting felicity of the saints). Thus, St. Augustine is expressing his thought strictly when he declares that here below the two cities are mingled together, and that they will remain so until the final judgement definitely separates the citizens of the one from those of the other (*perplexae quippe sunt istae duae civitates in hoc saeculo, donec ultimo iudicio dirimantur*).⁶² Now, what is to remain then will obviously not be the Church, on the one hand, and the State, on the other; it will be the divine society of God's elect and the diabolical society of the reprobate. Taken in their essential meaning, then, these two pairs of terms are quite distinct.

Fairly frequently, however, Augustine will express himself so ambiguously that we can understand why a certain number of his commentators have felt differently. In a well-known passage in the *City of God* (XX, 9, 1), he formally declares that the Church is henceforth the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom of heaven. Is this not precisely to re-introduce under another form the identification of the two which we have just rejected? Not exactly. The kingdom of Christ, which is the Church at the present time—because He is with it until the consummation of the world—is not identical with the City of God. This kingdom does, in fact, allow cockle to grow among the wheat, while in the celestial city there will no longer be cockle mixed with the good grain.⁶³ Hence, it is true that the Church is the kingdom of God, but it is not entirely true that it is the City of God. As to the State, all we can say is that by essence it is naturally foreign and indifferent to supernatural ends. According to one forceful definition given of the world, the State is "human society organizing itself apart from God."⁶⁴ Under such conditions it is not surprising that members of the State who are only members of the State, should be here and now the fated citizens of the earthly city, and for this reason it would be legitimate to identify them.⁶⁵ On the other hand, even though the

Church is not identical with the City of God, it coincides with it in part and is, at any rate, the only human society which works for its establishment. Since the Church is expressly willed, founded and aided by God to recruit the elect of the kingdom of heaven, it is natural that its members should be, in principle, the future citizens of this kingdom. Hence the simplifying pairs of opposites to which Augustine sometimes reduces history: two cities—Babylon and Jerusalem; with two peoples—the reprobate and the elect; and two kings—the devil and Christ.⁶⁶

Augustine, then, can neither be considered to have defined the mediaeval ideal of a civil society subject to the primacy of the Church,⁶⁷ nor to have condemned such a conception in advance. What does remain strictly and absolutely true is that under no circumstances can the earthly city, much less the City of God, be identified with any form of the State whatsoever. But that the State can, and even should, be used on occasion for the Church's own ends and, through her, for the ends of the City of God, is an entirely different matter and a point to which Augustine would certainly make no objection. Although he never formulated the principle explicitly, the notion of a theocratic government is not incompatible with his doctrine, for even though the ideal of the City of God does not include such a notion, it does not exclude it either.⁶⁸ The City of God is stranger to every nation and every state, and recruits its citizens from every quarter; it is indifferent to diversities of language, habits and customs, and attacks nothing, destroys nothing which is good and useful; on the contrary, among nations of widely differing character, it strives to consolidate whatever each places at the service of earthly peace, provided only that there is no opposition to the establishment of God's peace.⁶⁹ Thus, without being able to achieve it here below, it prepares the way for that perfect social life—*quoniam vita civitatis utique socialis est* (for the life of the city is, of course, a social life)—where absolute order will reign through the union of many wills in one common happiness, namely the eternal life in the bosom of God.

Much has been said about the significance and import of this doctrine. Some see in it a survival of Manichaeism, the City of God being contrasted in Augustine with the earthly city, as the Manichaean kingdom of good and light is contrasted with the kingdom of evil and darkness.⁷⁰ Augustine himself, however, does not appear to have had the slightest suspicion of any such affiliation, because the sources of his doctrine to which he refers are entirely scriptural. The idea of a City of God was expressly suggested to him by Psalm 86, 3: "Glorious things are said of Thee, O City of God"; on the other hand, the classic an-

tagonism between Babylon and Jerusalem was enough to suggest the idea of an evil city opposed to the divine city,⁷¹ and finally, the antithesis between the two cities was already put forward by earlier writers known to Augustine, by Tyconius, for example. These facts dispense with any unverifiable psychological hypothesis as to the germination of such an idea in his mind.⁷² Whatever its origin may be, this much at least should be perfectly clear: the positive tone of the Augustinian doctrine of the two cities not only has nothing Manichaean about it, but is actually resolutely anti-Manichaean. According to Mani and his disciples, there was an antagonism between the two cities, one being naturally good and the other naturally evil; according to St. Augustine, the notion of an evil nature is a contradiction in terms, so much so that even the earthly city is naturally good, and evil only because of its perversity of will.⁷³ Since Augustinism is a doctrine in which even darkness is good in so far as it exists, it constitutes the very negation of Manichaean dualism.

Going so far afield to seek the sources of this doctrine is all the more futile especially since his doctrine makes no secret either of its origin or intent. Here as everywhere, faith precedes understanding and produces it. We must, then, start with Scripture if we are to discover Augustine's point of view. What intrigues him is the fact that revelation makes us aware of events like creation and the fall which would otherwise remain unknown to us, but which are the keys to universal history; then the fact that it shows us God's designs and in that way enables us to foresee that future history will have a meaning, no less than the history of the past. When we look at the universe from the standpoint of space, everything in it—being, goodness, order, proportion, beauty, truth—is met with again in successive states of the universe, at various moments in its duration. Augustine's point of departure, then, is revelation, and by conferring on history a universality which our fragmentary empiricism cannot attain and, above all, by unveiling its origin and end to him, it makes the theology of history possible and confers on the universe intelligibility in the order of time.

By adopting this first point of view, St. Augustine is necessarily obliged to accept another, namely that of the fundamental unity of humanity and its history. Inasmuch as God has foreseen, willed and directed the course of historical events from the beginning to the approaching end, every nation and every man must play his role in one and the same drama and cooperate to the extent willed by Providence in realizing the same end. In a certain sense, therefore, the whole of humanity is but a single man subjected by God to the purifying and illuminating tests of a progressive revelation. And yet these graces and

illuminations will be fully efficacious only for the future elect, the members of the Communion of Saints or, as Leibniz will say, the "community of minds," whose foundation and completion are the final cause of the universe and its history. Whence the profound idea of a mystical city comprised of more dead and unborn than of living, a perfect society and the only society fully worthy of the name, because based as it is on the love of God, it alone realizes the social ideal of peace and justice; it is, in a word, an end-society and all others are but waste-products or means to it. That Augustine's doctrine should develop into a theology of history is no accident; it is the result of unreserved fidelity to the requirements of his method and basic principles.

Part Three

CONTEMPLATING GOD IN HIS WORKS



Since its starting point is faith, understanding depends essentially on grace, and modern theologians would undoubtedly classify understanding, as Augustine conceives it, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.¹ And yet, even though understanding is supernatural in origin and nature, it produces effects observable in the natural order. By its light, knowledge of some things becomes accessible to reason which reason unaided could not have attained. This gives rise to the formation of an order of certitudes which reason must recognize as its own because it produces them, and yet reason is well aware that it is not their sufficient cause since it cannot attain any knowledge of things divine unless it is taught by God. This order has been rightly named the order of "Augustinian contemplation,"² and in it purified intelligence discovers the first fruits of beatitude in the enjoyment of truth at least partially unveiled.³ The pages Augustine devotes to meditation on these problems are the most beautiful he has written. They pulsate with a mystic joy, and even if it were possible, any attempt to reproduce their tone would be a kind of sacrilege. In this case the history of ideas must limit itself to more modest tasks and merely note the stages in these ascents in which philosophical reflection spontaneously changes into prayer in order to find its ultimate depth therein.

At this point man knows there is a God, wants Him as his happiness and therefore loves Him. But in loving God, just what is it that man loves?⁴ To answer this question, Augustinian contemplation strives to discern the object of its love more and more clearly so as to enjoy it more and more completely. Unable to see God in Himself—except perhaps in the extraordinary case of ecstasy—it contemplates Him in His works, i.e. first in the world of bodies of which man is a part, and then in the human soul because it is the clearest image of God. Contemplating, then, means directing an act of sustained atten-

tion towards things—it asks a question and the sight of things provides the answer.⁵ But this is not enough. To profit by asking a question, we must be able to understand the answer. Let us suppose that the question is put to the world of bodies. To interpret correctly what we are taught by bodies, we must be able to judge them. But we only judge things we dominate. Consequently, only a mind which has been purified and liberated from the sensible world is qualified to question the universe, but if it does so, there is no doubt as to the answer it will receive.

The world of bodies appears as a great mass which can be divided into parts and is only realized in space piecemeal, but the soul is indivisible because it is spiritual. Hence the power the soul possesses to animate and rule the body, for this implies that the soul is superior to the body. However, since God animates and rules the soul as the soul animates and rules the body, He is necessarily superior to them both, and the unanimous answer which things make to a mind which questions and judges them is that they are not God but that God has made them.⁶ To provide this answer, heaven and earth have only to show themselves as they are, i.e. scenes of constant change wherein everything is in movement and never at rest. Now to change is to lose what one once had and to acquire what one did not have; a changing thing becomes what it was not and ceases to be what it was, and this is equivalent to saying that it is not eternal. Moreover a thing which is not eternal has not always existed, and anything which exists but has not always existed must have been made. And, to go one step further, everything made is made by another, because to make itself, a thing would have to exist so as to give itself being before it had any being, and this is absurd. We were quite right, then, in saying that the mere sight of the world gives us a ringing reply when we ask who its author is.⁷ It is God Who created it. Now how did He create, and what does creation teach us about its Creator?⁸

Chapter I

CREATION AND TIME

As long as Augustine clung to Manichaeism he professed a radical materialism, a materialism which was applied first of all to God. Now according to the doctrine of Mani God is light, i.e. a corporeal, bright and very subtle substance. It is this substance which shines first in God, shines now in the stars and in our souls, and fights on earth against darkness.⁹ At this period, then, Augustine considered God to be a subtle, resplendent body;¹⁰ and since God is essentially light, everything that is body and shares that light to any degree appeared to him as a part of God. "I thought, O Lord God and Truth, that you were a bright, immense body and I a fragment of that body."¹¹ It is by way of reaction against this initial error that Augustine will teach creation *ex nihilo*. In his view the world can have but one of two origins: God either creates it from nothing, or makes it out of His own substance. If we accept the latter hypothesis we admit that a part of the divine substance can become finite, changeable and subject to modifications of every sort, even to the destruction which parts of the universe undergo.¹² If such a premise is self-contradictory, the only thing left to say is that God created the universe from nothing.¹³ Hence, the opposition between the divine and the mutable is irreducible.¹⁴ But then it simply becomes all the more difficult to understand how the eternal and immutable could have produced the temporal and changeable.

What does the phrase "create out of nothing" really mean? God is not like an artist who reflects upon a form in his mind and then imposes this on the matter he finds at hand, clay, for example, or stone or wood. On the contrary, it is God Who has brought into being the various materials the human artist finds at hand. The creative act means, then, the production of the very being of that which exists,

and such production is possible to God alone because He alone is Being (*quid enim est, nisi quia tu es?*).¹⁵ Thus, without any pre-existing matter God willed that things exist and they did exist; and this is precisely what we call creation *ex nihilo*.

Why did God will to create things? If in asking this we seek some cause for the universe antecedent to God's will and distinct from it, then the question is a foolish one, because God's will is the sole cause of things, and since it is the cause of everything, it has no cause itself. To look for the cause of God's will is to look for something that does not exist.¹⁶ But the case is quite different if we ask why the will of God could will a universe such as ours. The answer to this question is not beyond the grasp of natural reason because Plato himself formulated it in the *Timaeus*—and he did so in line with the teaching of Scripture. God is essentially good; and to go a step further, everything is good to the extent that it exists. This is why, according to the account in Genesis, God gazed upon the world He had created and saw that His work was good. This is also what Plato suggests, in imaginative terms, when he says that God was filled with joy when He had finished the universe. Indeed, there is no artist more excellent than God, no art more effectual than that of the Word of God, and no better reason for the creation of the world than the production of a good work by a God Who is good. This answer ends all debate about the origin of the world: *Hanc causam, id est ad bona creanda bonitatem Dei . . .* (This cause of a good creation, namely the goodness of God . . .). The divine goodness did not allow a good creation to remain in a state of nothingness.¹⁷ But exactly how did it come forth from nothingness?

The first problem to settle is that of the moment of creation. Scripture says: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth" (Gen. 1, 1). There are many ways of understanding "in the beginning," but no matter what interpretation we insist on, it is clear at least that Scripture thereby attributes a beginning to every creature. Now since time is by definition change, it too is a creature. It had a beginning therefore, so that things which have duration are not eternal nor is time itself eternal.¹⁸

In setting down this conclusion, Augustine hopes to eliminate at once the persistent illusion of a time before the existence of the world, in a given moment of which God would have created the world. Indeed, since it is not clear why one moment should have been chosen in preference to another in a duration which was indiscriminately void, some conclude that if the world exists, it has always existed. This is what the Manichaeans do, for example, when they ask what God

was doing *before* He created heaven and earth, if the world is not eternal. They might just as well ask why God created the world in one place in space rather than in another, because the imagination can be given free rein in the one case as in the other. Actually, there is no real space outside the universe nor was there a *before* heaven and earth. If we assume that the creation of the world did not occur, then there is only God. But since God is a completely realized perfection, He is immutable and admits of no change. With respect to God there is neither before nor after: He *is*, in a motionless eternity.¹⁹ If on the other hand we put ourselves in the creature's position—and time forms part of creation—then our assumption means that creation does not yet exist, with the result that for creation as well there is neither time, nor before, nor after.²⁰ The truth of the matter is that a false imagination is chiefly responsible for such a discussion, and that we vainly try to transpose a problem of time into terms of eternity. We know that God, being eternal, has created everything, even time. Where we fail is in our attempt to get a clear picture of the link between time and eternity. In this case it means comparing two modes of heterogeneous duration founded on two modes of heterogeneous being, and we must add that one of these, namely that of God, escapes us almost entirely. Since we ourselves are subject, even in our minds, to the law of becoming, we cannot picture how that which is permanent exists.

To escape this formidable difficulty, Stoic philosophers imagined an eternal cycle composed of long periods following one another in fixed order, periods which would always bring back in nature the same rebirths, the same destructions, in a word the same eternal new beginnings. The subtlest of the arguments advanced in support of this thesis is based on the inability of any knowledge whatsoever to comprehend the infinite. If the infinite as such is incomprehensible, then God could have had, or can have now, only finite reasons for His finite works. On the other hand, His goodness could never have been idle. It is impossible to believe that after a period of inactivity He was suddenly smitten with remorse and set to work creating the world. Hence, the only solution to the problem of such a universe would be to suppose that the world always existed but that the finite number of beings composing it constantly follow one upon the other and disappear only to return once more in a fixed cycle.

If, then, it is granted that the world has always existed, there is no reason to ask why it did not begin sooner or later. But in place of this settled question another and more serious one appears for which there is no answer. In the hypothesis of an eternal recurrence, it is the fundamental problem of philosophy which becomes insoluble because

in such a universe there is no room left for any happiness worthy of the name. Happiness, as we have said, is the permanent, secure possession of the sovereign good. But how can we have permanent possession of it in a world where we are certain, on the contrary, to lose it periodically, with the hope, it is true, of finding it again but of doing so only to lose it once again? How can we love completely and without reserve a thing we know we are destined one day to leave behind? What kind of happiness will we have if everlasting interruptions are to shatter it inevitably? As for saying that God cannot comprehend the infinite, this is to forget that numbers are infinite and therefore to deny God a knowledge of numbers. Numbers are certainly infinite because every number, no matter how large it may be, can not only be doubled but multiplied by as much as we like and as often as we like. On the other hand, no two numbers are equal, because each of them is defined in its essence by properties belonging to it alone. Finally, number is certainly endowed with an eminent dignity, for the *Timaeus* shows us God fashioning the universe in accordance with the laws of number, and Scripture also says: "Who produces the world according to number" (Septuagint Isaias 40, 26), or again: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight" (Wisdom 11, 21). We must, therefore, admit both that numbers are infinite and that God knows the infinite since He knows number. No doubt such a proposition seems somewhat contradictory because anything grasped by knowledge seems to become finite and limited by that very fact so that comprehension of the infinite as such becomes an impossibility. Now this reasoning holds good for human knowledge but it is invalid for divine knowledge, and in this case we are concerned only with divine knowledge. There is no number for the perfect simplicity of God's understanding. To think of His understanding as a discursive faculty which moves from one given quantity to another larger quantity and so on indefinitely is to forget that God sees everything in a simple intuition and that for Him, consequently, the infinite must be encompassed in one knowledge to which we have no right to set limits.²¹

Since, then, there is no reason for saying that the universe has always existed, the truth of its beginning in time leaves no room for doubt. But we must go further. Even if we assumed that the world has always existed, we should have no right to consider it as a creature coeternal with God. The concept "coeternal creature" is really an impossibility and a contradiction because it implies the attribution of a homogeneous mode of duration to heterogeneous modes of being.²² Some Platonists make use of a naïve example in their attempts to

reconcile the formation of the world by God with the eternal duration they ascribe to it. Let us imagine, they say, a foot set in the dust from all eternity. The imprint of the foot would be on the dust from all eternity, so that the foot would obviously be the cause of its imprint while the cause would not be prior to its effect nor the effect posterior to its cause. The same is true of the world; and we can say that God has always existed and has always created the world, so that creation would have a beginning in the order of being but not in the order of time.²³ It would be an eternal creature.

To expose the sophism hidden in this metaphor, let us grant that the world has always existed in the past. Then it is clear that time has always existed, but it does not follow that the world is eternal, because perpetual time is not eternity. It is the essence of time to have only a fragmentary existence, because the past of anything is no more at the moment of duration, and its future has yet to be. As for its present, it can only consist of an indivisible moment, because if it is extended in duration ever so little, it too falls into a past which is no more and an immediate future which has yet to be.²⁴ Hence, the three customary divisions amount to one, namely the present. In the present the past survives in memory and the future pre-exists, so to speak, as an anticipation based on the present perception of its present causes. But even the indivisible present is always passing on to make way for another, so that no matter how far we extend its duration, time at best is something impermanent and its being, composed as it is of a series of indivisible moments, remains foreign by definition to the permanent immobility of the divine eternity (*tempus autem quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitati immutabili non potest esse coaeternum*).²⁵ There is the same difference between God and the creature as there is between a consciousness to which every note of a melody would be simultaneously present and our consciousness which only perceives them one by one and adds to the note it hears the memory of those it has heard and the anticipation of those it has yet to hear. Now how are we to describe this relationship?

The difficulty is due not merely to the fact that eternity escapes us; for us even time—which carries us along with it—remains a mysterious reality: its whole substance is contained in that indivisible moment we call the present. Now an indivisible thing cannot be longer or shorter than it is. How, then, can we speak of a longer or a shorter time, or even of a time twice as long as another?²⁶ Yet it is a fact that we do measure time. But how can we measure the length of a past which is no more, a future which is yet to be, or a present which is instantaneous?

The identification of time and motion has been suggested as a way of solving this problem. The solution appears to be an extreme simplification of that of Aristotle and if we accept it the difficulty disappears. For if time is mere motion, and motion can obviously be its own measure, it will always be possible to measure time with time and motion with motion. But then another difficulty appears and it is a much more serious one. A body's motion is essentially its movement between two points located in space, but such spatial movement remains the same no matter what time it takes the body to carry it out.

Furthermore, if the body remains motionless at the same point, there is no movement, and yet I can estimate the time of its immobility with more or less perfect accuracy. So the motion time measures is one thing, and the time which measures it is another. Time is not the motion of bodies.²⁷

It is true that this conclusion in turn gives rise to a further problem, namely that of the measurement of time itself. If I measure motion with time, with what can I measure time? With time? In a certain sense, yes. The duration of a long syllable can be measured by the duration of a short syllable, or the duration of a poem by the number of verses it has; these verses are measured in turn by the number of their feet, the duration of their feet by that of their syllables, and lastly the duration of their long syllables by that of the short syllables. But here again, what are we talking about? If it were a question of their length on paper, we should be measuring space, not time; if we are dealing with verses uttered by the voice, then the dissociation of time and motion reappears in another form, because a short verse can be delivered so as to last much longer than a long verse, and vice versa. The same is true of a poem, a foot or, a syllable.²⁸ Therefore, their measure must be sought in something other than themselves.

To grasp the relation between the permanent and the transitory, in so far as that is possible—and this is the whole problem—Augustine resorts to a metaphor and proposes to consider time as a kind of distention of the soul (*distentio animi*) which makes it possible for the future and the past to exist together in the present and thereby enables us to perceive duration and effect its measurement.²⁹ If we consider a particular time in itself, no measurement of it is possible because we only measure past time, i.e. time which no longer endures and no longer exists, and we cannot measure a thing which no longer exists. But if we refer time to the soul and especially to the memory, then the measurements in question become possible. What has ceased to exist in itself still exists in the recollection we retain of it. The impressions transitory things leave in us outlive the things themselves,

and by enabling us to compare them make some measurement of their intervals possible.³⁰ What is true of the memory of the past is also true of anticipation of the future. It is possible, then, for the three divisions of time to coincide even though the present moment—and it alone is real—is in itself indivisible; but this is possible only because of the soul. To see this more clearly we must look upon the soul's present as an attention which is directed both towards that which is yet to be (through anticipation), and towards that which is no more (through memory). This attention is continuous: it is, so to speak, the point of transition from something anticipated to something remembered.³¹

In our study of sensation we were introduced to this "light of the intervals of duration" which makes it possible for the various elements of a complex perception to coexist in the view of consciousness.³² Here we meet it again, but now we study it for its own sake, not for what it explains. From the vantage-point at which we now stand, it appears as the aptitude of an indivisible, vital activity to expand, so to speak, from the present in which it subsists, in two directions, namely towards the future it anticipates and towards the past it recalls.³³ What is true of the duration of a poem, whether read or heard, is also true of the duration of one of its verses or of a single one of its syllables. It is equally true of a man's whole life, of which his actions are the parts. And finally, it is true of the whole course of human generations, of which each of our lives is only a part.³⁴ But if this is so, what becomes of our question: What did God do before creating? How can the question have any meaning? Before there was a human consciousness to receive the future and the past into its present attention, the words "before" and "after" had no meaning.³⁵ But we also see what superhuman efforts are required of us if we would understand the relation of created time to creative eternity. Man can do this only on condition that he finds a haven for the mind beyond the reach of time's tide, that he becomes moored, so to speak, and by gathering together into a permanent present all things that are no more and that are yet to be, leaves time behind to cross over, alone, into eternity.³⁶

We see, then, that beyond the psychological problem of time there is a metaphysical problem which has a bearing on its solution. Our inability to perceive things simultaneously and in the unity of an indivisible act is primarily the inability of things to exist simultaneously in a permanent and stable unity. Only things which cannot coexist follow one another.³⁷ Hence, in order to form an idea of eternity it is not enough to think of the universe as a familiar song and to imagine

a boundless consciousness which always knows exactly how much of that song has been sung; it is far beyond any such mind as this that God subsists, for He is the Creator of every mind. For him there is neither past nor future; His knowledge of things is one and undivided, like the act itself by which He created them.³⁸ Hence, we may reasonably expect that the study of this creative act has great difficulties in store for anyone who would attempt to describe it.

Chapter II

MATTER AND FORMS

In the beginning (*in principio*) God made heaven and earth. To obviate the difficulties which arise from the use of the word *principium*, Augustine prefers to interpret it symbolically. According to him, the phrase does not signify the beginning of time but the principle of all things, i.e. the Word.¹ Because of this, the problem *de originatione rerum radicali*, as Leibniz will call it, is transferred from the metaphysics of time to the metaphysics of causes. The question is no longer how the eternal can create the temporal, but how the immutable can create the mutable, and the doctrine of the divine ideas provides the means for solving the difficulty.

Whatever the sense of *in principio*, it is a fact that according to Genesis God created heaven and earth in this *principio*. Now what are we to understand by these words?² It is evident at once that the account of creation should imply no temporal duration in the creative act. God created everything simultaneously, and the entire work of the six days differentiated in the account of Genesis should be understood as the work of one day, or better, the work of a single moment.³ The Bible uses such imaginative language only in order to accommodate itself to the weakness of our imagination⁴ and probably also to prophesy the future in the form of an image of the past. Rather than teaching a real succession of days spent in the work of creation, it foretells the real succession of the world's seven ages in the future.⁵ We must say, then, that God created everything at once.⁶ Now what does the word "everything" mean?

In the first place, it means heaven and earth, but by this we should not understand the organized heaven and earth we know. The "heaven" spoken of in the first verse of Genesis signifies a spiritual matter completely and definitively formed from the very moment of

its creation: it is the angels. The angels, 'being creatures and so not coeternal with God, probably have a material and changeable substratum like every other creature, but the bliss of beatific contemplation fixes, as it were, their natural mutability and binds them inseparably to God.⁷ Since they are immutable *de facto* as a result of their beatitude, they are preserved from change and consequently do not fall within the order of time, but since they are mutable by nature they do not rise to the eternity of God.⁸

In contrast to this fully informed spiritual matter, God created earth, i.e. an absolutely unformed matter. By these words we do not mean that God first created matter in order to clothe it in forms the next day, for matter does not precede the creation of everything else in time, since everything was created simultaneously, but it does precede it in the order of causality. The voice does not exist apart from the articulated words which are, as it were, its form and yet it is different from them and sustains them. In the same way, the matter created by God as earth is not prior to its forms in time, but it is prior to them as the condition of their subsistence.⁹ And since it is completely devoid of forms, it cannot be the scene of those marked changes without which, as we have seen, time is impossible. Hence, prime matter does not belong to the order of time any more than heaven, i.e. the angels; it does not count as one of the days of creation.

Although this material formlessness never existed apart from the forms which clothe it, it should not be thought of as a pure nothingness. When we try to define it, we can only conceive it negatively by refusing to it every form, be it sensible or intelligible. The result is that we only seem to know it to the extent that we are ignorant of it, or that we can only be ignorant of it in order to know it. However, undetermined though it may be, it is still something, for through it bodies constantly change from one form to another and it is, so to speak, their very mutability.¹⁰ This is the reason why St. Augustine looks upon it as something that lives a kind of wretched life, possessing in its own right only that shifting from one form to another wherein its whole being is spent.¹¹ From this point of view, it is of all existing things the farthest removed from God, for He is being and it is almost nothing,¹² and yet it is not pure nothingness.

In order to understand the informing of matter, we must begin with the existence of things in God's Ideas. The word "idea" goes back to Plato, but ideas themselves existed before him because they are eternal. Moreover we can assume that other men knew of them before Plato, whatever they may have called them, because there were wise men before Plato and even outside of Greece, and there is no wisdom with-

out a knowledge of ideas. At any rate their name indicates exactly what they are. Actually, the correct Latin translation of the Greek word for them would be *forma* or *species*. It is often translated by *ratio*, but *ratio* corresponds exactly to λόγος, not to ἰδέα. If we want to be correct we should translate the term by "form." However, since *ratio* may signify ideas as principles of knowledge and of the intelligibility of things, we can say that it means fundamentally the same thing.¹³ In Augustine, then, *idea*, *forma*, *species*, *ratio* are practically synonymous terms.

Augustinian ideas are "principal forms or stable and unchangeable essences of things. They are themselves not formed, and they are eternal and always in the same state because they are contained in God's intelligence. They neither come into being nor do they pass away, but everything that can or does come into being and pass away is formed in accordance with them."¹⁴ Things always exist in at least two different ways: either in themselves and their own nature, or in God and their eternal ideas. Moreover, this twofold existence is simultaneous. When a carpenter builds a chest, the chest exists in his mind first and then in the material object he makes, but its material existence does not interfere with its continued existence in the mind of the carpenter who made the chest.¹⁵ All things in the world at the present time are in the divine ideas at the same time, and not only in the general idea of the species to which they belong but in the particular idea which represents them in God.¹⁶ St. Augustine always taught that this formation of things through their ideas constitutes precisely the work which Genesis describes in imaginative language in the account of the six days.

Difficulties of interpretation occasioned by this doctrine of creation undoubtedly stem in great part from the fact that here too Augustine endeavoured to interpret the "existential" data of the Bible in accordance with Plato's ontology. In accepting this fundamental portion of his Platonic inheritance, he implicitly pledged himself to translate into "essential" language everything the Bible teaches about God, and not only God considered in Himself but also as the creator and conservator of man and the universe. It would be impossible to say how many historians have been fascinated by this extraordinary and, in a sense, inexplicable phenomenon. Here we have a convert to Christianity reading a few treatises of Plotinus for the first time and what he finds there is the God of Christianity with all His principal attributes. For him, Plotinus' One immediately becomes God the Father, the first Person of the Trinity. Plotinus' Intelligence is identified in his mind with the second Person of the Trinity, i.e. the Word

mentioned in the prologue of St. John's Gospel: "And there I did read, not indeed in so many words but to the selfsame effect, enforced by many reasons of various kinds, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made."¹⁷ In short, the moment Augustine read Plotinus he found there the three essentially Christian notions of God the Father, the Word Who is God with the Father, and creation.

There is no questioning the fact that Augustine read all these things in Plotinus, but it is much less certain that they are actually there. No doubt, it would be pointless to press Plotinus to tell us how he conceives the One, since he calls it something ineffable. Besides, it would be incorrect to say that Plotinus conceived the One as an essence, because for him the One was, like Plato's Good, beyond essence and being. And yet when Plotinus has to speak of the radical origin of things, it is as though the One produces all other things in virtue of the perfection of its essence, and this essence is none other than that of the Good in Plato's *Republic*. The Good is perfect by right, and it is the nature of a perfect thing to beget according to its own likeness. The sun produces light, the grown animal its young, the mature tree its fruit. In the same way the One produces the highest Intelligence, and everything along with it. Is this production free? It is free, but if we are to say that the One is independent and free, it is because in the ontological order, that on which everything depends does not depend on anything else. The liberty of the One is but another name for its transcendence. Let us be careful, therefore, not to transform it into a liberty of action or choice. How, indeed, would it choose? Choice is a selection made possible by the knowledge one being has of other beings. Now the One is prior to being and knowledge. Plotinus says: "As for that principle which is not engendered and above which there is nothing but which is eternally what it is, what reason could it have for thinking?"¹⁸ Let us answer with Plotinus: actually none whatever. But let us hasten to add that this is all that is needed to make it utterly impossible for the One to become the God of Christianity, or for the world it produces to be the created world of Christians.

To understand why St. Augustine thought he found these things in Plotinus, we must recall the position in which he found himself after his conversion. This new Christian in search of a theology he had to elaborate himself never knew any other metaphysics but that of Plotinus and the Platonists. Since this was the only technique at his disposal, he simply had to use it, not, to be sure, without doing

violence to it at times by forcing it to satisfy the requirements of Christianity but also by granting it more at times than he himself was aware of doing. It is the Christian Creator Augustine adores but the creation he thinks of as a philosopher sometimes bears the marks of Plotinus' metaphysics. Plotinus' universe remains typically Platonic, at least to the extent that his first principle is beyond being and divinity, and that correlatively, being and the highest god, Intelligence, is not the first principle. It is this factor that makes comparison between Platonic emanation and Christian creation scarcely possible.

A metaphysics of the One is not a metaphysics of Being. Since nothing can produce itself, whatever the One produces has to be other than the One, that is to say, many. Such is Intelligence, at once the highest of gods and the highest of beings, but in no sense the first principle. To compare Plotinus' cosmogony with that of Christianity is to make a comparison between a doctrine in which the existence of the first being, bearing the name "god," depends on the first principle precisely because it is the first principle, and a doctrine in which God is He Who creates everything else. Nor is this all. However Plotinus' emanation is understood, it is a serious mistake to see in it a community of being. The point which sets his interpreters at odds usually amounts to asking whether Plotinus' One is the creator of the being of the world, or whether the world has the being of the One, as would be the case in pantheism. Now in Plotinus the problem of pantheism cannot be raised in terms of being. Since the One is beyond being, the universe cannot share in the being of the One. To ask whether Plotinus' doctrine is a creationism or a pantheism is to ask a doctrine which depends on the relation of the One to the many to solve problems bound up with the relation of Being to beings. We can be sure beforehand that discussions of this kind will never produce a conclusion. On the other hand—and this third observation has its importance—no matter what relation exists between many things and the One, Intelligence depends on the One in exactly the same sense as everything else. Since it is the highest term in the order of the many, it forms part of that order. Except for differences of rank based on their degree of proximity to the One, all intelligible beings following Intelligence belong to the same order as it does and they have every right to be there. Intelligence is knowledge, being and god; they too are knowledges, beings and gods. If the problem of pantheism were to arise anywhere in Plotinus it would be here: not between the One and the world, but between Intelligence, the highest being and highest god, and the other beings or gods flowing from it. But even then the two world systems would still be incommensurable. The problem of

the mutual relations between a plurality of gods, all of them contained in the order of the many, has no connection with the problem of the relations between a multiplicity of beings, each of which is not a god, and Being which alone is God.

Augustine could not attempt the transformation which was the source of his view of creation without becoming involved in these difficulties to some extent. In the proper sense of the word, "creation" signifies the act whereby God produces existences without the help of any other cause. This notion, existential to the very core, can find its full meaning only in a metaphysics in which God, the first principle of the universe, is also Being in the absolute sense of the word. This is the metaphysics born of the Old Testament. Yahweh does not say merely: "I am," but also: "Let there be light"; and there was light. The free giving of being by Being, this is creation. In his effort to explain this notion with the help of Plotinianism, Augustine found it easy enough to do away with the dissociation of the One and Being brought about by Plotinus. This was simply a matter of theological adjustment in the notion of God, an adjustment which was easy to make owing to the recent definition of the dogma of the Trinity made by the Council of Nicea. But it was a much more difficult task to do away with the identification of God and Being with the eternal and unchangeable suggested by Platonism, and this was, as we have seen, what he hesitated to do. In the final analysis, this is the source of the ambiguities which have rightly been pointed out in his doctrine of creation. Of course Augustine knew very well that creation signifies the giving of being by Being, but since for him Being is reduced to *essentia*, in his doctrine creation naturally tends to be reduced to a relation between that which "truly is" and that which does not truly deserve the name "being," i.e. to a relation between the immutable and the changeable, the eternal and the temporal, the same and the other, the one and the many. Of their metaphysical essence itself, these relations belong to the order of the participation of beings in their essences. They were already precisely this in Plato; they remained so in Plotinus, and Augustine experienced the utmost difficulty in making relations of existence out of relations which had been correctly conceived for the purpose of binding essences to one another. In short, Augustine undertook an undoubtedly impossible task, namely that of explaining creation in terms of participation.

This fact would be incomprehensible in a Father of the Church as great as Augustine were it not for the fact that the very impeccability of his theology entitled him to make the attempt without any fear for the integrity of his dogma. His theology of creation is as irreproach-

able as his theology of the Trinity. With scrupulous regard for the data of revelation, whose existential character is so striking, Augustine conceives creation as the personal work of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. By deliberate decree this God produced the world *ex nihilo* without any pre-existent matter. Consequently the world is not eternal, because it had a beginning, if not in time, then at least along with time. Creation did not occur in history, it is the beginning of history. The fact that the beginning of the world is an *occurrence* is brought home with striking clearness to anyone who is faithful to this tradition. Something which did not exist suddenly appears, and it is this the St. Augustine of the *Confessions* puts into words, as well as this can be done: "How, O God, did you make heaven and earth? . . . You did not create the universe in the universe, for there was no place wherein to make it before it was made to be. Nor did you hold anything in your hand wherewith to make heaven and earth. For whence could you have what you had not made wherewith to make anything? Indeed, what is there, except because you *are*?"¹⁹ And again: "It was you, then, O Lord, who made heaven and earth; . . . you who *are*, because they *are*."²⁰

It would be impossible to put it better, but the difficulties appear when as a philosopher Augustine strives to understand his faith. Moses set all this down in writing and what Moses says Truth itself says, but once it was written Moses left without explaining anything. Here as in the case of understanding the verb *sum* (I am), our only recourse is to implore Truth to give us the power to understand what it has given its servant Moses the power to speak.²¹ But how are we to know who is speaking now that Truth no longer speaks through the mouth of a prophet? Here again, it would appear, Augustine questions Truth, but it is Plato who answers, becoming Christian only to the extent needed to allow Augustine to Platonize henceforth in comfort.

When Truth is consulted on the meaning of Moses' words, it tells reason first of all that God *created* heaven and earth *together at one and the same moment*, i.e. matter and the forms that determine it, differentiate it in things, and embellish it. By this is eliminated, first the picture of an immutable God who spent six days creating the world, as though He were Himself in time, and next eternal matter, which was conceived as something not created and needed by Plato's Demiurge for the formation of the world. But what is this matter which God creates? It is, Augustine tells us, something formless and chaotic: the fluid, boundless *waters* over which the Spirit moved, as Scripture says, or else the *deep*, or the *invisible and shapeless earth* which no definite form can distinguish and grasp.²² The idea that this matter

cannot be created by God apart from any form does not belong to Augustine's doctrine, but a point which does reveal his latent Platonism is his answer to the question: Did God create being when He created matter? In an existential ontology the reply could only be yes or no. In an existential ontology that is Christian the answer could only be, yes: matter exists because it is created by God. But in an essential ontology the reply is neither yes nor no. Since being is nothing more than a function of essentiality, its value becomes variable, and since matter appears as the principle or substratum of mutability, its index of being is naturally the lowest possible. We shall not say, then, that it is nothing: because it is created, God created something in creating it; we shall describe it as "something that is nothing" (*nihil aliquid*), or as an "is is not" (*est non est*), or if we are prepared to follow where logic leads, we shall say that when deprived of any form and taken in itself, it is nothing but a nothing. In short, Augustine is here heir to all the difficulties inherent in the Platonic view of matter conceived as a quasi non-being, but he adds to them this difficulty of Christian origin which makes them even more formidable: since the creative act causes being and since matter is created, then in spite of everything this quasi non-being *exists*.

If the act which creates being does not, strictly speaking, have to do with matter, does it have to do with form? Augustine prefers to put it differently by saying that both are created together *ex nihilo*, matter representing that *from which* creation is made, their synthesis constituting *that which* was made. It is a subtle point to understand properly and it has been explained in various ways. The Platonic stamp of the doctrine is so obvious that we might be tempted to reduce the Augustinian notion of creation to the Platonic notion of participation. No doubt that would be going too far. As a commentator on Genesis, Augustine never fails to recall that everything that exists and is not God began to be when it did not exist before. This is the reason why a thing composed of matter and form, i.e. a creature, is in his view a *concreatum*²³ whose entire being has God as its cause. Augustine's Platonism has in no way weakened or limited the comprehensive character of the creative act in his mind, but we find it at work again in the notion he has formed of the effect of that act. Although his God is the Christian God who creates being, He is a God supremely being, in the Platonic sense of the term, who creates being, in the Platonic sense of the term. After all, nothing is more natural. Since creation is the giving of being, Augustine could only understand it in terms of his conception of being. Hence, his creative God is He who "is what He is," the first cause of "what beings are."

Thus, it is easier to understand why Augustine, when he wants to define creatures as such (*creata*), refers them to a cause which makes them to be "what they are." For him the words *creata* and *facta* are words borrowed from ordinary speech and when he wants to find their technical equivalent his choice falls on the phrase *ex informitate formata*, i.e. "things formed of the unformed."²⁴ The unformed is matter or *that of which* things are made, but beings themselves are *that which* God makes. Therefore, if creating means producing beings, and if the creative act attains its full effect only at the point where it causes being, then creation does indeed consist in conferring upon quasi non-being or matter the permanent and particular mode of existence it can only derive from form. Now what is form but a participation in the eternal rules which are God's ideas? This fixing and stabilizing of matter by form which results in being is uppermost in Augustine's mind whenever he speaks of creation and, after all, we might have expected it. The act proper to a *Deus-Essentia* is to produce *entia* by giving them "existence," in the strict sense Augustine gives to that term, namely "to be what they are."

However it is interpreted, the divine act of creation combines in its indivisible unity the production of two different effects: it makes, and it perfects.²⁵ The act of making consists essentially in giving crude, unformed being, which is merely the simple capacity to receive the form of the ideas; but at the same time that God creates things in their very subsistence, He also creates them in their forms. It goes without saying that these two effects are simultaneous, and it seems equally clear, in spite of everything that has been said about it, that they both fall directly under the influence of the creative act. For if creating is the giving of being to matter which is only *penitus nihil*, with greater reason is it the giving of being to form, for form alone constitutes matter in its completed reality. The only difference in the production of these two effects is that in so far as God makes (*fecit Deus caelum et terram*), He gives being to a matter which tends to nothingness because of its formlessness alone, while in so far as He speaks (*dixit Deus, fiat*), i.e. in so far as He creates as the Word, God impresses, as it were, a movement upon matter whereby it turns towards Him, and this movement in turn is but an imitation of the Word's eternal adherence to the Father. As the Word is the perfect image of the Father by virtue of His complete adherence to Him, so matter becomes an imperfect image of the Word and His ideas²⁶ by turning towards Him. To create, then, means that God, by one and the same act, produces the unformed and calls it back to Himself so as to form it.²⁷

Now, we know that God produced and formed everything simultaneously, but we see that new beings continually appear. How are we to solve this apparent contradiction? To get out of the difficulty, St. Augustine distinguishes two kinds of creatures, namely those fixed in their form in the work of the six days, and those which were created only in germ, so to speak, and had still to develop.²⁸ The following were in finished form from the moment of creation: the angels, who were the work of the first day,²⁹ day itself, the firmament, earth, sea, air and fire, i.e. the four elements, stars,³⁰ and finally man's soul, which was created, as we see, before it was placed in the body.³¹ Only preformed at the time of creation were the primordial seeds of all living things to come,³² whether animal or vegetable,³³ including Adam's body which, through its union with a soul already in finished form, was to constitute the first man.³⁴

When Augustine speaks of the kind of existence those creatures have which were only preformed at the time of creation, he says that they were made "invisibly, potentially, causally, as future things which have not been made are made" (*invisibiliter, potentialiter, causaliter, quomodo fiunt futura non facta*). The technical phrases he uses to designate this kind of existence are *rationes causales* or *rationes seminales*, which are usually translated "seminal reasons."³⁵ Because of these hidden seeds which contain everything future ages are to see unfolded, the world created by God may be said to be pregnant with causes of beings still to come. In one sense, then, the world was created complete and perfect, since none of the things seen in it escaped the creative act; but in another sense the universe was only created in an unfinished state, because everything that was to appear in it later was created only in germ or seminal reason. How may we describe these seminal reasons?³⁶

As to their nature, the seeds or seminal reasons are essentially humid, i.e. they belong to the element, water, one of the four created by God at the beginning. But in addition to this nature, seminal reasons possess a principle of activity and development that is the cause of their fruitfulness. In keeping with his Platonic metaphysics, which Scripture confirms, Augustine looks upon them as numbers which bring with them for development in time the efficacious forces contained in the works God finished before He rested on the seventh day.³⁷ From this point of view, creation was complete from the beginning in this production of things "wherein all things were made together" (*ubi facta sunt omnia simul*), because all the forces which were to show their effects later were already contained in the elements, and the *numbers*, which are the vehicles of these primitive forces in time, add nothing to

the sum-total of being produced by creation. It is true to say, then, as Scripture states, that God rested on the seventh day (Gen. 2, 2) because by then everything had been produced in germ, in moist seeds endowed with efficacious numbers; but it is equally true to say that God is constantly at work (John 5, 17), for even though He creates no longer, He keeps all things in being by His power, rules them by His wisdom and causes the seeds He created to reach the full development He prescribed for them.³⁸

When the Augustinian doctrine of seminal reasons is looked at from this point of view, it plays a role quite different from that sometimes assigned to it. Far from being called upon to explain the appearance of something new, as would be the case with creative evolution, they serve to prove that whatever appears to be new is really not so, and that in spite of appearances, it is still true to say that God "created all things simultaneously" (*creavit omnia simul*). This is the reason why seminal reasons, instead of leading to a transformist hypothesis, are constantly called upon by Augustine to account for the stability of species. The elements from which the seminal reasons are made have their own nature and efficacy, and this is the reason why a grain of wheat produces wheat rather than beans, or a man begets a man and not an animal of another species.³⁹ The seminal reasons are principles of stability rather than of change.

When we examine this conception of the universe more closely, we see that it is perfectly consistent with the basic tendencies of Augustinism. It effectively rules out any suspicion of a creative efficacy in man's activity and in that of other created beings. The farmer directing the flow of water according to his needs, sowing seed and planting slips in the ground, the doctor administering remedies or applying bandages to a wound are both equally incapable of producing new things by creating them. All they do is make use of nature's secret, inner forces (*natura id agit interiore motu nobisque occultissimo*). Hence, no matter what man's causal activity may be, it does no more than apply itself to latent forces from the outside, and it is God who creates from within (*creationem rerum visibilium Deus interius operatur*). Whence results a universe whose characteristic appearance will be jealously safeguarded by the Augustinian tradition. In it, the activity of the creature does little more than put into play and utilize God's creative efficacy. The teaching of St. Paul on the spiritual order can be transferred literally to the material order: ". . . neither he that planteth is anything, nor he that watereth, but God that giveth the increase" (1 Cor. 3, 7). The parents who beget are not anything, but God who fashions the child; the mother carrying the child newly conceived, or

nursing it is not anything, but God who gives growth. It is He who to the present day by His constant operation makes the seminal reasons reveal their numbers and unfold from their inner recesses the visible forms we see.⁴⁰ In Augustinism, the activity of the creature does not draw form out of the passive potency of matter, as secondary causes do in Thomistic Aristotelianism; it simply brings to light the effects implanted by God in the seminal reasons at the moment of creation.

One final service Augustine asks of the doctrine of seminal reasons is that it solve the bothersome problem of man's creation in keeping with the letter of Genesis. According to the definition we have already commented on, man is a rational animal subject to death: in so far as he is rational, he is distinct from the beasts; in so far as he is subject to death, he is distinct from the angels.⁴¹ If then his essence is to be a rational animal, man is neither his body alone, nor his rational soul alone, but a composite of both.⁴² Such a formula would satisfy even the viewpoint of St. Thomas Aquinas, but the same could not be said of the way St. Augustine interprets it, because that interpretation sometimes betrays formulae different from the preceding, e.g. man is a soul using a body.⁴³ Perhaps we have here the source of his indecision on this score.

St. Augustine conceives the soul's nature in the light of our knowledge of its origin. The account in Genesis, however, conceals rather serious difficulties on this point. One moment the Bible says that God made man to His image and likeness and that He created man and woman on the sixth day (Gen. 1, 26-7); and the next moment it says that God formed man from the slime of the earth and took Eve from Adam after He had rested on the seventh day (Gen. 2, 7). Now obviously we cannot say that there were two creations of the same being and we already know that God created everything simultaneously (Eccli. 18, 1). Therefore the two texts of Genesis must refer to two different parts of man, and the second part, although formed after the first, must have been created at the same time. The doctrine of seminal reasons helps Augustine out of this difficulty. He says that Gen. 1, 26-7 refers to the production of the soul, and that Gen. 2, 7 refers to the formation of the human body. According to this interpretation, there is no doubt that the description of man being formed from the slime of the earth and Eve from man's rib refers, not to the creation in which everything was made at once, but rather to the creation that unfolds with the ages and in which God continues to work down to the present time.⁴⁴ Consequently, since the soul was created in its finished form at the beginning, the first creation of man mentioned by the

Bible (Gen. 1, 26-7) would be the creation of the soul in its finished form and of the body in the form of a seminal reason, while the second creation (Gen. 2, 7) would mean that God developed and perfected the seminal reason thus created, thereby bringing Adam's body and that of Eve to their perfected state.⁴⁵

This interpretation of Genesis leads Augustine to a conception of man's soul that will remain characteristic of the Augustinian school throughout the Middle Ages, although he himself proposed it only as a hypothesis. It is because of the mutability of bodies that we speak of corporeal matter, for matter is attributed to bodies only as the subject of their constant change; but the soul too is continually changing. Why, then, should we not attribute matter to it?⁴⁶ Augustine lays down that in order to be matter for the soul, that from which the soul was made must have been different from the soul. We cannot say, for example, that God created an irrational soul and then made it into a rational soul. Such a hypothesis would favor the error of metempsychosis and would be contradictory besides, for just as the earth from which flesh was made was not flesh, so the matter from which the soul was made could not have been soul. To go beyond this and state precisely what it was is quite impossible.⁴⁷ All we can add is that the soul's matter, like that of the angels,⁴⁸ must have been formed by a divine illumination which would clothe it in an intelligible form and thereby confer rationality upon it immediately.⁴⁹

Again and again in the course of his long career St. Augustine asked himself if man's soul was the highest soul created by God or if, over and above it, one would have to admit the existence of a world-soul which would serve God as an instrument in the administration of the universe. Plato thought there was such a soul.⁵⁰ Augustine himself considered it a great and difficult question, one he knew himself incapable of settling either by the authority of Scripture or by the evidence of reason.⁵¹

Chapter III

TRACES OF GOD

The universe whose creation Augustine has just described is organized entirely on the model of the divine ideas. Its entire order, form and productivity come from them, so that the fundamental tie linking the world to God is a relationship of similarity. Let us try to describe this relationship without which the universe would immediately cease to be intelligible and even cease to exist.

To form some notion of it, let us return to the principle of creation. God is Being *par excellence*, so much so that this is the name He gave Himself when He sent Moses to the children of Israel: "I am who am" (Exod. 3, 14). Now the word "essence" signifies precisely the act of existing, for just as *sapientia* is derived from *sapere*, so the term *essentia* is derived from *esse*. We can say, then, that since God is Being *par excellence*, He is the supreme essence and therefore perfect immutability. As for the things He has created and made from nothingness, He has not made them to be what He is Himself. That would be a contradiction. He has, rather, given them more or less being and in doing so has arranged the natures of their essences in varying degrees (*aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus; atque ita, naturas essentialium gradibus ordinavit*).¹ Therefore, the inequality and the hierarchical arrangement of essences is based on the inequality of their possible participation in Being, and each essence is represented by one of God's ideas.

Consequently, everything is what it is because it participates in God's ideas. But to get down to the very root of this relation, we must go beyond it and extend the relation of participation to participation itself. In other words, everything is like God because of the manner in which it imitates the ideas. There is, then, a Chastity-in-itself, and by participating in it all chaste souls are chaste; there is also a Wisdom,

and it is by participating in it that wise souls are made wise; and a Beauty, by sharing in which beautiful things are beautiful. But if all things are what they are because they resemble something else, then there must be a Resemblance and by participating in it all like things are alike. This primary Resemblance is none other than the Word.² Being the perfect imitation of the Father, the Son is the identical representation of the one who begets Him. For even as there is nothing more chaste than Chastity, nothing wiser than Wisdom, nothing more beautiful than Beauty, so too is there nothing more similar than Resemblance itself. That is why the Father's Resemblance is so like the Father that He reproduces the nature of the Father to absolute fullness and perfection.³

The result is that the universe of images in which we live is not only composed of images of one kind or another because of the ideas they represent; it is also composed of images in a wider sense because there exists an Image-in-itself,⁴ a Participation-in-itself which is perfect and in virtue of which everything that exists can participate in God and imitate Him.⁵

Now what is an image? It is essentially an *expressed likeness*. Image, then, is not to be confused with likeness, for it is only one species of likeness. It is true that every image is like the thing of which it is the image, but the reverse is not true, because everything that is like another thing is not its image. An image must be the resemblance between a thing produced and the thing which produces it. In this sense the likeness a man produces of himself in a mirror is truly his image because he produces it,⁶ and for the same reason the Word can rightly be called God's image because the Father begets Him as the perfect likeness of Himself.⁷ This initial relation of God to Himself whereby He is fully expressed in Image-in-itself, i.e. in the Word, is the source and model of every relation which will enable creatures to come to be and to subsist.⁸

How does Resemblance-in-itself impose form on things? This question is beyond the power of human reason to answer, but some idea of it is possible thanks to the principle that likeness in creatures is the substitute for the perfect unity which belongs to God alone. To exist is to be one,⁹ and God alone exists absolutely because He alone is absolutely one. Therefore, in the strictest sense, nothing can exist outside of God since He is Unity itself, but in the Augustinian doctrine likeness plays the role of intermediary between absolute unity, which is God, and pure multiplicity, which in its extreme condition would be identical with nothingness. To be like another thing means to be that thing to some extent, but since it only means to be like that thing, it

also means not to be that thing. Likeness, then, is a middle-term between absolute sameness and absolute otherness, and this is why it makes the existence of created things possible, for even though they are not truly one, they are sufficiently one to exist.

If we take material bodies, for instance, none of them is really one because every body as such is divisible, and yet if there were not some kind of unity in every body, if it were not one to some degree, that body could not exist in any way whatever.¹⁰ Now it is likeness which confers this relative unity on a body. In the first place, a body is the body it is only because of the homogeneity of its constitutive parts. For water to be water, all of its parts must be water, and the same can be said of the other elements. Secondly, in order that a body may be defined as such, it must belong to a certain species and the unity of a species consists only in the likeness of the individuals belonging to it, so that the very notion of "tree" or "animal" has no meaning apart from the likeness trees or animals have in common. Since whatever is true of tree is true of the oak, the beech and all the other species, we may say that the likeness of the individuals is the basis of the relative unity of the species just as the likeness of the parts is the basis of the relative unity of the individual.¹¹ But let us go from the material to the spiritual order. A soul is one only on condition that it remain consistent with itself, i.e. that it regularly display the same powers and perform the same actions. This internal unity corresponds to the likeness of the various parts which constitutes the unity of a body. But the relations between one soul and another are also based on similarities of varying degree and give rise to various spiritual unities. Friendship has no other foundation than similarity of habits¹² and, as we have seen in our study of the city, its unity is due to the fellowship which unites all its members in love of one and the same good. Consequently, no matter what thing we consider, whether material or spiritual, individual or social, it appears as something constituted by numbers, relations, proportions, equalities, or resemblances, and these in turn are merely the creature's attempt to imitate the original relation of likeness whereby God is perfectly equal to Himself, i.e. His essential and indivisible unity.

It is in the Word, then, that we find the source of unity and of being, but the source of the beautiful can be found there as well. Whenever an image matches the thing whose image it is, it brings about a perfect correspondence, symmetry, equality and likeness to it: there is no difference between model and image, hence no lack of harmony, no inequality; the copy corresponds identically in every particular to the original, and this is the source of its beauty and the

reason why it is given the name "form" (*species*).¹³ Now this original beauty based on resemblance reappears in every participated beauty, for the more the parts of a body resemble one another, the more beautiful the body.¹⁴ In general, then, it is order, harmony, proportion, i.e. the unity produced by likeness, that causes beauty.¹⁵

The truth of this statement may be seen first in the order of physical bodies. Harmony and proportion are only particular examples of similarity because things are harmonious and proportioned to the extent that the arrangement of their constitutive elements reveals relationships of identity or kinship between them. Thus, every tree germinates, grows, blossoms and bears fruit according to a certain order and rhythm; every living thing is composed of harmonious parts and the balance between these ensures its unity and beauty; the whole universe itself is beautiful only because it is composed of things each of which is what it is because of the similarity of its parts, and all of which are alike in the relation they all have to creative unity.¹⁶

If we go from the order of nature to that of art, the relation of likeness to beauty is even clearer. If we ask a workman who is building an arch why he must make one side the same as the other, he will likely say that the corresponding parts of the structure must be the same. If we press him further and ask why he wants them the same, his answer will be that it must be so because that is beautiful, nor will he want to hear anything more about it, because he is a man who judges only with his eyes without asking why his eyes judge as they do. But if we put the same question to a man who can contemplate the intelligible, he too will say that it must be so if the arch is to be beautiful, but he will add that its beauty is due to the fact that its parts are alike and therefore arranged and grouped in a certain unity. It is a unity very far removed from true unity, but it is a real unity nonetheless, because it is based on the similarity which confers on bodies whatever unity they can receive.¹⁷

What is true of being and beauty in nature and art is no less true of truth. In every being, even in bodies, there is a kind of truth and falsity; or perhaps it would be more correct to say that things exist in virtue of a certain truth that is essential to them, so that everything that is true is true only because it exists, and, inversely, whatever exists only exists because it is true.¹⁸ Now things only exist through God and in so far as they are images of God's ideas. They may be said to exist, then, to the extent that they realize the Unity which is their principle, and whose likeness they strive to express within themselves. Just as the image that has been completely successful in copying its principle is both Being and Truth, so images that do not succeed in copying it

lack being and truth to the precise degree that they fail to do so. All we can say of them is that they resemble it to the extent that they exist and that to this extent also they are true. In this sense the Word of God may be called the form of everything that exists since, in virtue of His perfect likeness to the Father, He confers on everything its being, unity, beauty and truth.¹⁹

Thus, the Augustinian universe derives its metaphysical structure from a complex participation in the nature of divine being, a participation which is based on the transcendental relations of the divine Persons to one another. God is Being and consequently the Good. By expressing Himself in Himself He is the One, Beauty and Truth, the universal source of every participated perfection. In one sense, then, i.e. in the order of being, there is nothing in the universe nor in any of its characteristics that does not find its sufficient reason and final explanation in God, but in another sense, since the work of God can be explained only by God, it becomes in turn the means of knowing Him. If the universe is but an image, that image should enable us to divine to some extent the nature of its author. This is why we should go from the work to the workman and try to discover in nature the traces or footprints He has left there to guide us back to Him and to have us share in His beatitude.

God is triune. The fact is often stressed, and with good reason, that for Augustine this does not mean a characteristic added over and above that of divinity: God is not God and one in three Persons besides. It is His divine nature itself to be triune.²⁰ In these circumstances, if there are traces of God in nature, they should bear witness to His Trinity no less than to His Unity. From what has been said above, we see at once that St. Augustine is not without the means for discovering such traces. The complexity of the metaphysical structure of beings which corresponds to and expresses the inner complexity of God's relations to Himself, enables him to establish various trinity-relations between the world and its author, and Augustinians throughout the Middle Ages will devote themselves to collecting and even multiplying these.²¹ No matter what these comparisons may be, they all suffer from their inability to express the unity of the three terms without excluding their multiplicity, or vice versa. This is the reason why St. Augustine prefers analogies borrowed from the realm of knowledge and in particular from sensation.

The sensible order belongs only to the "outer man," and for this reason we cannot find there an *image* of God,²² properly speaking, but only a *trace* of Him, i.e. a likeness which is remote and vague but at the same time easier to grasp because of its sensible character (*et si non*

expressiorem, tamen fortassis ad dignoscendum faciliorem). Any of the five senses would serve to illustrate this point, but we shall limit ourselves to sight, the noblest of them all, because it is nearest to intellectual knowledge.²³

When we look at an object, it is easy to distinguish these three terms: the thing seen, a stone or a flame for instance; the sight of that thing, i.e. the form impressed by the object on the organ of sight;²⁴ and finally the mind's attention, which keeps the sight fastened on the object as long as the perception lasts. These three things are obviously distinct: the visible, material body taken in itself is one thing; the form it impresses on the sense organ is another; and finally, the mind's attention differs both from the unseeing body we see and the sense organ that sees it because this attention belongs to the mind alone. At the same time there is a kind of generation of vision by the object, for if there were no action exercised on the sense by the object, there would be no vision. Here then we have an example of three terms at once distinct and yet closely linked, so closely in fact that at least two of them are scarcely distinguishable.²⁵ These are the first trace of the Trinity.²⁶

Even after the sense object is removed, its image is still present to the memory and the will can turn to it again whenever it likes to enjoy and contemplate it. Here we have a second trinity, another trace of God in the outer man: the recollection, the inner vision of that recollection, and the will which links them. In the first trinity, two of the three terms belonged to different substances: sensible body is a material substance utterly foreign to the order of mind, vision already belongs to the order of the soul because it presupposes an organ animated by an inner power, and the will belongs entirely to the purely spiritual order, i.e. to mind in the proper sense of the word. In the second trinity, however, the operation is like a cycle completed entirely within the soul itself. Of course the recollection originates outside because it is the recollection of a sensation or of images made up of recollections of sensations, but once the image is acquired, the will has but to focus the attention of the soul upon it to cause knowledge and to have it last as long as it wants it to last.²⁷

Thus, if we begin with corporeal form (*species*) and end with that contemplated by pure thought, we find four forms or species in all which spring one from the other, from first to last. The form of a body seen gives rise to the form in the eye that sees it; this second form causes that in the memory; and finally, from the form in the memory is produced the form which the mind contemplates.²⁸ On three occasions the will links, so to speak, the producing species with the species

it produces. The first time, it joins the form of the sensible body to the form produced in the sense; the second time, it joins the form produced in the sense to that produced in the memory; and the third time, it unites the form in the memory with the form produced in the mind's intuition. Only the first and last of these three trinities produce knowledge, and this is the reason why only they are retained as vestiges of the Trinity. In all three, however, the will intervenes to join the producing form with the form produced, and this puts us in mind at once of the sensible resemblance to the divine relations.

The material object impressing its form on the sense may be compared to the Father; the form it impresses on the sense may be compared to the Son; and finally, the will uniting object to sense may be likened to the Holy Ghost. Let us hasten to add, however, that such a comparison is far from valid in every detail. The Father is sufficient of Himself to beget the Son, while here the object is not sufficient to produce a form without the presence and coöperation of the sense in which the form is produced. Hence, the object cannot truly be called father, nor can the form really be said to be produced because a third term is still required for its production. The same is true of the will. In the divine Trinity the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from the Father and Son, but in sensation or in the recollection of an image the will is prior to the object, to the form it produces, and to the recollection we retain of it. Even before we see a thing we have a will capable of causing the sensation by applying the sense to that thing. Hence, the will precedes the other two terms, it does not proceed from them.²⁹ But to see profounder analogies we must go from the outer to the inner man; look beyond the footprints and find the images of the Creator within ourselves.

Chapter IV

THE IMAGE OF GOD

Augustine is under no illusions about the extent of our knowledge with reference to the divine nature. When the soul has tried to grasp God, it becomes aware of how much it does *not* know about Him.¹ He is even fond of saying that silence is the best way of honoring Him.² Nevertheless, Augustine did his utmost to reach the object of his faith through understanding, and the results he obtained exercised a profound influence on mediaeval thought.³

There is no definition of God because He is Being itself and removed from every kind of determination (*Deum nihil aliud dicam esse, nisi idipsum esse*).⁴ To put his ideas on this important point in precise terms, Augustine formulated a doctrine which was to remain the permanent possession of Christian philosophy and theology. He says that God is what He has (*quae habet haec et est, et ea omnia unus est*).⁵ Although the creature has a certain number of perfections, it does not have them in such a way as to make it impossible for it not to have them. It *has* each of its perfections but it is not its perfections. This is why all of man's attributes are distinct from his substance and therefore distinct from one another. On the other hand, since God is absolute being, He is neither wise nor strong nor just: rather, wisdom, fortitude and justice are God because in Him they are one with His very being.⁶ God does not have His attributes; He is His attributes. Under these conditions, how could we form a satisfactory concept of Him? We can only think of Him by distinguishing Him from His perfections and attributing them to Him.

Man would be condemned to utter silence on the subject of the divine nature if we did not know that, through the Likeness-in-itself which is the Word, everything bears the stamp of the source whence

it has received its being. Hence, the only way left open to man to rise to a knowledge of God is through an examination of His effects.

To walk this path in safety we must avoid two opposing errors which threaten the mind: the first is the idea that nothing we know of things can be affirmed of God in any sense whatever; and the second is the idea that what we know of things can be affirmed of God in the same sense as it is affirmed of things. Actually, the distance between Creator and creature is immeasurable and yet it is of some advantage to use words proper to creatures when we speak of their Creator. However, we can only do so after taking certain precautions and at the expense of considerable mental effort. Let us suppose, for example, that we strip human knowledge of its mutability, i.e. do away with the various transitions from one knowledge to another which occur whenever we try to remember and think of something we were not thinking of a moment before; and let us leave human knowledge in permanent possession of only one certain and invincible truth which would embrace everything in a single eternal contemplation. Or rather, let us not say that we leave it in permanent possession of this because human knowledge does not admit of any such thing, but if we try to imagine this as best we can we shall have some vague idea of divine knowledge, for even though it is as different from ours as it possibly can be it is at least enough like ours to have the same name. Both have this much in common at least, that they are not unaware: we can rightly say of both that what they know does not escape them and that to this extent they are both knowledge (*ad non latere quoquo modo pertinet communicatio ipsa vocabuli*).⁷

What we have done with human knowledge could be done with other human acts as well, even with the passions. If I eliminate the agitation which accompanies anger and retain only its avenging power, I can get an approximate idea of what is called God's anger. So too of mercy: if we remove the compassion which makes us suffer from the misery we pity, there is left only the untroubled kindness of one who knows the misfortunes of others and wishes to remedy them. So no matter what human operation we begin with, if we remove those elements which arise from our weakness and ignorance and retain only the perfection involved, we get a word whose meaning can be applied legitimately to God.⁸

God is inaccessible to the mind when considered in the unity of His nature but He is even more so—if that is possible—when considered in His Trinity. Yet even here we are justified in trying to know Him through His creatures. Scripture even invites us to do so, for God says in the Bible: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gen. 1,

26). Now we have seen that an image is an expressed likeness. Why, then, should we not look for the image of the creative Trinity in the creature called man?

Actually, there is nothing in nature that does not bear some resemblance to the Trinity and that may not, as a result, help us to get some idea of it. In its proper sense, however, the distinction of being an image belongs only to man,⁹ and in man it belongs by right only to his soul, and in his soul it belongs by right only to the mind (*mens*), for this is his highest part and the one nearest to God.¹⁰

Now it remains to be seen how this image is expressed in the mind. As he looks for analogies to help him sound this mystery, Augustine hesitates between several possible images of God in man. In the main, three held his attention: *mens*, *notitia*, *amor* is the first; *memoria sui*, *intelligentia*, *voluntas* the second; *memoria Dei*, *intelligentia*, *amor* the third.¹¹ They all have the following things in common: first, they are all found in the *mens* or the spiritual eye of the soul;¹² secondly, in making man an image of God they do not introduce an accidental but an essential quality into his mind, for since man has been created *ad imaginem*, his divine likeness is inscribed upon his being as an inalienable property. The image of God can be deformed within us by sin and may have to be re-formed there by grace, but it cannot be lost; it is not necessarily an actual participation of God by the soul but the ever-present possibility of this participation.¹³ Finally, the consubstantiality, at least the relative consubstantiality, of the elements constituting these created trinities enables us to obtain some idea of the real consubstantiality of the three Persons in the Trinity. This last point will have a profound influence on Augustinian psychology in the Middle Ages. The constant refusal to admit any real distinction between the soul and its faculties or between the faculties themselves is noticeable throughout the whole history of this school and can be traced to a desire to preserve enough unity in the soul to guarantee that, in spite of the diversity of its parts, it will remain for us a recognizable image of the Trinity.¹⁴ Thus, no matter what created trinity Augustine has in view, it must show that there are within the *mens* three terms which are consubstantial in spite of being distinct, and equal to one another in their relations.¹⁵

Every analysis developed by St. Augustine on this score has a historical importance. These analyses were transmitted in succinct form to the Middle Ages by Peter Lombard who gathered them together in his *Books of the Sentences*,¹⁶ and became a required subject of meditation and teaching for every professor of theology. For the modern historian who would recover the authentic meaning of various

doctrines, these analyses are indispensable for the study of St. Augustine's psychology and natural theology. It is tempting, but it would be dangerous to separate the problem of the *mens* from that of the Trinity and apply it to the study of the human soul, for while this kind of transposition would gratify our taste for order and distinctions, it would cut Augustinian psychology off from its theological roots and Augustinian theology from its psychological roots. What the philosopher has joined together let us not sunder artificially.

When I love a thing, my love comprises three terms: myself, the thing I love, and my love itself. I do not love love but rather the object of my love. Let us suppose that I am myself that object. In that case the terms are reduced from three to two, for to say that a man loves himself and that he is loved by himself is to say the same thing twice. Hence, love and the object loved are the only terms left. The object loved is the mind itself, in this case considered as an essence,¹⁷ and love is not yet the act whereby the will loves but rather the mind's natural disposition to desire the enjoyment of itself, a disposition always ready to be realized. We have, then, two terms which are related to each other, but we can add that their relation is one of equality: the mind desires itself wholly, and since its self-love is but a natural affirmation of itself, the thing that loves is exactly equal to the object loved.¹⁸ On the other hand, it is obviously impossible to love oneself without knowing oneself. Therefore the mind cannot love itself without knowing itself, and knowing itself is an easy thing for the mind, because it is incorporeal and therefore essentially intelligible. Now just as the soul's love for itself is exactly equal to the soul, so the knowledge it has of itself is exactly equal to the soul. In this case the thing it loves is neither above it, as is the case with God, nor is it beneath it, as is the case with bodies; it is exactly at its own level. Hence, mind, love and knowledge are three, and these three are one; and these three that are one are equal; and this is a faithful image of the Trinity.¹⁹

The distinctive feature of this first image is that it unfolds entirely within the substance of the *mens* before it appears in acts. The thing which guarantees the substantial unity of the *mens* with its love and knowledge is also the basis for the substantiality of its knowledge and love. If self-love and self-knowledge were in the mind as accidents in a subject, the mind could only know or love itself, but the fact is that it can love and know anything else. Therefore it is not a mind which has a knowledge or a love of itself; it is a mind which is love and knowledge *substantially* and therefore naturally capable of knowing and loving itself pending the time when it will love and know every-

thing else. And vice versa, the love and knowledge the mind has of itself are substances in virtue of their being its substance.²⁰ Their substantiality is born of their consubstantiality, and this is the reason why these three terms constitute a trinity.

This first trinity, then, is presented to us in a state of involution (*tamquam involuta*). The mind may strive to unfold it (*evolvi*), so to speak, within its own substance, but even when unfolded in this way it is still a virtual image. The Trinity of divine Persons is, on the contrary, perfectly actualized, and this is why the second image we are going to examine is clearer than the first.²¹ It does not consist in mind, knowledge and love, but in memory, intelligence and will.

By memory here Augustine means nothing more than the mind's knowledge of itself. Why give it this name? The mind is, as we have seen, substantially inseparable from its self-knowledge, but our actual knowledge (*cogitatio*) does not always have to do with our mind, does not always, so to speak, place it in front of itself and look at it. It often happens that the mind does not see itself even though it is always present to itself. To denote this unperceived presence, we can use the same word we use for recollections or knowledge we have but are not using at the moment. The situation is really the same in both. I know something but I am not thinking about it, so I say it is present in my memory; my mind is always present but I am not thinking of it, so I say that I have a memory of myself. This is also the reason why, when the mind does come to notice itself, it is not said to know itself but to recognize itself.²²

By right, for the mind to recognize itself it should have to do nothing more than become aware of itself and apprehend itself; but in fact and for reasons we have already noted, if it does this it obtains little more than a false appearance, i.e. its own image deformed and materialized by a heavy covering of sensible images. In order to reach itself in its own true nature, it must penetrate this crust of accumulated sensations and discover itself as it really is. Now in its true nature the mind is what the divine model is because it was made in its image, and for this reason the influence of the eternal reasons along with the latent memory the soul has of itself are both needed if it is to discover itself as it is. If that influence is active, then the mind naturally produces a true knowledge of itself. It expresses itself; it says itself, as it were, and the result of this self-expression is what we call a word.

Here then we have an image of the Son's generation by the Father, in the act whereby the mind expresses itself. For as the Father eternally conceives a perfect expression of Himself which is the Word, so the

human mind, made fruitful by the eternal reasons of the Word, produces a true knowledge of itself within itself. This actual expression is obviously distinct from the latent memory of self it expresses, but it does not become detached from it; what becomes separate is only the external word whereby our inner knowledge is externalized in the form of words or other signs. At this point we are at the very root of Augustinian illumination. For if, as we have seen, all true knowledge is of necessity a knowledge in the Word's eternal truths, the very act of conceiving truth is but an image within us of the Word's conception by the Father in the bosom of the Trinity.²³

However, the generation of the word within the mind implies a third element also. Why did the mind want to look for and find itself beneath the covering of sensible images and finally express itself when it was already present to itself? It does so not only because it knows itself, but also because it loves itself. As *memoria* in the second trinity corresponds to *mens* in the first trinity, so *intelligentia* and *voluntas* correspond to *notitia* and *amor*. What we produce we want to have and possess; what we have produced we cling to and delight in. Love, then, is doubly interested in every generation: it causes it and after causing it clings to the thing produced. What is true of every generation is true of that of the inner word whereby the mind expresses itself. The word which love has produced and the mind producing it are finally joined together once more by a spiritual bond that unites them without confusing them and once again this bond is love.²⁴ The word, then, is not only knowledge but a knowledge which is linked inseparably with love (*verbum est igitur . . . cum amore notitia*),²⁵ with the result that a new perfect equality is re-established before our eyes and constitutes a second image of the Trinity.²⁶

It might, perhaps, be asked why love is not considered here as something produced, and what distinguishes it from the expressed word. This is a difficult and obscure question.²⁷ This much, however, is certain: since love is the cause of the word's generation by the mind, it cannot be identical with the expression which results therefrom. On the other hand, this same love which is the cause of the generation embraces the fruit of that generation and takes delight in it. The desire to know becomes a love of knowledge, and since it was prior to knowledge it does not result from it.²⁸ Here then we have another image of the Trinity for there are three terms, not two: memory or the mind's presence to itself, the self-knowledge it expresses, and the love which unites them. These three are one and form but a single substance, because the mind knows itself to the extent that it exists, loves itself to the extent that it exists, and knows itself.

But over and above this second image there is a third, an image which does not merely establish a relation between the soul and itself but between the soul and God.²⁹ This image makes its appearance in the mind when it gives birth to understanding and wisdom through the effort we have described in our study of the search for God through reason and will. If the soul does not make this effort, it can still remember and love itself but its life is folly. If it turns towards the God who made it and thereby becomes aware of its character as a divine image, then remembering itself, expressing itself in a word and loving itself will be the same as recalling God in the way He expresses and loves Himself. By this a wisdom is born in man, a wisdom that is nothing less than a participation in God's Wisdom and that restores the bond between creature and Creator which was broken long ago.³⁰ It is true that God is always with man since His power, light and love continually bestow being, knowledge and life on him; but it is not true that man is always with God because we constantly forget Him even though we have from Him everything we have. To be with Him means precisely to remember Him, to know Him through understanding, and to love Him; it means to renew His image within ourselves, for when it becomes defaced in us it is forgotten so completely that no warning from without can bring it back to life.³¹

These analogies are the only things reason can apprehend clearly as it tries to penetrate the deepest of mysteries. But even after it has given thought to them, it has still to bear in mind the infinite distance separating it from its object. For neither a study of the divine image within us nor even the terms of the dogmatic formulae we use to define the Trinity give us a real understanding of it. Moreover, after devoting the first fourteen books of the *De Trinitate* to probing this mystery, Augustine uses the fifteenth and last book to describe the radical differences between created images and the Trinity which creates them. God's utter simplicity is at the root of all these distinctions. When we speak of life, knowledge, memory or any other perfection, we have in mind the attributes of finite beings like ourselves, while in God every perfection is one with His Being and absolutely identical with each of the three divine Persons. Although we speak as though it were a matter of attributing qualities to God, we are really dealing with His Substance or Essence. The human soul is none of its trinities and the most we can say is that they are *in* it, but the Trinity is not *in* God, it is God.³²

Now what is true of the created images of the Trinity is no less true of the formulae which define it. God is a single substance or, if we wish to translate the Greek *οὐσία* more correctly, a single essence. The

term *essentia* is derived, as we know, from the verb *esse* and agrees therefore with the teaching God gave us when He defined Himself for His servant Moses as Being *par excellence*.⁸³ But this essence is so perfectly simple that it has no accidents: everything attributed to it belongs to it substantially; the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, i.e. there are not three gods but the one essence of a simple God. The same is true if we go from Persons to attributes: the Father is great, the Son is great, the Holy Ghost is great, i.e. there are not three who are great but only one, a single essence, a single greatness. Now this single essence or substance, the Trinity, is comprised of three Persons. The commonly accepted formula is *μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*. Its exact Latin translation, *una essentia, tres substantiae*, does not give a suitable meaning because we cannot properly say: "one essence, three substances." Many Latins have used this formula for want of a better one, but it is preferable to say that God is one essence and three persons (*una essentia vel substantia, tres autem personae*). By this we state clearly that the Father is not the Son, that the Son is not the Father, and that the Holy Ghost is neither the Father nor the Son.⁸⁴ Once the human mind has formulated the truth in this way, it has done almost all it can do. Precisely what these Persons are and how their unity is to be explained are questions no one can answer. If we say God is three Persons and one essence, we do so not to express what He is, but to say something about Him.⁸⁵

Conclusion



AUGUSTINISM

There has been much discussion of St. Augustine's intellectual evolution, perhaps because some have wanted to reduce a man's progress in his search for truth to the mere evolution of an intellect. The historian of ideas is not obliged to take a position on this problem of personal psychology, but it is his duty to point out the significance Augustine himself attached to a history on which his doctrine was, in one form or another, a continuous commentary.

Reduced to its abstract form, Augustine's experience may be said to amount to a discovery of humility. Errors of understanding are bound up with the corruption of the heart through pride,¹ and man only finds the truth which brings happiness by subjecting his intellect to faith and his will to grace, in humility.²

A catechumen from infancy and not yet baptized,³ Augustine was ignorant of the essential dogmas of Christianity.⁴ Even after his formal acceptance of the faith he was still mistaken as to the meaning of the Incarnation⁵ and professed Photinus' heresy without being aware of it.⁶ The early breakdown of his moral life must be added to this religious ignorance as a determining factor in his history. Yet two bright spots remain amid this darkness and chaos: he never ceased to believe that, come what may, Christ was the only way to happiness; and whenever good example was given him, he was always inflamed with a desire to imitate it. These two fundamental traits of character came into play when he read Cicero's *Hortensius*, a work now lost. Since there was a wisdom, and that the highest, he had to have it; but since he could not find it anywhere except in Christ, his reading of Cicero led him to the study of Holy Scripture.⁷ Now what was he to find there?

This first contact between the Bible and the professor of rhetoric was a catastrophe. No other work was as badly written, none further removed from the ideal proclaimed by Cicero. To a reader like Augustine, who interpreted Scripture in a material sense, nothing was more ridiculous than to depict God as a man like ourselves, walking in the garden of Eden and talking to Adam as men talk to one another. Deeply disappointed, he fell in with the Manichaeans.⁸ Surprising as it may seem to us, the seductive influence of this sect on Au-

gustine is confirmed by his own testimony and proves that he was sincere in his efforts to find wisdom in Christ. Mani's disciples always had Christ's name on their lips and appealed to the evidence of the Scriptures,⁹ and this was enough to satisfy Augustine's Christian aspirations; but they also promised an interpretation of Scripture that would satisfy reason and would appeal to faith only to the extent that reason was capable of justifying it, and this satisfied the young reader of the *Hortensius*. As far as he was concerned, the problem was to find a philosophical wisdom in the Scriptures,¹⁰ and this the Manichaeans promised to give him.¹¹

Setting details aside, the fantastic cosmogony elaborated by the Manichaeans¹² amounted to a dualism, based in turn on a radical materialism. Mani taught the existence of two principles of things, both eternal and perpetually in opposition, namely Light and Darkness. Light is identical in essence with God, while Darkness is evil, and the world's history is merely the history of the struggle between these two principles.

This radical dualism owes its consistency to the materialism supporting it. If God is light, he is material. Of course the Manichaeans did say that light is incorporeal, and in a certain sense they did help to turn Augustine away from the material interpretation of the Bible with which he had begun, but this only served to lead him into a much subtler materialism which was all the more difficult to eradicate. Mani's disciples ridiculed a literal interpretation of Scripture which would make God a mere man like ourselves. Since their god was a bright, shining, infinitely subtle substance, he appeared as something "incorporeal," and in a sense, so he was. In Augustine's eyes Manichaeism had the advantage of removing from the Bible the shocking picture of a God who resembled the human body and was equipped with members like ours. However, Mani's "incorporealism" was not a spiritualism¹³ and from the fact that the light was not a body like ours it did not follow that it was not matter. In any case Augustine always understood it in a materialist sense.¹⁴ Not only did he understand the light materially; he materialized everything that was of a luminous nature and was, therefore, to be looked upon as a part of God. Among such things was the soul¹⁵ as well as the representations it contains.¹⁶

In these circumstances, not only did God's spirituality remain utterly incomprehensible to Augustine, but any metaphysical solution to the problem of evil became impossible. If God is material, then *a fortiori* Darkness is material as well; materiality is, so to speak, its very definition. And if the principle of evil is material, then it is necessarily real

and every particular evil sharing in that principle is also real, with the result that on all counts evil always appears as a positive reality whose coexistence with a perfect God becomes difficult to conceive.¹⁷ If he had been free of materialism, Augustine would never have imagined evil as a body and would have been in a position to conceive it simply as the privation of good,¹⁸ but even though Manichaeism was not originally a derivative of materialism, it thrived on the materialism of the sect and its prejudice against anything purely spiritual.

At this point we, along with Augustine, are at the root of all the errors in which he was involved. The root was deeper than Manichaeism, for in a sense the latter was merely its offshoot. This explains why it survived his Manichaeism for a time.¹⁹ The source of the ills he suffered was a kind of basic inability to conceive of a reality that was not corporeal,²⁰ but the source of this inability itself was his unpardonable confidence in a reason vitiated by a corrupt heart. In Augustine's view, Manichaeism broke down because it was inconsistent. It proclaimed itself as a rational explanation of Scripture, and yet a simple comparison with accepted scientific doctrines made it appear utterly unreasonable.²¹ The result of this comparison was his renunciation of Manichaeism and his temporary adherence to Cicero's Academism.²² At that time Augustine saw in Academism nothing more than a universal scepticism²³ tempered, it is true, by two elements which restricted its depth as well as its scope.

We should note first of all that even at the time he despaired of finding truth, Augustine did not compromise on the notion itself of truth. Moreover he recognized the existence of one certain science, namely mathematics, and it was owing to the high regard in which he held its certitude that he despised all other knowledge. A sceptic who does not believe in truth is one thing, a sceptic who is in doubt because he is too exacting about certitude is quite another. What the young Augustine wanted was the possibility of having the certitude of mathematics in the order of metaphysics and physics.²⁴ His scepticism was a dogmatism momentarily discouraged.

The second characteristic of Augustine's Academism was this: in addition to his lofty ideal of certitude, we notice in him an impulse which moves him towards concrete certitudes. He withholds assent but uncertainty is torture (*timens praecipitium et suspendio magis necabar*).²⁵ Far from finding his home in scepticism like Montaigne, Augustine impatiently made his way across it as though it were a bridge between two dogmatisms, and a bridge he was eager to burn behind him.

While this evolution was in progress the radical materialism from

which Augustine suffered maintained its hold on his mind and had its influence upon it. In his view, it was something so evident that one could scarcely dream of doubting it, and yet under the weight of various influences it began to give way.

The first elements in his materialism to give way were those nearest the surface, those we might call his Biblical anthropomorphism. When he was in Milan, already recovered from Manichaeism but without anything to put in its place, he heard St. Ambrose give an allegorical commentary on the Gospel. The bishop of Milan looked for the spirit beneath the letter and beyond the material images (*littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat*),²⁶ and from that moment the anthropomorphisms with which the Manichaeans reproached Catholics vanished like phantoms. For the first time Augustine met a spiritualism which rose up in protest against the letter.²⁷ It was a modest beginning but its effects were soon to multiply.

It was owing to this experience that Augustine noticed for the first time how thoughtless he had been in turning to the Manichaeans. To learn the Church's teaching he had sought information of her worst enemies.²⁸ But even this position was soon left behind. If the Church proposes an interpretation of Scripture superior to that of her enemies then why not examine her claims to authority? Distrust of the enemies of Scripture tempts one to believe its friends, but can one go so far as to have complete confidence in them?

One feels more inclined to do so if his initial experience favors the Church. The main obstacle for Augustine was that the Church lays down faith as a condition for understanding. Now the Manichaeans, promising reason before faith, present their proofs. Under the guise of reason they propose a whole host of absurdities and when they are asked for proof they refer us to the authority of their teachers. Thus, the Manichaean method ends in faith in the absurd so that neither at the beginning nor at the end of the search do we find reason. Of the two courses, that suggested by the Church is the better: she proposes faith at the beginning but at least she does so in order to give us reason later.

Further confirmation may be added to this, because far from being unreasonable, the act of believing is perfectly normal. We make constant use of it in our lives. Not a single man but believes many things he has not seen simply on the word of witnesses he trusts. Is there anything absurd, then, in believing the many witnesses who vouch for the truth of the content of Scripture?²⁹ Then too, how can anyone fail to see that the *de facto* authority of Scripture itself demands explanation? Whatever his idea of God and the extent of his scepticism may

have been, Augustine had never lost faith in the existence of a provident God.³⁰ How, then, could one avoid suspecting that there was a final source of authority? How could anyone help thinking that God willed the authority of Scripture and of the Church which interprets it precisely in order to provide all men with the doctrine of salvation couched in humble language suited to their grasp?³¹ Yet it is not merely for the ignorant and simple that the authority of faith can prove salutary; it is salutary for the wise as well. Since the wise man does not always stay on the level of his wisdom, he is happy to find the support of authority available in his moments of weariness.³² Hence, one can believe before understanding because there are positive reasons for believing. In Catholicism authority does come before reason, but there are reasons for accepting authority; in fact, in one sense, we should never believe anything if we did not first understand that we have to believe it.³³ From this point it was but a short way to taking the last step and bending reason to faith. Augustine finally took the step³⁴ and accepted the doctrine of salvation contained in the Scriptures, guaranteed by the Church's authority and based on Christ, the Son of God.

To maintain, as some have hoped to do, that Augustine was not a Christian at this time³⁵ is to contradict all the texts and, while pretending to be critical, to destroy the historical method itself. To imagine that his conversion was perfect and complete from this moment is to fail completely to recognize its character as Augustine himself has revealed it. In his own eyes it did not consist in an instantaneous act; it was a continuing movement that began with his reading of the *Hortensius*,³⁶ was carried on by his discovery of the spiritual meaning of Scripture and culminated in the act of faith in Christ's Church noted above. He had the faith, he was in the Church, and yet his faith was still unformed, still encumbered with ignorance; and he still had to grasp its content distinctly.³⁷

At this period two obstacles still separated him from a faith no longer "unformed and diverging from doctrinal rules" (*informis et praeter doctrinae normam fluitans*): the first was his unyielding materialism along with the problem of evil of which it made an insoluble enigma;³⁸ the second was the corruption of his own moral life. He was in search, not of a theory alone, but of a practice as well. The wisdom he sought was a rule of life: adhering to it meant practicing it. Now he was impressed by the fact that the lives of Christians like St. Anthony, the hermit, or St. Ambrose translated an evident wisdom into action. Here was detachment from the goods of this world, continence, chastity, the soul's freedom from the body, everything which gave evi-

dence of perfect self-mastery. But Augustine was faced with a dilemma from which he could not free himself. Judging from his own personal experience continence was impossible, but the lives of saints about whom he had read or who were there for him to see showed that it was possible. Consequently, he was not merely a believer who did not have a correct knowledge of the content of his faith, he was also a man who aspired to the Christian life but lacked the power to live it. His final liberation was accomplished in two stages, namely by his contact with Neoplatonism and with St. Paul.

Augustine's introduction to Neoplatonism was brought about by a man filled with appalling pride. He gave him a Latin translation of the books of Plotinus and perhaps of Porphyry as well.³⁹ The effect of this contact was to reveal philosophical spiritualism to him. In these books he found first the doctrine of the divine Word, the creation of the world in the Word and the illumination of men by a divine light which was purely spiritual in nature; but he did not find the Incarnation.⁴⁰ Another acquisition which proved decisive for him was the discovery that, since God is immaterial and immutably subsistent truth, He is Being, and compared with Him changing things do not truly deserve the name "beings." Of such things it can neither be said that they are nor that they are not.⁴¹

A third ray of light for Augustine was the idea that everything is good to the extent that it exists. When the objection is raised that beings are not good because they become corrupt, we forget that they must first be good before they can become corrupt. Evil is the deprivation of being, and if we follow this to its conclusion, the complete deprivation of good would bring about absolute evil and would mean by definition the complete deprivation of being, and this would be nothing. This is to say that evil is only the absence and lack of something. Instead of being an entity, evil is nothing.⁴²

One final conclusion follows from this, a conclusion that freed Augustine of his metaphysical anguish once and for all. Since evil is nothing God cannot be its author. Everything that exists is good to the extent that it exists. What is true of material entities is also true of spiritual entities, and what is true of their substances is true of their acts as well, even of evil acts like sins, because these imply some good in so far as they imply being. As soon as he saw this clearly, Augustine was finally given some respite; his distraction subsided, his soul awakened to the knowledge of God. He saw in God an infinite, spiritual substance, and for the first time his view was not that of the flesh but of the spirit.⁴³

In its essential features, this was the discovery Neoplatonism brought

him. Its importance cannot be exaggerated, provided we do not reduce his conversion to that discovery. In his view, it meant a purification and spiritualization of his Christianity. After Plotinus had made him attentive, he entered into himself and with God's help discovered the spiritual and immaterial nature of the Light of which St. John speaks. In short, Plotinus enabled him to grasp the spiritual nature of the Christian God and the unreal nature of evil. That this vision was indissolubly philosophical and religious is incontestable. He discovered the purely spiritual nature of the Christian God whom he had already accepted through faith.⁴⁴ We have here a philosophical vision combined with a religious experience and the two cannot be separated without falsifying arbitrarily the testimony of Augustine himself.

No matter which account of these events we follow, whether that given in the *Contra Academicos* or that of the *Confessions*, we see that the effect, surprising as it seems to us, was to lead Augustine to read St. Paul.⁴⁵ The hidden reason for this apparently strange combination was that Augustine was confronted by two pieces of evidence: on the one hand, Christ's admirable life in which he believed through the Scriptures as well as the lives of saints who had imitated Him; and on the other, the clear evidence of Plotinus' philosophy which he had just discovered. Now the good and the true cannot contradict each other, therefore Christian doctrine must be in essential agreement with the thought of Plotinus. It was to test this hypothesis that he took up, tremblingly, the Epistles of St. Paul. One final decisive illumination awaited him there, namely the doctrine of sin and redemption through the grace of Jesus Christ.

In Plotinus Augustine had found the whole prologue of St. John's Gospel with the exception of the one essential fact that the Word became flesh and dwelt amongst us. Reading the Neoplatonists enables us to know the truth but it gives no means of attaining it. By becoming flesh the Word came to give men something more than precepts; He gave them an example capable of bringing souls to themselves and leading them to God.⁴⁶ As he read St. Paul he found not only the harmony between the good and true that he had hoped to find, but more important still, he saw that all philosophical truth had already been revealed to men by God and made available by a divine authority which made it unnecessary for their feeble reasons to exhaust themselves in long study. In addition he found the basic cause of his own moral impotence. St. Paul's Christianity makes it possible for the Platonism of the mind to become a thing of the heart, for the Platonism of theory to become practice. To say with Plotinus that spirit is distinct from flesh is in no sense to free the spirit from the flesh. Al-

though Augustine might follow Plotinus in his metaphysical flights towards the intelligible, he was certain to fall back again beneath the weight of his carnal habits until St. Paul showed him the law of sin and the need of grace to set him free from it.⁴⁷ Only after this last discovery did he see philosophy in all its grandeur,⁴⁸ but from that moment also philosophy was always to mean wisdom, and wisdom was always to imply the life of grace, the acceptance of those things God grants the humble who receive them and denies the proud who claim to provide them for themselves.

The young Augustine had only performed, for his own satisfaction, the experiment already made by Justin, Minucius Felix and Lactantius, and he had arrived at the same result, namely that the solution to problems raised by reason can be given only by a doctrine which does not appeal to reason. Neither Mani's materialistic dualism nor Cicero's Academism give satisfactory answers; even Plotinus' spiritualism is not a complete answer; the correct, full answer can be given only by St. John and St. Paul. The difference between Augustine and his predecessors lies neither in the problem he raised nor in the solution he provided, but in the intensity with which he lived his problem and the profundity of the solution he elaborated. The root of the evil from which men suffer was the root of the evil from which he had suffered so much himself, namely pride. The desire of finding philosophical truth by reason alone is, when applied to the order of knowledge, a desire to do without God Who directs man's activity in every detail. The galling restraint imposed on reason by its surrender to faith and on the will by its surrender to grace is the very means God uses to call us back to a sense of our dependence on Him (*volens ostendere mihi quam resistas superbis, humilibus autem des gratiam*).

The memory of this telling experience was never to leave Augustine, and the analyses of his thought as we have presented them always reveal the presence of the two essential factors in that experience, namely Plotinus and the Bible. To Plotinus he is indebted for almost all the matter and for the whole technique of his philosophy. He is indebted to the Bible for the basic Christian notions which compelled him to make the inner transformations he performed on the Plotinian theses he borrowed and to construct in this way a new doctrine which represents one of the first, and one of the most original, contributions Christianity has made to enrich the history of philosophy. The question is not whether this was what he set out to do; all we can say is that he did for Plotinus what St. Thomas Aquinas was later to do for Aristotle, i.e. to make, in the light of faith, a rational revision of a great philosophical interpretation of the universe. When-

ever this has been done we see a Christian philosophy appear. Whatever is philosophically new in Augustine's doctrine was born of his effort to transform Plotinus' doctrine of emanation into a doctrine of creation, and this is the reason why the doctrine he elaborates is different from Neoplatonism even when he uses materials borrowed from Plotinus. It transfers all problems to a plane quite foreign to that of Greek philosophy and inaugurates the era of great Christian philosophies which will follow one another without interruption as time goes on.

Now let us make some attempt to determine the essential characteristics of the doctrine which gives expression to this experience and to recapture its spirit.⁴⁹ First of all, this doctrine is obviously quite different from the thing we call "philosophy," in the ordinary sense of that word. To the extent that philosophy is defined as a purely rational and theoretical attempt to solve the most general questions raised by man and the universe, Augustine's doctrine proclaims the insufficiency of philosophy on every page. On the one hand he knows from personal experience that when left to his own resources man is incapable of attaining absolute certitude without which there is neither peace nor happiness. On the other hand he wants to find a rule of life rather than the solution to a problem, but such a rule will be efficacious only on condition that peace is established in the will through the mind's control over the senses and order established in the mind through a system of truths which is secure against relapse into doubt. It is characteristic of Augustinism to find the answer to both of these needs in an order which is above the human. Without Christ the Mediator who became flesh to liberate us from the flesh, without the revelation of Scripture which determines with transcendent authority the body of salutary truths, man can only wander aimlessly at the whim of concupiscence and vacillate between antagonistic systems. Hence, there is no Augustinism without the fundamental postulate that *true philosophy implies an act of adherence to the supernatural order which frees the will from the flesh through grace and the mind from scepticism through revelation.*

On the other hand, it is a persistent fact in the history of philosophy that doctrines wherein Augustine's inspiration predominates do not readily lend themselves to synthetic exposition. Pascal and Malebranche are most unsuited to the linear type of exposition which would do for the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance. It is only right to add, however, that no Augustinian suffered as much as Augustine himself from his native inability to organize his thoughts in this order. The difficulty confronting the Augustinian is that to ex-

plain himself he must begin with something that might just as well have been his conclusion, and to describe any point in his doctrine he has to set forth the whole of it. This is why we are never quite certain whether Augustine is speaking as a theologian or philosopher, whether he is proving God's existence or developing a theory of knowledge, whether the external truths of which he speaks are scientific or moral truths, whether he is explaining a doctrine of sensation or the results of original sin. Everything stands together and holds together, so much so that Augustine cannot lay hold of one link in the chain without drawing the whole chain, and the historian who tries to examine it link by link is in constant danger of putting too much strain upon it and breaking it wherever he sets a provisional limit.

Perhaps the lack of order we find in Augustinism is due merely to the fact that it has an order different from that we expect. Instead of the synthetic, linear order displayed by doctrines which follow the process of the intellect, we find a method of exposition necessarily different because it is suited to a doctrine whose center is grace and charity. If we are dealing not so much with knowledge but with love, then the philosopher's task is not so much to cause knowledge as to cause love. Now in order to arouse love we do not prove, we show. Augustine never tires of doing this. "Jesus Christ and St. Paul," writes Pascal, "follow the order of charity, not that of the intellect, because they wanted to warm rather than instruct. It is the same with St. Augustine. This order consists chiefly in digressions on each point, and these are related to the end in order to show it to us in every case."⁵⁰ In Augustine's works the digression that always seems to break the order of the discourse is really the order itself. Instead of leading us simply to God as to a terminus, he makes use of digression to refer us constantly to Him as to a center to which we must return no matter what route we have taken in leaving Him. If he speaks of material bodies, then things are rhythms, forms, numbers, hence images of intelligible numbers, hence images of God Himself. If he is dealing with knowledge, then the smallest perception implies memory, true judgement, and God who is its norm. If he is dealing with the will, then every movement of the will is a desire, every desire is love, and beyond the particular goods every love has in view, it tends towards the highest Good, which is God. If he speaks of science, then every science aims at wisdom which is the enjoyment of God through love. If he speaks of the social life, then the whole history of humanity is reduced to the history of the heavenly city whose citizens have no other bond than their common love of God. Whatever the problem Augustine raises, he treats it as something he can refer to God in order to show Him to us constantly. While this char-

acteristic is particularly noticeable in Augustine it is always to be found at least to some extent in philosophers who have come under his influence. *Digression is Augustinism's natural method. The natural order of an Augustinian doctrine is to branch out around one center, and this is precisely the order of charity.*

Charity imposes its own order on his doctrine only because it dominates and inspires it. God is its center. Now according to the words of St. John which Augustine never tires of repeating, God is charity and charity means love, i.e. the will's inner weight and very essence. If this is true, in this doctrine the will necessarily becomes the dominant faculty of the human soul for if it turns away from its divine end it cuts the whole man off from it, and if it adheres to it it binds him to it. Objections have been raised at times, and not without reason, against the use of the epithet "voluntarist" in connection with Augustine's doctrine. It is true that no epithet can sum up a philosophy and we may add that given the variety of meanings this particular epithet can have, without some qualification it would be especially unsuited as a description of a doctrine. If we limit its meaning to a "primacy of the will,"⁵¹ or even to a "primacy of love,"⁵² it is certain that even then further specification is needed. In reference to God such expressions have no meaning because He is Being and the perfect simplicity of absolute Being excludes the very possibility of any sort of primacy in any sense of the word. With reference to man they cannot mean that he is more essentially will than intelligence for the simple reason that without intelligence the very notion of will becomes contradictory and impossible. Therefore neither in God nor in man is there a primacy of the will or of love in the order of being.⁵³

But is the same thing true in the order of action in which philosophy is the rule? It is true that even here Augustine is not unmindful of the necessary role of intelligence nor of its pre-eminent dignity. No one challenges this, and yet it is true that the goal of Augustinian philosophy is wisdom and since it identifies wisdom with the beatifying enjoyment of the Sovereign Good through love, the whole doctrine is directed towards an act of will as to its end. Of course without intelligence there is no will, but as the will is, so are the objects of intelligence. In the drama in which we all perform, the will decides everything, for upon it depends the choice that binds us to God or cuts us off from Him forever. This is why St. John's *Deus caritas est* finds an echo in Augustine's words as he tries to find the eternal light: *qui novit veritatem novit eam, et qui novit eam novit aeternitatem; caritas novit eam*. We can also understand why, when he wants to emphasize the fundamental unity of his doctrine in a few lines, he

looks at it not so much from the standpoint of knowledge as from that of charity. Are any propositions or any texts of any philosopher whatever, or any laws of any society whatever in any way comparable to the two precepts on which Christ says the whole law and the prophets depend: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt. 22, 37, 39)? Physics is included here, for the causes of every nature are all in God the Creator. Ethics is there, because life becomes good and upright only on condition that we love what we should as we should, i.e. God and our neighbor. Logic is there, because there is no truth or light for the rational soul except God alone. And finally, there is to be found the well-being of every lawful society, because the firmest foundation and strongest bond of a society, i.e. honesty and enduring harmony, presuppose a love of that universal good which is the supreme and true God and a sincere love for all men in Him, i.e. when they love each other because of Him from Whom no one can conceal the sincerity of his love for Him. It seems then that we should only express Augustine's own mind if we said that *the more a doctrine tends to be built around charity the more Augustinian it is*.

As far as St. Augustine is concerned, placing charity at the center of his doctrine meant not only a promise to give love and grace the upper hand in man; it meant the implicit acceptance of a certain conception of nature and of its relations with the supernatural. His attitude on this point is much more complex than appears at first sight. Augustinism sometimes passes for a doctrine which lessens the autonomy of nature almost to the point of denying its existence for all practical purposes. But surely this was not Augustine's intention. His Manichaean experience had taught him once and for all that a real distinction which rules out any identification of God with nature implies not only a recognition of their separate being but the attribution to creatures of an activity which would be their own. God does not take the place of the creatures He rules; on the contrary He assists them so as to make it possible for them to perform their own operations themselves (*sic itaque administrat omnia quae creavit ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat; quamvis enim nihil esse possint sine ipso, non sunt quod ipse*).⁵⁴ No one was ever to be more unyielding than Augustine on this score. But the difficulty begins when we come to define the nature of these beings and the operations they have in their own right. We could proceed like the metaphysician, i.e. define the content of their essences and deduce therefrom the nature of their operations. There was nothing to prevent Au-

gustine from doing this because he did admit the existence of eternal ideas in God and the conformity of things with their ideas. It may even be said that he often looks upon the universe from this point of view, especially when he is dealing with other things than man. But the moment it becomes a question of man, other considerations take precedence of metaphysics and we see him proceed both as psychologist and as historian. Hand in hand with this change in perspective goes a notable change in method. Instead of describing man, as the metaphysician does, according to what he should be, the historian and psychologist describe him as he is. This is the source of a notion, common in Augustine although surprising to minds accustomed to other methods, namely the notion of nature, not as something made up of inviolable essences, but as something in which things can, within certain limits, continue to exist even though they cease to be what they are.

To understand the reason for this we must remember that Augustine had to reconcile two very different conceptions of the universe, namely the Platonic cosmology with its motionless world of essences, and the Judeo-Christian cosmology with its history of the world and of man. Augustine passes constantly from one perspective to the other, more because he felt that they were fundamentally one than because of any doctrine elaborated expressly for the purpose of uniting them. When he asks what man is in general, he suggests certain abstract definitions of the sort any metaphysician might propose; but when he asks what man is in the concrete as we know him by psychological experience, and especially when he asks what he is himself, Augustine comes down from the level of eternal ideas to the plane of history. It is then that he develops a historical cosmology whose perspectives always lead him to describe how God communicated Himself to nature and man through creation; how, after the order established by that communication was destroyed by sin, a second nature replaced the first; how finally the original order could be restored. In the course of this extensive investigation, one that is constantly being started afresh and deepened, the nature he has before his eyes and the precise object of his inquiry is only the historical remains of a divine order corrupted by sin. Whereas the nature probed by St. Thomas Aquinas is a metaphysically indestructible essence whose intrinsic necessity resists even the corruption of original sin and surrenders to it only the graces removed by it and the powers weakened or vitiated by it, Augustine uses the word "nature" to describe the actual state caused by sin and what there is left in that state to justify man's hope of finding a way out of it.⁵⁵ In our view there is no reason to suppose that, all

things considered, these two attitudes are dogmatically contradictory: Augustine does not close the door to St. Thomas on this central point of any Christian philosophy, he rather makes ready for him and asks him in. But it is also our opinion that it is impossible to defend the thesis that the two expositions are on the same plane. Augustine reduces the world's history to the history of sin and grace because he thinks of the cosmic drama in terms of that enacted within his own soul. In his description of nature and man he is always guided by a personal experience of great importance, namely his own conversion.

If we reduce St. Augustine to his essence alone—and as such he does not belong to any race or age—he is man in his yearning to be self-sufficient and in his inability to do without God. If it is true that his philosophy is, in Windelband's excellent phrase, a "metaphysics of inner experience,"⁵⁶ we should add that the inner experience is precisely the experience of this ambition and its failure. His doctrine is this and, fundamentally, nothing more, but since the obscure forces which gave rise to the struggle it has to tell are to be found in every human heart, it reveals the pride and misery of every one of us. This is the source of its extraordinary individuality and universality. His doctrine is the metaphysics of his own conversion and remains pre-eminently the metaphysics of conversion. We can understand, then, why his psychology of the inner life must necessarily strengthen his basic tendencies as a theologian of history. He had had actual experience of the radical insufficiency of nature and this is the reason for his constant concern to keep within their actual limits the capacity of essences and the efficacy of their operations. There is, then, a latent misunderstanding among those historians who discuss whether Augustine should or should not be classed among the philosophers who "deprive natural things of their own operations."⁵⁷ In principle he does not take away any of their activities, but in fact he does restrict considerably the sphere of activities he regards as possible to them. Although particularly attentive to the actual insufficiency of nature to satisfy the desire for things divine which God has placed within it, he in no wise confuses it with the supernatural. On the contrary he underscores its congenital and acquired deficiencies because only a clear awareness of these can give us a true sense of our helplessness and revive in us a salutary feeling of the need for God. Hence, *when there are two equally possible solutions to one and the same problem, an Augustinian doctrine will incline spontaneously towards that which concedes less to nature and more to God.*⁵⁸

This is, in our opinion, the spirit of Augustinism, the common inspiration which unites into one family doctrines like those of St.

Anselm, St. Bonaventure, or Malebranche, in spite of differences or even internal disagreements which would be easy to point out. Against this conception of Augustinism age-old objections have made a united stand and by doing so bear testimony in their own way to its unity and originality. The fundamental objection raised against it is that it is at variance with the notion of philosophy, even Christian philosophy. By philosophy is meant a purely rational inquiry, i.e. an inquiry based on principles which belong to reason alone while, according to our description of it, Augustinism requires that reason begin with revelation. In so far as it expresses the basic tendencies of the doctrine, the famous *credo ut intelligam* exhibits this fundamental confusion because it offers as a philosophical method what is pre-eminently the method of theology. It is theology which usually begins with the data of revelation and examines their content with the aid of reason, and in doing so it consciously agrees to place itself on a level different from that of the philosopher and not to confuse his work with its own. Augustine's doctrine, vitiated as it is by this initial mingling of the sciences, is disqualified as philosophy once and for all. In short, the very notion "Augustinian philosophy" would imply a contradiction.⁵⁹

However great the authority of these objectors, it may be that their objections are based on certain confusions. In the first place, Augustine cannot be numbered indiscriminately among the advocates of a *philosophia ancilla theologiae* for the simple reason that he never imagined a philosophy apart from a theology and consequently could have had no idea, at least in this sense, of making one the servant of the other. That the philosophy of the Greeks should serve Christian wisdom is perfectly natural precisely because Greek philosophy is not true philosophy, but as it undergoes self-criticism, self-correction and self-refinement and fits more perfectly into the doctrine of salvation, it ceases to exist apart as a distinct discipline and blends into the unity of Christian wisdom. But if so, someone will say, it is true that in Augustinism philosophy as such enjoys no autonomy whatever and, quite literally, does not exist.

This conclusion is forced on us if we begin with the notion of philosophy as a separate essence and then try to find what place it would have in Augustine's doctrine. It would have no place there, of course. There is no reason to look for philosophy in Augustinism because it is everywhere and nowhere. But it refuses to part from revelation, and the certainty it has of being linked with it is its guarantee that it is the true philosophy.⁶⁰ However, we shall be mistaken if we imagine that Augustine bases the truth of his philosophical conclu-

sions on the fact of their being deduced from revelation. Actually, neither in him nor in any Augustinian have we come upon a single idea whose philosophical truth was demonstrated by an appeal to faith. In genuinely Augustinian doctrine faith points out, it does not prove. It is one thing to begin with something revealed, as the theologian does, so as to define it or rationally to deduce its content, and it is quite another to begin with something revealed, as the Augustinian does when he philosophizes, to see whether and to what extent its content coincides with the content of reason. Revelation provides premises for the theologian's proof when he is engaged in argumentation, and Augustine does not deny himself this activity; but for the Christian philosopher in his meditation (and this is what Augustine chose to be at times) revelation simply proposes an object. What is characteristic of the Augustinian method as such is its refusal to blind reason systematically by closing its eyes to anything faith points out. Whence the corresponding ideal of a *Christian philosophy* which is true philosophy to the extent that it is Christian; for while allowing each knowledge its proper order, *the Christian philosopher considers revelation a source of light for his reason.*⁶¹

A second trait which distinguishes the spirit of Augustinian philosophy from that of any other is its continual refusal to separate speculation from action. Not that we can speak of any primacy of action in Augustinism.⁶² Quite the contrary. We have seen that Augustine expressly subordinates action to contemplation. The truth is that since the whole man is to share in beatitude the whole man should engage in the search for it. The whole of Augustinism is an ascent to God and happy are they who rise to Him in word and thought, but blessed are they whose very life and actions "sing the Canticle of the Steps" (*beati ergo qui factis et moribus cantant canticum graduum*).⁶³ On this score the mark of Augustinism is its refusal to count as "true philosophy" any doctrine which shows what must be done but fails to provide the power to do it. For this reason Christian wisdom alone deserves the name "philosophy" because it alone makes it possible to translate the vision of contemplation into action. This is the reason why there would always be in Augustine's eyes a fundamental difference and an insuperable gulf between his own doctrine and that of the Greek philosophers, whatever the Plotinian or Platonic sources from which he drew his inspiration. Plotinus sees the truth and longs for it; Porphyry knows that philosophy's task is the liberation of the soul and he bends to it with a will; but neither knows the only way which leads to the goal, namely Jesus Christ, the model and well-spring of humility.⁶⁴ Does such impotent knowledge

deserve the name "philosophy"? Augustine says it does not because it is a contradiction to give the title "wisdom" to systems incapable of making us attain the very thing wisdom aims to give us. Bent entirely upon the possession of beatitude, *Augustinism recognizes as true only that philosophy which is not satisfied to point out the end but provides the means of reaching it.*

If these are genuine characteristics of its spirit, we may say that wherever they are lacking we do not have genuine Augustinism. However, considering the matter only from the metaphysician's point of view, we cannot in fairness limit Augustine's influence to doctrines which follow or perpetuate his spirit. It is a persistent fact in the history of philosophy that the great thinkers give currency to methods and theses which are then used in ways quite contrary to their authors' intentions.⁶⁵ Augustine's doctrine did not escape this law. Although the body of philosophical theses which constitute his system is in intimate dependence upon the spirit which inspires them, it was possible to detach them and make them constituent parts of doctrines with a different spirit.⁶⁶ It would be advisable, therefore, to describe the main ideas that still bear witness to Augustine's influence wherever they are found, even when they are no longer part of his original religious conception.

Since Augustinism is especially concerned to make the creature aware of the limits of his own powers so as to enable him to perform more reliably the act of conversion that is to turn him towards God, it falls heir first of all to the Platonic view of sensible things which, in the philosophical order, corresponds to the condemnation of the flesh in the religious order.⁶⁷ The better to establish this primacy of spirit over matter, Augustine also appeals to everything in the philosophical tradition which can be invoked in support of the soul's basic transcendence over the body. Of course this is a metaphysical thesis, but Augustinian moralism requires it because the whole doctrine tends towards the Sovereign Good, and since the Sovereign Good is the greatest in a series of the greatest goods, it is vital for us to know that the greatest goods belong to the order of the spirit.⁶⁸ From this follows a whole series of closely linked theses which were rarely to be separated in the course of history, but the necessary connection between them was to be nowhere more manifest than in the doctrine of Descartes and of Malebranche.

Since the soul radically transcends the body, it must be impervious to the body. We have suggested calling this "the principle of the innerness of the mind," because the fact alone that nothing enters the Augustinian soul from without gives rise to a whole series of conse-

quences. In the first place, since everything comes to the soul from within, it can receive nothing which is prior to itself with the result that the soul itself is the soul's first object. At the same time, since nothing separates the thinking subject from the object of thought, the Augustinian soul discovers an invincible certitude and a guarantee of the possibility of certitude in general in the very act whereby it apprehends itself. Hence, one of the prime characteristics of metaphysical Augustinianism is that *the certainty with which the soul apprehends itself is the first of all certitudes and the criterion of truth.*

When this consequence is taken literally two others follow immediately. Since nothing enters the soul from without and since nothing comes between the mind and its thought, it must follow that sensation itself comes to the mind from within. Hence, Descartes speaks like an authentic Augustinian when he says that in a sense all our knowledge, even our sensations, are innate.⁶⁹ On the other hand, this position cannot be granted without maintaining at the same time that the evidence every sensation gives for the existence of the soul which produces it is much more immediate than the evidence it gives for the existence of the body which is the occasion of its production by the soul. Here we have a second characteristic of every metaphysical Augustinianism, for in it *the soul is better known than the body.*⁷⁰

And this is not all, for if everything comes to the soul from within, then the ideas of incorporeal realities other than itself must be given it in exactly the same way. Now some of these ideas are difficult to account for if we look for their origin in the soul alone. There is one in particular for which no adequate justification can be found either in things or in the mind which conceives it, namely the idea of God. This idea is identical in kind with the idea of Truth. Hence a philosophy of this sort undertakes in advance to reach God only by passing through the interior of the soul, but far from finding this a restriction it regards it as an invitation to follow the shortest and simplest path. Why, indeed, would the soul, when its nature is spiritual like that of God, try to reach God by passing through bodies, for these are cut off from God by their very materiality? *Propinquior certe nobis est qui fecit quam illa quae facta sunt* (Surely the Maker of things is nearer to us than the things He made). In every Augustinian metaphysics, *the path leading to God must of necessity pass through the mind because God is better known to us than the body.*

The Augustinian doctrine whose spirit and fundamental positions we have described has already had a career extending over fifteen centuries and there is no indication as to when it will end. In reading the various works in which this doctrine is set forth, it is very difficult,


if not impossible, not to feel its vigorous vitality. On the other hand, the fact remains that technicians who practice it often regret the unfinished quality of most of its fundamental positions. Perhaps with a little more practice these philosophers will come to realize that they complain of a characteristic proper to the doctrine itself, for this incompleteness is no less a part of it than the digressive method for which it is criticized. We immediately try to find a system in these writings, i.e. a collection of truths ready-made and linked together in an order that helps us to understand and remember them. What they give us is a method, i.e. the proper order to follow in a long series of efforts which we must make ourselves. As long as this method is treated as a system, it will appear lacunose and deficient on many counts. Not a single idea is defined with thorough metaphysical strictness, not a single technical term keeps the same meaning from beginning to end. There are conjectures and adumbrations everywhere, attempts made again and again and soon abandoned only to appear once more just when we felt they had been forgotten. But if we try to apply this method to the problem of human destiny—and this is what it seeks to solve—everything takes on a different appearance, everything becomes clear. The lacunae become so many fields left open to the free play of our inner development, and we come to understand at last that it is our task and ours alone to fill them.

After a moment's reflection, we see that this attitude is in perfect accord with the fundamental conditions Augustine assigned to all philosophical teaching and inquiry. He lapses into silence too soon for our liking, but he does so merely to allow us to speak, for he has shown that nothing passes from one mind into another. No one ever learns anything. Each man sees the truth common to all only to the extent that it becomes the truth of his own mind. Why should the defender of such a doctrine be occupied in arranging and developing his positions as though their explanations and the endless commentaries that go with them could take the place of the personal effort of those who read them? All he can do is set them on the path of inquiry, show them the attitude they should adopt to discover in the divine light the truths which no one can see for them or in their stead. But there is more. If it is true that I can see the truth only in my own mind, it is even truer that no one can enjoy my own happiness for me. Now it is appropriate that the possession of happiness constitutes wisdom, and philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom. To think that we can give happiness by teaching it is to think that we can give wealth by describing the art of acquiring it. In like manner and for the same reason, philosophy is not the knowledge of what we

must do but rather the power to do it, and this power comes to no man unless he asks for it in humility, receives it through grace and exercises it by the constant and renewed effort of a will freed by grace. It is only on these conditions that man will pass beyond a sterile knowledge of the good to enter into the enjoyment and possession of that good and attain happiness.

But this is also the reason why any introduction to the study of St. Augustine becomes conscious of futility, especially as it draws to a close and becomes fully aware of the task undertaken, for it has done nothing more than to enable others to understand him, but to have others follow him does not rest with man.

Appendix



NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

1 *Confess.* III, 4, 7; *PL* 32, 685. *De Beata Vita* I, 4; *PL* 32, 961.

2 *De Trinitate* X, 5, 7; *PL* 42, 977.

3 *De Moribus Ecclesiae* I, 3, 4; *PL* 32, 1312. *De Trinitate* XIII, 20, 25; *PL* 42, 1034. As this Greek formula passes through Augustinism it receives a new meaning. This natural desire for happiness is an innate instinct in man, one that God has bestowed on him (*De Trinitate* XIII, 8, 11; *PL* 42, 1023) so as to lead him back to Himself; *De Trinitate* XI, 6, 10; *PL* 42, 992.

4 *De Beata Vita* II, 10; *PL* 32, 964-65. Concerning the fact that this treatise probably depends on Cicero's *Hortensius*, see P. Alfarić's remarks, *L'évolution intellectuelle de S. Augustin*, Paris, 1918, p. 429-32.

5 Ergo nullo modo dubitamus, si quis beatus esse statuit, id eum sibi comparare debere quod semper manet, nec ulla saeviente fortuna eripi potest . . . Deus, inquam, vobis aeternus et semper manens videtur? . . . Deum igitur, inquam, qui habet, beatus est. *De Beata Vita* II, 11; *PL* 32, 965.

6 *De Beata Vita* II, 14; *PL* 32, 966.

7 *De Beata Vita* II, 12; *PL* 32, 965-66; also III, 17; *PL* 32, 968.

8 *De Beata Vita* III, 18; *PL* 32, 968-69.

9 *De Beata Vita* III, 19; *PL* 32, 969.

10 *De Beata Vita* III, 22; *PL* 32, 970.

11 *De Beata Vita* IV, 32; *PL* 32, 975.

12 Here, introduced for the first time, we see the fundamental theme of

Christian liberty, a theme which will assume greater and greater importance at the time of the Anti-Pelagian controversy. But even then it will in no way constitute a novelty in his system. In *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 13, 37 it is already delineated in such detail that there can hardly be any further misconception about it: Haec est libertas nostra, cum isti subdimur veritati: et ipse est Deus noster qui nos liberat a morte, id est a conditione peccati. Ipsa enim Veritas, etiam homo cum hominibus loquens, ait credentibus sibi: Si manseritis in verbo meo, vere discipuli mei estis, et cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos (*John* 8, 31-32). Nulla enim re fruitur anima cum libertate, nisi qua fruitur cum securitate. *PL* 32, 1261. For the complete development of this doctrine, see Part II, ch. III *Christian Liberty*.

13 *I Corinthians* 1, 24.

14 *John* 14, 6.

15 *De Beata Vita* IV, 34; *PL* 32, 976.

16 *De Beata Vita* IV, 35; *PL* 32, 976. St. Augustine's mind is pretty well settled on this point from the very first of his works: perfect happiness is not of this world. Therefore, if he has later retracted certain equivocal expressions used in this very treatise, the conclusion cannot be drawn that he has had to change his mind fundamentally: Et quod tempore vitae hujus in solo animo sapientis dixi habitare vitam beatam (*scil.* displicet mihi) . . . , cum perfectam cognitionem Dei, hoc est

qua homini major esse non possit, in futura vita speret Apostolus, quae sola beata vita dicenda est, ubi et corpus incorruptibile atque immortale spiritui suo sine ulla molestia vel reluctatione subdetur. *Retract.* I, 2; *PL* 32, 588. Cf. I, 4, 3; *PL* 32, 590.

17 *De Mor. Eccl.* I, 3, 4; *PL* 32, 1312.

18 *Op. cit.*, I, 3, 5-I, 5, 8; *PL* 32, 1312-14.

19 *Op. cit.*, I, 6, 9; *PL* 32, 1314-15.

20 *Op. cit.*, I, 6, 10; *PL* 32, 1315.

21 F. Cayré, *La contemplation augustinienne*, Paris, 1927, p. 251.

22 This is the sense in which Augustine interprets Plato, and it is especially for having known this truth that he praises him in *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 8; *PL* 41, 233. Moreover, it is well to note the care he takes to depict the acquiring of truth as enjoyment the moment it is a question of truth *beati-fying* and, consequently, of happiness: Num aliam putas esse sapientiam nisi veritatem, in qua cernitur et tenetur summum bonum? *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 2, 26; *PL* 32, 1254. Cf. Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas: *amplectere* illam si potes, et *fruere* illa, et *delectare* in Domino, et dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui; . . . et nos in *amplexu* veritatis beatos esse dubitabimus? . . . et nos negabimus beatos esse, cum *irrigamur pascimurque* veritate? . . . *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 13, 35; *PL* 32, 1260. Immo vero quoniam in veritate cognoscitur et tenetur summum bonum, eaque veritas sapientia est, cernamus in ea, teneamusque summum bonum, *eoque fruamur*. Beatus est quippe qui fruitur summo bono. *Op. cit.* II, 36; *PL* 32, 1260. These are obviously only metaphors. They should not be pressed in

their material meaning. However, they do express the characteristic of possessing truth, and St. Augustine sees the formal element of beatitude as consisting in this.

23 *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 35, 2; *PL* 40, 24. We are not reproducing this text here because it is a rather long and difficult one to break up, but in view of its importance we do invite our reader to make every effort to analyze it.

24 Et quoniam id quod amatur afficiat ex se amantem necesse est, fit ut sic amatum quod aeternum est, aeternitate animum afficiat. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, loc. cit. . . . talis est quisque, qualis ejus dilectio est. Terram diligis? terram eris. Deum diligis? quid dicam, Deus eris. *In Epist. Joh. ad Parth.* II, 2, 14; *PL* 35, 1997. See also that curious text from the *De Trinitate* (XI, 2, 5; *PL* 42, 988) by which St. Francis de Sales was inspired (*Traité de l'amour de Dieu*, Bk. VI, ch. 15).

25 Profound remarks on this point are to be found in the classic work of P. Laberthonnière, *Le réalisme chrétien et l'idéalisme grec*, 4 ed., Paris, n.d.; especially ch. 11, pp. 13-35. The opposition he establishes between Greek intellectualism and Christian thought would be better expressed with certain finer shades of meaning. But as far as the essential points are concerned, it is certainly true of St. Augustine and, to the extent that Augustinism coincides with it, of Christianity itself. Is there any need to add that to our mind that extent is very considerable? Fundamentally, however, we do not think that any philosophical doctrine exhausts the essence of Catholicism, not even St. Augustine's. Moreover, we believe that the essence

of Catholicism is just as perfectly safeguarded in Thomism, although there it is safeguarded in quite another way.

26 On the other hand, knowledge that is not needed for beatitude becomes, for that very reason, relatively indifferent. A person is not required to have any definitive thoughts on such a matter, to take a stand on it. Thus, Augustine's eudemonism may be accompanied by a kind of scepticism regarding any problem for which our future happiness does not demand a definite solution. For example, we do not have to know where the soul came from in order that we may attain future beatitude; it is enough for us to know where it is going. Consequently, Augustine will hold that four different solutions to this problem are possible: see below, pp. 50-51.

27 See below, Part II, ch. I. Cf.: Quae cum ita sint, quid est aliud beate vivere, nisi aeternum aliquid cognoscendo habere? *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 35, 2; *PL* 40, 24. On the necessity for a happiness founded on knowledge: Et ideo non amandum est, quod manenti et fruendi amoris auferri potest. Cujus ergo rei amor amandus est, nisi ejus quae non potest deesse dum amatur? Id autem est, quod nihil est aliud habere quam nosse. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 35, 1; *PL* 40, 24.

28 The two texts are deliberately set side by side by Augustine himself, *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 35, 2; *PL* 40, 24-25.

29 Quantum restat, ut video, ubi beata vita inveniri queat; cum id quod est hominis optimum, et amatur, et habetur. Quid enim est aliud quod dicimus frui, nisi praesto habere quod diligis? Neque quisquam beatus est, qui non fruitur eo quod est hominis optimum; nec quisquam, qui eo fruitur, non est beatus. *De Mor. Eccl.* I, 3, 4; *PL* 32, 1312. Beatus est quippe qui fruitur summo bono. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 13, 36; *PL* 32, 1260. Cf. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 35, 1; *PL* 40, 24.

30 *De Mor. Eccl.* I, 6, 10; *PL* 32, 1315.

31 This is the same conclusion as the "ecstasy of Ostia"; *Confess.* I, 10, 25. This important point has been illuminated in splendid fashion in Fr. Fulbert Cayré's work, *La contemplation augustinienne, Principes de la spiritualité de s. Augustin*, Paris, 1927. See the *Introduction*, especially pp. 1-12.

32 In the same sense, see H. Weinand, *Die Gottesidee, der Grundzug der Weltanschauung des hl. Augustins*, Paderborn, 1910, quoted by Fr. Cayré, *op. cit.*, p. 248 (He defends the same thesis but from an entirely different point of view). We do not believe anyone would dream of contesting such evidence.

CHAPTER II

1 Haec est enim vis verae divinitatis, ut creaturae rationali jam ratione utenti, non omnino ac penitus possit abscondi. *In Joan. Evang.*, 106, 17, 4; *PL* 35, 1910. Cf. *De nullo loco judicat*, qui ubique secretus est, ubique publicus; quem nulli licet, ut est, cog-

noscere, et quem nemo permittitur ignorare. *Enarr. in Ps.* 74, 9; *PL* 36, 952. This formula will be perfected by Hugh of St. Victor in the 12th century and, in its new form, will pass into St. Bonaventure in the 13th. Cf. *Deus enim sic ab initio notitiam sui ab*

homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam quid esset totum poterat comprehendere, ita nunquam quia esset prorsus posset ignorari. H. of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* I, 3, 1; PL 176, 217. Cf. E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, London 1938, pp. 120-121.

2 Si tale hoc hominum genus est, non multos parturimus; quantum videtur occurrere cogitationibus nostris, pauci sunt; et difficile est ut incurramus in hominem qui dicit *in corde suo, non est Deus* (Ps. 13, 1); tamen sic pauci sunt, ut inter multos timendo hoc dicere, in corde suo dicant, quia ore dicere non audent. Non ergo multum est quod jubemur tolerare; vix invenitur: rarum hominum genus est qui dicant *in corde suo, non est Deus*. *Enarr. in Psalm.* 52, 2; PL 36, 613. Insania ista paucorum est. *Sermo* 70, 2, 3; PL 38, 441.

3 *Enarr. in Ps.* 13; PL 36, 141. *Enarr. in Ps.* 52; PL 36, 613.

4 Exceptis enim paucis in quibus natura nimium depravata est, universum genus humanum Deum mundi hujus fatetur auctorem. In hoc ergo quod fecit hunc mundum caelo terraque conspicuum, et antequam imbuerentur in fide Christi, notus omnibus gentibus Deus. *In Joan. Evang.*, 106, 17, 4; PL 35, 1910. See also *Sermo* 126, 2, 3; PL 38, 699. *Enarr. in Ps.* 73, 25; PL 36, 944. *Enarr. in Ps.* 103, 1; PL 37, 1336. These considerations are inspired by St. Paul, *Rom.* 1, 20.

5 *Conf.* VI, 5, 7-8.

6 Illud saltem tibi certum est Deum esse? Etiam hoc non contemplando, sed credendo inconcussum teneo. Si quis ergo illorum insipientium, de quibus scriptum est: *dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus* (Ps. 52, 1), hoc tibi

diceret, nec vellet tecum credere quod credis, sed cognoscere utrum vera crederis; relinqueresne hominem, an aliquo modo, quod inconcussum tenes, persuadendum esse arbitraberis, praesertim si ille non obluctari pervicaciter, sed studiose id vellet agnoscere? *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 2, 5; PL 32, 1242.

7 *Op. cit.*, PL 32, 1242-43.

8 . . . neque quisquam inveniando Deo fit idoneus, nisi antea crediderit quod est postea cogniturus. Quapropter Domini praeceptis obtemperantes, quaeramus instanter. Quod enim hortante ipso quaerimus, eodem ipso demonstrante inveniemus, quantum haec in hac vita, et a nobis talibus inveniri queunt. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 2, 6; PL 32, 1243. The necessity of believing in God's existence (as revealed in the Scriptures) before demonstrating it by reason will be affirmed by St. Anselm and with the same reference (Ps. 13, 1) at the beginning of his famous proof in the *Proslogion*, cap. II; PL 158, 227.

9 The conclusion of a rational proof of God's existence presents that truth as a very meagre bit of knowledge (in comparison with a glimpse of God's existence), but as certain nonetheless. Cf. Est enim Deus, et vere summeque est. Quod jam non solum indubitatum, quantum arbitror, fide retinemus, sed etiam certa, quamvis adhuc tenuissima, forma cognitionis attingimus. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 15, 39; PL 32, 1262.

10 *Evod.* Quanquam haec inconcussa fide teneam, tamen quia cognitione nondum teneo, ita quaeramus quasi omnia incerta sint . . . *August.* Illud saltem tibi certum est, Deum esse. *Evod.* Etiam hoc non contemplando, sed credendo inconcussum teneo. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 1, 5; PL 32, 1242. Quan-

tum memini, trium illarum quaestionum . . . nunc prima versatur, id est, quomodo manifestum fieri possit, quamvis tenacissime firmissimeque credendum sit, Deum esse. *Op. cit.*, II, 5, 11; *PL* 32, 1246.

11 Quare prius abs te quaero, ut de manifestissimis capiamus exordium, utrum tu ipse sis. An tu fortasse metuis, ne in hac interrogatione fallaris, cum utique si non esses, falli omnino non posses? *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 3, 7; *PL* 32, 1243.

12 *Confess.* V, 10, 19.

13 See below, Part I, Ch. II.

14 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 3, 7; *PL* 32, 1243-44. These degrees of being are merely so many degrees of participation in the divine likeness. See *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 51, 1-2; *PL* 40, 32, and Part II, Ch. III.

15 Intelligis ergo et quaedam singulos sensus habere propria, de quibus renuntient, et quaedam quosdam habere communia. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 3, 8; *PL* 32, 1244. The expressions *proper sensibles* and *common sensibles* which we use are not St. Augustine's, but they have been clearly suggested by his text.

16 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 3, 8 and 9; *PL* 32, 1244-46.

17 *Op. cit.*, 10; *PL* 32, 1246.

18 *Op. cit.*, 12; *PL* 32, 1247.

19 *Ibid.*, *PL* 32, 1247.

20 Quare vide, obsecro, utrum aliquid invenire possis, quod sit in natura hominis ratione sublimius. Nihil omnino melius video. *Ibid.*, 13; *PL* 32, 1248.

21 *August.* Quod si aliquid invenire potuerimus, quod non solum esse non

dubites sed etiam ipsa nostra ratione praestantius, dubitabimusne illud quidquid est, Deum dicere? *Evod.* Non continuo, si quid melius quam id quod in mea natura optimum est invenire potuero, Deum esse dixerim. Non enim mihi placet Deum appellare quo mea ratio est inferior, sed quo nullus est superior. *August.* Ista plane . . . sed, quaeso te, si non inveneris esse aliquid supra nostram rationem, nisi quod aeternum atque incommutabile est, dubitabisne hunc Deum dicere? Nam et corpora mutabilia esse cognoscis; et ipsam vitam qua corpus animatur, per affectus varios mutabilitate non carere manifestum est; et ipsa ratio cum modo ad verum pervenire nititur, modo non nititur, et aliquando pervenit, aliquando non pervenit, mutabilis esse profecto convincitur. Quae si nullo adhibito corporis instrumento . . . sed per seipsam cernit aeternum aliquid et incommutabile, simul et seipsam inferiorem, et illum oportet Deum suum esse fateatur. *Evod.* Hunc plane fatebor Deum, quo nihil superius esse constiterit. *August.* Bene habet; nam mihi satis erit ostendere esse aliquid hujusmodi, quod aut fateberis Deum esse, aut si aliquid supra est, eum ipsum Deum esse concedes. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 6, 14; *PL* 32, 1248.

22 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 8, 21; *PL* 32, 1252.

23 Quam ergo verae atque incommutabiles sunt regulae numerorum, quorum rationem atque veritatem incommutabiliter atque communiter omnibus eam cernentibus praesto esse dixisti, tam sunt verae atque incommutabiles regulae sapientiae, de quibus paucis nunc singillatim interrogatus respondisti

esse veras atque manifestas, easque omnibus qui haec intueri valeant, communes ad contemplandum adesse concedis. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 10, 29; *PL* 32, 1257.

24 Omne quod corporeus sensus attingit, quod et sensibile dicitur, sine ulla intermissione temporis commutatur; . . . Quod autem non manet, percipi non potest: illud enim percipitur quod scientia comprehenditur. Comprehendi autem non potest quod sine intermissione mutatur. Non est igitur exspectanda sinceritas veritatis a sensibus corporis. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 9; *PL* 40, 13.

25 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 8, 22; *PL* 32, 1252-35.

26 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 9-10, 27-29; *PL* 32, 1255-57. Also II, 12, 33-34; *PL* 32, 1259; II, 13, 35; *PL* 32, 1260; II, 15, 38; *PL* 32, 1261.

27 Et iudicamus haec (*scil.* corpora) secundum illas interiores regulas veritatis, quas communiter cernimus; de ipsis vero nullo modo quis iudicat. Cum enim dixerit aeterna temporalibus esse potiora, aut septem et tria decem esse, nemo dicit ita esse debuisse, sed tantum ita esse cognoscens, non examinatore corrigit, sed tantum laetatur inventor. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 12, 34; *PL* 32, 1259.

28 Si autem esset aequalis mentibus nostris haec veritas, mutabilis etiam ipsa esset. Mentes enim nostrae aliquando eam plus vident, aliquando minus et ex hoc fatentur se esse mutabiles, cum illa, in se manens nec proficiat cum plus a nobis videtur, nec deficiat cum minus, sed integra et incorrupta, et conversos laetificet lumine, et aversos puniat caecitate. Quid, quod

etiam de ipsis mentibus nostris secundum illam iudicamus, cum de illa nullo modo iudicare possimus? Dicimus enim: minus intelligit quam debet, aut tantum quantum debet intelligit. Tantum autem mens debet intelligere, quantum proprius admoveri atque inhaerere potuerit incommutabili veritati. Quare si nec inferior, nec aequalis est, restat ut sit superior atque excellentior. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 12, 34; *PL* 32, 1259-60. Cf. that classic text II, 14, 38; *PL* 32, 1261-62.

29 Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esset superius. Quam tuam concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse, ut hoc demonstrarem. Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est; si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 15, 39; *PL* 32, 1262. Augustine refers to Plotinus on this point: Dicit ergo ille magnus Platonius, animam rationalem (sive potius intellectualis dicenda sit, ex quo genere etiam immortalium beatorumque animas esse intelligit, quos in caelestibus sedibus habitare non dubitat) non habere supra se naturam nisi Dei, qui fabricatus est mundum, a quo et ipsa facta est. *De Civitate Dei* X, 2; *PL* 41, 279-80. Cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* II, 3, 18; ed. E. Bréhier, pp. 44-45.

30 Promiseram autem, si meministi, me tibi demonstraturum esse aliquid quod sit mente nostra atque ratione sublimius. Ecce tibi est ipsa veritas; amplectere illam si potes, et frui illa, et delectare in Domino. . . . *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 13, 35; *PL* 32, 1260. Cf. *op. cit.*, 37; *PL* 32, 1261 and 15, 39; *PL* 32, 1262.

31 Haec autem lex omnium artium cum sit omnino incommutabilis, mens vero humana cui talem legem videre concessum est, mutabilitatem pati possit erroris, satis apparet supra mentem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur. Nec jam illud ambigendum est, incommutabilem naturam, quae supra rationalem animam sit, Deum esse; et ibi esse primam vitam et primam essentiam, ubi est prima sapientia. *De Vera Religione* XXX, 56-XXXI, 57; *PL* 34, 146-47. Chapters XXIX, 52-XXXI, 58; *PL* 34, 145-48 contain one of the most complete proofs for the existence of God that St. Augustine has left us.

32 Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas; et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcede et teipsum. Sed memento cum te transcendis, ratiocinantem animam te transcendere. Illuc ergo tende, unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur. Quo enim pervenit omnis bonus ratiocinator, nisi ad veritatem, cum ad seipsam veritas non utique ratiocinando perveniat, sed quod ratiocinantes appetunt, ipsa sit? . . . Confitere te non esse quod ipsa est; si quidem se ipsa non quaerit; tu autem ad ipsam quaerendo venisti. . . . *De Vera Religione* XXXIX, 72; *PL* 34, 154.

33 Aut si cernis quae dico, et an vera sint dubitas, cerne saltem utrum te de iis dubitare non dubites; et si certum est te esse dubitantem, quaere unde sit certum: non illic tibi, non omnino solis hujus lumen occurret, sed lumen verum quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. *De Vera Religione* XXXIX, 73; *PL* 34, 154.

34 *De Spiritu et Littera* XII, 19; *PL* 44, 211-12. Cf. the following text, for it shows quite clearly how St. Paul's words find their Augustinian interpretation. Mens itaque humana prius haec quae facta sunt, per sensus corporis experitur, eorumque notitiam pro infirmitatis humanae modulo capit, et deinde quaerit eorum causas, si quo modo possit ad eas pervenire principaliter atque incommutabiliter manentes in Verbo Dei, ac sic invisibilia ejus, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspicere (*Rom.* 1, 20). *De Genesi ad Litt.* IV, 32, 49; *PL* 34, 316-17.

35 We are thinking here particularly of *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 17, 45; *PL* 32, 1265; *De Natura Boni* 19; *PL* 42, 557 and especially, *De Immortalitate Animae* VIII, 14; *PL* 32, 1028. Therefore, it would be incorrect to say with von Hertling (*Augustin*, p. 43) that St. Augustine was unaware of the proof of God as cause of the external world. But it may be said that in its specifically Augustinian form the proof rises to God as the cause of the mind's truth rather than as the cause of the truth of things (see preceding note). On the role of the principle of causality in Augustinian proofs, see Mondadon in *Recherches des sciences religieuses*, (1913), p. 155; and J. Hessen (*Die Begründung der Erkenntnis nach dem hl. Augustinus*, p. 47-51), who discusses the opinions of von Hertling and M. Baumgartner. Concerning the proof for the existence of God through the contingency of the world in Augustine, see van Endert, *Der Gottesbeweis in der patristischen Zeit mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Augustins*, Würzburg, 1869, and J. Hessen in *Phil. Jahrbuch* XXXVII, 12 (1924), p. 186; and by the same author *Augustins*

Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, Berlin, 1931, pp. 123-99; Ch. Boyer, S.J., "La Preuve de Dieu augustinienne" in *Études sur s. Augustin* (Arch. de Phil., VII, 2, 1930), pp. 105-41.

36 See Cl. Baeumker's well-taken remarks in *Witelo* (*Beiträge* III, 12, 1908), p. 288, note 4. This is, moreover, the close tie binding Augustine's doctrine to that of Plotinus. He has read the treatise *On the Three Principal Substances* (Enn. V, 1, especially ch. 1-7); it is quoted in *De Civitate Dei* X, 23; PL 41, 301-02. Plotinus' treatise is also a journey of the soul to God from within, a journey that St. Augustine has been able to refashion into a Christian one, but one in which he has changed none of the Platonic essentials. Plotinus' technique is Augustine's also.

37 The order of an Augustinian proof, starting with a sensible object, is quite apparent in the important text from the *Enarr. in Ps.* 41, 6-8, PL 36, 467-69. This text will be consulted with great benefit, but on account of its length we bring only its chief statements together. Verum tamen audiendo quotidie *ubi est Deus tuus?* quaesivi etiam ego ipse Deum meum, ut si possem, non tantum crederem, sed aliquid et viderem; video enim quae fecerit Deus meus, non autem video ipsum Deum meum qui fecit haec . . . Considerabo terram: facta est terra . . . Magna miracula sunt seminum et gignentium . . . ; caelum suspicio . . . ; haec miror, haec laudo; sed eum qui fecit haec, sitio. Redeo ad meipsum . . . ; invenio me habere corpus et animam . . . discerno animam melius esse aliquid quam corpus . . . Oculi membra sunt carnis, fenestrae sunt mentis . . . Deus

meus qui fecit haec, quae oculis video, non istis oculis est inquirendus. Aliquid etiam per seipsum animus ipse conspiciat . . . Dicatur ergo mihi, quem colorem habeat sapientia . . . Est prorsus (animus); seipsum enim per seipsum videt, et animus ipse, ut norit se videt se . . . Sed numquid aliquid tale Deus ipsius est, qualis est animus? Non quidem videri Deus nisi animo potest, nec tamen ita ut animus videri potest . . . Aliquam quaerit incommutabilem veritatem, sine defectu substantiam. Non est talis ipse animus: deficit, proficit . . . Ista mutabilitas non cadit in Deum . . . Aliquid super animam esse sentio Deum meum . . . Ibi enim domus Dei mei, super animam meam . . . It will be noted that this is an Augustinian interpretation of St. Paul's text, *Rom.* 1, 20. Augustine himself refers to it in two places (PL 36, 467 and 469): *invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicere.*

38 These are Augustine's exact words: "from the outer to the inner and from the lower to the higher," but his method lifts us up from that which is lower in the inner to the higher. Nihil invenimus amplius in homine quam carnem et animam: Totus homo hoc est, spiritus et caro. An forte ipsa anima sibi dicit (*scil.* quando dicit: *lauda, anima mea, Dominum*), et sibi quodam modo imperat, et se exhortatur atque excitat? Quibusdam enim perturbationibus ex quadam sui parte fluitabat; ex quadam vero parte, quam vocant mentem rationalem, illam qua cogitat sapientiam, inhaerens Domino jam et suspirans in illum, animadvertit quasdam suas inferiores partes perturbari motibus saecularibus, et cupiditate quadam terrenorum desideriorum ire in exteriora, relinquere interiorum

Deum; revocat se ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora. *Enarr. in Ps.* 145, 5; *PL* 37, 1887. Cf. that wondrously profound formula concluding this development: consilium sibi ex luce Dei dat ipsa anima per rationalem mentem, unde concipit consilium fixum in aeternitate auctoris sui. (*ibid.*) Cf. *De Trinitate* XIV, 3, 5; *PL* 42, 1039.

39 The dialectic used is that of Plotinus. According to Plotinus the method or art that makes us discover the Good is at the same time an ascent towards it (Plotinus, *Enn.* I, 3; ed. Bréhier, t. 1, p. 62, lines 4-5). Concerning the difference between this conception of dialectic and Aristotle's, see M. de Corte, *Aristote et Plotin*, Paris, 1935, ch. 4, especially pp. 229-32. These are excellent pages and of value for Augustine as well as for Plotinus.

40 Quoquo enim te verteris, vestigiis quibusdam, quae operibus suis impressit, loquitur tibi, et te in exteriora relabentem, ipsis exteriorum formis intro revocat; ut quidquid te delectat in corpore, et per corporeos illicit sensus, videas esse numerosum, et quaeras unde sit, et in teipsum redeas, atque intelligas te id quod attingis sensibus corporis, probare aut improbare non posse nisi apud te habeas quasdam pulchritudinis leges, ad quas referas quaeque pulchra sentis exterius. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 16, 41; *PL* 32, 1263.

41 Things are *nutus*. Vae qui derelinquunt te ducem, et oberrant in vestigiis tuis; qui nutus tuos pro te amant, et obliviscuntur quid innuas, o suavissima lux purgatae mentis sapientia! Non enim cessas innuere nobis quae et quanta sis, et nutus tui sunt omne creaturarum decus. . . . *De Lib. Ar-*

bit. II, 16, 43; *PL* 32, 1264. In connection with texts of this kind, some have spoken of an abridged, poetic form of the Augustinian proofs for the existence of God (G. Grunwald, *Die Geschichte der Gottesbeweise*, p. 8). But perhaps it would be better to say that these elevations of the soul to God as He is contemplated in nature, belong to a moment of Augustinian thought that is not at all the moment of proof properly so-called. Once it has found God, the mind contemplates Him in the things He has made. To say then "In dieser einfachsten Art der Argumentation . . ." (*ibid.*), is to qualify such texts quite improperly, for they presuppose that the demonstration about God is already completed and, in conformity with his method, that faith in His existence has already been acquired. See above, note 8.

42 This mystical formulation of the proof is quite clear in that wonderful account given in *Confessions* IX, 10, 23-26. But it will be noted that even here the proof starts with the sensible world so as to rise to God step by step. *Loc. cit.*, 25.

43 Transcende ergo et animum artificis, ut numerum sempiternum videas; jam tibi sapientia de ipsa interiore sede fulgebit et de ipso secretario veritatis; quae si adhuc languidiorem aspectum tuum reverberat, refer oculum mentis in illam viam, ubi se ostendebat hilariter. Memento sane distulisse te visionem quam fortior saniorque repetas. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 16, 42; *PL* 32, 1264.

44 In this sense the complete proof is the sum-total of the whole dialectical movement including: 1. initial sceptical doubt; 2. refutation of that doubt

by the *Cogito*; 3. discovery of the external world in sensible knowledge and the surpassing of that external world; 4. discovery of the intelligible world through truth and the journey beyond truth to reach God. Thus, it is absolutely correct to compare this proof to a kind of indivisible organism. See van Endert, *Der Gottesbeweis in der patristischen Zeit*, p. 8 ff. This is also the opinion of G. Grunwald when he characterizes the proof as "eine grossartige Induktion . . . , die als Ganzes erfasst werden muss, einen Organismus, dessen Teile, aus dem lebensvollen Zusammenhange gerissen, für sich bedeutungslos wären." *Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter* (Beiträge, VI, 3), p. 6.

45 In *Joan. Evang.* 38, 8, 10; *PL* 35, 1680. For what follows, see E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, New York, 1956, pp. 49-50.

46 *Enarr. in Ps.* 101, 10; *PL* 37, 1311. This text deserves to be read in its entirety.

47 *Sermo* 7, 7; *PL* 38, 66. Cf. Cujus erroris impietate tanto quisque carebit expeditius et facilius, quanto perspicacius intelligere potuerit, quod per angelum dixit Deus, quando Moysen mittebat ad filios Israel: *Ego sum, qui sum* (*Exod.* 3, 14). Cum enim Deus summa essentia sit, hoc est summe sit, et ideo immutabilis sit; rebus quas ex nihilo creavit, esse dedit, sed non summe esse, sicut ipse est; et aliis dedit esse amplius, aliis minus; atque ita naturas essentialium gradibus ordinavit *De Civitate Dei* XII, 2; *PL* 41, 350. Et quis magis est quam ille qui dixit famulo suo Moysi, *Ego sum qui sum*; et, *Dices filiis Israel: QUI EST,*

misit me ad vos (*Exod.* 3, 14)? Sed aliae quae dicuntur essentiae, sive substantiae, capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna, vel quantacumque mutatio; Deo autem aliquid ejusmodi accidere non potest; et ideo sola est incommutabilis substantia vel essentia, qui Deus est, cui profecto ipsum esse, unde essentia nominata est, maxime ac verissime competit. *De Trinitate* V, 2, 3; *PL* 42, 912.

48 Habes etiam librum *De Vera Religione*, quem si recoleres atque perspiceres, numquam tibi videretur ratione cogi Deum esse, vel ratiocinando effici Deum esse debere. Quandoquidem in ratione numerorum, quam certe in usu quotidiano habemus, si dicimus, septem et tria decem esse debent, minus considerate loquimur; non enim decem esse debent, sed decem sunt. *Epist.* 162, 2; *PL* 33, 705. This text refers to *De Vera Religione* 31, 58; *PL* 34, 148.

49 Quid factum est in corde tuo, cum audisses, *Deus*? Quid factum est in corde meo, cum dicerem, *Deus*? Magna et summa quaedam substantia cogitata est, quae transcendat omnem mutabilem creaturam, carnalem et animalem. Et si dicam tibi: Deus commutabilis est, an incommutabilis? respondebis statim: absit ut ego vel credam, vel sentiam commutabilem Deum; incommutabilis est Deus. Anima tua quamvis parva, quamvis forte adhuc carnalis, non mihi potuit respondere nisi incommutabilem Deum. Omnis autem creatura mutabilis. Quomodo ergo potuisti scintillare in illud quod est super omnem creaturam, ut certus mihi responderes incommutabilem Deum? Quid est ergo illud in corde tuo, quando cogitas quamdam substantiam

vivam, perpetuam, omnipotentem, infinitam, ubique praesentem, ubique totam, nusquam inclusam? Quando

ista cogitas, hoc est verbum de Deo in corde tuo. *In Joan. Evang.* 1, 1, 8; *PL* 35, 1383.

NOTES TO PART ONE

CHAPTER I

1 On this question see J. F. Nourrisson, *La philosophie de s. Augustin*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1866, Bk. 1, ch. 1; vol. I, pp. 53-83. And especially F. Cayré, *La contemplation augustinienne*, Paris, 1927, ch. 8, pp. 216-233.

2 Quis enim non videat, prius esse cogitare quam credere? Nullus quippe credit aliquid, nisi prius cogitaverit esse credendum . . . Quamquam et ipsum credere nihil aliud est, quam cum assensione cogitare. Non enim omnis qui cogitat credit, cum ideo cogitent plerique, ne credant; sed cogitat omnis qui credit, et credendo cogitat, et cogitando credit. *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* II, 5; *PL* 44, 962-63.

3 *De Utilitate Credendi* XII, 26; *PL* 42, 84. See also an excellent summary of this doctrine in *De Civitate Dei* XI, 3; *PL* 41, 318.

4 *Epist.* 147, 2, 7; *PL* 33, 599.

5 *Op. cit.* 3, 8; *PL* 33, 600.

6 *Op. cit.* 2, 7; *PL* 33, 599.

7 Si non potes intelligere, crede ut intelligas; praecedit fides, sequitur intellectus. *Sermo* 118, 1; *PL* 38, 672. Ergo noli quaerere intelligere ut credas, sed crede ut intelligas. *In Joan. Evang.* 29, 6; *PL* 35, 1630.

8 *Cont. Acad.* I, 1, 3; *PL* 32, 907.

9 Nulli autem dubium est gemino pondere nos impelli ad discendum,

auctoritatis atque rationis. Mihi autem certum est nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere; non enim reperio valentiorum. Quod autem subtilissima ratione persequendum est; ita enim jam sum affectus, ut quid verum, non credendo solum, sed etiam intelligendo apprehendere impatienter desiderem; apud Platonicos me interim quod sacris nostris non repugnet reperiturum esse confido. *Cont. Acad.* III, 20, 43; *PL* 32, 957.

10 Sed aliud est intellectus, aliud ratio. Nam rationem habemus et antequam intelligamus; sed intelligere non valemus, nisi rationem habeamus. Est ergo (homo) animal rationis capax; verum et melius et citius dicam, animal rationale, cui natura inest ratio, et antequam intelligat jam rationem habet. Nam ideo vult intelligere, quia ratio praecedit. *Sermo* 43, 2, 3; *PL* 38, 255. As will be seen later (Chap. III, note 1), *intellectus* is sometimes called *intelligentia*. The accepted practice of thinking in terms of "faculties" leads us to speak of intelligence as a power in the soul really distinct from mind and reason. These real distinctions are foreign to Augustine's thought, since for him intelligence is rather the result attained by the mind in virtue of its activity as reason.

11 Hoc ergo unde bestias anteceditur, maxime in nobis excolere debemus, et resculpere quodam modo, et

reformare. Sed quis poterit, nisi sit artifex qui formavit? Imaginem in nobis Dei deformare potuimus, reformare non possumus. *Sermo 43*, 3, 4; *PL* 38, 255.

12 *Enarr. in Ps.* 118, 3; *PL* 37, 1552. Regarding what are today called "motives of credibility," see *Confess.* VI, 5, 7; and VI, 5, 8. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 1, 5; *PL* 32, 1242. *De Utilitate Credendi* 1; *PL* 42, 65 and following. On this point see Fr. Batiffol's excellent study, *Le Catholicisme de saint Augustin*, 2 ed., Paris, 1920, vol. I, pp. 1-75. One might go further and consider this class of questions as forming part of St. Augustine's philosophy (B. Romeyer, "Trois problèmes de philosophie," in *Archives de Philosophie*, VII, 2, 1930, pp. 201-203). But since even the proof of God's existence starts with the *Nisi credideritis*, what philosophical problem could usefully be discussed before faith? Indeed, according to p. 203 of his article, B. Romeyer seems more intent than he realizes on interpreting the notion of Christian philosophy which he intends to criticize along with us.

13 Concerning the need for this purifying role of faith, cf. *Modo enim credimus, tunc videbimus; cum credimus, spes est in isto saeculo; cum videbimus, res erit in futuro saeculo. Videbimus autem facie ad faciem (1 Cor. 13, 12); tunc autem videbimus facie ad faciem, cum habuerimus corda mundata. Beati enim mundo corde, quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt (Matt. 5, 8). Unde autem corda mundantur, nisi per fidem, sicut Petrus ait in Actibus Apostolorum: Mundantur fide corda eorum (Act. 15, 9). Mundantur autem corda nostra per fidem, ut possint esse*

idonea capere speciem. Ambulamus enim nunc per fidem, nondum per speciem. . . . Enarr. in Ps. 123, 2; PL 37, 1640.

14 Absit namque ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis animantibus excellentiores creavit. Absit, inquam, ut ideo credamus ne rationem accipiamus sive quaeramus, cum etiam credere non possemus, nisi rationales animas haberemus. Ut ergo in quibusdam rebus ad doctrinam salutarem pertinentibus, quas ratione nondum percipere valemus, sed aliquando valebimus, fides praecedat rationem, qua cor mundetur, ut magnae rationis capiat et perferat lucem, hoc utique rationis est. Et ideo rationabiliter dictum est per prophetam: Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis (*Isai. 7, 9: Septuag.*). Ubi procul dubio discrevit haec duo, deditque consilium quo prius credamus, ut id quod credimus intelligere valeamus. Proinde ut fides praecedat rationem, rationabiliter visum est. Nam si hoc praeceptum rationabile non est, ergo irrationabile est. Absit! Si igitur rationabile est ut ad magna quaedam, quae capi nondum possunt, fides praecedat rationem, procul dubio quantumque ratio quae hoc persuadet, etiam ipsa antecedit fidem. *Epist. 120*, 1, 3; *PL* 33, 453. Ergo ex aliqua parte verum est quod ille dicit: Intelligam, ut credam; et ego qui dico, sicut dicit Propheta: Immo crede, ut intelligas; verum dicimus, concordemus. Ergo intellige, ut credas; crede, ut intelligas. Breviter dico quomodo utrumque sine controversia accipiamus. Intellige, ut credas, verbum meum; crede, ut intelligas, verbum Dei. *Sermo 43*, 7, 9; *PL* 38, 258.

15 Melius est enim quamvis nondum visum, credere quod verum est, quam

putare te verum videre quod falsum est. Habet namque fides oculos suos, quibus quodammodo videt verum esse quod nondum videt, et quibus certissime videt, nondum se videre quod credit. Porro autem qui vera ratione jam quod tantummodo credebat intelligit, profecto praeponendus est ei qui cupit adhuc intelligere quod credit; si autem nec cupit, et ea quae intelligenda sunt, credenda tantummodo existimat, cui rei fides prosit ignorat, nam pia fides sine spe et sine charitate esse non vult. Sic igitur homo fidelis debet credere quod nondum videt, ut visionem speret et amet. *Epist. 120, 2, 8; PL 33, 456.*

16 *De Ordine* II, 9, 27; *PL 32, 1007-1008.*

17 Sed ego dixeram: Si quis crediderit; et hoc consilium dederam: Si non intellexisti, inquam, crede. Intellectus enim merces est fidei. Ergo noli quærere intelligere ut credas, sed crede ut intelligas; quoniam *nisi credideritis, non intelligetis*. Cum ergo ad possibilitatem intelligendi consilium dederim obedientiam credendi, et dixerim Dominum Jesum Christum hoc ipsum adjunxisse in consequenti sententia, invenimus eum dixisse: *si quis voluerit voluntatem ejus facere, cognoscat de doctrina* (*John 7, 17*). Quid est, *cognoscat*? Hoc est, intelliget. Quod est autem *Si quis voluerit voluntatem ejus facere*, hoc est credere. Sed quia *cognoscat*, hoc est intelliget, omnes intelligunt; quia vero quod ait, *si quis voluerit voluntatem ejus facere*, hoc pertinet ad credere, ut diligentius intelligatur, opus est nobis ipso Domino nostro expositore, ut indicet nobis utrum revera ad credere pertineat facere voluntatem Patris ejus. Quis nesciat hoc esse facere voluntatem Dei operari

opus ejus, id est, quod illi placet? Ipse autem Dominus aperte alio loco dicit: *Hoc est opus Dei, ut credatis in eum quem ille misit* (*John 6, 29*). *Ut credatis in eum*; non, ut credatis ei. Sed si creditis in eum, creditis ei; non autem continuo qui credit ei, credit in eum. Nam et daemones credebant ei; et non credebant in eum . . . Quid est ergo credere in eum? Credendo amare, credendo diligere, credendo in eum ire, et ejus membris incorporari. Ipsa est ergo fides quam de nobis exigit Deus . . . Non qualiscumque fides, sed *fides quae per dilectionem operatur*, haec in te sit, et intelliges de doctrina. Quid enim intelliges? Quia *doctrina ista non est mea, sed ejus qui misit me*, id est, intelliges quia Christus Filius Dei, qui est doctrina Patris, non est ex seipso, sed Filius est Patris. *In Joan. Evang. 29, 7, 6; PL 35, 1630-1631. Cf. Sermo 118, 1; PL 38, 672.*

18 Deinde addidit: *Ego in eis, et tu in me, ut sint consummati in unum* (*John 17, 23*). Ubi se mediatorem inter Deum et homines breviter intimavit . . . Quod vero addidit, *ut sint consummati in unum*, ostendit eo perducì reconciliationem, quae fit per Mediatorem, ut perfecta beatitudine, cui jam nihil possit adjici, perfruamur. Unde id quod sequitur, *Ut cognoscat mundus quia tu me misisti*, non sic accipiendum puto, tanquam iterum dixerit: *Ut credat mundus* (*quia tu me misisti, John 17, 21*); aliquando enim et cognoscere pro eo quod est credere ponitur . . . Sed hic, quandoquidem de consummatione loquitur, talis est intelligenda cognitio, qualis erit per speciem, non qualis nunc est per fidem . . . Quamdiu enim credimus quod non videmus, nondum sumus ita consummati, quemadmodum erimus cum

meruerimus videre quod credimus. Rectissime igitur ibi, *Ut credat mundus*; hic, *Ut cognoscat mundus*; tamen et ibi et hic, *quia tu me misisti*, ut noverimus, quantum pertinet ad Patris et Filii inseparabilem charitatem, hoc nos modo credere quod tendimus credendo cognoscere. In *Joan. Evang.* 110, 17, 4; *PL* 35, 1922-1923.

19 Even in the natural order it is authority that we do, in practice, follow before using our reason. Cf. *De Mor. Eccl.* I, 2, 3; *PL* 32, 1311. The rest of the text holds sin responsible for this state of affairs. From his first works Augustine calls attention to the fact that, if reason is first in principle, authority always comes first in fact. Cf. *De Ordine* II, 9, 26; *PL* 32, 1007. There is all the more reason why it should be so when it is no longer a question of a man's fallible authority but of God's infallible authority. Cf. *loc. cit.* 27; *PL* 32, 1007-1008, and *De Musica* V, 5, 10; *PL* 32, 1152.

20 Istam cogitationis carnalis compositionem (*scil.* the material representation of the Trinity in imagination) vanumque figmentum ubi vera ratio labefactare incipit, continuo illo intus adjuvante atque illuminante, qui cum talibus idolis (cf. above: quamdam idololatriam, quam in corde nostro ex consuetudine visibilium constituere conatur humanae cogitationis infirmitas) in corde nostro habitare non vult, ita ista configere atque a fide nostra quodammodo excutere festinamus, ut ne pulverem quidem ullum talium phantasmatum illic remanere patiamur. Quamobrem nisi rationem disputationis, qua forinsecus admoniti, ipsa intrinsecus veritate lucente, haec falsa esse perspicimus, fides in corde nostro antecessisset, quae nos indueret

pietate, nonne incassum quae vera sunt audiremus? Ac per hoc quoniam id quod ad eam pertinebat fides egit, ideo subsequens ratio aliquid eorum quae inquirebat invenit. Falsae itaque rationi, non solum ratio vera, qua id quod credimus intelligimus, verum etiam fides ipsa rerum nondum intellectarum sine dubio preferenda est. *Epist.* 120, 2, 7-8; *PL* 33, 456. Concerning the mental purification achieved by faith, see *De Agone Christiano* 13, 14; *PL* 40, 299; and *De Trinitate* IV, 18, 24; *PL* 42, 903-05. This last text is very important for Jesus Christ's role as the sensible object of faith which leads to its intelligible object.

21 Saint Augustine is citing Isaias according to the Septuagint translation. The Vulgate gives the more accurate translation: *Si non credideritis, non permanebitis*. Augustine feels that, no matter which is the better translation, the lesson each teaches us is important. *De Doct. Christiana* II, 12, 17; *PL* 34, 43. See this text in note 28 of this chapter.

22 *De Trinitate* XV, 2, 2; *PL* 42, 1058. J. Martin (*Saint Augustin*, p. 122) quite rightly sees in this formula the direct antecedent of St. Anselm's *fides quaerens intellectum*.

23 In *Joan. Evang.* 29, 7, 6; *PL* 35, 1630. Cf. . . . non ut fidem respuas sed ut ea quae fidei firmitate jam tenes, etiam rationis luce conspicias. *Epist.* 120, 1, 2; *PL* 33, 453. Haec dixerim, ut fidem tuam ad amorem intelligentiae cohorter, ad quam ratio vera perducit, et cui fides animam praeparat. *Ibid.* 6; *PL* 33, 454. Est autem fides, credere quod nondum vides; cujus fidei merces est, videre quod credis. *Sermo* 43, 1, 1; *PL* 38, 254. Quisquis autem ad sumen-

dum solidum cibum verbi Dei adhuc minus idoneus est, lacte fidei nutriatur, et verbum quod intelligere non potest, credere non cunctetur. Fides enim meritum est, intellectus praemium. *In Joan. Evang.* 48, 10; *PL* 35, 1741. Merces enim cognitionis meritis redditur; credendo autem meritum comparatur. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 68, 3; *PL* 40, 71. Sic accipite hoc, sic credite, ut mereamini intelligere. Fides enim debet praecedere intellectum, ut sit intellectus fidei meritum. Propheta enim apertissime dixit: *Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis* (*Isai.* 7, 9; Septuag.). Quod ergo simpliciter praedicatur, credendum est; quod subtiliter disputatur, intelligendum est. *Sermo* 139, 1, 1; *PL* 38, 770. This is why an echo (although very faint) of the tradition of Clement of Alexandria and Origen is heard in Augustine; all Christians have the same faith, but the *meliores* seek understanding, which is its temporary reward while they await the sight of God that all the just will one day possess: nam et a *melioribus* etiam dum has terras incolunt, et certe a bonis et piis omnibus post hanc vitam, evidentius atque perfectius ista cerni obtinerique credendum est. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 2, 6; *PL* 32, 1243. He is speaking about the proof of God's existence.

24 Nisi enim aliud esset credere, et aliud intelligere, et primo credendum esset, quod magnum et divinum intelligere cuperemus, frustra Propheta dixisset *nisi credideritis non intelligetis* (*Is.* 7, 9). Ipse quoque Dominus noster et dictis et factis ad credendum primo hortatus est, quos ad salutem vocavit. Sed postea cum de ipso dono loqueretur, quod erat daturus credentibus, non ait: haec est autem vita aeterna ut credant; sed *haec est*, inquit,

vita aeterna ut cognoscant te solum Deum verum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum (*John* 17, 3). Deinde jam credentibus dicit: *quaerite et invenietis* (*Matt.* 7, 7); nam neque inventum dici potest, quod incognitum creditur, neque quisquam inveniundo Deo fit idoneus, nisi antea crediderit quod est postea cogniturus. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 2, 6; *PL* 32, 1243. Sed ea recta intentio est, quae proficiscitur a fide. Certa enim fides utcumque inchoat cognitionem; cognitio vero certa non perficitur, nisi post hanc vitam, cum videbimus facie ad faciem (*1 Cor.* 13, 12). Hoc ergo sapiamus, ut noverimus tutiorem esse affectum vera quaerendi, quam incognita pro cognitis praesumendi. Sic ergo quaeramus tanquam inventuri, et sic inveniamus tanquam quaesituri . . . De credendis nulla infidelitate dubitemus, de intelligendis nulla temeritate affirmemus; in illis auctoritas tenenda est, in his veritas exquirenda. *De Trinitate* IX, 1, 1; *PL* 42, 961.

25 Propterea monet apostolus Petrus, paratos nos esse debere ad responsum omni poscenti nos rationem de fide et spe nostra (*1 Pet.* 3, 15), quoniam si a me infidelis rationem poscit fidei et spei meae, et video quod antequam credat capere non potest, hanc ipsam ei reddo rationem in qua, si fieri potest, videat quam praepostere ante fidem poscat rationem earum rerum quas capere non potest. Si autem jam fidelis rationem poscat, ut quod credit intelligat, capacitas ejus intuenda est, ut secundum eam ratione reddita, sumat fidei suae quantum potest intelligentiam; majorem, si plus capit, minorem, si minus, dum tamen quousque ad plenitudinem cognitionis perfectionemque perveniat, ab itinere

fidei non recedat . . . Jam ergo si fideles sumus, ad fidei viam pervenimus; quam si non dimiserimus, non solum ad tantam intelligentiam rerum incorporearum et incommutabilium, quanta in hac vita capi non ab omnibus potest, verum etiam ad summitatem contemplationis, quam dicit Apostolus *facie ad faciem* (1 Cor. 13, 12), sine dubitatione perveniemus. Nam quidam etiam minimi, et tamen in via fidei perseverantissime gradientes, ad illam beatissimam contemplationem perveniunt; quidam vero quid sit natura invisibilis, incommutabilis, incorporea, utcumque jam scientes, et viam quae ducit ad tantae beatitudinis mansionem, quoniam stulta illis videtur, quod est Christus crucifixus, tenere recusantes, ad quietis ipsius penetrabile, cujus jam luce mens eorum velut in longinquo radiante perstringitur, pervenire non possunt. *Epist.* 120, 1, 4; *PL* 33, 453-54.

26 The identity between the "summit of contemplation" and the beatific vision emerges rather clearly from the text quoted from St. Paul. But it is further confirmed by the following lines: Tutissima est enim quaerentis intentio, donec apprehendatur illud quo tendimus et quo extendimur. Sed ea recta intentio est, quae proficiscitur a fide. Certa enim fides utcumque inchoat cognitionem; cognitio vero certa non perficitur, nisi post hanc vitam, cum videbimus facie ad faciem (1 Cor. 13, 12). *De Trinitate* IX, 1, 1; *PL* 42, 961. Cf. *De Trinitate* I, 10, 21; *PL* 42, 835, where *contemplatio* is used in the sense of beatific vision; and *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* XII, 46; *PL* 42, 279; and *De Trinitate* IV, 18, 24; *PL* 42, 904, where *contemplatio* and *species* are used. Cf. the long but very

clear text in *Enarr. in Ps.* 123, 2; *PL* 37, 1610-1611; and *Sermo* 346, 2; *PL* 39, 1525.

27 Whence the two meanings of the word "philosophy" encountered in Augustinian texts. If he is speaking of philosophy in general terms, i.e. simple rational speculation, then all search for truth is philosophy, whether it be successful or not. But if it be a matter of a search for truth which does attain its goal, then philosophies are classified according as they succeed more or less in doing so. Then Plato and Plotinus come nearest to the dignity of philosophers, and there is, strictly speaking, but a single philosophy, that of Christians. Cf. *Obsecro te*, non sit honestior philosophia gentium, quam nostra Christiana quae una est vera philosophia, quandoquidem studium vel amor sapientiae significatur hoc nomine. *Cont. Julian. Pelag.* IV, 14, 72; *PL* 44, 774.

28 Vision, and especially the beatific vision, is often designated by St. Augustine by the word *species*. Such terminology goes back to St. Paul, 2 Cor. 5, 7: per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. See Augustine: Ergo quoniam intellectus in specie sempiterna est, fides vero in rerum temporalium quibusdam cunabulis quasi lacte alit parvulos; nunc autem *per fidem ambulamus, non per speciem* (2 Cor. 5, 7); nisi autem per fidem ambulaverimus, ad speciem pervenire non poterimus, quae non transit sed permanet, per intellectum purgatum nobis cohaerentibus veritati; propterea ille ait: *nisi credideritis, non permanebitis*; ille vero: *nisi credideritis, non intellegitis*. *De Doct. Christiana* II, 12, 17; *PL* 34, 43. For the Middle Ages, cf. J. Scotus Eriugena: Lux in tenebris fide-

lium animarum lucet, et magis ac magis lucet, a fide inchoans, ad speciem tendens. *In Prolog. Evang. sec. Joan.*, PL 122, 290; Saint Anselm: . . . inter fidem et speciem intellectum quem in hac vita capimus esse medium intelligo . . . *De Fide Trinitatis, Praef.*, PL 158, 261. This characteristic of Augustinian speculation forces it to place between rational knowledge, even after it has been enlightened by Faith, and the future beatific vision, a mysticism which we shall examine later.

29 St. Augustine does not appear to have asked himself whether the complete rational demonstration of an article of faith eliminates faith by substituting that demonstration for it, or whether the same truth can be known and believed. For a discussion of this problem among the Augustinians of the Middle Ages, see E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, London 1938, pp. 112-114.

30 Here it is a question of the mystery of the Trinity (*De Trinitate* XV, 2, 2; PL 42, 1057-58) and, consequently, of an inexhaustible object of thought even when thought is illumined by faith.

31 Above all see *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* (I, 2, 3; PL 32, 1311-12), where St. Augustine considers it a faulty method to begin with reason. He only resigns himself to doing so in this work in order to stoop to the madness of the Manichaeans by provisionally adopting their method, even as Jesus Christ submitted to death to save us.

32 J. F. Nourrisson, *La philosophie de s. Augustin*, vol. I, p. 56. Cf. ". . . sa philosophie a toujours été une philoso-

phie d'emprunt, une doctrine d'autorité, et non point un original et libre système, quelque effort qu'il ait fait pour embrasser la sagesse en elle-même et par elle-même" (p. 61).

33 *Epist.* 120, 2, 9; PL 33, 456-57.

34 *Epist.* 120, 3, 14-15; PL 33, 459.

35 *De Lib. Arbit.* I, 2, 4; PL 32, 1224.

36 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 2, 5-6; PL 32, 1243.

37 *Epist.* 120, 2, 12; PL 33, 458.

38 *Epist.* 120, 3, 14; PL 33, 459.

39 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 2, 6; PL 32, 1243. Cf. *praeponendus* above, note 15.

40 . . . sed intellectui fides aditum aperit, infidelitas claudit. *Epist.* 137, 4, 15; PL 33, 522. *Sed sunt quidam*, inquit (Christus), *in vobis qui non credunt* (John 6, 65). Non dixit, *Sunt quidam in vobis qui non intelligunt*; sed *causam dixit*, quare non intelligunt. *Sunt enim quidam in vobis qui non credunt*; et ideo non intelligunt, quia non credunt. Propheta enim dixit, nisi credideritis, non intelligetis (*Isaías* 7, 9. Septuag.). Per fidem copulamur, per intellectum vivificamur. Prius haereamus per fidem, ut sit quod vivificetur per intellectum. Nam qui non haeret, resistit; qui resistit, non credit. Nam qui resistit, quomodo vivificatur? Adversarius est radio lucis, quo penetrandus est: non avertit aciem, sed claudit mentem. *Sunt ergo quidam qui non credunt*. Credant et aperiant, aperiant et illuminabuntur. *In Joan. Evang.* 27, 6, 7; PL 35, 1618. Cf. *ibid.* 9; PL 35, 1619. Si intelleximus, Deo gratias; si quis autem parum intellexit, fecit homo quousque potuit; cetera videat unde speret. Forinsecus ut operarii possumus plantare et rigare,

sed Dei est incrementum dare (1 Cor. 3, 6). *Mea*, inquit, *doctrina non est mea, sed ejus qui misit me* (John 7, 16). Audiat consilium, quit dicit, Nondum intellexi. Magna quippe res et profunda cum fuisset dicta, vidit utique ipse Dominus Christus hoc tam profundum non omnes intellectueros, et in consequenti dedit consilium: Intelligere vis? Crede. Deus enim per prophetam dixit: *nisi credideritis, non intelligetis* (Isaia 7, 9. Septuag.). In Joan. Evang. 29, 7, 6; PL 35, 1630. And so, as St. Anselm will later note, Scripture asks us to believe that even belief is necessary for understanding. 41 Fides enim gradus est intelligendi;

intellectus autem meritum fidei. Aperte hoc propheta dicit omnibus praepropere et praepostere intelligentiam requireribus, et fidem negligentibus. Ait enim: *Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis* (Isaia 7, 9. Septaug.). Habet ergo et fides ipsa quoddam lumen suum in Scripturis, in Prophetia, in Evangelio, in apostolicis lectionibus. Omnia enim ista quae nobis ad tempus recitantur, lucernae sunt in obscuro loco, ut nutriamur ad diem. *Sermo* 126, 1, 1; PL 38, 698.

42 *Cont. Jul. Pelag.* IV, 14, 72; PL 44, 774. For the identity between true philosophy and true religion see *De Vera Religione* V, 8; PL 34, 126.

CHAPTER II

1 On this question consult H. Leder, *Untersuchungen über Augustins Erkenntnistheorie*, Marburg, 1901; P. Alfari, *L'évolution intellectuelle de s. Augustin*, Paris, 1918, pp. 415-28. Cf. Ch. Boyer, *L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1920, pp. 12-46 (an excellent chapter); J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, 2 ed., Paris, 1923, pp. 32-48; E. Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, London 1936, pp. 209-228.

2 Mihi satis est quoquo modo molem istam transcendere, quae intranscibilibus ad philosophiam sese opponit. *Cont. Acad.* III, 14, 30; PL 32, 950. This is also the first moment of what a modern would consider St. Augustine's philosophy properly so-called. In this sense we may say: "Nous connaissons la vérité: voilà le fait sur lequel repose la philosophie de saint Augustin." Ch. Boyer, *L'idée de vérité*, p. 12.

3 Nondum baptizatus, contra Academicos vel de Academicis primum scripsi,

ut argumenta eorum, quae multis ingerunt veri inveniendi desperationem, et prohibent cuicumque rei assentiri . . . ab animo meo, quia et me movebant, quantis possem rationibus amoverem. *Retract.* I, 1, 1; PL 32, 585.

4 Unde tria confeci volumina in initio conversionis meae, ne impedimento nobis essent, quae tanquam in ostio contradicebant. Et utique fuerat removenda inveniendae desperatio veritatis, quae illorum videtur argumentationibus roborari. *Enchiridion* 20, 7; PL 40, 242. The question's vital interest for Augustine is forcibly expressed in the following lines: . . . non tam me delectat quod, ut scribis, Academicos vicerim . . . quam quod mihi abruptim odiosissimum retinaculum, quo ab philosophiae ubere desperatione veri, quod est animi pabulum, refrenabar. *Epist.* I, 3; PL 33, 62-63.

5 Sunt inde libri tres nostri, primo nostrae conversionis tempore conscripti, quos qui potuerit et voluerit

legere lectosque intellexerit, nihil eum profecto quae ab eis contra perceptionem veritatis argumenta multa inventa sunt permovebunt. *De Trinitate* XV, 12, 21; *PL* 42, 1074-75.

6 The doctrine of illumination is, in fact, indicated in a veiled allusion: Etenim numen aliquod aisti (*scil.* Alypi) solum posse ostendere homini quid sit verum, cum breviter, tum etiam pie. Nihil itaque in hoc sermone nostro libentius audivi, nihil gravius, nihil probabilius, et si id numen ut confido adsit, nihil verius. *Cont. Acad.* III, 6, 13; *PL* 32, 940.

7 Hic jam non de gloria, quod leve ac puerile est, sed de ipsa vita, et de aliqua spe animi beati, quantum inter nos possumus, disseramus. *Cont. Acad.* III, 9, 18; *PL* 32, 943; and III, 14, 30; *PL* 32, 950.

8 Augustine does not always summarize Zeno's definition in identical terms. Sed verum non posse comprehendere, ex illa Stoici Zenonis definitione arripuisse videbantur, qui ait id verum percipi posse, quod ita esset animo impressum ex eo unde esset, ut esse non posset ex eo unde non esset. Quod brevius planiusque sic dicitur, his signis verum posse comprehendere, quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est. *Cont. Acad.* II, 5, 11; *PL* 32, 925. Cf. *Op. cit.* III, 9, 18; *PL* 32, 943.

9 Hoc si ita est, dicendum potius erat, non posse in hominem cadere sapientiam quam sapientem nescire cur vivat, nescire quemadmodum vivat, nescire utrum vivat. *Cont. Acad.* III, 9, 19; *PL* 32, 943. This is the first sketch of what will later be the *cogito*.

10 *Ibid.* and III, 14, 31-32; *PL* 32, 950-51.

11 *Cont. Acad.* III, 9, 21; *PL* 32, 944-45.

12 *Cont. Acad.* III, 10, 23; *PL* 32, 946. On truths of the same order as those discovered in dialectics, see *op. cit.* III, 13, 29; *PL* 32, 949.

13 *Cont. Acad.* III, 11, 24; *PL* 32, 946.

14 Si autem unus et sex mundi sunt, septem mundos esse, quoquo modo affectus sim, manifestum est, et id me scire non impudenter affirmo. Quare vel hanc connexionem, vel illas superius disjunctiones, doce somno aut furore aut vanitate sensuum posse esse falsas; et me, si expergefactus ista meminero, victum esse concedam. Credo enim jam satis liquere quae per somnium et dementiae falsa videantur, ea scilicet quae ad corporis sensus pertinent; nam ter terna novem esse, et quadratum intelligibilium numerorum necesse est vel genere humano stertente sit verum. *Cont. Acad.* III, 11, 25; *PL* 32, 947. Cf. Descartes, *Meditatio* II, ed. Adam-Tannery, vol. VII, pp. 28-29.

15 Nihil habeo quod de sensibus conquerar: injustum est enim ab eis exigere plus quam possunt; quidquid autem possunt videre oculi, verum vident. Ergone verum est quod de remo in aqua vident? Prorsus verum. Nam causa accedente quare ita videretur, si demersus unda remus rectus appareret, magis oculos meos falsae renuntiationis arguerem. Non enim viderent quod talibus existentibus causis videntum fuit. Quid multis opus est? Hoc de turrium motu, hoc de pinnulis avium, hoc de ceteris innumerabilibus dici potest. Ego tamen fallor, si assentiar, ait quispiam. Noli plus assentiri quam ut ita tibi apparere per-

suadeas, et nulla deceptio est. *Cont. Acad.* III, 11, 26; *PL* 32, 947. This last text is presented as an Epicurean's possible objection to an Academician, but Augustine takes it for his own use.

16 *Cont. Acad.* III, 11, 26; *PL* 32, 948. Cf. *De Trinitate* XV, 12, 21; *PL* 42, 1075.

17 Potesne, inquam, nobis dicere aliquid eorum quae nosti? Possum, inquit. Nisi molestum est, inquam, profer aliquid. Et cum dubitaret, scisne, inquam, saltem te vivere? Scio, inquit. *De Beata Vita* II, 2, 7; *PL* 32, 963. The *De Beata Vita* was composed after the first and before the second book of the *Contra Academicos*, i.e. Nov. 13, 14 and 15, 387. The argument is still very far removed from Descartes, (i) in that it bears on life instead of thought, (ii) in that it is immediately completed in an affirmation of the body's existence (Scis etiam corpus te habere?), which Descartes would, on the contrary, eliminate as the very type of thing that is doubtful.

18 *Ratio*. Tu qui vis te nosse, scis esse te? *Augustinus*. Scio. *R.* Unde scis? *A.* Nescio. *R.* Simplicem te sentis, anne multiplicem? *A.* Nescio. *R.* Moveri te scis? *A.* Nescio. *R.* Cogitare te scis? *A.* Scio. *R.* Ergo verum est cogitare te. *A.* Verum. *Soliloq.* II, 1, 1; *PL* 32, 885.

19 *Aug.* Quaeramus autem hoc ordine, si placet: primum, quomodo manifestum est Deum esse, deinde, utrum ab illo sint quaecumque in quantumcumque sunt bona . . . Quare prius abs te quaero, ut de manifestissimis capiamus exordium, utrum tu ipse sis. An tu fortasse metuis, ne in hac interrogatione fallaris, cum utique si non esses, falli omnino non posses? *Evod.* Perge potius ad cetera. *Aug.* Ergo

quoniam manifestum est esse te . . . *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 3, 7; *PL* 32, 1243. This is the text Arnauld has compared with a passage in Descartes (*Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Adam-Tannery, vol. IX, p. 154). On this question see M. Ferraz, *La psychologie de s. Augustin*, pp. 148-53; J. F. Nourrisson, *La philosophie de s. Augustin*, vol. II, pp. 207-220; L. Blanchet, *Les antécédents historiques du 'Je pense donc je suis,'* Paris, 1920, 1st. part; Ch. Boyer, *L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de s. Augustin*, Paris, 1920, pp. 32-41; E. Gilson, *René Descartes. Discours de la méthode, texts et commentaire*, Paris, 1925, pp. 295-98, and *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*, Paris, 1930.

20 *De Vera Religione* 39, 73; *PL* 34, 154.

21 After he has shown that the Academician's scepticism is based on his affirming the errors of sense and the illusions of dreams and madness (as in Descartes' *1st. Meditation*), Augustine replies: Exceptis enim quae in animum veniunt a sensibus corporis, in quibus tam multa aliter sunt quam videntur, ut eorum veri similitudine nimium constipatus, sanus sibi esse videatur qui insanit, unde Academica philosophia sic invaluit, ut de omnibus dubitans multo miserius insaniret, his ergo exceptis quae a corporis sensibus in animum veniunt, quantum rerum remanet quod ita sciamus, sicut nos vivere scimus? In quo prorsus non metuimus, ne aliqua veri similitudine forte fallamur, quoniam certum est etiam eum qui fallitur vivere; nec in eis visis hoc habetur, quae obijciuntur extrinsecus, ut in eo sic fallatur ocu-

lus, quemadmodum fallitur cum in aqua remus videtur infractus, et navigantibus turres moveri, et alia sexcenta quae aliter sunt quam videntur; quia nec per oculum carnis hoc cernitur. Intima scientia est qua nos vivere scimus, ubi ne illud quidem Academicus dicere potest: fortasse dormis, et nescis, et in somnis vides . . . Numquam ergo falli nec mentiri potest, qui se vivere dixerit scire. Mille itaque fallacium visorum genera obijciantur ei qui dicit, Scio me vivere; nihil horum timebit, quando et qui fallitur vivit. *De Trinitate* XV, 12, 21; *PL* 42, 1073-74. Cf. *op. cit.* X, 10, 14; *PL* 42, 981.

22 Nam et sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id esse ac nosse diligimus. In his autem tribus quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas veri similis turbat. Non enim ea, sicut illa quae foris sunt, ullo sensu corporis tangimus, velut colores videndo . . . sed sine ulla phantasiarum vel phantasmatum imaginatione ludificatoria, mihi esse me, idque nosse et amare certissimum est. Nulla in his

veris Academicorum argumenta formido, dicentium, Quid si falleris? Si enim fallor, sum. Nam qui non est, utique nec falli potest, ac per hoc sum, si fallor. *De Civitat. Dei* XI, 26; *PL* 41, 339-340. Cf. Descartes: Sed est deceptor nescioquis, summe potens, summe calidus, qui de industria me semper fallit. Haud dubie igitur ego etiam sum, si me fallit; et fallat quantum potest, nunquam tamen efficiet ut nihil sim quamdiu me aliquid esse cogitabo. *Meditatio* II, ed. Adam-Tannery, vol. VII, p. 25, lines 5-10.

23 This opposition between intelligible truth and sensible error is well marked in the preceding text and in *De Trinitate* XV, 12, 22; *PL* 42, 1075. Ch. Boyer (*L'idée de vérité*, pp. 29-32) has very rightly pointed out that on this point the influence of Plotinus and Plato was decisive. Plato freed Augustine from scepticism by liberating him from sensualism and revealing to him, along with the intelligible world, the place of truth.

CHAPTER III

1 Here, as elsewhere, Augustine's terminology is rather flexible. Let us try to fix a few points.

a) *Anima, Animus*—Properly speaking, *anima* designates the animating principle of bodies considered in the vital function it exercises in them. Man has an *anima*, animals also have one. *Animus*, a term borrowed from Varro, *De Diis Selectis* (see *De Civitate Dei* VII, 23, 1; *PL* 41, 212), is used by Augustine preferably to designate man's soul, i.e. a vital principle that is at the same time a rational substance (see the definition of *animus* in note 3 below). In this sense *animus* is the *summus gradus animae* (*De Civitate Dei*, loc. cit.), and

sometimes it seems to be identified with *mens* (*De Civitate Dei* XI, 3; *PL* 41, 318).

b) *Spiritus*—This term has two entirely different meanings according as Augustine takes it from Porphyry (*De Civitate Dei* X, 9; *PL* 41, 286-87) or from Scripture (*De Anima et ejus Origine* II, 2, 2; *PL* 44, 495-96; IV, 13, 19; *PL* 44, 535; IV, 23, 37; *PL* 44, 545-46). In its Porphyrean meaning, *spiritus* pretty well designates the thing we call reproductive imagination or sensible memory. Thus it is above life (*anima*) but below mind (*mens*). See *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 24, 51; *PL* 34, 474-75. In its Scriptural meaning *spiritus* desig-

nates, on the contrary, the soul's rational part and consequently, it becomes a faculty special to man, and one that animals do not possess: Et quoniam tria sunt quibus homo constat: spiritus, anima et corpus, quae rursus duo dicuntur, quia saepe anima simul cum spiritu nominatur; pars enim quaedam ejusdem rationalis, qua carent bestiae, spiritus dicitur; principale nostrum spiritus est; deinde vita qua conjungimur corpori, anima dicitur; postremo ipsum corpus, quoniam visibile est, ultimum nostrum est. *De Fide et Symbolo* 10, 23; *PL* 40, 193-94.

c) *Mens, Ratio, Intelligentia*—The mind, *mens*, is the higher part of the rational soul (*animus*). It is the part that clings to things intelligible and to God (see *Introduction*, Ch. II, note 38). Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* 3, 3; *PL* 36, 73-74. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 7; *PL* 40, 13. The mind naturally contains reason and intelligence: . . . *mens*, cui ratio et intelligentia naturaliter inest . . . *De Civitate Dei* XI, 2; *PL* 41, 318. Reason (*ratio*) is the movement whereby the mind (*mens*) passes from one of its knowledges to another to associate or dissociate them: Ratio est mentis motio, ea quae discuntur distinguendi et connectendi potens . . . *De Ordine* II, 11, 30; *PL* 32, 1009. The two terms *intellectus* and *intelligentia* were imposed on Augustine by Scripture (*Epist.* 147, 18, 45; *PL* 33, 617). Both signify a faculty above reason (*ratio*). *Intelligentia* is that which is most eminent in man and, consequently, in *mens* (*De Lib. Arbit.* I, 1, 3; *PL* 32, 1223). For this very reason it is often identified with *intellectus* (. . . *intellectus ergo vel intelligentia* . . . *Enarr. in Ps.* 31, 9; *PL* 36, 263).

d) *Intellectus*—The intellect is a fac-

ulty of the soul proper to man and belonging more particularly to *mens*. It is directly illumined by the divine light: Sic in anima nostra quiddam est quod intellectus vocatur. Hoc ipsum animae, quod intellectus et mens dicitur, illuminatur luce superiore. Jam superior illa lux, qua mens humana illuminatur, Deus est. *In Joan. Evang.* 15, 4, 19; *PL* 35, 1517. *Intellectus* is a faculty above reason because it is possible to have reason without intelligence, but it is impossible to have intelligence without reason, and it is precisely because man has reason that he wants to attain intelligence (*Sermo* 43, 2, 3-3, 4; *PL* 38, 254-56). In a word, intelligence is an inner sight (*Enarr. in Ps.* 32, 22; *PL* 36, 296) through which the mind perceives the truth that the divine light reveals to it. Considered in its highest form, this is the *intellectus* to which, as we have seen, faith is the necessary preamble. (See Part I, ch. I.)

In this classification we have not included the distinction between *ratio superior* and *ratio inferior*, for we shall have to return to it in Part II, ch. I.

2. . . cum . . . constet . . . ex anima et corpore nos esse compositos, quid est ipse homo; utrumque horum quae nominavi, an corpus tantummodo, an tantummodo anima? Quanquam enim duo sint anima et corpus, et neutrum vocaretur homo si non esset alterum (nam neque corpus homo esset, si anima non esset; nec rursus anima homo, si ea corpus non animaretur); fieri tamen potest ut unum horum et habeatur homo et vocetur. *De Mor. Eccl.* I, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 1313.

3 Si autem definiri tibi animum vis, et ideo quaeris quid sit animus, facile respondeo. Nam mihi videtur esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, re-

gendo corpori accommodata. *De Quant. Animae* 13, 22; *PL* 32, 1048. In this text *animus* has no other meaning than *anima*. This definition will be adopted and popularized by the apocryphal Augustinian work *De Spiritu et Anima*, cap. I; *PL* 40, 781.

4 *De Mor. Eccl.* I, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 1313; *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 3; *PL* 41, 625-26.

5 Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est mortali atque tereno utens corpore. *De Mor. Eccl.* I, 27, 52; *PL* 32, 1332. This is the definition of the "superior man" which Plotinus says he borrowed from Plato (*Enn.* VI, 7, 5. Cf. Plato, *Alcibiades*, 129 E). Plato himself logically concludes from it that "man is found to be nothing but the soul" (*Alcibiades*, 130 C). Thus Augustine inherited a Platonic definition of man. On the other hand, his Christianity compels him to give staunch support to the unity of the human composite made up of a soul and a body. Whence arises in him a certain indecisiveness of thought that is often perceptible in his texts, especially when he is trying to make Plato's formula express a Christian notion of man. Cf. *Quid est homo?* *Anima rationalis habens corpus*. So much for Plato. But Augustine adds: *Anima habens corpus non facit duas personas sed unum hominem*. In *Joan. Evang.* 19, 5, 15; *PL* 35, 1553. We shall meet other instances where Augustine will find himself in difficulty owing to his desire to introduce a Christian meaning into Platonic formulae unsuited to its expression.

6 Sive enim utrumque (*scil.* corpus et anima), sive anima sola nomen hominis teneat, non est hominis optimum quod optimum est corporis; sed quod

aut corpori simul et animae, aut soli animae optimum est, id est optimum hominis. *De Moribus Ecclesiae* I, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 1313. Cf. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 3, 1; *PL* 41, 625-26.

7 Non enim ullo modo aut longa, aut lata, aut quasi valida suspicanda est anima; corporea ista sunt, ut mihi videtur . . . *De Quant. Animae* 3, 4; *PL* 32, 1037. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 21, 27; *PL* 34, 365.

8 Nunc de anima incorporea satis dictum sit; quam si corpoream mavis credere, prius tibi definiendum est quid sit corpus; . . . Quanta te tamen absurda secuta sint tale corpus in anima cogitantem, qualia sunt quae ab omnibus eruditis corpora nuncupantur, id est quae per distantiam longitudinis, latitudinis, altitudinis, locorum occupant spatia, minora minoribus suis partibus, et majora majoribus, puto quod jam prudenter advertas. *De Anima et ejus Origine* IV, 21, 35; *PL* 44, 544. Cf. in exactly the same sense: Porro si corpus non est, nisi quod per loci spatium aliqua longitudine, latitudine, altitudine ita sistitur vel movetur, ut majore sui parte majorem locum occupet, et breviori brevior, minusque sit in parte quam in toto, non est corpus anima. *Epist.* 166, 2, 4; *PL* 33, 722. The Cartesian character of such a definition of the body by extension and movement, as well as the distinction between soul and body for which it is the basis, need scarcely be pointed out. Cf. Descartes, *Meditatio* II; ed. Adam-Tannery, vol. VII, p. 26, line 14—p. 27, line 17.

9 *De Trinitate* X, 10, 13; *PL* 42, 980.

10 Cum ergo, verbi gratia, mens aerem se putat, aerem intelligere putat, se tamen intelligere scit; aerem autem se

esse non scit, sed putat. Secernat quod se putat, cernat quod scit; hoc ei remaneat; unde ne illi quidem dubitaverunt, qui aliud atque aliud corpus esse mentem putaverunt. *De Trinitate* X, 10, 13; *PL* 42, 980. Desinat ergo nunc interim suspicari se esse corpus; quia si aliquid tale esset, talem se nosset, quae magis se novit quam coelum et terram, quae per sui corporis oculos novit. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 21, 28; *PL* 34, 366.

11 Sed quoniam de natura mentis agitur, removeamus a consideratione nostra omnes notitias quae capiuntur extrinsecus per sensus corporis; et ea quae posuimus omnes mentes de se ipsis nosse certasque esse diligentius attendamus. Utrum enim *aeris* sit vis vivendi, reminiscendi, intelligendi, volendi, cogitandi, sciendi, iudicandi; *an ignis*, an cerebri, an sanguinis, an atomorum; an praeter usitata quatuor elementa quinti nesciocujus corporis; *an ipsius carnis nostrae compago* vel temperamentum haec efficere valeat, dubitaverunt homines, et alius hoc, alius aliud affirmare conatus est. Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intelligere et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et iudicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit; . . . si dubitat, cogitat; . . . Quisquis igitur aliunde dubitat, de his omnibus dubitare non debet; quae si non essent, de ulla re dubitare non posset. *De Trinitate* X, 10, 14; *PL* 42, 981. Cf. Descartes: Non sum compages illa membrorum, quae corpus humanum appellatur; non sum etiam tenuis aliquis *aer* istis membris infusus, non ventus, non *ignis*, non vapor, non halitus, non quidquid mihi fingo . . . ; de iis tantum quae mihi nota sunt, iudicium ferre possum. Novi me existere; quaero quis sim ego ille quem

novi . . . Sed quid igitur sum? Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque et sentiens. *Meditatio* II, ed. Adam-Tannery, vol. VII, p. 27, line 17—p. 28, line 22.

In addition to this basic proof, Augustine has proposed less important arguments. They will be found classified by J. F. Nourrisson, *La philosophie de s. Augustin*, vol. I, p. 169-82. The argument most often stressed is the simultaneous presence in sensation or memory of representations of extension which do not have any extension there. *De Quant. Animae* 5, 9; *PL* 32, 1040-41; 14, 23-24; *PL* 32, 1048-49.

12 Unde consequenter etiam intelligentiam quid aliud quam in eodem subjecto corpore existimant? Qui omnes non advertunt, mentem nosse se etiam cum quaerit se, sicut jam ostendimus. Nullo modo autem recte dicitur sciri aliqua res, dum ejus ignoratur substantia. Quapropter, cum se mens novit, substantiam suam novit; et cum de se certa est, de substantia sua certa est. Certa est autem de se, sicut convincunt ea quae supra dicta sunt. *Nec omnino certa est, utrum aer, an ignis sit, an aliquod corpus, vel aliquid corporis. Non est igitur aliquid eorum; totumque illud quod se jubetur ut noverit, ad hoc pertinet ut certa sit non se esse aliquid eorum de quibus incerta est, idque solum esse se certa sit, quod solum esse se certa est.* Sic enim cogitat ignem aut aerem, et quidquid aliud corporis cogitat. Neque ullo modo fieri posset ut ita cogitaret id quod ipsa est, quemadmodum cogitat id quod ipsa non est. Per phantasiam quippe imaginariam cogitat haec omnia, *sive ignem, sive aerem, sive illud*

vel illud corpus, partemve illam, seu compaginem temperationemque corporis; nec utique ista omnia, sed aliquid horum esse dicitur. Si quid autem horum esset, aliter id quam cetera cogitaret, non scilicet per imaginale figmentum, sicut cogitantur absentia, quae sensu corporis tacta sunt, sive omnino ipsa, sive ejusdem generis aliqua; sed quadam interiore, non simulata, sed vera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius): sicut cogitat vivere se, et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle se. Novit enim haec in se, nec imaginatur quasi extra se illa sensu tetigerit, sicut corporalia quaeque tanguntur. Ex quorum cogitationibus si nihil sibi affingat, ut tale aliquid esse se putet, quidquid ei de se remanet, hoc solum ipsa est. De Trinitate X, 10, 15-16; PL 42, 981-82.

13 *De Civitate Dei* XXII, 24, 3; PL 41, 789. *De Trinitate* XIV, 4, 6; PL 42, 1040.

14 Quia et iste alius modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus, et animalia fiunt, omnino mirus est, nec comprehendendi ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo est. *De Civitate Dei* XXI, 10, 1; PL 41, 725. This is the text Pascal quotes and interprets as follows: L'homme est à lui-même le plus prodigieux object de la nature; car il ne peut concevoir ce que c'est que corps, et encore moins ce que c'est qu'esprit, et moins qu'aucune chose comme un corps peut-être uni avec un esprit. C'est là le comble de ses difficultés, et cependant c'est son propre être. *Pensées* II, 72; in L. Brunschvicg, ed. minor, p. 357, which refers to Montaigne, *Apologie de R. Sebond*.

15 *De Trinitate* XV, 7, 11; PL 42, 1065. Cf. *De Civitate Dei* XIII, 24; PL

41, 399, where man is conceived as a *conjunctum*.

16 We do not see why J. Martin has written: "Cette conception de l'homme devrait supprimer toute question sur les rapports de l'âme et du corps" (*S. Augustin*, p. 358); it is very true that, according to Augustine, man is his soul and body joined together, but inasmuch as the soul is a substance apart from the body, the problem of their relations could not have been avoided.

17 Per totum quippe corpus quod animat, non locali diffusionem, sed quadam vitali intentione porrigitur. *Epist.* 156, 2, 4; PL 33, 722. To exercise this action on the body, the soul acts with the mediation of air and fire, the two subtlest elements that are in closest proximity to its immateriality. Thus, they are instruments of motivity and sensibility. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 15, 21; PL 34, 363 and 19, 25; PL 34, 364. See Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, 4, 20; ed. E. Bréhier, vol. IV, p. 121, for the notion of the soul's vital attention to the body.

18 Nam per omnes ejus particulas tota (*scil.* anima) simul adest, nec minor in minoribus et in majoribus major; sed alicubi intentius, alicubi remissius, et in omnibus tota, et in singulis tota est. Neque enim aliter, quod in corpore etiam non toto sentit, tamen tota sentit: nam cum exiguo puncto in carne viva aliquid tangitur, . . . animam tamen totam non latet; neque id quod sentitur, per corporis cuncta discurrit, sed ibi tantum sentitur ubi fit. *Epist.* 166, 2, 4; PL 33, 722. Concerning the exact meaning of the expression *non latet*, see the following chapter. *De Immort. Animae* 16, 25; PL 32, 1034. Augustine recognizes as well that the

soul's actions are exercised preferably through certain bodily sense organs and especially the brain. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 17-18, 23-24; *PL* 34, 364, where the principal centres of localization are indicated.

19 Postremo si, quamvis locum occupanti corpori, anima tamen non localiter jungitur, summis illis aeternisque rationibus, quae incommutabiliter manent, nec utique loco continentur, prior afficitur anima quam corpus; nec prior tantum, sed etiam magis. Tanto enim prior, quanto propinquior; et eadem causa tanto etiam magis, quanto etiam corpore melior. Nec ista propinquititas loco, sed naturae ordine dicta est. Hoc autem ordine intelligitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam tribui, qua est in quantumcumque est. *De Immort. Animae* 15, 24; *PL* 32, 1033. It is the universality of this principle that has moved Augustine to admit as possible at least, the hypothesis of a soul for the world: Per animam ergo corpus subsistit, et eo ipso est quo animatur, sive universaliter, ut mundus; sive particulariter, ut unumquodque animal intra mundum. *De Immort. Animae* 15, 24; *PL* 32, 1033. Cf. *De Civitate Dei* X, 29, 2; *PL* 41, 308-09. For the Plotinian sources of the doctrine, see E. Bréhier, *La philosophie de Plotin*, Paris, 1928, p. 54.

20 Si enim non tradit (*scil.* anima) speciem quam sumit a summo bono, non per illam fit corpus; et si non per illam fit, aut non fit omnino, aut tam propinque speciem sumit quam anima; sed et fit corpus, et si tam propinque sumeret speciem, id esset quod anima; nam hoc interest, eoque anima melior, quo sumit propinquius. Tam propinque autem etiam corpus sumeret, si

non per animam sumeret. Etenim nullo interposito tam propinque utique sumeret. Nec invenitur aliquid quod sit inter summam vitam, quae sapientia et veritas est incommutabilis, et id quod ultimum vivificatur, id est corpus, nisi vivificans anima. *De Immort. Animae* 15, 24; *PL* 32, 1033. Thus, Augustine could not accept the reason which Origen suggests for the placing of souls in bodies. Cf. *De Civitate Dei* XI, 23, 1-2; *PL* 41, 336-37.

21 *De Anima et ejus Origine* I, 19, 32; *PL* 44, 493; II, 3, 5; *PL* 44, 496-97. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 28, 43; *PL* 34, 372. *Epist.* 166, 3, 7; *PL* 33, 723-24.

22 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 7, 15-19; *PL* 32, 1249-50.

23 We have a direct perception of this principle's presence within us; we infer its presence in other men or in animals from operations they perform analogous to our own. On the other hand, Augustine refuses to apply the term "soul" to vital principles which do not confer any knowledge, not even sensible knowledge, on their bodies. Thus he admits souls in animals, but he does not accord them to plants. However, he does grant them a vital "movement" which is, in them too, the principle of their form and operations. On this point see J. Martin, *S. Augustin*, p. 364-68. Let us point out, too, that Augustine has noted the paradoxical character of the soul as he conceives it: while it is the principle that gives order to the body, it is ignorant of everything it does there. Malebranche will start from that point and add to the Augustinian denial of any action of the body on the soul, his own corresponding denial of any action of the soul on the body. Concerning Augus-

tine, see *De Anima et ejus Origine* IV, 5, 6; *PL* 44, 527-28.

24 . . . et tamen vermiculi laudem sine ullo mendacio copiose possum dicere, considerans nitorem coloris, figuram teretem corporis, priora cum mediis, media cum posterioribus congruentia, et unitatis appetentiam pro suae naturae humilitate servantia; nihil ex una parte formatum, quod non ex altera parili dimensione respondeat. Quid jam de anima ipsa dicam vegetante modulum corporis sui, quomodo eum numerose moveat, quomodo appetat convenientia, quomodo vincat aut caveat obsistentia quantum potest, et ad unum sensum incolumitatis referens omnia, unitatem illam conditricem naturarum omnium multo evidentius quam corpus insinuet? *De Vera Religione* 41, 77; *PL* 34, 156-57. The soul's beneficent activity in the body is explained by the fact that God created the soul and endowed it with a natural desire to be united to the body it animates. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 25, 36; *PL* 34, 368-69, and *Epist.* 166, 2, 4; *PL* 33, 722.

25 *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 21, 61; *PL* 32, 1301-02.

26 Non est itaque natura incommutabilis, quae aliquo modo, aliqua causa, aliqua parte mutabilis est; Deum autem nefas est nisi vere summeque incommutabilem credere. Non est igitur anima pars Dei. *Epist.* 166, 2, 3; *PL* 33, 721. This letter bears the title *De Origine Animae Hominis* and constitutes a veritable treatise. Cf. *De Mor. Manichaeorum* II, 11, 21-24; *PL* 32, 1354-55. See also below, Part III, ch. I at the beginning.

27 *De Anima et ejus Origine* I, 4, 4; *PL* 44, 477.

28 See Part III, ch. I.

29 *De Civitate Dei* XI, 23, 1-2; *PL* 41, 336-37. Cf. *Epist.* 166, 9, 27; *PL* 33, 732.

30 *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 20, 56-59; *PL* 32, 1298-1300. *De Gen. ad Litt.* X, 14-16; *PL* 34, 418-20 and X, 24; *PL* 34, 426-27; X, 25-26; *PL* 34, 427-28 (against the materialism of Tertullian); *Epist.* 166, 4, 8; *PL* 33, 724 and 5, 12; *PL* 33, 725.

On this question consult J. F. Nourrisson, *Le philosophie de s. Augustin*, vol. 1, pp. 199-219; M. Ferraz, *La psychologie de s. Augustin*, pp. 19-41; E. Portalié in *Dict. de théol. catholique*, vol. I, part 2, col. 2359-60.

31 *De Anima et ejus Origine* IV, 11, 15-16; *PL* 44, 532-34. *Epist.* 166, 4, 9; *PL* 33, 724. *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 20-21; *PL* 32, 1297-1302.

32 *Soliloq.* II, 19, 33; *PL* 32, 901-02. This text is recalled by Augustine in *Epist.* 3, 4; *PL* 33, 65. The doctrine is taken up and developed in *De Immortalitate Animae*, ch. 1-6; *PL* 32, 1021-27.

33 Porro autem minuitur (*scil.* corpus) cum ex eo aliquid praecisione detrahatur. Ex quo conficitur ut tali detractio tendat ad nihilum. At nulla praecisio perducit ad nihilum. Omnis enim pars quae remanet, corpus est, et quidquid hoc est, quantolibet spatio locum occupat. Neque id posset, nisi haberet partes in quas identidem caederetur. Potest igitur infinite caedendo infinite minui, et ideo defectum pati atque ad nihilum tendere, quamvis pervenire numquam queat. Quod item de ipso spatio et quolibet intervallo dici atque intelligi potest. Nam et de his etiam terminatis, dimidiam, verbi gratia, partem detrahendo, et ex eo quod restat, semper dimidiam; minuitur in-

tervallum atque ad finem progreditur, ad quem tamen nullo pervenitur modo. Quo minus hoc de animo formidandum est. Est enim profecto corpore melior et vivacior, a quo huic vita tribuitur. *De Immort. Animae* 7, 12; *PL* 32, 1027.

34 *De Immort. Animae* 8, 14; *PL* 32, 1028.

35 St. Augustine says of the soul that it is *per se*. This does not mean at all that it can subsist without God, but that unlike the body, it does not have to move or change in order to subsist. *Op. cit.* 8, 15; *PL* 32, 1028-29.

36 Quidquid enim vita desertum mortuum dicitur, id ab anima desertum intelligitur; haec autem vita, quae deserit ea quae moriuntur, quia ipsa est animus, et seipsam non deserit, non moritur animus. *De Immort. Animae* 9, 16; *PL* 32, 1029.

37 Sed si per seipsum est (*scil.* animus), quoniam ipse sibi causa existendi est, et nunquam se deserit, nunquam interit, ut supra etiam disputavimus. Si vero ex illa (*scil.* summa essentia), diligenter opus est quaerere quae res ei possit esse contraria, quae animo auferat animum esse quod illa praebet. Quid est igitur? An forte falsitas, quia illa veritas? Sed manifestum est, atque in promptu situm, quantum nocere animo falsitas possit. Num enim amplius potest quam fallere? At nisi qui vivit, fallitur nemo.

Non igitur falsitas interimere animum potest. *De Immort. Animae* 11, 18; *PL* 32, 1030-31.

38 Nam si nulla essentia, inquantum essentia est, aliquid habet contrarium, multo minus habet contrarium prima illa essentia, quae dicitur veritas, in quantum essentia est. Primum autem verum est. Omnis enim essentia non ob aliud essentia est, nisi quia est. Esse autem non habet contrarium nisi non esse; unde nihil est essentiae contrarium. Nullo modo igitur res ulla esse potest contraria illi substantiae, quae maxime ac primitus est. Ex qua si habet animus idipsum quod est (non enim aliunde hoc habere potest, qui ex se non habet, nisi ab illa re quae illo ipso est animo praestantior), nulla res est qua id amittat, quia nulla res ei rei est contraria qua id habet; et propterea esse non desinit. . . . Non igitur potest interire. *De Immort. Animae* 12, 19; *PL* 32, 1031.

39 Quapropter cum per illam (*scil.* animam), ut dictum est, corpus subsistat, ipsa in corpus nullo modo verti potest. Corpus enim nullum fit, nisi accipiendo per animam speciem. At anima ut corpus fieret, non accipiendo speciem, sed amittendo, fieri potest; et propterea fieri non potest; . . . *De Immort. Animae* 16, 25; *PL* 32, 1034. St. Augustine has also outlined a proof for the soul's immortality from the natural desire for beatitude; see J. Martin, *S. Augustin*, p. 160-61.

CHAPTER IV

I Unde liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus, congenerat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognos-

cente et cognito. *De Trinitate* IX, 12, 18; *PL* 42, 970.

2 *De Trinitate* XI, 8, 14; *PI* 42, 995. See also *Epist.* 7; *PL* 33, 68-71. Care

should be taken not to understand anything beyond the precise points which the conclusions of this letter state. We may think that we read a declaration that sensation is an action of the body on the soul in the following lines: . . . nihil est aliud illa imaginatio, mi Nebridi, quam plaga inflicta per sensus . . . *Op. cit.* 2, 3, *PL* 33, 69. This text simply says that imagination is directly caused by sensation, but it does not say how sensation causes it. And that is the whole question.

3 Nemo de illo corpore utrum sit intelligere potest nisi cui sensus quidquam de illo nuntiavit. *Epist.* 13, 4; *PL* 33, 78. Cf. *De Trinitate* XI, 5, 9; *PL* 42, 991. To simplify our exposition, we gather together here the essential data on the relations between sensation and the image. There are four forms (*species*) each of which produces the form following it in the list: (i) the form of the object; (ii) the form produced in the sense; (iii) the form produced in the memory; (iv) the form produced in thought when one actually remembers (*De Trinitate* XI, 9, 16; *PL* 42, 996). In practice, we distinguish only two of these four forms: the object's form is not distinguished from the sensed form, nor is the form retained in the memory distinguished from the recollection it produces in thought (*De Trinitate* XI, 3, 6; *PL* 42, 989. Cf. XI, 8, 13; *PL* 42, 994). These four forms give birth to two kinds of visions (*visiones*): the corporeal vision in which the eye is informed (*formatur*) by the form (*species*) of the object; the spiritual vision in which thought (*cogitatio*) is formed (*formatur*) by the form (*species*) preserved in the memory. This image of sensation stored in the memory is called *similitudo*, *imago*,

or *phantasia* in the proper sense of the word. A composite image that is arbitrarily formed to represent objects that have not been perceived is called a *phantasma*: Aliter enim cogito patrem meum quem saepe vidi, aliter avum quem nunquam vidi. Horum primum *phantasia* est, alterum *phantasma*. *De Musica* VI, 11, 32; *PL* 32, 1180. Cf. *De Vera Religione* X, 18; *PL* 34, 130. *De Trinitate* XI, 5, 8; *PL* 42, 990.

4 *De Quant. Animae* 23, 41; *PL* 32, 1058. Cf. . . . corpus quo (anima) velut nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod extrinsecus annuntiatur. *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 24, 51; *PL* 34, 475.

5 Sensum puto esse, non latere animam quod patitur corpus. *De Quant. Animae* 23, 41; *PL* 32, 1058. Jam video sic esse definiendum, ut sensus sit passio corporis per seipsam non latens animam, nam et omnis sensus hoc est, et omne hoc, ut opinor, sensus est. *De Quant. Animae* 25, 48; *PL* 32, 1063. The expression *non latet* is based on the $\mu\eta\lambda\alpha\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ of Plotinus. *Enn.* IV, 4, 19; ed. E. Bréhier, vol. IV, p. 121, line 25.

6 Scattered indications regarding the classic doctrine of the five senses contain nothing original. As regards the nature of sensible objects which act on the senses, their hierarchical classification will, on the contrary, be noted in accordance with the degree of their participation in the light which is the active agent of every physical stimulation: Quae cum ita sint, pertinet corporis sensus ad visa corporalia, qui per quinque quasi rivulos distanter valentes distribuitur: cum illud quod est subtilissimum in corpore et ob hoc animae vicinius quam cetera, id est

lux, primum per oculos sola diffunditur, emicatque in radiis oculorum ad visibilia contuenda; deinde mixtura quadam, primum cum aere puro, secundo cum aere caliginoso atque nebuloso, tertio cum corpulentiore humore, quarto cum terrena crassitudine, quinque sensus cum ipso, ubi sola excellit, oculorum sensu efficit, sicut in libro quarto, itemque in septimo disseruisse me recolo. *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 16, 32; *PL* 34, 466. The theory according to which every visual sensation supposes rays emitted by our eyes (a theory which is implicit in this passage) is developed in *De Gen. ad Litt.* IV, 34, 54; *PL* 34, 319-20. *De Trinitate* IX, 3, 3; *PL* 42, 962. The active role reserved for light, as the only sense stimulant, makes all other sensations more or less degraded visual sensations. This position is to be explained by the purely passive conception St. Augustine formed of matter (*De Civitate Dei* V, 9, 4; *PL* 41, 151-52). Thus, to make it possible to attribute any efficacy to sensible bodies, he had to have recourse to a material principle which would be as similar to the soul as possible and which would share to a certain extent in the soul's efficacy. This is precisely the sensible light which, without being spirit, is still the reality which approaches it closest in the world of bodies (Cf. In corporibus autem lux tenet primum locum. *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 5, 16; *PL* 32, 1279. . . . corpus quod incorporeo vicinum est, sicut est ignis, vel potius lux et aer . . . *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 15, 21; *PL* 34, 363). This is connected with the one which makes fire an instrument of sensation (*De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 13, 20; *PL* 34, 362), because light is on the order of fire. Concerning the develop-

ment of this doctrine in the Middle Ages, see Cl. Baumeister, Witelo, p. 454 ff; and E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, ch. 9, p. 286; ch. 10, pp. 309-310.

7 Quia quanquam sit aliud sensus, aliud scientia, illud tamen *non latere* utrique commune est; ut ipsi homini et bestiae, quamvis plurimum differant, animal tamen esse commune est. Non latet enim quidquid animae apparet, sive per temperationem corporis, sive per intelligentiae puritatem; atque illud primum sensus, hoc autem alterum scientia sibi vindicavit . . . (Vellem diceret) non continuo esse scientiam si quid non latet, sed si per rationem non latet: cum autem per corpus non latet, sensum vocari, si per se ipsam non lateat corporis passio. *De Quant. Animae* 30, 58; *PL* 32, 1068.

8 The Augustinian doctrine of sensation is a reinterpretation of Plotinus' doctrine; for him the soul impresses on itself images of sensible objects perceived by the body it animates. Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, 4, 23; lines 1-3; ed. E. Bréhier, vol. IV, p. 124.

9 St. Augustine is here recalling his Manichaean error; whence the texts *De Gen. ad Litt.* III, 5, 7; *PL* 34, 282 and *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imperf.* 5, 24; *PL* 34, 228-29. The formula that follows is from the first text.

10 The paradoxical aspect of the problem has been pointed out by St. Augustine himself: Quia vero spiritus omnis omni est corpore sine dubitatione praestantior, sequitur ut non loci positione, sed naturae dignitate praestantior sit natura spiritualis isto corporeo caelo, etiam illa ubi rerum corporaliū exprimuntur imagines. *Hic existit quiddam mirabile*, ut cum prior sit cor-

pore spiritus, et posterior corporis imago quam corpus, tamen quia illud quod tempore posterius est, fit in eo quod natura prius est, praestantior sit imago corporis in spiritu quam ipsum corpus in substantia sua. Nec sane putandum est facere aliquid corpus in spiritu, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti materiae vice subdatur. Omni enim modo praestantior est qui facit ea re de qua aliquid facit; neque ullo modo spiritu praestantius est corpus; immo perspicuo modo spiritus corpore. *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 16, 32-33; *PL* 34, 466-67. Cf. below, note 21. This principle is the last rampart behind which Augustinians in the Middle Ages will make their stand in their struggles against Thomistic doctrines. Nevertheless very few of them, not even St. Bonaventure, will dare to maintain it in all its strictness. On this point see my *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, Ch. 12, pp. 353-358.

11 *PL* 32, 1161 ff. The first five books of this work are devoted to discussions of prosody and metric, and in them the knowledge of the rhetorician, still fresh to his mind, is given free play. However, Augustine declares that he has cultivated them only as a means of drawing to intelligible things minds which are attracted by such sensuous display: *Illos igitur libros qui leget, inveniet nos cum grammaticis et poeticis animis, non habitandi electione, sed itinerandi necessitate versatos.* *De Musica* VI, 1, 1; *PL* 32, 1161-62. Thus, the doctrine we are going to study is a stage in a journey: *ut a corporeis ad incorporea transeamus.* *Ibid.* 2, 2; *PL* 32, 1163. For St. Ambrose's hymn to which the following verse belongs, see *Confess.* IX, 12, 22.

12 The list, according to the final or-

der given them by St. Augustine, is as follows: *Vocentur ergo primi judiciales* (discriminating), *secundi progressores* (voiced), *tertii occurrentes* (heard), *quarti recordabiles* (remembered), *quinti sonantes* (sounding). *De Musica* VI, 6, 16; *PL* 32, 1172.

13 *De Musica* VI, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 1165. Thus, the principle in virtue of which Augustine assigns them the first place is this: *non de illis posset (scil. hoc numerorum genus), nisi excelleret, judicare.* The principle whereby he will assign the second place will be different, since the four remaining classes are all judged by the first. This new principle will be: *facientes factis jure anteponuntur.* *De Musica* VI, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 1166.

14 *De Musica* VI, 4, 7; *PL* 32, 1166.

15 *De Musica* VI, 5, 8; *PL* 32, 1168. This principle is to be taken formally. When Augustine speaks elsewhere of generation of spiritual species by corporeal species (cf. text quoted in note 3 above), we must understand: "in the sense in which such a generation is possible," that is to say, the object acts on the body and produces its species in it, but then the soul produces within itself the sense species and later, by its own action, draws the higher species from this. Instead of "helping the problem," B. Romyer's article (*Archives de Philosophie*, 1930, VII, 2, pp. 224-6) seems to me to make it more obscure. By his extremely literal interpretation of the text in *De Trinitate* XI, 9, 16, he makes St. Augustine contradict himself. I prefer to interpret an incidental text within the framework of a treatise where the question is discussed *ex professo*.

16 *Sed si ad hoc fit anima, ut mit-*

tatur in corpus, quaeri potest utrum, si noluerit, compellatur. Sed melius creditur hoc naturaliter velle, id est, in ea natura creari ut velit, sicut naturale nobis est velle vivere. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 27, 38; *PL* 34, 369. It is this same love of the soul for its body which makes the resurrection of their bodies necessary for the perfect happiness of souls. Quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota intentione pergat in illud summum caelum, quamdiu non subest corpus, cujus administratione appetitus ille conquiescat. *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 35, 68; *PL* 34, 483.

17 Nam et ipse corporis dolor in quolibet animante magna et mirabilis animae vis est, quae illam compagem ineffabili permixtione vitaliter continet, et in quamdam sui moduli redigit unitatem, cum eam non indifferenter, sed, ut ita dicam, indignanter, patitur corrumpi atque dissolvi. *De Gen. ad Litt.* III, 16, 25; *PL* 34, 290.

18 *De Quant. Animae* 19, 33; *PL* 32, 1054. Cf. Haec igitur primo, quod cuius animadvertere facile est, corpus hoc terrenum atque mortale praesentia sua vivificat, colligit in unum atque in uno tenet, diffuere atque contabescere non sinit; alimenta per membra aequaliter, suis cuique reddit, distribui facit; congruentiam ejus modumque conservat, non tantum in pulchritudine, sed etiam in crescendo atque gignendo. . . . Ascende itaque alterum gradum, et vide quid possit anima in sensibus, ubi evidentior manifestiorque vita intelligitur. *De Quant. Animae* 33, 70-71; *PL* 32, 1074. This last formula shows clearly the vital character of sensation.

19 Ego enim ab anima hoc corpus

animari non puto, nisi intentione facientis. Nec ab isto quidquam illam pati arbitror, sed facere de illo et in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae. *De Musica* VI, 5, 9; *PL* 32, 1168.

20 Corporalia ergo quaecumque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obijciuntur extrinsecus, non in anima, sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt, quod operi ejus aut adversetur aut congruat. Ideoque cum renititur adversanti, et materiam sibi subjectam in operis sui vias difficulter impingit, fit attentior ex difficultate in actionem; quae difficultas, propter attentionem cum eam non latet, sentire dicitur, et hoc vocatur dolor aut labor. *De Musica* VI, 5, 9; *PL* 32, 1168. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 14, 20; *PL* 34, 363. *Epist.* 118, 4, 24; *PL* 33, 443-44. A comparison with Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, 3, 21-22 and IV, 4, 19, is useful, not for the terminology, but for the general tendencies.

21 Et ne longum faciam, videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in ejus passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur. Sed iste sensus, qui etiam dum nihil sentimus, inest tamen, instrumentum est corporis, quod ea temperatione agitur ab anima, ut in eo sit ad passionem corporis cum attentione agendas paratior, similia similibus ut adjungat, repellatque quod noxium est. Agit porro, ut opinor, luminosum aliquid in oculis, aerium serenissimum et mobilissimum in auribus, caliginosum in naribus, in ore humidum, in tactu terrenum et quasi lutulentum. Sed sive hac sive alia dis-

tributione ista conjiciantur, agit haec anima cum quiete, si ea quae insunt in unitate valetudinis, quasi familiari quadam consensione cesserunt. Cum autem adhibentur ea quae nonnulla, ut ita dicam, alteritate corpus afficiunt, exserit attentiores actiones, suis quibusque locis atque instrumentis accommodatas: tunc videre, vel audire, vel olfacere, vel gustare, vel tangendo sentire dicitur; quibus actionibus congrua libenter associat, et moleste obstitit incongruis. Has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere cum sentit, non easdem passionibus recipere. *De Musica* VI, 5, 10; *PL* 32, 1169. The Augustinian doctrine of sensation has been well understood by Ferraz, *La psychologie de s. Augustin*, pp. 117-124. The pronounced *mentalism* of this theory of sensation is undoubtedly explained by Augustine's strong desire to react against the materialistic sensualism of Democritus and Epicurus. See *Epist.* 118, 29; *PL* 33, 446. Whence, too, all the arguments based on the disproportion between the perceiving mind and the object perceived.

22 Quamvis ergo prius videamus aliquod corpus, quod antea non videramus, atque inde incipiat imago ejus in spiritu nostro, quo illud cum absens fuerit recordemur, tamen eandem ejus imaginem non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in seipso facit celeritate mirabili, quae ineffabiliter longe est a corporis tarditate. *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 16, 33; *PL* 34, 467. This text, along with the phrase "celeritate mirabili," will recur frequently in the course of the Middle Ages. Neque enim corpus sentit, sed anima per corpus, quo velut nuntio utitur ad formandum

in seipsa quod extrinsecus nuntiatur. *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 24, 51; *PL* 34, 475. Ferraz (*La Psychologie*, pp. 121-22) compares the Augustinian doctrine of sensation to that of Plotinus (*Enn.* IV, 6, 2 and IV, 6, 19). For sensations conceived as actions see *Enn.* III, 6, 2 and IV, 6, 3; as judgements, *Enn.* III, 6, 1; IV, 3, 23; IV, 3, 26; and even as kinds of intelligible contemplation, *Enn.* I, 1, 7. Ch. Boyer (*L'idée de vérité*, p. 171) mentions *Enn.* III, 6, 2.

23 The mode of expression and the doctrine are borrowed from Plotinus, *Enn.* IV, 4, 23.

24 The mode of expression is Augustine's own: Dat enim (anima) eis (corporum imaginibus) formandis quiddam substantiae suae. *De Trinitate* X, 5, 7; *PL* 42, 977.

25 Cum autem ab eisdem suis operationibus aliquid patitur, a seipsa patitur, non a corpore, sed plane cum se accommodat corpori; et ideo apud seipsam minus est, quia corpus semper minus quam ipsa est. *De Musica* VI, 5, 12; *PL* 32, 1169-70.

26 *De Utilitate Credendi* 1, 1; *PL* 42, 65. See also *De Musica* VI, 4, 7; *PL* 32, 1166-67 and VI, 5, 14; *PL* 32, 1170-71; *De Trinitate* (note 24 above). Cf. Chapter V, sec. 3.

27 Itemque in auditu, nisi auribus perceptae vocis imaginem continuo spiritus in seipso formaret, ac memoria retineret, ignoraretur secunda syllaba utrum secunda esset, cum jam prima utique nulla esset, quae percussa aure transisset; ac sic omnis locutionis usus, omnis cantandi suavitas, omnis postremo in actibus nostris corporalis motus dilapsus occideret; neque ullum

progressum nancisceretur, si transactos corporis motus memoriter spiritus non teneret, quibus consequentes in agendo connecteret. Quos utique non tenet, nisi imaginaliter a se factos in se. *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 16, 33; *PL* 34, 467. Note particularly the full development in the *De Musica* and especially: Quamlibet enim brevis syllaba, cum et incipiat et desinat, alio tempore initium ejus, et alio finis sonat. Tenditur ergo et ipsa quantulumcumque temporis intervallo, et ab initio suo per medium suum tendit ad finem. Ita ratio invenit tam localia quam temporalia spatia infinitam divisionem recipere; et idcirco nullius syllabae cum initio finis auditur. In audienda itaque vel brevissima syllaba, nisi memoria nos adjuvet, ut eo momento temporis quo jam non initium, sed finis syllabae sonat, maneat ille motus in animo, qui factus est cum initium ipsum sonuit, nihil nos audisse possumus dicere. . . . Quod si de una syllaba brevi minus sequitur mens tardior quod invenit ratio, de duabus certe nemo dubitat, quin eas simul nulla anima possit audire. Non enim sonat secunda, nisi prima destiterit: quod autem simul sonare non potest, simul audiri qui potest? Ut igitur nos ad capienda spatia locorum diffusio radiorum juvat, qui e brevibus pupulis in aperta emicant, et adeo sunt nostri corporis, ut quanquam in procul positis rebus quas videmus, a nostra anima vegetentur; ut ergo eorum effusione adjuvamus ad capienda spatia locorum, ita memoria, quod quasi lumen est temporalium spatiorum, quantum in suo genere quodammodo extrudi potest, tantum eorumdem spatiorum capit. *De Musica* VI 8, 21; *PL* 32, 1174.

28 For example, when we pay no attention to the sound which strikes our ear, the sensation is not perceived: Hinc est illud quod plerumque alia cogitatione occupati, coram loquentes non nobis videmur audisse; non quia occurrentes illos numeros non agit tunc anima, cum sine dubio sonus ad aures perveniat, et illa in passione corporis sui cessare non possit, nec possit nisi aliter moveri quam si illa non fieret, sed quia intentione in aliud subinde extinguitur motionis impetus, qui si maneret, in memoria utique maneret, ut nos et inveniremus et sentiremus audisse. *De Musica* VI, 8, 21; *PL* 32, 1174. Thus the soul produces the sensation of sound within itself, but for want of attention does not gather its successive elements in its memory and, consequently, does not perceive it. So St. Augustine was aware of the existence of non-conscious psychological states.

29 It must turn a solid body about in front of itself in order to study its various sides one after the other, and then remember each of them in order to perceive the form of the whole: a sphere, cube etc.: Siquidem nec in ipsis corporum formis quae ad oculos pertinent, possumus rotunda vel quadra, vel quaecumque alia solida et determinata judicare, et omnino sentire, nisi ea ob oculos versemus: cum autem alia pars aspicitur, si exciderit quod est aspectum in alia, frustratur omnino judicantis intentio, quia et hoc aliqua mora temporis fit; cui variatae opus est invigilare memoriam. *De Musica* VI, 8, 21; *PL* 32, 1175.

30 See note 9 above. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imperf.* 5, 24; *PL* 34, 228-229.

CHAPTER V

1 On this point consult especially the *De Magistro* (PL 32, 1193-1221). Reference will be made to other important texts in the course of this analysis. On the question in general see A. Martin, *S. Augustini philosophia*, Pt. II, cap. 29, ed. J. Fabre, pp. 204-8; W. Ott, *Ueber die Schrift des hl. Augustinus de Magistro*, Hechingen, 1898; J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, 2nd. ed., pp. 63-69; P. Alfarcic, *L'évolution intellectuelle de s. Augustin*, vol. I, pp. 494-99; R. Jolivet, "La doctrine augustinienne de l'illumination," in *Mélanges augustiniens*, pp. 77-84.

2 Aug. Constat ergo inter nos verba signa esse. *Ad. Constat. De Magistro* 2, 3; PL 32, 1196. A general distinction must be made between signs (*signa*) and things signified (*significabilia*). *De Magistro* 4, 8; PL 32, 1199. From another point of view, visual and auditory signs are distinguished (*ibid.*). And finally, among signs, words designating other signs, e.g. the words "gesture" or "words," are distinguished from words signifying things, e.g. the word "stone." *De Magistro* 4, 7; PL 32, 1198-99.

3 *De Magistro* 3, 5-6; PL 32, 1197-98 and 10, 32; PL 32, 1213. A useful summary of the first part of the *De Magistro* is found in the same work, ch. 7, 19-20; PL 32, 1204-07.

4 *De Magistro* 13, 41; PL 32, 1218. With this argument are linked those of section 42 (*ibid.*): the words we utter do not always correspond to the content of our minds. Sometimes we tell lies, and this amounts to speaking in order to hide our thoughts rather than to reveal them. At other times our

memory suggests a ready-made formula to us and it does service for the thing we really wanted to say, e.g. distraction while singing a hymn. Sometimes we make mistakes through mere *lapsus linguae*.

5 *De Magistro* 13, 43; PL 32, 1218-19.

6 *De Magistro* 13, 44; PL 32, 1219.

7 *De Magistro* 13, 45; PL 32, 1219.

8 *De Magistro* 10, 33-35; PL 32, 1214-15 and 12, 39; PL 32, 1216-17.

9 Quid autem absurdius quam eum putare locutione mea doceri, qui posset, antequam loquerer, ea ipsa interrogatus exponere? Nam quod saepe contingit, ut interrogatus aliquid neget, atque ad id fatendum aliis interrogationibus urgeatur, fit hoc imbecillitate cernentis, qui de re tota illam lucem consulere non potest; quod ut partibus faciat, admonetur, cum de iisdem istis partibus interrogatur, quibus illa summa constat, quam totam cernere non valebat. Quo si verbis perducitur ejus qui interrogat, non tamen docentibus verbis, sed eo modo inquiringibus, quo modo est ille a quo quaeritur, intus discere idoneus . . . *De Magistro* 12, 40; PL 32, 1217.

10 Tum vero totum illud quod negaveras fatereris, cum haec ex quibus constat, clara et certa esse cognosceres; omnia scilicet quae loquimur, aut ignorare auditorem utrum vera sint, aut falsa esse non ignorare, aut scire vera esse. Horum trium in primo aut credere, aut opinari, aut dubitare; in secundo adversari atque renuere; in tertio attestari: nusquam igitur discere. Quia et ille qui post verba nostra rem nescit, et qui se falsa novit audisse,

et qui posset interrogatus eadem respondere quae dicta sunt, nihil verbis meis didicisse convincitur. *De Magistro* 12, 40; *PL* 32, 1217-1218.

11 In 387 he writes: Tales sunt qui bene disciplinis liberalibus eruditi; siquidem illas sine dubio in se oblivione obrutas eruunt discendo, et quodammodo refodiunt. . . . *Soliloq.* II, 20, 35; *PL* 32, 902. This and the following texts are those in which the doctrine of reminiscence is stated most categorically. They are also the texts Augustine retracts (see note 12 below). In 388 he writes: Magnam, omnino magnam, et qua nescio utrum quidquam majus sit, quaestionem moves, in qua tantum nostrae sibi met opiniones adversantur, ut tibi anima nullam, mihi contra omnes artes secum attulisse videatur; nec aliud quidquam esse id quod dicitur discere, quam reminisci et recordari. *De Quant. Animae* 20, 34; *PL* 32, 1055. Other allusions in the same treatise: 26, 50-51; *PL* 32, 1064; 32, 69; *PL* 32, 1073. In 389 he writes: Nonnulli calumniantur adversus Socraticum illud nobilissimum inventum quo asseritur, non nobis ea quae discimus, veluti nova inseri, sed in memoriam recordatione revocari, dicentes memoriam praeteritarum rerum esse, haec autem quae intelligendo discimus, Platone ipso auctore, manere semper nec posse interire, ac per hoc non esse praeterita; qui non attendunt illam visionem esse praeteritam, qua haec aliquando vidimus mente; a quibus quia defluximus et aliter alia videre coepimus, ea nos reminiscendo revisere, id est, per memoriam. *Epist. 7 ad Nebridium* 1, 2; *PL* 33, 68. If his mind had been settled on the point, this would have been an excellent opportunity to substitute the Augustinian

memory of the present for the Platonic recollection of the past, but Augustine does not do so. P. Alfarić (*L'évolution*, p. 497, note 4) seems to admit also that Augustine has changed his point of view on the question. See J. Hessen, *Die Begründung*, pp. 55-62. His arguments are very strong and his conclusion, a very sober one, is that in his early writings Augustine "leaned towards the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul." This, it seems to me, is difficult to question.

12 It is difficult to draw any conclusion on this point from the text of the *Retractationes*. The retraction of the text from the *Soliloquia* seems rather to bear on the same theme. After retracting one passage in which the wording might lead one to suppose that he had agreed with an erroneous view of Porphyry's (cavendum fuit ne putaremur illam Porphyrii falsi philosophi tenere sententiam. . . .), Augustine replaces reminiscence with illumination: Item quodam loco dixi, quod disciplinis liberalibus eruditi, sine dubio in se illas oblivione obrutas eruunt discendo et quodam modo refodiunt (*Soliloq.* II, 20, 35; *PL* 32, 902). Sed hoc quoque improbo: credibilis est enim propterea vera respondere de quibusdam disciplinis etiam imperitos earum quando bene interrogantur, quia praesens est eis, quantum id capere possunt, lumen rationis aeternae, ubi haec immutabilia vera conspiciunt, et non quia ea noverant aliquando et obliiti sunt, quod Platoni vel talibus visum est. *Retract.* I, 4, 3-4; *PL* 32, 590. On the other hand, it seems impossible to interpret the passage retracting the text of the *De Quantitate Animae* as anything more than the retraction of an expression:

. . . non sic accipiendum est, quasi ex hoc approbatur, animam vel hic in alio corpore, vel alibi sive in corpore sive extra corpus, aliquando vixisse; et ea quae interrogata respondet, cum hic non didicerit, in alia vita ante didicisse. *Retract.* I, 8, 2; *PL* 32, 594. Moreover, we should note that Augustine already clearly teaches the doctrine of illumination in the *Soliloquia* (I, 8, 15; *PL* 32, 877), and that on this point he could not have contradicted himself in the same work. Besides, he seems to allow the full explanation of the difficulty to stand over (*Soliloq.* II, 20, 36; *PL* 32, 904).

13 See Chapter III, p. 51.

14 Denique cur de solis rebus intelligibilibus id fieri potest, ut bene interrogatus quisque respondeat quod ad quamque pertinet disciplinam, etiamsi ejus ignarus est? Cur hoc facere de rebus sensibilibus nullus potest, nisi quas isto vidit in corpore constitutus, aut eis quae noverant indicantibus credit, seu litteris cujusque seu verbis? *De Trinitate* XII, 15, 24; *PL* 42, 1011-12.

15 By eliminating reminiscence Augustine *ipso facto* eliminates Innatism. However, the doctrine of innate ideas has often been attributed to him, sometimes even in order to distinguish his doctrine clearly from that of reminiscence. See, for example, J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, p. 55: "La théorie de la réminiscence a souvent occupé saint Augustin" or, "pour lui, réminiscence signifie toujours innéité." Actually, the expression "innate ideas" is not, as far as I know, to be found in his works, and it has the disadvantage of concealing the genuine Augustinian theory of the origin of true ideas, namely the theory of God's presence. The passage

of the *Confessions* (X, 12, 19) which Martin advances in support of Innatism (p. 55, note 2) actually does not refer to this doctrine at all. Martin also says (p. 51): "Dès qu'il se met à écrire, saint Augustin enseigne la doctrine de l'innéité; et il s'y est toujours tenu." The texts cited in support of this statement (pp. 51-55) show that by Innatism Martin really means the doctrine of illumination. This, then, is merely a case of unfortunate terminology, not of misunderstanding the substance of the doctrine.

16 Sed cum vel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes, vel ab alio bene interrogati de quibusdam liberalibus artibus, ea quae invenimus, non alibi quam in animo nostro invenimus: neque id est invenire, quod facere aut gignere; alioquin aeterna gigneret animus inventione temporali; nam aeterna saepe invenit; quid enim tam aeternum quam circuli ratio, vel si quid aliud in hujusmodi artibus, nec non fuisse aliquando, nec non fore comprehenditur? *De Immort. Animae* 4, 6; *PL* 32, 1024.

17 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 9, 27 and 10, 28; *PL* 32, 1255-56.

18 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 7, 15-19; *PL* 32, 1249-51.

19 Quapropter nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem, haec omnia quae incommutabiliter vera sunt continentem; quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam, vel cujusquam hominis, sed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tanquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen, praesto esse ac se praebere communiter; omne autem quod communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque intelligentibus praesto est, ad ullius eorum proprie

naturam pertinere quis dixerit? Meministi enim, ut opinor, quid de sensibus corporis paulo ante tractatum sit; ea scilicet quae oculorum vel aurium sensu communiter tangimus, sicuti sunt colores et soni, quos ego et tu simul videmus, vel simul audimus, non pertinere ad oculorum nostrorum auriumve naturam, sed ad sentiendum nobis esse communia. Sic ergo etiam illa quae ego et tu communiter propria quisque mente conspiciamus, nequaquam dixeris ad mentis alicujus nostrum pertinere naturam. Duorum enim oculi quod simul vident, nec hujus nec illius oculi esse poteris dicere, sed aliquid tertium in quod utriusque conferatur aspectus. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 12, 33; *PL* 32, 1259.

20 *De Beata Vita* 4, 35; *PL* 32, 976.

21 *Soliloq.* I, 1, 1; *PL* 32, 869.

22 De universis autem quae intelligimus non loquentem qui personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus veritatem, verbis fortasse ut consulamus admoniti. Ille autem qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus (*Ephes.* 3, 16), id est, incommutabilis Dei Virtus atque sempiterna Sapientia. *De Magistro* 11, 38; *PL* 32, 1216.

23 . . . sed tunc quoque noster auditor, si et ipse illa secreto ac simplici oculo videt, novit quod dico sua contemplatione, non verbis meis. Ergo ne hunc quidem doceo vera dicens, vera intuentem; docetur enim non verbis meis, sed ipsis rebus, Deo intus pandente, manifestis; itaque de his etiam interrogatus respondere posset. *De Magistro*, 12, 40; *PL* 32, 1217. This remains true even in the case of faith; if Moses himself were speaking to us, the inner truth would teach us that what

he says is true. *Confess.* XI, 3, 5; *PL* 32, 811.

24 *Matt.* 23, 10. See *Retract.* I, 11, 4; *PL* 32, 602. *De Magistro* 14, 46; *PL* 32, 1220. *Epist.* 144, 1; *PL* 33, 591. *Epist.* 166, 4, 9; *PL* 33, 724.

25 *Sermo* 298, 5, 5; *PL* 38, 1367. Cf. *Sermo* 23, 2, 2; *PL* 38, 155-56.

26 Fieri enim potest, sicut jam in hoc opere supra diximus, ut hoc (*scil.* interrogata respondere) ideo possit (*scil.* anima), quia natura intelligibilis est, et connectitur non solum intelligibilibus, verum etiam immutabilibus rebus, eo ordine facta, ut cum se ad eas res movet quibus connexa est, vel ad seipsam, in quantum eas videt, in tantum de his vera respondeat. Nec sane omnes artes eo modo secum attulit, ac secum habet: nam de artibus quae ad sensus corporis pertinent, sicut multa medicinae, sicut astrologiae omnia, nisi quod hic didicerit, non potest dicere. Ea vero quae sola intelligentia capit, propter id quod dixi, cum vel a seipsa vel ab alio fuerit bene interrogata, et recordata respondet. *Retract.* I, 8, 2; *PL* 32, 594. It goes without saying that if the questions asked refer to what is intelligible in the body, then sensible experience is useless. Cf. *Epist.* 13 ad *Nebriid.* 4; *PL* 33, 78.

27 On this new meaning of memory, see this Chapter, sec. 3, *The Life of the Soul*.

28 Quocirca invenimus nihil esse aliud discere ista, quorum non per sensus haurimus imagines, sed sine imaginibus, sicuti sunt, per seipsa intus cernimus, nisi ea, quae passim atque indispote memoria continebat, cogitando quasi colligere, atque animadvertendo curare, ut tanquam ad manum posita

in ipsa memoria, ubi sparsa prius et neglecta latitabant, jam familiari intentioni facile occurrant . . . Nam cogo et cogito sic est, ut ago et agito, facio et factito. Verum tamen sibi animus hoc verbum proprie vindicavit, ut non quod alibi, sed quod in animo colligitur, id est cogitur, cogitari proprie jam dicatur. *Confess.* X, 11, 18; *PL* 32, 787. Thus, *cogitare* is a movement of the mind gathering together within itself the hidden knowledge it contains, whether it has never as yet considered it (in which case it *learns*), or has already known and then forgotten it (in which case it *remembers*). It follows, then, that learning is in a sense but remembering, since a thing about which a person has never thought is knowledge that is already present, but has not yet received attention. Cf. *De Trinitate* XIV, 6, 8; *PL* 42, 1042. Cartesian *cogitatio* clearly finds its source here.

29 Indeed, in so far as their substance is concerned, sensations are themselves mental. In a sense, then, what Descartes will say of his own doctrine can be said of Augustine's: since nothing enters the soul from without, its whole content is innate, including sensation itself. Augustine, however, never said so, because he distinguishes the ideas the soul forms on notice from the body from the ideas it forms in considering itself alone. Only the latter are properly innate.

30 Haec igitur natura spiritualis, in qua non corpora, sed corporum similitudines exprimuntur, inferioris generis visiones habet, quam illud mentis atque intelligentiae lumen, quo et ista inferiora dijudicantur, et ea cernuntur quae neque sunt corpora, neque ullas gerunt formas similes corporum, velut

ipsa mens et omnis animae affectio bona, cui contraria sunt ejus vitia, quae recte culpantur atque damnantur in hominibus. Quo enim alio modo ipse intellectus nisi intelligendo conspicitur? Ita et caritas, gaudium, pax, longanimitas, benignitas, bonitas, fides, mansuetudo, continentia et cetera hujusmodi, quibus propinquatur Deo (*Galat.* 5, 22-23), et ipse Deus ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia (*Rom.* 11, 36). *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 24, 50; *PL* 34, 474. Cf. *Confess.* X, 14, 22; *PL* 32, 788.

31 *De Trinitate* IX, 3, 3; *PL* 42, 962-963.

32 *De Ordine* II, 3, 10; *PL* 32, 999. Cf. Ego autem ratio ita sum in mentibus, ut in oculis est aspectus. *Soliloq.* I, 6, 12; *PL* 32, 875. P. Alfarić observes that an analogous comparison is implied in a passage of the Neo-Platonist Fonteius of Carthage quoted by Augustine in *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 12; *PL* 40, 14 (*L'évolution intellectuelle*, p. 435, note 1). Cf. *Retract.* I, 26; *PL* 32, 624.

The principal texts on the doctrine of illumination are collected by A. Martin, *S. Augustini Philosophia*, II, ch. 32. In addition to the book of J. Hessen already quoted, consult also R. Jolivet, *La doctrine augustinienne*, pp. 52-172. This work, revised and supplemented by new notes, has been published separately as *Dieu soleil des esprits*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1934.

33 Nam mentis quasi sui sunt oculi sensus animae; disciplinarum autem quaeque certissima talia sunt, qualia illa quae sole illustrantur, ut videri possint, veluti terra est atque terrena omnia; Deus autem est ipse qui il-

lustrat. *Soliloq.* I, 6, 12; *PL* 32, 875. Cf. I, 14, 24; *PL* 32, 882.

34 Plato, *Republ.* 517 b. In the *De Civitate Dei* (XI, 25; *PL* 41, 338), Plato is praised for having taught that God is "intelligentiae dator," and this assumes the identification of God with the Idea of the Good. Moreover, the whole Allegory of the Cave (Plato, *Republ.* 514 ff.) is summarized by Augustine in *Soliloq.* I, 13, 23; *PL* 32, 881-882.

35 Saepe multumque Plotinus asserit sensum Platonis explanans, ne illam quidem, quam credunt esse universitatis animam, aliunde beatam esse quam nostram: idque esse lumen quod ipsa non est, sed a quo creata est, et quo intelligibiliter illuminante intelligibiliter lucet. Dat etiam similitudinem ad illa incorporea de his caelestibus conspicuis amplisque corporibus, tanquam ille sit sol et ipsa sit luna. Lunam quippe solis objectu illuminari putant. *De Civitate Dei* X, 2; *PL* 41, 279. Cf. Deum de Deo, lumen de lumine. Per hoc lumen factum est solis lumen, et lumen quod fecit solem, sub quo fecit et nos, factum est sub sole propter nos. Factum est, inquam, propter nos sub sole lumen quod fecit solem. In *Joan. Evang.* 34, 8, 4; *PL* 35, 1653. For the distinction between intelligible and sensible knowledge, see Plotinus, *Enn.* V, 1, 10; V, 9, 1.

36 Consonans (scil. Plotinus) Evangelio, ubi legitur: "Fuit homo missus a Deo, cui nomen erat Joannes; hic venit in testimonium, ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine, ut omnes crederent per eum. Non erat ille lumen, sed ut testimonium perhiberet de lumine. Erat lumen verum quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in

hunc mundum." In qua differentia satis ostenditur, animam rationalem vel intellectualem, qualis erat in Joanne, sibi lumen esse non posse, sed alterius veri luminis participatione lucere. Hoc et ipse Joannes fatetur, ubi ei perhibens testimonium dicit: "Nos omnes de plenitudine ejus accepimus." *De Civitate Dei* X, 2; *PL* 41, 280. These texts of Scripture are taken from *John* 1, 6-9 and 16. Whence, undoubtedly, comes the comparison which will be repeated over and over again during the Middle Ages, namely that between God and a source of light.

37 Some of the texts Augustine used most frequently are collected in his *In Joan. Evang.* 34-35; *PL* 35, 1652-1662.

38 See the whole opening prayer of the *Soliloquies*: Deus qui nisi mundos verum scire noluisti. Deus pater veritatis, pater sapientiae, pater verae summaeque vitae, pater beatitudinis, pater boni et pulchri, pater intelligibilis lucis, pater evigilationis atque illuminationis nostrae, pater pignoris quo admonemur redire ad te. *Soliloq.* I, 1, 2; *PL* 32, 870. On the other hand, the presence of divine Wisdom in the soul is inspired by the book of Wisdom, 6, 13-21, whose testimony Augustine invoked in *De Moribus Ecclesiae* I, 17, 32; *PL* 32, 1324-1325.

39 Intelligibilis nempe Deus est, intelligibilia etiam illa disciplinarum spectamina; tamen plurimum differunt. Nam et terra visibilis, et lux; sed terra, nisi luce illustrata, videri non potest. Ergo et illa quae in disciplinis traduntur, quae quisque intelligit, verissima esse nulla dubitatione concedit, credendum est ea non posse intelligi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole illustrentur. Ergo

quomodo in hoc sole tria quaedam licet animadvertere: quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat; ita in illo secretissimo Deo quem vis intelligere, tria quaedam sunt: quod est, quod intelligitur, et quod cetera facit intelligi. *Soliloq.* I, 8, 15; *PL* 32, 877. A shorter formula is: Lumen et alia demonstrat et scipsum. *In Joan. Evang.* 35, 8, 4; *PL* 35, 1659.

40 Cf. *Soliloq.* I, 8, 15; *PL* 32, 877: . . . ex illa similitudine sensibilibus etiam de Deo aliquid nunc me doceat. And also: Lux est quaedam ineffabilis et incomprehensibilis mentium. Lux ista vulgaris nos doceat, quantum potest, quomodo se illud habeat. *Op. cit.* I, 13, 23; *PL* 32, 881. It is not without some interest to observe that this comparison, and it is one dear to the Platonists, is justified in Augustine's eyes by a decisive text of St. Paul (*Ephes.* 5, 13) which he himself used: Omne enim quod manifestatur lumen est. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 19, 52; *PL* 32, 1268. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imperf.* 5, 24; *PL* 34, 228-229. But even when it is a question of scriptural testimony, Augustine clearly underscores its metaphorical character: Loquens ergo per nubem carnis lumen indeficiens, lumen sapientiae ait hominibus: ego sum lux mundi. . . . *In Joan. Evang.* 34, 8, 5; *PL* 35, 1654; and *ibid.* 34, 8, 2; *PL* 35, 1652.

41 Noster sol iustitiae veritas Christus, non iste sol qui adoratur a paganis et Manichaeis, et videtur etiam a peccatoribus, sed ille alius cujus veritate humana natura illustratur, ad quem gaudent Angeli, hominum autem infirmatae acies cordis etsi trepidant sub radiis ejus, ad eum tandem contemplandum per mandata purgantur. *Enarr. in Ps.* 25, 2, 3; *PL* 36, 189. Cf.

In Joan. Evang. 34, 8, 2; *PL* 35, 1652. *De Gen. contra Manich.* I, 3, 6; *PL* 34, 176.

42 *Confess.* VII, 9, 13; *PL* 32, 740.

43 *De Gen. ad Litt.* IV, 28, 45; *PL* 34, 314-315.

44 *De Gen. ad Litt.* IV, 28, 45; *PL* 34, 314-315.

45 Ipsa autem visio, intellectus est ille qui in anima est, qui conficitur ex intelligente et eo quod intelligitur: ut in oculis videre quod dicitur, ex ipso sensu constat atque sensibili, quorum detracto quolibet, videri nihil possit. *Soliloq.* I, 6, 13; *PL* 32, 876. Cf. Hoc ergo discernite, aliud esse lumen quod illuminat, aliud esse quod illuminatur. Nam et oculi nostri lumina dicuntur, et unusquisque ita jurat, tangens oculos suos, per lumina sua: sic vivant lumina mea! usitata juratio est. Quae lumina si lumina sunt, desit lumen in cubiculo tuo clauso, pateant et luceant tibi: non utique possunt. Quomodo ergo ista in facie quae habemus, et lumina nuncupamus, et quando sana sunt, et quando patent, indigent extrinsecus adiutorio luminis; . . . sic mens nostra, qui est oculus animae, nisi veritatis lumine radietur, et ab eo qui illuminat nec illuminatur, mirabiliter illustretur, nec ad sapientiam nec ad iustitiam poterit pervenire. *In Joan. Evang.* 35, 8, 3; *PL* 35, 1658.

46 We refer to the following classic text: . . . sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligibilibus naturali ordine, disponente creatore, sub iuncta, sic ista videat in quadam luce sui generis incorporea, quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadjacent, cujus lucis capax eique congruens est crea-

tus. *De Trinitate* XII, 15, 24; *PL* 42, 1011. 'Sui generis' may be translated 'of a particular kind' or 'of the same kind as it is.' We believe the first translation is the more natural one, and that was the opinion of the Augustinian, Matthew of Aquasparta (*Quaest. Disput.*, ed. Quarrachi, 1903; vol. i, p. 243 and 264, ad 10). St. Thomas adopts the second translation (*De Spirit. Creat.* X, Praeterea) and Thomistic interpreters generally agree with him. No doubt the problem cannot be solved by grammar, but it is of little importance for the fundamentals of the question, because in any case the text cannot mean that the light in question is created, as is the soul to whose genus it belongs, but only that this light is of the same kind as the soul, i.e. incorporeal as it is. Ch. Boyer is right, at least for normal, not mystical knowledge, in saying that even if we admit the other translation, "a certain light of a special kind," it could not designate God (*L'idée de vérité*, p. 199, note 1). But from the fact that this expression does not designate God, it does not follow that it designates a human intellect analogous to Thomism's agent intellect. St. Augustine is here speaking of something entirely different. He says simply that the soul sees the intelligible in a light which is incorporeal as the soul itself is, just as the eyes of the body see material objects in a light which is corporeal as the eyes are. The mind has to be very much filled with the theory of the agent intellect to find one in such a comparison, for if a person wants to press it further than is reasonable, it really leads to the contrary meaning: the human intellect is to the intelligible light as the human eye is to the sun's light. Now the sun's light is external

to the eye. Therefore, the intelligible light is external to the intellect. In our opinion that is not what St. Augustine means. But it is the only thing he can be made to say if, instead of taking *sui generis* to indicate the contrast between the spiritual nature of the mind and the corporeal nature of sight, we persist in reading into it an ontological fellowship between the being of the light and the being of the intellect.

47 . . . sicuti est nostra ipsa intelligentia . . . and further on: Ipsa enim pax quae praececlit omnem intellectum, non est utique minor nostro intellectu, ut cum iste sit oculis corporalibus invisibilis, illa putetur esse visibilis. *Epist.* 147 ad Paulinam 18, 45; *PL* 33, 617. Moreover, in this case the terms do not come from Aristotle but from St. Paul (*Philipp.* 4, 7), and it is always a question of the divine light's incorporeity.

48 This text has been pointed out by Ch. Boyer (*Op. cit.*, p. 197) with whom we are happy to agree on this point, even though we do not agree with him on this intellect's functions: Proinde cum tantum intersit inter cogitationem qua cogito terram luminis vestram (*scil.* of the Manichaeans) quae omnino nusquam est, et cogitationem qua cogito Alexandriam quam nunquam vidi, sed tamen est; rursusque tantum intersit inter istam qua cogito Alexandriam incognitam, et eam qua cogito Carthaginem cognitam; ab hac quoque cogitatione qua intelligo iustitiam, castitatem, fidem, veritatem, caritatem, bonitatem et quidquid ejusmodi est; quae cogitatio dicite, si potestis, quale lumen sit, quo illa omnia quae hoc non sunt et inter se discernuntur, et quantum ab hoc distent fida manifestatione cognoscitur; et tamen etiam hoc lumen

non est lumen illud quod Deus est; hoc enim creatura est, creator est ille; hoc factum, ille qui fecit; hoc denique mutabile, dum vult quod nolebat, et scit quod nesciebat, et reminiscitur quod oblitum erat, illud autem incommutabili voluntate, veritate, aeternitate persistit, et inde nobis est initium existendi, ratio cognoscendi, lex amandi. *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* XX, 7; PL 42, 372.

49 See note 46.

50 *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 54; PL 40, 38.

51 Audisti quanta vis sit animae ac potentia, quod ut breviter colligam, quemadmodum fatendum est animam humanam non esse quod Deus est, ita praesumendum nihil inter omnia quae creavit, Deo esse propinquius. *De Quant. Animae* 34, 77; PL 32, 1077. The angels can intervene only to prepare our souls to receive illumination, as one opens the windows to let in the sun. See *Enarr. in Ps.* 118, 18, 4; PL 37, 1553.

52 Ideas Plato primus appellasse perhibetur; non tamen si hoc nomen antequam ipse instrueret, non erat, ideo vel res ipsae non erant . . . Nam non est verisimile sapientes aut nullos fuisse ante Platonem, aut istas . . . non intellexisse, siquidem tanta in eis vis constituitur ut nisi his intellectis sapiens esse nemo possit. . . . *Ideas* igitur latine possumus vel *formas* vel *species* dicere, ut verbum a verbo transferre videamur. Si autem rationes eas vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discimus; rationes enim graece *λόγοι* appellantur, non *ideae*: sed tamen quisquis hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non aberrabit. Sunt namque *ideae* principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommu-

tabiles quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur, neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit. Anima vero negatur eas intueri posse, nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit, id est ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie vel oculo suo interiore atque intelligibili. . . . Quo constituto atque concesso, quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? Quod si recte dici vel credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita. Nec eadem ratione homo, quae equus: hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus. Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nisi in ipsa mente Creatoris? *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 46, 1-2; PL 40, 29-30. Reproduced by Malebranche, *Entretiens sur la métaphysique*, Preface, ed. P. Fontana, p. 5.

53 See preceding note.

54 Note particularly the invocation of the *Soliloquia*: Te invoco, Deus veritas, in quo et a quo et per quem vera sunt, quae vera sunt omnia. Deus sapientia, in quo et a quo et per quem sapiunt, quae sapiunt omnia. Deus vera et summa vita. . . . Deus beatitudo . . . Deus bonum et pulchrum . . . Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo et a quo et per quem intelligibiliter lucent, quae intelligibiliter lucent omnia. *Soliloq.* I, 1, 3; PL 32, 870. The same gradation is seen further along: Deus supra quem nihil, extra quem nihil, sine quo nihil est. Deus sub quo totum est, in quo totum est, cum quo totum est. *Soliloq.* I, 1, 4; PL 32, 871.

55 . . . in ea quae supra mentes nostras est incommutabili veritate. *Confess.* XII, 25, 35; *PL* 32, 840. In illa igitur aeterna veritate, ex qua . . . facta sunt omnia, formam, secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam vel in nobis vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspiciamus: atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam, tanquam verbum apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus; . . . *De Trinitate* IX, 7, 12; *PL* 42, 967. Cf. *De Vera Religione* 31, 58; *PL* 34, 148.

56 Quoted in *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 16, 34; *PL* 34, 333.

57 Creatoris namque potentia et omnipotentis atque omnitenentis virtus, causa subsistendi est omni creaturae, quae virtus ab eis quae creata sunt regendis, si aliquando cessaret, simul et illorum cessaret species omnisque natura concideret. Neque enim sicut structor aedium cum fabricaverit abscedit, atque illo cessante atque abscedente, stat opus ejus, ita mundus vel ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei Deus regimen sui subtraxerit. . . . Et illud quod ait Apostolus cum Deum Atheniensibus praedicaret: *In illo vivimus, et movemur et sumus* (*Acts* 17, 28), liquide cogitatum quantum humana mens valet, adjuvat hanc sententiam, qua credimus et dicimus Deum in iis quae creavit, indesinenter operari. *De Gen. ad Litt.* IV, 12, 22-23; *PL* 34, 304-305. Cf. *ibid.* VIII, 26, 48; *PL* 34, 391-392.

58 Neque enim, ut dicebamus, sicut operatur homo terram, ut culta atque fecunda sit, qui cum fuerit operatus abscedit, relinquens eam vel aratam vel satam vel rigatam vel si quid aliud, manente opere quod factum est, cum

operator abscesserit; ita Deus operatur hominem justum, id est justificando eum, ut si abscesserit, maneat in abscedente quod fecit: sed potius sicut aer praesente lumine non factus est lucidus, sed fit; quia si factus esset, non autem fieret, etiam absente lumine lucidus maneret; sic homo Deo sibi praesente illuminatur, absente autem continuo tenebratur; a quo non locorum intervallis, sed voluntatis aversione disceditur. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VIII, 12, 26; *PL* 34, 383. This last text points directly to illumination of the will by grace, but what is true of that illumination is also true of illumination of the intellect by the divine ideas. On these texts, see I. Sestili, "Thomae Aquinatis cum Augustino de illuminatione concordia," in *Divus Thomas*, XXXI (1928) p. 54-56.

59 See I. Sestili, *art. cit.*, and Ch. Boyer, *L'idée de vérité*, p. 212-213. Cf. *Gregorianum* VIII, (1927), p. 110.

60 *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 16, 34; *PL* 34, 333. This is the difference between our knowledge of sensible things and that of the angels, for they see them directly in God. Cf. *De Civitate Dei* XI, 29; *PL* 41, 343. Malebranche saw perfectly well that on this point he could not appeal to Augustine's authority: "J'avoue que saint Augustin n'a jamais dit que l'on voyait les corps en Dieu." *Entretiens sur la métaphysique*, Preface, ed. P. Fontana, vol. I, p. 14.

61 *Retract.* I, 4, 4; *PL* 32, 590. Cf. J. Martin's excellent pages (55-58); we merely dislike his use of the word 'innateness.' For a similar interpretation, cf. Ch. Boyer, *L'idée de vérité*, p. 210.

62 For an interpretation opposed to ours, consult especially Ch. Boyer, *L'*

idée de vérité, p. 156-220; "Saint Thomas et saint Augustin," in *Scuola Cattolica*, July-Sept. 1924, pp. 22-34 (in support of his interpretation he quotes Bossuet, Kleutgen, Zigliara, Lepidi etc.); "Autour de l'illumination augustinienne," in *Gregorianum* VI (1925), p. 449-453 (we have not seen this work); "Saint Thomas et saint Augustin d'après M. Gilson," in *Gregorianum* VIII (1927), 1, pp. 106-110. Consult also I. Sestili, in *Divus Thomas* XXXI (1928), pp. 50-82.

63 We should note that on this fundamental point it is St. Thomas himself who distinguishes Plato and Augustine from Aristotle: Plato vero, . . . sensum etiam posuit virtutem quamdam per se operantem . . . Et hanc opinionem tangere videtur Augustinus . . . Aristoteles autem media via processit . . . ita quod sentire non sit actus animae tantum, sed conjuncti . . . Quia igitur non est inconueniens quod sensibilia quae sunt extra animam causent aliquid in conjunctum . . . *S. Theol.* I, 84, 6 resp. It is this *conjunctum* in the Thomistic sense which is lacking in St. Augustine, not the union of soul and body, but the *Thomistic* union which entails the existence of the sensitive soul; and without it there is necessarily lacking the Thomistic phantasm which is the proper matter of abstraction. See also the penetrating metaphysical dissection performed by St. Thomas in *S. Theol.* I, 84, 6 ad 2.

64 On the other hand, Ch. Boyer writes: "D'ordinaire, on est détourné de donner à la théorie augustinienne de la connaissance une signification aussi péripatéticienne, par ce préjugé que chez Aristote et saint Thomas les données sensibles collaborent à la formation de l'intelligible et que chez

saint Augustin une telle collaboration est inconcevable" (*L'idée de vérité*, p. 213). Not at all! The difference lies in the soul's relation to the sensible object in the two doctrines. St. Thomas subjects the soul to the sensible, and therefore the Thomistic soul must elaborate the sensible, to which it is subjected, into an intelligible, while the Augustinian soul is the agent from the moment of sensation. Thus the Thomistic sensible, received by the soul from a material object, cannot be made to coincide with the Augustinian sensible, which is produced by a mind that is itself intelligible. The difference between image and idea is much less in the Augustinian than in the Thomistic system. We can see from this the cause of the difficulty which detains Ch. Boyer, who writes: "On oublie trop d'une part, que dans la théorie aristotélicienne et scolastique, le phantasm ne joue d'autre rôle que de présenter à l'intellect agent un objet où réellement se trouve de l'intelligible, lequel reste soustrait à la prise des sens; et d'autre part, que selon la pensée augustinienne, toute créature matérielle, étant un reflet de la parfaite vérité, est constituée en son fond par une participation à l'intelligible; pour quoi cette participation ne pourrait-elle pas en être saisie? Les deux métaphysiques, pour l'essentiel, coïncident: elles doivent aboutir à une même théorie de la connaissance" (*L'idée de vérité*, p. 213). Possibly, but they do not end in the same theory. The historical truth lies somewhere in between the two extremes within which we try to confine it. The intelligible is only virtual in the Thomistic phantasm and there is virtual intelligibility in the material world of Augustinism,

but there is no sensible phantasm, in the Thomistic sense, capable of entering the Augustinian soul. The *metaphysics* coincide, and it is in their conclusions rather than in the precise philosophical explanations which they provide, but the two *psychologies* do not coincide, and this is why the theory of knowledge is not the same in St. Augustine and in St. Thomas Aquinas.

65 *De Trinitate* XII, 15, 24; *PL* 42, 1011.

66 *De Trinitate* XII, 15, 25; *PL* 42, 1012.

67 "Die Frage, wie die in den Dingen liegende, objektive Wahrheit sich in die wahre Erkenntnis umsetze, oder wie die ratio im Wirklichen den Kontakt mit der ratio in der Seele findet, hat Augustinus oft berührt, ohne aber eine endgültige Entscheidung zu treffen." O. Willmann, *Geschichte der Idealismus*, II, 2, p. 299. J. Hessen (*Die Begründung der Erkenntnis*, p. 46) protests against those who, like Carl van Endert (*Der Gottesbeweis*, p. 178), say that the theory of abstraction is foreign to St. Augustine. But Hessen uses the term 'abstraction' in a very vague sense. He means merely that the senses play a part in Augustinian knowledge, and no one denies this.

68 "Licet enim gnoseologicum problema data opera et juxta aristoteleam mediae aetatis formulam in sua peculiari et quasi mechanica, ut ita dicam, structura exhibitam, versaverit nunquam Augustinus, ideoque nec unquam explicite loquutus fuerit de specie impressa in intellectu possibili, ab intellectu agente elaborata . . ." I. Sestili, *art. cit.* p. 73. Cf. B. Romeyer, *art. cit.* p. 201-202.

69 Saint Augustine's corporeal world is nearer that of Plato or Plotinus than that of Aristotle. In such a universe, sensations are intelligible contemplations of intelligible impressions (*Enn.* I, 1, 7), and abstraction of the Aristotelian type has nothing to work on here.

70 Let us note in passing that later on a certain nominalism will be able to ally itself quite easily with some Augustinian tendencies simply because the image, as thus understood, is intelligible in its own right. But here again, before we ascribe any sort of nominalism to Augustine, it would be well to discuss it. As far as I am concerned, I attribute nothing of the sort to him, but nominalism was one of the possible "offshoots" of his doctrine.

71 This important fact has been explained with penetrating insight by J. Rohmer in connection with St. Bonaventure (*La doctrine de l'abstraction dans l'école franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halès à Jean Peckham* in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, Paris, 1928, vol. III, pp. 148-161).

72 The confusion caused by this false starting point is apparent in E. Portalié's excellent article wherein he seeks to prove that, according to St. Augustine, God would play the role of agent intellect (*Dict. de théol. catholique*, t. I, col. 2336-2337). According to this interpretation God "would speak to the soul in the sense that He would impress a representation of eternal truths on it, and this would be the cause of our knowledge." This is a return to the interpretation of William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon (see E. Gilson, "Pourquoi saint Thomas a

critiqué saint Augustin," in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, Paris, 1926-1927, t. I, pp. 76-85). More exactly, it is to believe with them that Augustinian illumination has as its function the production of concepts, in which case God must really be the one who gives them and the one who, consequently, plays the role of agent intellect. Against E. Portalié, Ch. Boyer contends that in Augustine it is impossible to conceive of the first truth's creative influence on the mind "as a transmitter of ready-made ideas" (*L'idée de vérité*, p. 212). This is perfectly right. But it does not follow at all that Augustinian illumination has as its purpose the production of an agent intellect such as Thomism accords us. The Augustinian man has an intellect which produces its concepts and receives their truth from God, not a Thomistic agent intellect, nor God as agent intellect. The difficulty into which this confusion of two different problems plunges Augustine's interpreters seems to me definitively expressed in I. Sestili's article (p. 26-27), which has already been mentioned.

On the other hand, in the event that my interpretation should prove to be well founded, the question can legitimately be asked: what becomes of the concept in Augustine's doctrine? I know of no theory of generalization in Augustinism, and this, I think, is explained by the fact that in his doctrine reality, as well as the image representing it, are already quite close to intelligibility (on this point see B. Romeyer's precise analysis in *Archives de Philosophie*, III, 5, 1928, pp. 202-203). Augustinians will, indeed, interpret *abstraction* as a conscious psychologi-

cal process which is reduced to a certain way of 'considering' the image (see J. Rohmer in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, art. cit.). This also explains why St. Augustine always passes directly from image to judgement (*De Trinitate* IX, 6, 11; PL 42, 967); this is also the reason why the judgement, and not the concept, is for him the *verbum mentis* (*De Trinitate* IX, 7, 12; PL 42, 967). Let us add that the real cause of difference pointed out by B. Romeyer does not seem to me the only one and, contrary to his opinion, I do not think that the intellect, any more than the object, is the same in both doctrines.

73 . . . intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit unuscujusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat. *De Trinitate* IX, 6, 9; PL 42, 966. Cf. illam (formam aeternae veritatis) cernimus rationalis mentis intuitu. *Ibid.* IX, 6, 11; PL 42, 967. Ipsam quippe regulam veritatis, qua illam clamant esse meliorem, incommutabilem vident, nec uspiam nisi supra suam naturam vident, quandoquidem se vident mutabiles. *De Doct. Christ.* I, 8, 8-9; PL 34, 22-23.

74 Dicendum quod secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu, sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicitur. *Sum. Theol.* I, 79, 3 resp. Cf. *Sum. Theol.* I, 85, 1 resp., the last phrase.

75 This is the reason why I wrote "that by radically eliminating any *special* collaboration on the part of a separate intellect in the production of the intel-

ligible element in the human soul, St. Thomas eliminated, along with Avicenna's agent intellect, an important aspect of God as illuminator in St. Augustine" (*Saint Thomas critique de s. Augustin*, p. 120). I. Sestili (*Divus Thomas*, 1928, p. 81) writes on the subject: "Ignoramus quo jure affirmari possit quod S. Thomas, eliminando intellectum agentem Avicennae, eliminabat Deum illuminantem Augustini." Nor do I. I. Sestili is surprised here only because he has misunderstood: to eliminate "an important aspect of God as illuminator in St. Augustine" is not to eliminate God as illuminator in St. Augustine.

76 Itaque cum mihi de sua propria (scil. mente) loquitur, utrum intelligat hoc aut illud, an non intelligat, et utrum velit, an nolit hoc aut illud, credo: cum vero de humana specialiter aut generaliter verum dicit, agnosco et approbo. Unde manifestum est, aliud unumquemque videre in se, quod sibi alius dicenti credat, non tamen videat; aliud autem in ipsa veritate, quod alius quoque possit intueri: quorum alterum mutari per tempora, alterum incommutabili aeternitate consistere. Neque enim oculis corporeis multas mentes videndo, per similitudinem colligimus generalem vel specialem mentis humanae notitiam; sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, definiamus, non qualis sit uniuscujusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus esse debeat. *De Trinitate* IX, 6, 9; *PL* 42, 965-966.

77 *De Trinitate* IX, 6, 10; *PL* 42, 966. Cf. *De Vera Religione* 30, 54-56; *PL* 34, 145-147.

78 Item cum arcum pulchre ac aequa-

biliter intortum, quem vidi, verbi gratia, Carthagine, animo revolve, res quaedam menti nuntiata per oculos, memoriaeque transfusa, imaginarium conspectum facit. Sed aliud mente conspicio, secundum quod mihi opus illud placet; unde etiam, si displiceret, corrigerem. Itaque de istis secundum illam judicamus, et illam cernimus rationalis mentis intuitu. *De Trinitate* IX, 6, 11; *PL* 42, 967. Augustine calls this intuition a "simplex intelligentia," and it attains eternal ideas "super aciem mentis." It is from this intuition that the inner word is born within us (*ibid.* IX, 6, 12; *PL* 42, 967). It will be noted that there is nothing mystical in these examples.

79 *Confess.* X, 12, 19; *PL* 32, 787. In the same sense: . . . ratio et veritas numeri. . . . *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 8, 20; *PL* 32, 1251.

80 See the excellent exposition of this point in B. Kälin, *Die Erkenntnislehre des hl. Augustinus*, Sarnen, 1921, pp. 42-50.

81 See E. Gilson, *Pourquoi S. Thomas a critiqué S. Augustin*, p. 68.

82 This is what William of Auvergne did, and it was this that led him to teach illumination of concepts in Augustine's name, a doctrine quite close to that of God as agent intellect in Roger Bacon. The fact that he did do so is easily understood. Aristotle led philosophers in the 13th century to take cognizance of the problem of the concept's origin. His solution, one which implied an empiricism extending even to the ideas of the soul and of God, could not be accepted without opposition. Now if a person wants to find a solution to the problem of the concept in Augustinian illumination, the only thing left to do

is to admit that the concept is impressed on our mind by the divine light: God is substituted for Avicenna's *dator formarum*. Thus, William of Auvergne and Roger Bacon continue St. Augustine in their own way, but not *historically*, for they make him solve a problem which he did not expressly raise and which, perhaps, the basic tendencies of his doctrine excluded.

83 Not only in the texts mentioned above, where St. Augustine clearly distinguishes the *idea* of number from the *laws* of number (the whole development of *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 8, 20-22; *PL* 32, 1251-53 rests on this distinction), but even more clearly in the following: . . . sapientiae *notionem* in mente habemus impressam . . . (*De Lib. Arbit.* II, 9, 26; *PL* 32, 1255) and . . . mentibus tamen nostris impressa est *notio* beatitatis . . . (*Ibid.*; *PL* 32, 1254). The objection could be raised to these texts that at the period of the *De Libero Arbitrio*, Augustine had not abandoned Platonic reminiscence and that later he will speak only of "in nescioqua notitia" (*Confess.* X, 20, 29; *PL* 32, 792), but beyond the fact that it is always dangerous to push Augustine's terminology too far, formulae are to be found in the *De Trinitate* which are just as strong as those in his early works, e.g. . . . nisi esset nobis impressa *notio* ipsius boni . . . (*De Trinitate* VIII, 3, 4; *PL* 42, 949). Thus he never hesitated to affirm the *impression* of certain notions on our mind by the divine light. It is the meaning of this term we must define.

84 See the text from *De Trinitate* IX, 6, 9; *PL* 42, 965 quoted in note 76 above.

85 See note 48 above.

86 J. Hessen, *Augustins Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, p. 107.

87 *De Civitate Dei* XI, 27, 2; *PL* 41, 341.

88 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 10, 29; *PL* 32, 1257. See also: Nam hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem et multa recte reprehendunt recteque laudant in hominum moribus. Quibus ea tandem regulis iudicant, nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiamsi nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ubi eas vident? Neque enim in sua natura, cum procul dubio mente ista videantur, eorumque mentes constet esse mutabiles, has vero regulas immutabiles videat, quisquis in eis et hoc videre potuerit; nec in habitu suae mentis, cum illae regulae sint iustitiae, mentes vero eorum constet esse injustas. Ubinam sunt istae regulae scriptae, ubi quid sit justum et injustum agnoscit, ubi cernit habendum esse quod ipse non habet? Ubi ergo scriptae sunt, nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur? *De Trinitate* XIV, 15, 21; *PL* 42, 1052.

89 Ubi ergo scriptae sunt (istae regulae) nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur? Unde omnis lex justa describitur, et in cor hominis qui operatur iustitiam, non migrando, sed tanquam imprimendo transfertur; sicut imago ex anulo et in ceram transit, et anulum non relinquit. *De Trinitate* XIV, 15, 21; *PL* 42, 1052.

90 *De Vera Religione* 30, 56; *PL* 34, 147.

91 *De Gestis Pelagii* 3, 7; *PL* 44, 323-324. E. Portalié, who quotes this text (*Dict. de théol. cath.*, col. 2236-2237), quite rightly takes occasion to point out the parallel between natural il-

lumination and supernatural illumination.

92 *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 31, 59; *PL* 34, 479-480.

93 *De Trinitate* XIV, 15, 21; *PL* 42, 1052. I am indebted to L. W. Keeler's excellent collection of texts (*Sancti Augustini doctrina de cognitione*, Rome, 1934, p. 36) for having called my attention to this remarkable text. I feel bound to thank him for it expressly.

94 *De Gen. ad Litt.* XII, 34, 67; *PL* 34, 483. Cf. other texts in L. W. Keeler, *op. cit.* pp. 61-64.

95 On this point see J. Marechal's penetrating study, "La vision de Dieu au sommet de la contemplation," in *Nouvelle revue théologique*, February 1930, pp. 19-20. Concerning the judgments passed by Augustine on Plotinian ecstasy, see *ibid.*, pp. 8-14. The article is cited here from an offprint.

96 See note 48 above.

97 The text cited is *De Trinitate* XIV, 15, 21; *PL* 42, 1052.

98 J. Hessen, *Augustins Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, p. 216.

99 *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 46, 2; *PL* 40, 30. J. Hessen, who has seen the difficulty, calls these ideas "die rationale Seite der göttlichen Wesenheit." Needless to say, no text is cited, either in support of his formula, or of the thesis that in Augustine the ideas are not God. They are an intelligible world, but one that is uncreated and hence divine. Cf. L. W. Keeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53 note b, and also R. Jolivet, "La doctrine," pp. 72-74.

100 J. Hessen, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-211.

101 J. Hessen, *op. cit.*, p. 211.

102 In the same sense, R. Jolivet, "La doctrine," pp. 86-87.

103 *Confess.* VII, 17, 23; *PL* 32, 745.

104 For this analysis see *De Trinitate* X, cap. 1 and 2; *PL* 42, 971-975. The conclusion is as follows: Quilibet igitur studiosus, quilibet curiosus non amat incognita, etiam cum ardentissimo appetitu instat scire quod nescit. Aut enim jam genere notum habet quod amat, idque nosse expetit, etiam in aliqua resingula, vel in singulis rebus, quae illi nondum notae forte laudantur, fingitque animo imaginariam formam qua excitetur in amorem. Unde autem fingit, nisi ex iis quae jam noverat? Cujus tamen formae animo figuratae atque in cogitatione notissimae, si eam quae laudabatur dissimilem invenerit, fortasse non amabit. Quod si amaverit, ex illo amare incipiet ex quo didicit. Paulo ante quippe alia erat quae amabatur, quam sibi animus formans exhibere consueverat. Si autem illi formae similem invenerit quam fama praedicaverat, cui vere possit dicere: jam te amabam, nec tunc utique amabat incognitam, quam in illa similitudine noverat. *Loc. cit.* X, 2, 4; *PL* 42, 974-975.

105 Novit autem (anima) quid sit nosse, et dum hoc amat quod novit, etiam se cupit nosse. Ubi ergo nosse suum novit, si se non novit? Nam novit quod alia noverit, se autem non noverit: hinc enim novit et quid sit nosse. Quo pacto igitur se aliquid scientem scit, quae se ipsam nescit? Neque enim alteram mentem scientem scit, sed se ipsam. Scit igitur se ipsam. Deinde cum se quaerit ut noverit, quaerentem se jam novit. Jam se ergo novit. Quapropter non potest omnino nescire se, quae dum se nescientem scit, se utique

scit. Si autem se nescientem nesciat, non se quaerit ut sciat. Quapropter eo ipso quo se quaerit, magis se sibi notam quam ignotam esse convincitur. Novit enim se quaerentem atque nescientem, dum se quaerit ut noverit. *De Trinitate* X, 3, 5; *PL* 42, 976.

106 Quid ergo dicemus? an quod ex parte se novit, ex parte non novit? Sed absurdum est dicere, non eam totam scire quod scit. Non dico: totum scit; sed quod scit, tota scit. Cum itaque aliquid de se scit, quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit. *De Trinitate* X, 4, 6; *PL* 42, 976.

107 *De Trinitate* X, 5, 7; *PL* 42, 977. See also X, 8, 11; *PL* 42, 979 and X, 9, 12; *PL* 42, 980. Concerning the doctrine of sensation implied in this conclusion see Part I, ch. III.

108 *Confess.* X, 18, 27; *PL* 32, 791.

109 *Confess.* X, 19, 28; *PL* 32, 791.

110 An in ratione veritatis aeternae videt quam speciosum sit nosse semetipsam et hoc amat quod videt, studetque in se fieri? Quia quamvis sibi nota non sit, notum tamen ei est quam bonum sit, ut sibi nota sit. Et hoc quidem permirabile est, nondum se nosse, et quam pulchrum sit se nosse, jam nosse. An aliquem finem optimum, id est securitatem et beatitudinem suam, videt per quamdam occultam memoriam, quae in longinqua eam progressam non deseruit, et credit ad eundem finem, nisi se ipsam cognoverit, se pervenire non posse? *De Trinitate* X, 3, 5; *PL* 42, 975. It is quite clear that here, as in the texts of the *Confessions* we are analysing, the term "memory" means much more than its modern psychological connotation designates, i.e. memory of the past. In St. Augustine it is applied to

everything which is present to the soul (a presence which is evidenced by efficacious action) without being explicitly known or perceived. The only modern psychological terms equivalent to Augustinian *memoria* are "unconscious" or "subconscious," provided they too are expanded, as will be seen later, to include the metaphysical presence within the soul of a reality distinct from it and transcendent, such as God, in addition to the presence to the soul of its own unperceived states. On this notion see *De Trinitate* XIV, 6, 8-7, 10; *PL* 42, 1041-44.

111 Quomodo ergo quaero vitam beatam, quia non est mihi donec dicam, sat est, illic ubi oportet ut dicam? Quomodo eam quaero, utrum per recordationem, tamquam eam oblitus sim oblitumque me esse adhuc teneam, an per appetitum discendi incognitam, sive quam nunquam scierim, sive quam sic oblitus fuerim ut nec oblitum esse meminerim? *Confess.* X, 20, 29; *PL* 32, 791-92. For a criticism of the different possible interpretations of this memory, see *ibid.* X, 21, 30; *PL* 32, 792-93.

112 *Confess.* X, 23, 34; *PL* 32, 794.

113 *Confess.* X, 23, 33; *PL* 32, 793.

114 Amant enim et ipsam (veritatem), quia falli nolunt, et cum amant beatam vitam, quod non est aliud quam de veritate gaudium, utique amant etiam veritatem nec amarent, nisi esset aliqua notitia ejus in memoria eorum. *Confess.* X, 23, 33; *PL* 32, 794.

115 *De Anima et Ejus Origine* IV, 7, 10; *PL* 44, 529-30. Cf. the classic chapters of *Confess.* X, 8, 12-15; *PL* 32, 784-86. For a psychological analysis of the reproduction of memory or reminis-

cence, see *De Trinitate* XI, 7, 11; *PL* 42, 993.

116 . . . memoriae tribuens omne quod scimus, etiamsi non inde cogitemus . . . intelligentiae vero proprio modo quodam cogitationis informationem. *De Trinitate* XV, 21, 40; *PL* 42, 1088.

117 Magna ista vis est memoriae, magna nimis, Deus meus, penetrale amplum et infinitum. Quis ad fundum ejus pervenit? Et vis est haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse capio totum quod sum. Ergo animus ad habendum se ipsum angustus est, ut ibi sit quod sui non capit? *Confess.* X, 8, 15; *PL* 32, 785. On the memory of intellectual recollections, memory of memories, passions and even forgetfulness, see *Confess.* X, cap. 9-16; *PL* 32, 786-90. In this connection we recall that Augustine clearly affirmed the existence of a purely intellectual memory: Memoria tibi nulla videtur esse posse sine imaginibus vel imaginariis visis, quae phantasiarum nomine appellare voluisti; ego aliud existimo. *Epist.* 7, 1, 1; *PL* 33, 68.

118 Quapropter sicut in rebus praeteritis ea memoria dicitur, qua fit ut valeant recoli et recordari, sic in re praesenti quod sibi est mens, memoria sine absurditate dicenda est, qua sibi praesto est ut sua cogitatione possit intelligi et utrumque sui amore congiungi. *De Trinitate* XIV, 11, 14; *PL* 42, 1048. Cf. *De Trinitate* XIV, 6, 8; *PL* 42, 1041-42, and *Confess.* X, 25, 36; *PL* 32, 795: . . . quoniam sui quoque meminit animus. . . .

119 *Confess.* X, 24, 35; *PL* 32, 794. Cf. Habitas certe in ea (*scil.* memoria) quoniam tui memini, ex quo te didici,

et in ea te invenio, cum recordor te. *Confess.* X, 25, 36; *PL* 32, 795.

120 All these texts are taken from *De Trinitate* XIV, 15, 21; *PL* 42, 1052. To describe the transpsychological memory in which contact is made with the divine light and truth produced, Augustine uses different metaphors such as, illa . . . abstrusior profunditas nostrae memoriae . . . (*De Trinitate* XV, 21, 40; *PL* 42, 1088); . . . in . . . abdito mentis . . . (*De Trinitate* XIV, 7, 9; *PL* 42, 1043).

121 Quomodo ergo te quaero, Domine? Cum enim te, Deum meum, quaero, vitam beatam quaero. *Confess.* X, 20, 29; *PL* 32, 791.

122 Ecce quantum spatiatus sum in memoria mea quaerens te, Domine, et non te inveni extra eam. *Confess.* X, 24, 35; *PL* 32, 794. Admonitio autem quaedam, quae nobiscum agit, ut Deum recordemur, ut eum quaeramus, ut eum pulso omni fastidio sitiamus, de ipso ad nos fonte veritatis emanat. Hoc interioribus luminibus nostris jubar sol ille secretus infundit. *De Beata Vita* 4, 35; *PL* 32, 976.

123 Sed ubi manes in memoria mea, Domine, ubi illic manes? . . . Ubi ergo te inveni, ut discerem te? Neque enim jam eras in memoria mea, priusquam te discerem. Ubi ergo te inveni, ut discerem te, nisi in te supra me? *Confess.* X, 25, 36-26, 37; *PL* 32, 794-95.

124 *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 26; *PL* 41, 656.

125 Ita etiam te, vita vitae meae . . . *Confess.* VII, 1, 2; *PL* 32, 733. Deus autem tuus etiam tibi vitae vita est. *Confess.* X, 6, 10; *PL* 32, 783.

126 *Confess.* III, 6, 11; *PL* 32, 688.

127 *Confess.* I, 13, 21; *PL* 32, 670. Cf. the following image, one of less compelling power but of like inspiration: Bonum enim nostrum, de cuius fine inter philosophos magna contentio est, nullum est aliud quam illi cohaerere, cuius unius anima intellectualis incorporeo, si dici potest, amplexu, veris impletur fecundaturque virtutibus. *De Civitate Dei* X, 3, 2; *PL* 41, 281.

128 On this point see the basic text from *De Civitate Dei* XI, 25; *PL* 41, 339; Si ergo natura nostra esset a nobis, profecto et nostram nos genuissemus sapientiam, nec eam doctrina, id est aliunde discendo, percipere curaremus; et noster amor a nobis profectus, et ad nos relatus, ad beate vivendum sufficeret, nec bono alio quo frueremur ullo indigeret: nunc vero quia natura nostra, ut esset, Deum habet auctorem, procul dubio ut vera sapiamus, ipsum debemus habere doctorem; ipsum etiam ut beati simus, suavitatis intimae largitorem.

129 Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. *Confess.* I, 1, 1; *PL* 32, 661.

130 *De Trinitate* IV, 2, 4; *PL* 42, 889. The allusion is to *John* 1, 1-14.

131 *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 6 and 7; *PL* 41, 231 and 232.

132 *Confess.* VII, 9, 13; *PL* 32, 740.

133 All quotations in the foregoing paragraph are from *De Anima et Ejus*

Origine II, 5, 9; *PL* 44, 500. For having called our attention to this important text, we are indebted to O. Perler's interesting work, *Der Nus bei Plotin und das Verbum bei Augustin als vorbildliche Ursache der Welt*, Freiburg, 1931, p. 87, note 2.

134 *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 6; *PL* 41, 231-32.

135 Cf. E. Gilson, in *Revue Philosophique* (Nov.-Dec. 1919) p. 503. Along the same lines, Ch. Boyer, *Christianisme et néoplatonisme dans la formation de s. Augustin*, p. 5, and pp. 102-19. Cf. L. W. Keeler, *S. Augustini doctrina de cognitione*, p. 37, note a.

136 Plotinus, *Enn.* VI, 7, 29. Cf. *James* 1, 17.

137 Plotinus, *Enn.* V, 5, 7.

138 Plotinus, *Enn.* I, 6, 9. M. de Corte (*Aristote et Plotin*, Paris, 1935, Ch. III and IV) has pointed out the serious and fundamental disagreement between the two doctrines of salvation caused by this difference of viewpoint.

139 Cf. E. Gilson, "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustiniennne," in *Hommage à M. le Professeur M. de Wulf*, Louvain, 1934, p. 321-331. Similar opinions will be found in M. Grabmann, *Der göttliche Grund menschlichen Wahrheitserkenntnis*, Münster, 1924, p. 28; B. Kälin, *Die Erkenntnislehre*, p. 60; J. Barion, *Plotin und Augustinus*, Berlin, 1935, p. 152.

NOTES TO PART TWO

CHAPTER I

1 *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 1, 3; *PL* 41, 623. Concerning this aspect of Augustinian thought, E. Baudin's profound reflections will be consulted to good purpose, "La pragmatisme religieux de Pascal," in *Revue des Sciences religieuses*, V (1925), p. 61-63.

2 *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 1, 2; *PL* 41, 623.

3 *De Civitate Dei* XVIII, 39; *PL* 41, 599. In the same sense, *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 9, 26; *PL* 32, 1254.

4 A. Quid? Hoc nonne concedis, scientiam non esse nisi cum res aliqua firma ratione percepta et cognita est? E. Concedo. *De Quant. Animae* 26, 49; *PL* 32, 1063. *Ibid.* 30, 58; *PL* 32, 1068.

5 Quamvis enim et illa quae sapientia est, possit scientia nuncupari . . . tamen ubi dicit (Apostolus): alii quidem datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem Spiritum (*1 Corinth.* 12, 8), haec utique duo sine dubitatione distinguunt, licet non ibi explicet quid intersit, et unde possit utrumque dignosci. Verum Scripturarum sanctarum multiplicem copiam scrutatus, invenio scriptum esse in libro Job, eodem sancto viro loquente: *ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malis est scientia* (*Job* 28, 28). In hac differentia intelligendum est ad contemplationem sapientiam, ad actionem scientiam pertinere. *De Trinitate* XII, 14, 22; *PL* 42, 1009-10. The same interpretation in *Enarr. in Ps.* 135, 8; *PL* 37, 1759-60. Cf. *De Div. Quaest. ad Simpl.* II, 3; *PL* 40, 140.

6 The essential text on this point is *De Trinitate* XII, 1 and 2; *PL* 42, 997-99.

7 *De Trinitate* XII, 3, 3; *PL* 42, 999. Cf. . . . in mente uniuscujusque hominis quaesivimus quoddam rationale conjugium contemplationis et actionis, officiis per quaedam singula distributis, tamen in utroque mentis unitate servata. . . . *Op. cit.* XII, 12, 19; *PL* 42, 1008, and 21; 1009.

8 Cum igitur disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus, nec eam in haec duo quae commemoravi, nisi per officia geminamus. *De Trinitate* XII, 4, 4; *PL* 42, 1000. This distinction will play a leading role in Augustinian philosophies during the Middle Ages. For example, see E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, p. 363; pp. 379-381. Cf. J. Rohmer, "Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l'âme" in *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, vol. II, pp. 73-77.

9 Proinde cum duae virtutes propositae sint animae humanae, una activa, altera contemplativa; illa qua itur, ista qua pervenitur; illa qua laboratur, ut cor mundetur ad videndum Deum; ista qua vacatur et videtur Deus: illa est in praeceptis exercendae vitae hujus temporalis, ista in doctrina vitae illius sempiternae. Ac per hoc illa operatur, ista requiescit; quia illa est in purgatione peccatorum, ista in lumine purgatorum. Ac per hoc in hac vita mortali, illa est in opere bonae conversationis; ista vero magis in fide (as the

basis of *intellectus*), et apud perpaucos per speculum in aenigmate, et ex parte in aliqua visione incommutabilis veritatis. *De Cons. Evangel.* I, 5, 8; *PL* 34, 1045-46. The same doctrine is in *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* XXII, 52; *PL* 42, 432-33. It is difficult to understand W. Müller's mistake on this essential point (*Das Problem der Seelen-schönheit im Mittelalter*, p. 42). It prevents this author having access to the deepest parts of his own subject.

10 On this point see Fr. Fulbert Cayré's useful analyses in *La contemplation augustinienne*, p. 33, pp. 37-38, pp. 60-66.

11 Et in hominibus quidem haec ita discerni probabiliter solent, ut sapientia pertineat ad intellectum aeternorum, scientia vero ad ea quae sensibus corporis experimur. *De Div. Quaest. ad Simpl.* II, 3; *PL* 40, 140. . . . scientia, id est, cognitio rerum temporalium atque mutabilium navandis vitae hujus actionibus necessaria . . . *De Trinitate* XII, 12, 17; *PL* 42, 1007. Distat tamen ab aeternorum contemplatione actio qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus, et illa sapientiae, haec scientiae deputatur. *De Trinitate* XII, 14, 22; *PL* 42, 1009.

12 *Eccli.* 10, 15. Such a movement may even be given the name "cupidity," for it is the very definition of that vice: . . . nihil aliud est cupiditas, nisi amor rerum transeuntium . . . *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 33; *PL* 40, 23. That is the reason why *cupiditas* is, in turn, called "omnium malorum radix" (*ibid.* 35, 1; *PL* 40, 24). The opposite of *greed* (cupidity) is *charity* or *love*: Amor autem rerum amandarum, caritas vel dilectio melius dicitur (*Ibid.*).

13 *De Trinitate* XII, 8, 13; *PL* 42,

1005, and 10, 15; *PL* 42, 1006 with the note from the *Retractat.* II, 15, 3; *PL* 32, 636.

14 *De Trinitate* XII, 12, 17; *PL* 42, 1007. Cf. XII, 14, 22; *PL* 42, 1009.

15 Cf. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 16, 43; *PL* 32, 1264.

16 Habet enim et scientia modum suum bonum; si quod in ea inflat vel inflare assolet, aeternorum caritate vincatur, quae non inflat, sed ut scimus, aedificat (*I Cor.* 8, 1). Sine scientia quippe nec virtutes ipsae, quibus recte vivitur possunt haberi, per quas haec vita misera sic gubernetur, ut ad illam quae vere beata est, perveniatur aeternam. *De Trinitate* XII, 14, 21; *PL* 42, 1009.

17 *De Trinitate* XII, 14, 23; *PL* 42, 1010-11.

18 Si ergo haec est sapientiae et scientiae recta distinctio, ut ad sapientiam pertineat aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis, ad scientiam vero temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis: quid cui praeponendum sive postponendum sit, non est difficile judicare. *De Trinitate* XII, 15, 25; *PL* 42, 1012. . . . tamen etiam istorum duorum quae nos posuimus evidentissima differentia est, quod alia sit intellectualis cognitio aeternarum rerum, alia rationalis temporalium, et huic illam praeponendam esse ambigit nemo. *Ibid.* Cf. J. Mausbach, *Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus*, 1929; vol. I, p. 103, note 1.

19 We have seen (Chap. III, n. 1, p. 270) that the intellect is distinct from reason as the simple intuition of truth is distinguished from discourse. On the other hand, there can be no question

but that Augustine sometimes attributes wisdom to intellect and sometimes to higher reason. Hence, there must be one sense of the word "intellect" which corresponds to the meaning of the word "reason," and reason, as superior, must be identical with intellect. A way might, perhaps, be found of removing this difficulty in terminology—and we know such difficulties are frequent in Saint Augustine—with the aid of a text wherein he properly designates the mind's discursive movement by the term *rationatio*; *ratio* then becomes the simple vision of the result obtained by *rationatio*. Thus, there would be no longer any difficulty in attributing wisdom to higher reason, for it is the simple vision of the Ideas to which the mind is elevated by reasoning: Quia paulo ante dixisti, propterea me tibi debere assentiri scientiam nos habere ante rationem, quod cognito aliquo nititur, dum nos ratio ad incognitum ducit: nunc autem invenimus non rationem vocandam esse dum hoc agitur; non enim sana mens agit hoc semper, cum semper habeat rationem; sed recte ista fortasse *rationatio* nominatur; ut ratio sit quidam mentis aspectus, *rationatio* autem rationis inquisitio, id est, aspectus illius, per ea quae aspicienda sunt, motio. Quare ista opus est ad quaerendum, illa ad videndum. Itaque cum ille mentis aspectus, quem rationem vocamus, conjectus in rem aliquam, videt illam, scientia nominatur: cum autem non videt mens, quamvis intendat aspectum, inscitia vel ignorantia dicitur. *De Quant. Animae* 27, 53; *PL* 32, 1065.

20 Sensus quippe corporis corporalia sentiuntur: aeterna vero et incommutabilia spiritualia ratione sapientiae in-

telliguntur. Rationi autem scientiae appetitus vicinus est: quandoquidem de ipsis corporalibus quae sensu corporis sentiuntur, *rationatur* ea quae scientia dicitur actionis; si bene, ut eam notitiam referat ad finem summi boni; si autem male, ut eis fruatur tantum bonis talibus in quibus falsa beatitudine conquiescat. *De Trinitate* XII, 12, 17; *PL* 42, 1007.

21 Relinquentibus itaque nobis ea quae sunt exterioris hominis, et ab eis quae communia cum pecoribus habemus introrsum ascendere cupientibus, antequam ad cognitionem rerum intelligibilium atque summarum quae sempiternae sunt veniremus, temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis occurrit. *De Trinitate* XII, 15, 25; *PL* 42, 1012. This text gives a resumé of the development of *De Quant. Animae* 33, 70-76; *PL* 32, 1073-77.

22 *De Trinitate* XIV, 1, 3; *PL* 42, 1037-38. This doctrine explains why Augustinians during the Middle Ages will always oppose any effective distinction between philosophy and theology. To separate science from wisdom would be to render both impossible. On this point, see E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, ch. 2.

23 Saint Augustine gives seven in *De Doct. Christ.* II, 7, 9-11; *PL* 34, 39-40 and in the *De Quant. Animae* 33; *PL* 32, 1073-77. We shall rest content with this number, corresponding as it does to the number of Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and to the latter of these two classifications (which includes the first).

24 It is possible, without being too arbitrary it seems to us, to complete one of the two classifications by the other in the following manner:

De Quantitate Animae (33, 70-76)

1. Animatio
2. Sensus
3. Ars
4. Virtus a).....
b).....
c).....
5. Tranquillitas
6. Ingressio a).....
b).....
7. Contemplatio

We do not claim for an instant that the two texts coincide, nor even that each completes the other in exactly the manner we indicate. Above all we are not absolutely certain that the first six Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the *De Doctrina Christiana* do not enter into the fourth step of the *De Quantitate Animae*. In that case, *Virtus* would contain the six supernatural virtues from *Timor* to *Purgatio cordis*; and inversely, *Sapientia* would contain *Tranquillitas*, *Ingressio* and *Contemplatio*. But what does appear certain to us is the fact that the more closely the two texts are scrutinized, the more inclined we will be to see them as complementary.

25 *De Doct. Christ.* II, 11, 16; *PL* 34, 42. Cf. *Ibid.* 14, 21; *PL* 34, 45. During the course of the Middle Ages this text will be subject of linguistic study. See for example Roger Bacon, *Opus Majus*, ed. H. Bridges, t. I, p. 66. To Greek and Hebrew he will add Arabic.

26 *De Doct. Christ.* II, 16, 24; *PL* 34, 47. Cf. *ibid.* 29, 45; *PL* 34, 56. This text will serve as the justification for all authors of bestiaries and lapidaries during the Middle Ages. In general, every mediaeval encyclopedia from Isidore of Seville to Rhabanus Maurus and beyond will simply carry out the

De Doctrina Christiana (II, 7, 9-11)

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1. Timor
2. Pietas
3. Scientia
4. Fortitudo
5. Consilium
6. Purgatio cordis
7. Sapientia

plan outlined by Augustine in the *De Doctrina Christiana*, viz. to establish the "corpus" of sciences necessary for Christian wisdom: Sicut autem quidam de verbis omnibus et nominibus Hebraeis, et Syris, et Aegyptiis, vel si qua alia lingua in Scripturis sanctis inveniri potest, quae in eis sine interpretatione sunt posita, fecerunt ut ea separatim interpretarentur; et quod Eusebius fecit de temporum historia propter divinorum librorum quaestiones, quae usum ejus flagitant; quod ergo hi fecerunt de his rebus, ut non sit necesse christiano in multis propter pauca laborare, sic video posse fieri, si quem eorum qui possunt, benignam sane operam fraternae utilitati delectet impendere, ut quoscumque terrarum locos, quaeve animalia vel herbas atque arbores sive lapides vel metalla incognita, speciesque quaelibet Scriptura commemorat, ea generatim digerens, sola exposita litteris mandet. Potest etiam de numeris fieri, ut eorum tantummodo numerorum exposita ratio conscribatur, quos divina Scriptura meminit. . . . Quod utrum de ratione disputandi fieri possit, ignoro; et videtur mihi non posse, quia per totum textum Scripturarum colligata est nervorum vice; . . . *De Doct. Christ.* II, 39, 59; *PL* 34, 62. Isidore of Seville's encyclopedic turn of mind, as

well as that of the Venerable Bede, is sometimes referred to as a distinctive sign of the mediaeval mentality as opposed to the patristic mentality. In point of fact, compilers of the Middle Ages simply met a distinct *desideratum* of St. Augustine. Cf. Mich. de Boüard, *Une nouvelle encyclopédie médiévale: le Compendium Philosophiae*, Paris, E. de Boccard, 1936.

27 *De Doct. Christ.* II, 29, 46; *PL* 34, 57; II, 30, 47; *PL* 34, 57.

28 *Ibid.* II, 31, 48-49; II, 34, 52 and 35, 53; *PL* 34, 57, 58 and 59-60.

29 *Ibid.* II, 36, 54; *PL* 34, 60.

30 *Ibid.* 38, 56; *PL* 34, 61.

31 *Ibid.* II, 28, 42; *PL* 34, 55-56; II, 39, 58; *PL* 34, 62.

32 *Ibid.* II, 18, 28; *PL* 34, 49-50.

33 The fundamental text from which the Middle Ages will derive inspiration is the following: Philosophi autem qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accommodata dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis etiam tanquam iniustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda. Sicut enim Aegyptii non solum idola habebant et onera gravia, quae populus Israel detestaretur et fugeret, sed etiam vasa atque ornamenta de auro et argento, et vestem, quae ille populus exiens de Aegypto, sibi potius tanquam ad usum meliorem clanculo vindicavit, non auctoritate propria, sed praecepto Dei, ipsis Aegyptiis nescienter commodantibus ea, quibus non bene utebantur (*Exod.* 3, 22 and 12, 35); sic doctrinae omnes Gentilium non solum simulata et superstitiosa figmenta gravesque sarcinas

supervacanei laboris habent, quae unusquisque nostrum duce Christo de societate Gentilium exiens, debet abominari atque devitare, sed etiam liberales disciplinas usui veritatis aptiores, et quaedam morum praecepta utilissima continent, deque ipso uno Deo colendo nonnulla vera inveniuntur apud eos, quod eorum tanquam aurum et argentum, quod non ipsi instituerunt, sed de quibusdam quasi metallis divinae providentiae, quae ubique infusa est, eruerunt, et quo perverse atque injuriose ad obsequia daemonum abutuntur, cum ab eorum misera societate sese animo separat, debet ab eis auferre Christianus ad usum justum praedicandi Evangelii. Vestem quoque illorum, id est, hominum quidem instituta, sed tamen accommodata humanae societati, qua in hac vita carere non possumus, accipere atque habere licuerit in usum convertenda Christianum. *De Doct. Christ.* II, 40, 60; *PL* 34, 63. For the example provided by the Greek and Latin Fathers, *ibid.*, 61; *PL* 34, 63.

34 For the different conceptions of this Christian Wisdom throughout the Middle Ages and the problems its precise definition gives rise to, see Th. Heitz, *Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi de Bérenger de Tours à St. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, Lecoivre, 1909; E. Gilson, *Études de philosophie médiévale*, Strasbourg, 1921, p. 30-50; p. 76-124; *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, London 1938, p. 87-116; D. Chenu, "La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle," in *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, t. II, p. 31-77.

35 *De Quant. Animae* 33, 76; *PL* 32, 1076-77.

CHAPTER II

1 See Part I, ch. V. *Rational Knowledge*.

2 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 9, 26; *PL* 32, 1254-55.

3 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 9, 27; *PL* 32, 1255. On this point see Part I, ch. V, sec. 1, *The Inner Master*.

4 Item credo te non negare studendum esse sapientiae, atque hoc verum esse concedere . . . Hoc item verum, et unum esse, et omnibus qui hoc sciunt, ad videndum esse commune, quamvis unusquisque id nec mea, nec tua, nec cujusquam alterius, sed sua mente conspiciat, cum id quod conspicitur, omnibus perspicientibus communiter praesto sit, numquid negare poterimus? *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 10, 28; *PL* 32, 1256.

5 Jam hujusmodi plura non quaeram: satis enim est quod istas tanquam regulas et quaedam lumina virtutum, et vera et incommutabilia, et sive singula sive communiter adesse ad contemplandum eis qui haec valent sua quisque ratione ac mente conspicere, pariter mecum vides certissimumque esse concedis. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 10, 29; *PL* 32, 1256. Manifestissimum est igitur omnes has, quas regulas diximus et lumina virtutum, ad sapientiam pertinere. *Ibid.* *PL* 32, 1257.

6 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 11, 30-31; *PL* 32, 1257-58. *Art. 32 (ibid.)* explains that the knowledge of numbers is most scorned because it is most common. We find the following remark commented upon quite often during the Middle Ages: Sed quemadmodum in uno igne consubstantialis, ut ita dicam, sentitur fulgor et calor, nec separari ab invicem possunt, tamen ad ea calor

pervenit quae prope admoventur, fulgor vero etiam longius latiusque diffunditur; sic intelligentiae potentia, quae inest sapientiae, propinquiora fervescunt, sicuti sunt animae rationales; ea vero quae remotiora sunt, sicut corpora, non attingit calore sapiendi sed perfundit lumine numerorum. But this, Augustine adds, is simply an imperfect comparison, and there is no perfect one. Note the formula: quanquam sapientia absit ut in comparatione numeri inveniatur inferior, cum eadem sit. *Ibid.* *PL* 32, 1258. Cf. *De Ordine* II, 16, 44; *PL* 32, 1015.

7 Lex vero aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans. *Cont. Faustum Manich.* XXII, 27; *PL* 42, 418.

8 Quandoquidem manu formatoris nostri in ipsis cordibus nostris Veritas scripsit: *quod tibi non vis fieri, ne facias alteri* (*Matth.* 7, 12). Hoc et antequam Lex daretur nemo ignorare permissus est. . . . Sed ne sibi homines aliquid defuisse quererentur, scriptum est et in tabulis quod in cordibus non legebant. Non enim scriptum non habebant, sed legere volebant. Oppositum est oculis eorum quod in *conscientia* videre cogerentur. . . . Judicas enim malum esse in eo quod pati non vis, et hoc te cogit nosse lex intima, in ipso tuo corde conscripta. *Enarr. in Ps.* 57, 1; *PL* 36, 673-674. In this same text is to be found a long enumeration of the moral evidences of conscience. Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* 118, 25, 4; *PL* 37, 1574. The different laws and their order are studied in

detail in B. Roland-Gosselin, *La morale de s. Augustin*, Part I, "L'Ordre moral."

9 Haec autem disciplina ipsa Dei lex est, quae apud eum fixa et inconcussa semper manens, in sapientes animas quasi transcribitur; ut tanto se sciant vivere melius, tantoque sublimius, quanto et perfectius eam contemplantur intelligendo, et vivendo custodiunt diligentius. *De Ordine* II, 8, 25; *PL* 32, 1006. Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* 145, 5; *PL* 37, 1887-88. This last text is very beautiful and rich in meaning.

10 Ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo verbis explicem, ea est quae justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. *De Lib. Arbit.* I, 6, 15; *PL* 32, 1229.

11 The definition of order is: Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 13, 1; *PL* 41, 640. Hisce igitur motibus animae cum ratio dominatur, ordinatus homo dicendus est. Non enim ordo rectus, aut ordo appellandus est omnino, ubi deterioribus meliora subiiciuntur. *De Lib. Arbit.* I, 8, 18; *PL* 32, 1231.

12 Sicut enim bona sunt omnia quae creavit Deus . . . ita bene agit in his anima rationalis, si ordinem servet, et distinguendo, eligendo, pendendo, subdat minora maioribus, corporalia spiritualibus, inferiora superioribus, temporalia sempiternis. *Epist.* 140, 2, 4; *PL* 33, 540. Cf. *De Lib. Arbit.* I, 8, 18; *PL* 32, 1231; I, 15, 32; *PL* 32, 1238-39.

13 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 19, 52; *PL* 32, 1268. In this text note once again the expression *lumina virtutum*: Neque prudentia cujusquam fit prudens alius, aut fortis fortitudine, aut temperans

temperantia, aut justus justitia hominis alterius quisquam efficitur; sed coaptando animum illis incommutabilibus regulis luminibusque virtutum, quae incorruptibiliter vivunt in ipsa veritate sapientiaeque communi, quibus et ille coaptavit et fixit animum, quem istis virtutibus praeditum sibi ad imitandum proposuit. Cf. Verum tu in hac causa etsi ad scholam Pythagorae provocas vel Platonis, ubi eruditissimi atque doctissimi viri multo excellentiore ceteris philosophia nobilitati veras virtutes non esse dicebant, nisi quae menti quodam modo imprimuntur a forma illius aeternae immutabilisque substantiae, quod est Deus . . . *Cont. Jul. Pelag.* IV, 3, 17; *PL* 44, 745. Cf. *Sermo* 341, 7, 9; *PL* 39, 1498. Concerning the doctrine's influence during the Middle Ages, see E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, pp. 422, 423.

14 *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 4, 3; *PL* 41, 628-29.

15 *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 4, 4; *PL* 41, 629-30.

16 Ecce de anima loquebar. Est anima; etsi non sit sapiens, etsi non sit justa, anima est; . . . Aliud illi ergo est esse animam, aliud vero esse sapientem, esse justam. . . . Est ergo aliquid quod nondum est sapiens . . . non tamen nihil est, non tamen nulla vita est: nam ex operibus quibusdam suis ostendit se vitam, etsi non se ostendit sapientem . . . cum vero se erigit ad aliquid quod ipsa non est, et quod supra ipsam est, et a quo ipsa est, percipit sapientiam, justitiam, pietatem: sine quibus cum esset, mortua erat, nec vitam habebat qua ipsa viveret, sed qua corpus vivificaret. Aliud est enim in anima unde corpus vivificatur, aliud

unde ipsa vivificatur. Melius quippe est quam corpus, sed melius quam ipsa est Deus. Est ergo ipsa, etiamsi sit insipiens, injusta, impia, vita corporis. Quia vero vita ejus est Deus, quo modo cum ipsa est in corpore, praestat illi vigorem, decorem, mobilitatem, officia membrorum, sic cum vita ejus Deus in ipsa est, praestat illi sapientiam, pietatem, justitiam, caritatem. *In Joan. Evang.* XIX, 5, 12; *PL* 35, 1549-50.

17 Age nunc, videamus homo ipse quomodo in seipso sit ordinatissimus. *De Lib. Arbit.* I, 7, 16; *PL* 32, 1229-30.

18 *Epist.* 140, 2, 4; *PL* 33, 539.

19 Gradatim enim se (*scil.* anima) et ad mores vitamque optimam non jam sola fide, sed certa ratione perducit. Cui numerorum vim atque potentiam diligenter intuenti nimis indignum videbitur et nimis flendum, per suam scientiam versum bene currere citharamque concinere, et suam vitam seque ipsam quae anima est, devium iter sequi, et dominante sibi libidine, cum turpissimo se vitiorum strepitu dissonare. Cum autem se composuerit et ordinaverit, ac concinnam pulchramque reddiderit, audebit jam Deum videre, atque ipsum fontem unde manat omne verum, ipsumque Patrem veritatis. *De Ordine* II, 19, 50-51; *PL* 32, 1018-19.

20 *Confess.* VIII, 5, 11; *PL* 32, 753-54. Cf. VIII, 9, 21-10, 24; *PL* 32, 758-60. Cf. Ferraz's remarks in *La psychologie de s. Augustin*, p. 80-86.

21 *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 6; *PL* 41, 409.

22 Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum. *De Duabus Animabus* X, 14; *PL* 42, 104. Concerning the significance of this definition as regards

original sin, see *Retract.* I, 15, 2; *PL* 32, 609.

23 *De Trinitate* XI, 2, 2; *PL* 42, 985-86. The development is summed up in the final formula: Haec igitur tria, corpus quod videtur, et ipsa visio, et quae utrumque conjungit intentio, manifesta sunt ad dignoscendum . . .

24 Quae cum ita sint, tria haec quamvis diversa natura, quemadmodum in quamdam unitatem contemperentur meminerimus; id est, species corporis quae videtur, et impressa ejus imago sensui quod est visio sensusve formatus, et voluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum admovet, in eoque ipsam visionem tenet. *De Trinitate* XI, 2, 5; *PL* 42, 987. Voluntas autem tantam vim habet copulandi haec duo, ut et sensum formandum admoveat ei rei quae cernitur, et in ea formatum teneat. *Ibid.* *PL* 42, 988. The following remarks owe much to the excellent chapter of W. Kahl, *Die Lehre vom Primat des Willens bei Augustinus, Duns Scotus und Descartes*, ch. III, p. 24-42.

25 *De Trinitate* XI, 2, 4-5; *PL* 42, 987-988.

26 *De Musica* VI, 8, 21; *PL* 32, 1174 (See the analysis above of the perception of a verse or musical phrase, p. 63-64). Cf. *De Trinitate* XI, 8, 15; *PL* 42, 996. For the same reason the will searches within memory and finds the images it has fixed there. *De Trinitate* XI, 3, 6; *PL* 42, 989.

27 *De Trinitate* XI, 10, 17; *PL* 42, 997. In the *De Musica*, Augustine calls *phantasia* an image which purely and simply produces a memory, and *phantasma* an image of an object which has not been perceived and which we form

with the aid of memories. *Op. cit.* VI, 11, 32; *PL* 32, 1180-81.

28 Nam voluntas jam dici potest, quia omnis qui quaerit invenire vult; et si id quaeritur quod ad notitiam pertineat, omnis qui quaerit nosse vult. Quod si ardentem atque instantem vult, studere dicitur. . . . Partum ergo mentis antecedit appetitus quidam, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniendo, nascitur proles ipsa notitia. . . . *De Trinitate* IX, 12, 18; *PL* 32, 972.

29 *Confess.* XIII, 9, 10; *PL* 32, 849. Cf. Nec aliquid appetunt etiam ipsa corpora ponderibus suis, nisi quod animae amoribus suis. *Epist.* 55, 10, 18; *PL* 33, 213. Animus quippe, velut pondere, amore fertur quocumque fertur. *Epist.* 157, 2, 9; *PL* 33, 677. Neque enim vir bonus merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diligit. . . . Si essemus lapides, aut fluctus, aut ventus, aut flamma, vel quid ejusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate, sive sursum levitate nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore, fertur quocumque fertur. *De Civitate Dei* XI, 28; *PL* 41, 341-342. The intimate relationship between love and will is explained by the fact that, according to St. Augustine, love is but an intense will: . . . voluntatem nostram, vel amorem seu dilectionem quae valentior est voluntas. . . . *De Trinitate* XV, 21, 41; *PL* 42, 1089.

The notion of "delight," whose importance continued to increase throughout the history of Augustinism, is closely associated in his mind with

the notion of love, as we have defined it: Non ergo invidemus inferioribus quam nos sumus, nosque ipsos . . . ita Deo . . . ordinemus, ut . . . solis . . . superioribus delectemur. Delectatio quippe quasi pondus est animae. Delectatio ergo ordinat animam. *Ubi enim erit thesaurus tuus ibi erit et cor tuum* (*Matth.* 6, 21); ubi delectatio, ibi thesaurus: ubi autem cor, ibi beatitudo aut miseria. *De musica* VI, 11, 29; *PL* 32, 1179. The reason for this is that "delight" is the very thing love pursues in its object: Non enim amatur, nisi quod delectat. *Sermo* 159, 3, 3; *PL* 38, 869. See the whole sermon.

30 The will's action on the whole man is exercised through the mediation of the images and ideas over which it has control. In Augustinian psychology, the will is not a "generator" of representations, but it does bind them together. In other words, it applies our powers of sense, imagination and thought to their acts or turns them away from them. Whence the dominant influence it exercises by setting all of man's activities to work in the direction of his dominating love. See *De Trinitate* XI, 7, 12; *PL* 42, 993-994, and 8, 15; *PL* 42, 995-996.

31 *Enarr. in Ps.* 31, 2, 5; *PL* 36, 260.

32 *Ibid.* Cf. Cum . . . nihilque aliud curae esse debeat quomodo vivatur, nisi ut quod amandum est eligatur: . . . *Sermo* 96, 1, 1; *PL* 38, 585, and *De Bono Viduitatis* 21, 26; *PL* 40, 448.

33 Rectae autem sunt voluntates et omnes sibimet religatae, si bona est illa quo cunctae referuntur: si autem prava est, pravae sunt omnes. Et ideo rectarum voluntatum connexio iter est quoddam ascendentium ad beatitudinem, quod certis velut passibus agitur, prava-

rum autem atque distortarum voluntatum implicatio, vinculum est quo alligabitur qui hoc agit, ut projiciatur in tenebras exteriores. *De Trinitate* XI, 6, 10; *PL* 42, 992.

34 *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 7, 2; *PL* 41, 410. With this commentary: Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens eoque fruens, laetitia est; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est; idque si acciderit sentiens, tristitia est. Proinde mala sunt ista, si malus est amor: bona si bonus. It follows from this text that *cupiditas* does not necessarily mean disorder of the will (although this is its commonest meaning: cf. chap. I of this part, note 12). There can be a good cupidity if the love corresponding to it is good. The whole doctrine of *cupiditas* in St. Bernard presupposes this meaning. Cf. S. Bernard, *De diligendo Deo*, ch. XV.

35 See Augustine's discussion against Stoic apathy in *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 8-9; *PL* 41, 411-417.

36 Ac per hoc qui perverse amat cujuslibet naturae bonum, etiamsi adipiscatur ipse fit in bono malus, et miser meliore privatus. *De Civitate Dei* XII, 8; *PL* 41, 356. Concerning the role played by the end in the moral qualification of an act, see *Cont. Acad.* III, 16, 35; *PL* 32, 952-953, and the texts gathered together by B. Roland-Gosselin, *La morale de s. Augustin*, p. 94-101.

37 *De Trinitate* VI, 4, 6; *PL* 42, 927.

38 *De Moribus Eccles. Cath.* I, 15, 25; *PL* 32, 1322.

39 *Ibid.* The definition of temperance as a complete and unreserved love is explained by the fact that, when God is the object loved, *modus diligendi est*

sine modo diligere. For the development of the notion of charity and liberty implied in this thesis, see the section following, *Charity*, and ch. III, *Christian Liberty*.

40 On this point, as on many others, Augustine's terminology is rather flexible. As far as can be judged from the different texts, the most general meaning of the word *charity* would be, "a person's complete love for another person" (as opposed to his love for things). With this as a start, a distinction will be drawn between: (i) divine charity; (ii) human charity. Moreover, within human charity there will be a further distinction between: (i) licit charity; (ii) illicit charity. See *Sermo* 349, 1-3; *PL* 39, 1529-31. This usage is systematic and deliberate in St. Augustine. For him, as we shall see, *charitas* = *dilectio*; and *dilectio* = *amor*. Thus, since there may be good or evil loves, there may be good or evil charities. On this point he justifies himself with Scriptural texts against the contrary usage of certain writers whom he does not name. Cf. *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 7, 2; *PL* 41, 410. However, according to Augustine himself, *amor* is the most suitable term for designating the love of good as well as that of evil. Although the term *dilectio* can be applied to disordered love if things are taken in the strict sense, it designates, rather, a love of the good: *Omnis dilectio, sive quae carnalis dicitur, quae non dilectio, sed magis amor dici solet (dilectionis enim nomen magis solet in melioribus rebus dici, in melioribus accipi); . . . In Epist. Joan. ad Parthos* 8, 4, 5 *PL* 35, 2038. The same is true of charity. Moreover, to avoid any equivocation, in the following pages we shall limit the extension of the concept

"charity" to the following two meanings: licit love of man for man, love of man for God or of God for man. Besides, these are the only proper meanings of the term. Augustine has spoken of illicit charities only in exceptional instances. For the ordinary use of the term see *In Joan. Evang.* 87, 1; *PL* 35, 1852. Cf. *Adnot. in Job*; *PL* 34, 878. When used in the strict sense of licit love of man for man or for God, all the meanings of *charity* are linked together. For a licit love of man is a love which loves man for God. *Sermo* 265, 8, 9; *PL* 38, 1222-23.

41 Et ut generaliter breviterque complectar quam de virtute habeam notionem, quod ad recte vivendum attinet, virtus est caritas, qua id quod diligendum est diligitur. *Epist.* 167, 4, 15; *PL* 33, 739.

42 *Confess.* XIII, 7, 8; *PL* 32, 847.

43 *In Epist. Joan. ad Parthos* 8, 4, 5; *PL* 35, 2038. This is the reason why only love of persons is truly deserving of the name "love." Nihil enim aliud est amare, quam propter seipsam rem aliquam appetere. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 35, 1; *PL* 40, 23.

44 See note 29 above.

45 *In Epist. Joan. ad Parthos* 8, 4-5; *PL* 35, 2037-39. We should note how this conception of Christian charity embraces the notion of justice, to which we often feel inclined to oppose it. The view commonly expressed today, to the effect that the Christian idea of charity is an antiquated notion for which modern times have substituted the ideal of justice, rests on a complete ignorance of Christian doctrine as St. Augustine interpreted it. From this text of Augustine it is clear that there is not more justice in the

so-called modern ideal of justice, but less charity.

46 *De Trinitate* VIII, 10, 14; *PL* 42, 960. Cf. *Confess.* IV, 6, 11; *PL* 32, 697-98.

47 This formula, which will recur frequently during the Middle Ages, is not from Augustine but from his friend Severus, summarizing Augustine's own thought with great felicity of expression: *Epist.* 109, 2; *PL* 33, 419. Compare St. Bernard, *De Diligendo Deo*, cap. I; ed. Watkin W. Williams, Cambridge, 1926, p. 9.

48 *Sermo* 34, 4, 7; *PL* 38, 211-12. Cf. *Sermo* 91, 3, 3; *PL* 38, 568, *Sermo* 334, 3; *PL* 38, 1469, and *Epist.* 155, 4, 14-15; *PL* 33, 672-73.

49 Caritas ergo inchoata, inchoata iustitia est; caritas propecta, propecta iustitia est; caritas magna, magna iustitia est; caritas perfecta, perfecta iustitia est. *De Nat. et Gratia* 70, 84; *PL* 44, 290. Regarding the order to follow in acquiring charity (and so, Wisdom) beginning with fear of God, see the method described in *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 36; *PL* 40, 25-27.

50 *In Epist. Joan. ad Parthos* 7, 4, 8; *PL* 35, 2033.

51 *Epist.* 167, 4, 15; *PL* 33, 739.

52 For this reason charity is the exact opposite of cupidity. Quo modo enim radix omnium malorum cupiditas, sic radix omnium bonorum caritas est. *Enarr. in Ps.* 90, 1, 8; *PL* 37, 1154. Cf. *Liber de Gratia Christi*, 18, 19-20, 21; *PL* 44, 369-70.

53 *II Enarr. in Ps.* 31, 5; *PL* 36, 260-61. Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* 121, 1; *PL* 37, 1618.

54 *Ibid.* 31, 6; *PL* 36, 261.

55 1 *Joan.* 4, 8. Thus, in St. Augustine there are two meanings of the word "charity": substantial and subsistent charity, which is God, and charity which is the love of God in the soul, or the soul itself in so far as it is love of God. Deus igitur et animus quo amatur, caritas proprie dicitur purgatissima et consummata, si nihil aliud amatur: hanc et dilectionem dici placet. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 36, 1; *PL* 40, 25. Cf. *Sermo* 21, 2; *PL* 38, 143. Caritas usque adeo est donum Dei ut Deus vocetur. *Sermo* 156, 5; *PL* 38, 852. See also *De Trinitate* XV, 19, 37; *PL* 42, 1086, where the appropriation of charity to the Holy Ghost is clearly set forth. Cf. St. Bernard, *De Diligendo Deo*, XII; ed. cit. p. 61, lines 1-2.

56 Deambulat autem in nobis praesentia maiestatis, si latitudinem invenerit caritatis. . . . Si dilatamur, deambulat in nobis Deus: sed ut dilatemur, operetur ipse Deus. *Sermo* 163, 1, 1; *PL* 38, 889.

57 *Sermo* 23, 8; *PL* 38, 158-159. Two corollaries follow from this conception of charity: (i) Of faith, hope and charity, the latter is the only virtue which will not pass away (since it is the pledge of happiness itself). *Sermo* 158, 9; *PL* 38, 867. (ii) And correlatively, since it is the gift of God possessed by the soul, charity is the greatest gift God can bestow on us. *Sermo* 145, 4; *PL* 38, 793. Cf. St. Paul, 1 *Corinth.* 13, 1-3.

CHAPTER III

1 See *Confess.* VII, 3, 4-5; *PL* 32, 735. Regarding this question, see the detailed study of R. Jolivet, "Le problème du mal chez. s. Augustin," *Arch. de Philos.* VII, 2, 1930, pp. 1-104.

2 Summum bonum quo superius non est, Deus est: ac per hoc incommutabile bonum est; ideo vere aeternum et vere immortale. Cetera omnia bona non nisi ab illo sunt, sed non de illo. De illo enim quod est, hoc quod ipse est: ab illo autem quae facta sunt, non sunt quod ipse. Ac per hoc si solus ipse incommutabilis, omnia quae fecit, quia ex nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt. *De Nat. Boni* 1; *PL* 42, 551. God is called "truly immortal" in contrast with the soul, for instead of being so by itself, it is only immortal in so far as it has been created by God. See above, p. 52. *Enchir.* XII, 4; *PL* 40, 236-237. *C. Secund. Manich.* 8; *PL* 42, 584. For this doctrine's influence on Descartes,

see E. Gilson, *La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie*, Paris 1913, p. 211-235.

3 *Confess.* VII, 11, 17; *PL* 32, 742. Cf. *De Nat. Boni* 10; *PL* 42, 554. It seems that Augustine retained something of the Platonic identification of existence with immutability. Thus, Augustine's God is the Christian God in that He is Being, but the notion of existence which is characteristic of Jehovah is interpreted by him as a kind of energy of immutability. See *De Trinitate* XV, 2, 3; *PL* 42, 912.

4 *De Nat. Boni* 3; *PL* 42, 553 and 23; *PL* 42, 558.

5 *De Nat. Boni* 4; *PL* 42, 553; 6; *PL* 42, 553-54.

6 . . . quia non noveram malum non esse nisi privationem boni usque ad quod omnino non est. *Confess.* III, 7, 12; *PL* 32, 688. Quid est autem aliud

quod malum dicitur, nisi privatio boni? *Enchir.* 11; *PL* 40, 236.

7 Natura humana, etsi mala est, quia vitiata est, non tamen malum est, quia natura est. Nulla enim natura, in quantum natura est, malum est; sed prorsus bonum, sine quo bono ullum esse non potest malum. *Op. Imp. Cont. Jul.* III, 206; *PL* 45, 1334. By analogy, error is but an absence of being in a mind conceiving things otherwise than they are. Thus, there is never any falsity in things. The true is, the false is not. *Solil.* II, 3, 3; *PL* 32, 886-87; II, 4, 5; 887; II, 5, 8; 889. *Confess.* VII, 15, 21; *PL* 32, 744.

8 Porro mala voluntas, quamvis non sit secundum naturam, sed contra naturam, quia vitium est, tamen ejus naturae est, cujus est vitium, quod nisi in natura non potest esse, sed in ea quam creavit ex nihilo . . . *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 11, 1; *PL* 41, 418. Ut . . . bona tamen sine malis esse possint, sicut Deus ipse verus et summus. . . ; mala vero sine bonis esse non possint, quoniam naturae in quibus sunt, in quantum naturae sunt, utique bonae sunt. *Ibid.* Cf. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 17, 46; *PL* 32, 1265-66.

9 *De Nat. Boni.* 8; *PL* 42, 554. Concerning the beauty of this universal order, see *De Civ. Dei* XII, 4-5; *PL* 41, 351-353. The arguments whereby Augustine shows that imperfections of detail make for the harmony of the whole will be repeated again and again during the course of the Middle Ages. Cf. *De Ordine* I, 1, 2; *PL* 32, 979. *De Musica* VI, 11, 30; *PL* 32, 1179-80. *De Civitate Dei* XI, 22; *PL* 41, 335-36, with his criticism of Origen as a sequel. For this doctrine's influence on later

metaphysics, see E. Gilson, *La liberté chez Descartes*, pp. 211-235.

10 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 18, 48; *PL* 32, 1266. In this sense even the existence of sinners contributes to the perfection of the universe (*Enchir.* 96, 24; *PL* 40, 276; and 100, 26; 279), but they do not contribute to it in so far as they are sinners; they do so as wills which are free and capable of sinning or not. *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 9, 26; *PL* 32, 1283-84; III, 11, 32-33; *PL* 32, 1287-88.

11 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 19, 50; *PL* 32, 1267-68. See the fine resumé given in *Retract.* I, 9, 6; *PL* 32, 598.

12 Noli ergo mirari, si ceteris per liberam voluntatem utimur, etiam ipsa libera voluntate per eam ipsam uti nos posse; ut quodammodo se ipsa utatur voluntas quae utitur ceteris, sicut seipsam cognoscit ratio, quae cognoscit et cetera. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 19, 51; *PL* 32, 1268.

13 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 19, 52; *PL* 32, 1268.

14 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 19, 52-53; *PL* 32, 1268-69.

15 *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 1, 2; *PL* 32, 1271. Cf. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 1-4; *PL* 40, 11-12.

16 Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae voluntatis; non enim est efficiens, sed deficiens: quia nec illa effectio est, sed defectio. Deficere namque ab eo quod summe est, ad id quod minus est, hoc est incipere habere voluntatem malam. Causas porro defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint, ut dixi, sed deficientes, velle invenire, tale est ac si quisquam velit videre tenebras, vel audire silentium . . . *De Civitate Dei* XII, 7; *PL* 41, 355.

- 17 *De Civitate Dei* XII, 8; PL 41, 355.
- 18 *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 20, 54; PL 32, 1270.
- 19 Communis est omnibus natura, non gratia. Natura non putetur gratia; sed et si putetur gratia, ideo putetur gratia quia et ipsa gratis concessa est. *Sermo* 26, 4, 4; PL 38, 172. Cf. . . . illam generalem gratiam . . . qua creatus est homo . . . *Ibid.* 8, 9; 174-175. Cf. *Retract.* I, 25; PL 32, 624 which refers to *Epistolae ad Romanos Inchoata Expositio*, PL 35, 2087.
- 20 Excepta ergo illa gratia, qua condita est humana natura (haec enim Christianis Paganisque communis est), haec est major gratia, non quod per Verbum homines creati sumus, sed quod per Verbum carnem factum fideles facti sumus. *Sermo* 26, 6, 7; PL 38, 173.
- 21 This is the hypothesis envisaged in *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 20, 56; PL 32, 1298; it is confirmed in *Retract.* I, 9, 6; PL 32, 598: . . . quamvis ignorantia et difficultas, etiamsi essent hominis primordia naturalia, nec sic culpandus, sed laudandus esset Deus . . .
- 22 *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 10; PL 41, 417. Cf. XIV, 26; 434-435, and *De Gen. ad Litt.* XI, 1, 1; PL 34, 429.
- 23 *Op. Imp. Cont. Jul.* V, 1; PL 45, 1432.
- 24 *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 18, 52; PL 32, 1296.
- 25 The differences between Augustinism and Thomism entailed in adopting this viewpoint are made perfectly clear in the remarkable work of J. B. Kors, *La justice primitive et le péché originel d'après S. Thomas* (*Biblioth. Thomiste* II), Le Saulchoir, 1922, pp.

7-22. Particularly the following remark: "Théoriquement donc, saint Augustin ne pose pas la question de la nature pure. Il considère seulement ce fait, que Dieu créa l'homme dans la rectitude" (p. 11). We know of no text contradicting this assertion, or even warranting any restriction upon it. So, too: "Ainsi il (Augustin) ne considère pas la nature dans sa constitution essentielle, mais telle qu'elle a été créée par Dieu. Celle-ci est pour lui la vraie nature, au sens propre du mot" (p. 10). This assertion is justified by the following text: . . . naturam, qualis sine vicio primitus condita est: ipsa enim vere ac proprie natura hominis dicitur. *Retract.* I, 10, 3; PL 32, 600. The other meaning of the word "nature"—an improper one, according to St. Augustine—designates that other factual state into which we are born according to sin: Translato autem verbo utimur, ut naturam dicamus etiam, qualis nascitur homo. . . . *Ibid.* In all of this, there is no trace of Thomistic pure nature whose philosophical definition rests on man's essence, one that sin could not have corrupted without completely destroying it. If, with St. Thomas, "bonum naturae humanae" is understood as "ipsa principia naturae ex quibus ipsa natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae," it should be said that "primum . . . bonum naturae nec tollitur nec diminuitur per peccatum" (*Sum. Theol.* I, II, 85, 1 resp.). It will be seen, on the contrary, that according to St. Augustine nature could have been and was corrupted inasmuch as it was originally but the order established by God and then destroyed by sin.

26 Unicum enim Filium Deus habet quem genuit de substantia sua . . .

Nos autem non de substantia sua genuit; creatura enim sumus, quam non genuit, sed fecit; et ideo, ut fratres Christi secundum modum suum faceret, adoptavit. Iste itaque modus quo nos Deus, cum jam essemus ab ipso non nati, sed conditi et instituti, verbo suo et gratia sua genuit ut filii ejus essemus, adoptio vocatur. *Cont. Faustum Manich.* III, 3; *PL* 42, 215-16. See E. Portalé, *art. cit.*, col. 2393b, and J. B. Kors, *op. cit.* p. 13.

27 Mortalis ergo erat conditione corporis animalis, immortalis autem beneficio Conditoris. Si enim corpus animale, utique mortale, quia et mori poterat, quamvis et immortale, ideo quia et non mori poterat. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VI, 25, 36; *PL* 34, 354. . . . qui status eis de ligno vitae, quod in medio paradiso cum arbore vetita simul erat, mirabili Dei gratia praestabatur. . . . *De Civitate Dei* XIII, 20; *PL* 41, 394.

28 See J. Kors, *op. cit.* p. 9.

29 *De Corr. et Gratia* 11, 29; *PL* 44, 933-34.

30 Sed obedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae virtus in creatura rationali mater quodammodo est omnium custosque virtutum. . . . Hoc itaque de uno cibi genere non edendo, ubi aliorum tanta copia subjacebat, tam leve praeceptum ad observandum, tam breve ad memoria retinendum, ubi praesertim nondum voluntati cupiditas resistebat, quod de poena transgressionis postea subsecutum est, tanto majore injustitia violatum est, quanto faciliore posset observantia custodiri. *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 12; *PL* 41, 420.

31 According to *Eccli.* 10, 15. Quid est autem superbia, nisi perversae celsitudinis appetitus? Perversa enim celsi-

tudo est, deserto eo cui debet animus inhaerere principio, sibi quodammodo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, cum sibi nimis placet. Sibi vero ita placet, cum ab illo bono immutabili deficit, quod ei magis placere debuit quam ipse sibi. Spontaneus est autem iste defectus: quoniam si voluntas in amore superioris immutabilis boni, a quo illustrabatur ut videret, et accendebatur ut amaret, stabilis permaneret, non inde ad sibi placendum averteretur . . . *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 13, 1; *PL* 41, 420-21.

32 Manifesto ergo apertoque peccato, ubi factum est quod Deus fieri prohibuerat, diabolus hominem non cepisset, nisi jam ille sibi ipsi placere coepisset. Hinc enim et delectavit quod dictum est, *Eritis sicut dii* (*Gen.* 3, 5). Quod melius esse possent summo veroque principio cohaerendo per obedientiam, non suum sibi existendo principium per superbiam. Dii enim creati, non sua veritate, sed Dei veri participatione sunt dii. . . . Illud itaque malum, quo cum sibi homo placet, tanquam sit et ipse lumen, avertitur ab eo lumine, quod ei si placeat et ipse fit lumen: illud, inquam, malum praecessit in abditio, ut sequeretur hoc malum quod perpetratum est in aperto. *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 13, 2; *PL* 41, 421-22.

33 *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 14; *PL* 41, 422.

34 *De Corr. et Gratia* 10, 28; *PL* 44, 933. Cf. *Retract.* I, 15, 2; *PL* 32, 608.

35 Bona igitur voluntas opus est Dei: cum ea quippe ab illo factus est homo. Mala vero voluntas prima, quoniam omnia mala opera praecessit in homine, defectus potius fuit quidam ab opere Dei ad sua opera, quam opus

ullum. *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 11, 1; *PL* 41, 418.

36 St. Augustine's interpreters dispute as to whether concupiscence is original sin or only a consequence (*reatus*) of that sin. The very meaning of the term *reatus*—a consequence, or consequence and culpability or culpability alone—is involved in the discussion. E. Portalié (*art. cit.* col. 2395, 3rd question) contends that Augustine did not identify original sin with the first concupiscence, which is merely its effect. J. B. Kors (*op. cit.* p. 16, note 7) says that he cannot understand how E. Portalié could make such a statement: "Le saint docteur s'exprime trop nettement en sens contraire." Nevertheless, E. Portalié is right. And the reason is a matter of principle: concupiscence is a disorder. If God created man subject to concupiscence, we do not see any essential difference between the state of nature willed by God and the state of fallen nature. Moreover, there are formal texts to this effect that J. B. Kors should have discussed before condemning the contrary interpretation. Augustine expressly says of Adam before the fall: ubi praesertim nondum voluntati cupiditas resistebat, quod de poena transgressionis postea subsecutum est. . . . (see note 30 above). Thus, concupiscence is a disorder following pride of will, and the latter is original sin in its essence. All the texts adduced by J. B. Kors on p. 16 are explained by the fact that, in the state of fallen nature, original sin is distinguished from the punishment befalling it, namely concupiscence and ignorance. It is in this sense that "peccatum originale sic peccatum est, ut ipsum sit et poena peccati," as is apparent from the context itself (*ibid.* note 3).

37 . . . quando ille (*scil.* primus homo) propria voluntate peccatum illud grande peccavit, naturamque in se vitiauit, mutavit, obnoxiauit humanam. . . . *Op. Imp. Cont. Jul.* IV, 104; *PL* 45, 1401.

38 Concerning the problem of the transmission of original sin, see E. Portalié, *art. cit.* col. 2394-98, and J. B. Kors, *op. cit.* p. 20-22.

39 *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* I, 1, 11; *PL* 40, 107.

40 Neque enim damnando aut totum abstulit quod dederat, alioquin non esset omnino. . . . *De Civitate Dei* XXII, 24, 1; *PL* 41, 788. Nullum quippe vitium ita contra naturam est, ut naturae dealeat etiam extrema vestigia. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 12, 2; *PL* 41, 639. Neque enim totum aufert (Deus) quod naturae dedit: sed aliquid adimit, aliquid relinquit, ut sit qui doleat quod adimit. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 13, 2; *PL* 41, 641.

41 . . . non in eo (*scil.* homine) tamen penitus extincta est quaedam velut scintilla rationis, in qua factus est ad imaginem Dei. *De Civitate Dei* XXII, 24, 2; *PL* 41, 789. Whence the whole long development which might be called "a eulogy of fallen man," *ibid.* XXII, 24, 3-5; 789-92. The remarkable beauty of what is still left to us gives a faint idea of what man had received.

42 On the question of the pagans' natural virtues, see the substantial chapters of J. Mausbach's, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, t. II, pp. 258-94. See also, E. Portalié, *art. cit.* col. 2386-87.

43 Cum enim omnia bona dicerentur ex Deo, id est magna, et media, et minima: in mediis quidem bonis in-

venitur liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quia et male illo uti possumus; sed tamen tale est, ut sine illo recte vivere nequeamus. Bonus autem usus ejus jam virtus est, quae in magnis reperitur bonis, quibus male uti nullus potest. Et quia omnia bona . . . ex Deo sunt, sequitur ut ex Deo sit etiam bonus usus liberae voluntatis, quae virtus est, et in magnis numeratur bonis. *Retract.* I, 9, 6; *PL* 32, 598. What follows, *Deinde*, etc. shows that Augustine distinguishes such grace from salutary grace.

44 Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium atque peccatum. *In Joan. Evang.* V, 1; *PL* 35, 1414. Cum dico tibi: sine adjutorio Dei nihil agis, nihil boni dico, nam ad male agendum habes sine adjutorio Dei liberam voluntatem: quam non est illa libera. *Sermo* 156, 11, 12; *PL* 38, 856. On the meaning of this last remark, see this chapter, sec. 3, *Grace and Liberty*.

45 Saint Augustine is always careful to note:

(i) That the pagans' virtues, although real moral virtues, never have anything but the appearance of Christian virtues: God gives such virtues to them to arouse us by their example to acquire true virtues if we do not have them, and to forestall our praising ourselves for them if we already possess them. *De Civitate Dei* V, 18, 3; *PL* 41, 165; *Ibid.* V, 19; 105-106, and *Epist.* 138, 3, 17; *PL* 33, 533 (where this idea is linked up with the theme of order in the earthly city); *Epist.* 144, 2; *PL* 33, 591. *De Patientia* 27, 24; *PL* 40, 624. *De Gratia Christi* 24, 25; *PL* 44, 372-73. *Op. Imp. Cont. Jul.* IV, 3, 16; *PL* 44, 744.

(ii) These natural virtues have no

supernatural value. Moreover, they become just so many vices when man, as he is all too inclined to do, attributes the merit for them to himself and boasts of them. God is the only lawful end; every action referred to man, even though it be materially praiseworthy, ceases to be virtuous and becomes vicious for that very reason. See *De Civitate Dei* XXI, 16; *PL* 41, 730; and especially XIX, 25, the chapter entitled: Quod non possint ibi verae esse virtutes, ubi non est vera religio; *PL* 41, 656. Cf. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 66, 5; *PL* 40, 63.

46 *Epist.* 177, 7; *PL* 33, 767-68. *Epist.* 194, 3, 8; *PL* 33, 877. *Epist.* 217, 3, 11; *PL* 33, 982.

47 On Jesus Christ's role as mediator in Augustinian theology, see E. Portalié, *art. cit.* col. 2366-74.

48 . . . quia sponte homo, id est libero arbitrio, cadere potuit, non etiam surgere . . . *Retract.* I, 9, 6; *PL* 32, 598.

49 *De Spir. et Litt.* 28, 48; *PL* 44, 230; *Retract.* II, 24, 2; *PL* 32, 640.

50 Sed mortuum fuerat (*scil.* peccatum), id est occultatum, cum mortales nati sine mandato legis homines viverent, sequentes concupiscentias carnis sine ulla cognitione, quia sine ulla prohibitione. *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* I, 1, 4; *PL* 40, 104.

51 *Op. cit.* I, 1, 2; 103; I, 1, 6; 105.

52 *Op. cit.* I, 1, 3; 103; I, 1, 15; 108.

53 *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* I, 1, 7-14; *PL* 40, 105-108.

54 . . . eo ipso quo gratia est evangelica, operibus non debetur: *alioquin gratia jam non est gratia* (*Rom.* 11, 6). Et multis locis hoc saepe testatur (*scil.*

Apostolus), fidei gratiam praeponens operibus, non ut opera extinguat, sed ut ostendat non esse opera praecedentia gratiam, sed consequentia: Ut scilicet non se quisque arbitretur ideo percipisse gratiam, quia bene operatus est; sed bene operari non posse, nisi per fidem perceperit gratiam. *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* I, 2, 2; *PL* 40, 111.

55 Vocantis est ergo gratia; percipientis vero gratiam consequenter sunt opera bona, non quae gratiam pariant, sed quae gratia pariantur. Non enim ut ferveat calefacit ignis, sed quia fervet; nec ideo bene currit rota ut rotunda sit, sed quia rotunda est: sic nemo propterea bene operatur ut accipiat gratiam, sed quia accepit. *Op. cit.* I, 2, 3; *PL* 40, 113.

56 Non ergo secundum electionem propositum Dei manet, sed ex proposito electio: id est non quia invenit Deus opera bona in hominibus quae eligat, ideo manet propositum justificationis ipsius; sed quia illud manet ut justificet credentes, ideo invenit opera quae jam eligat ad regnum caelorum. Nam nisi esset electio, non essent electi. . . . Non tamen electio praecedit justificationem, sed electionem justificatio. *Op. cit.* I, 2, 6; *PL* 40, 115.

57 *Op. cit.* I, 2, 7; *PL* 40, 115.

58 *Op. cit.* I, 2, 11; *PL* 40, 117.

59 *Op. cit.* I, 2, 12; *PL* 40, 117-18. Cf. *Enchir.* 32; *PL* 40, 247-48.

60 Since liberty is a fact (every will being free by definition), and since God's infallible foreknowledge is undeniable (God being perfect), then His foreknowledge has to be compatible with that liberty. When arguing against Cicero, Augustine seeks to settle the

problem by showing that, if will equals liberty, then the divine foreknowledge of voluntary acts is by definition a foreknowledge of free acts. Consequently, it would be contradictory for divine foreknowledge to render our voluntary acts necessary; for voluntary acts are essentially free acts. On this question see *De Civitate Dei* V, 9-10; *PL* 41, 148-153, *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 3, 8; *PL* 32, 1275, and III, 4, 9-11; 1275-76. This doctrine will be made more precise in St. Anselm who, following Augustine, teaches that God foresees the necessary as necessary and the contingent as contingent. Cf. St. Anselm, *De Concord. Praesc.* I, 3; *PL* 158, 511-512.

61 An forte illi qui hoc modo vocati non consentiunt, possent alio modo vocati accommodare fidei voluntatem, ut et illud verum sit: *multi vocati, pauci electi*; ut quamvis multi uno modo vocati sint, tamen quia non omnes uno modo affecti sunt, illi soli sequantur vocationem, qui ei capiendae reperiuntur idonei. . . . Ad alios autem vocatio quidem pervenit, sed quia talis fuit qua moveri non possent, nec eam capere apti essent, vocati quidem dici potuerunt, sed non electi, et non jam similiter verum est: igitur non miserentis Dei, sed volentis atque currentis est hominis: quoniam non potest effectus misericordiae Dei esse in hominis potestate, ut frustra ille miseretur, si homo nolit; quia si vellet etiam ipsorum misereri, posset ita vocare, quomodo illis aptum esset, ut et moverentur et intelligerent et sequerentur. *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* I, 2, 13; *PL* 40, 118. Illi enim electi, qui congruenter vocati; illi autem qui non congruebant neque contemperabantur vocationi, non electi, quia non secuti, quamvis vocati. Item verum est: *non*

volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei, quia etiamsi multos vocet, eorum tamen miseretur, quos ita vocat, quomodo eis vocari aptum est, ut sequantur . . . nullius Deus frustra miseretur; cujus autem miseretur, sic eum vocat, quomodo scit ei congruere, ut vocantem non respuat. *Ibid.* PL 40, 119. Regarding this question see the texts collected by Portalié, *art. cit.* 2391c.

62 Haec est praedestinatio sanctorum, nihil aliud: praescientia scilicet, et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur. Ceteri autem ubi nisi in massa perditionis justo divino iudicio relinquantur? Ubi Tyrii relictus sunt et Sidonii, qui etiam credere potuerunt, si mira illa Christi signa vidissent? Sed quoniam ut crederent non erat eis datum, etiam unde crederent est negatum. Ex quo apparet habere quosdam in ipso ingenio divinum naturaliter munus intelligentiae, quo moveantur ad fidem, si congrua suis mentibus vel audiant verba, vel signa conspiciant: et tamen si Dei altiore iudicio, a perditionis massa non sunt gratiae praedestinatione discreti, nec ipsa eis adhibetur vel dicta divina vel facta, per quae possent credere, si audirent utique talia vel viderent. *De dono Persever.* 14, 35; PL 45, 1014. Cf. Ista igitur sua dona quibuscumque Deus donat, procul dubio se donaturum esse praescivit, et in sua praescientia praeparavit. Quos ergo praedestinavit, ipsos et vocavit vocatione illa, quam me saepe commemorare non piget. . . . Namque in sua quae falli mutarique non potest praescientia, opera sua futura disponere, id omnino, nec aliud quidquam est praedestinare. *Op. cit.* 17, 41; PL 45, 1018-19. Concerning grace's way

of acting on the will, see section 3 following, *Grace and Liberty*.

63 With St. Augustine himself we understand by this not a purely passive foreknowledge—as certain Molinists have understood it—but “praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum” in the twofold sense just defined.

64 *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* I, 2, 14; PL 40, 119.

65 *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* I, 2, 16; PL 40, 120-21. Cf. *ibid.* 22; PL 40, 127-28. *De dono Persever.* 14, 35; PL 45, 1014-15. *De Praedestin. Sanct.* 8, 14; PL 44, 971. *Ibid.* 16; PL 44, 972-73. *Epist.* 194, 6, 23; PL 33, 882. *Epist.* 214, 6-7; PL 33, 970-71.

66 A constructive criticism of this chapter will be found in B. Romeyer, “Trois problèmes de philosophie” (*Arch. de Philos.*, Vol. VII, cah. 2, pp. 228-243). These very valuable pages were an invitation to further development, but the lack of theological competence which is so necessary in such matter has warned us against it.

67 *De Duabus Animabus* 10, 13; PL 42, 104.

68 This point has been well noted by J. Martin, *S. Augustin*, pp. 176-79. All the necessary references will be found there.

69 *De Gratia et Lib. Arbit.* 14, 27; PL 44, 897.

70 See *Confess.* VII, 21, 27; PL 32, 748.

71 *Confess.* X, 29, 40; X, 31, 45; X, 37, 60. *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 15, 31; PL 44, 899. Cf. the first outlines of the formula in J. Martin, *S. Augustin*, p. 193-94. Augustine will write with good reason: . . . longe antequam Pelagiana haeresis extitisset, sic disputavimus,

velut jam contra illos disputaremus. *Retract.* I, 9, 6; *PL* 32, 598.

72 *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 14, 27; *PL* 44, 897.

73 Revelavit autem per Scripturas suas sanctas, esse in homine liberum voluntatis arbitrium. *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 2, 2; *PL* 44, 881. See also (*ibid.* 1, 1; *PL* 44, 880) the first statement of it. Cf. the well-known formula: et Dei donum est (*scil.* grace) et liberum arbitrium, *op. cit.* 4, 7; *PL* 44, 886. On the spirit in which this treatise should be interpreted see *Epist.* 214; *PL* 33, 969.

74 Numquid non liberum arbitrium Timothei est exhortatus Apostolus dicens: *Contine te ipsum* (1. *Tim.* 5, 22)? Et in hac re potestatem voluntatis ostendit, ubi ait: *non habens necessitatem potestatem autem habens suae voluntatis, ut servet virginem suam* (1 *Cor.*, 7, 37). Et tamen, *non omnes capiunt verbum hoc, sed quibus datum est.* Quibus enim non est datum, aut nolunt, aut non implent quod volunt: quibus autem datum est, sic volunt ut impleant quod volunt. *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 4, 7; *PL* 44, 886. *Velle enim*, inquit (Apostolus) *adjacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio.* His verbis videtur non recte intelligentibus velut auferre liberum arbitrium. Sed quomodo aufert, cum dicat: *Velle adjacet mihi?* Certe enim ipsum velle in potestate est, quoniam adjacet nobis: sed quod perficere bonum non est in potestate, ad meritum pertinet originalis peccati. *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* I, 1, 11; *PL* 40, 107. Cf. *Ibid.* I, 1, 14; 108.

75 *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 5, 11-12; *PL* 44, 888-89, and 6, 13; 889.

76 *Ibid.* 6, 15; 891 and *Dona sua coronat Deus, non merita tua, ibid.* 6,

15; 890. For a formulation of his opposition to Pelagius on this point, see *ibid.* 14, 28-29; 897-898. Cf. *Justitia tua (scil. Domine) sola me liberat; mea sola non sunt nisi peccata. Enarr. in Ps.* 70, 1, 20; *PL* 36, 890. *Nihil es per te, Deum invoca; tua peccata sunt, merita Dei sunt; supplicium tibi debetur, et cum praemium venerit, sua dona coronabit, non merita tua. Enarr. in Ps.* 70, 2, 5; *PL* 36, 895.

77 *De Spir. et Litt.* 34, 60; *PL* 44, 240. Cf. *Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te justificat sine te. Ergo fecit nescientem, justificat volentem. Sermo* 169, 11, 13; *PL* 38, 923.

78 *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 15, 31; *PL* 44, 899.

79 . . . gratiam Dei . . . qua voluntas humana non tollitur, sed ex mala mutatur in bonam et, cum bona fuerit, adjuvatur; . . . *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 20, 41; *PL* 44, 905. Neque enim voluntatis arbitrium ideo tollitur, quia juvatur; sed ideo juvatur, quia non tollitur. *Epist.* 157, 2, 10; *PL* 33, 677.

80 See above, chapter II, note 29.

81 *Condelector legi Dei secundum interiorum hominem:* cum ipsa delectatio boni, qua etiam non consentit ad malum, non timore poenae, sed amore justitiae (hoc est enim condelectari), non nisi gratiae deputanda sit. *Cont. Duas Epist. Pelag.* I, 10, 22; *PL* 44, 561. *Nihil hic ergo aliud dictum existimo: suavitatem fecisti cum servo tuo (Ps. 118, 65), nisi fecisti ut me delectaret bonum. Quando enim delectat bonum, magnum est Dei donum. Enarr. in Ps.* 118, 17, 1; *PL* 37, 1547. Cum quo ergo Deus facit suavitatem, id est, cui propitius inspirat boni delectationem, atque, ut apertius id ex-

plicem, cui donatur a Deo caritas Dei. . . . *Ibid.* 2; 1548. Docet ergo Deus suavitatem inspirando delectationem, docet disciplinam temperando tribulationem, docet scientiam insinuando cognitionem. Cum itaque alia sint quae ideo discimus ut tantummodo sciamus, alia vero ut etiam faciamus; quando Deus ea docet sic docet ut scienda sciamus, aperiendo veritatem, sic docet ut facienda faciamus, inspirando suavitatem. *Ibid.* 3; 1549. Cf. *Enarr. in Ps.* 118, 22, 7; *PL* 37, 1565-66. *De Peccat. Merit. et Remiss.* II, 17, 27; *PL* 44, 168. The overwhelming importance of the idea of *delight* in Jansenius is well-known. See especially, *Augustinus*, t. III, lib. 7, cap. 3: *Delectatio efficit voluntatem et libertatem, hoc est, facit velle et libere velle* (edit. Rouen, 1652, t. III, p. 309-311). His penetrating analyses are always useful, but he has committed the initial error of separating, as though they were things, different points in an analysis, although these are in reality inseparable. Thus, Jansenius always reasons as though *delight* (*delectatio*) were a weight in the will distinct from the will itself. According to him, it is as different from will as knowledge (*loc. cit.*). He thereby introduced a determining motive of heterogeneous nature into the Augustinian will, one which, in spite of every further effort, gives the action of divine grace the appearance of a determinism from without under which the will's liberty disappears. In this deviation from authentic Augustinism it is curious to note the role played by the definition of *delight* given in the apocryphal works *De Spiritu et Anima* and *De Substantia Dilectionis* (*PL* 40, 779, 843). See Jan-

senius, *Augustinus*, ed. cit., t. III, p. 185E and p. 309E. On this point, the fundamental difference between the two doctrines seems to us to be this: for Jansenius, *delight* is a cause of volition: Cum igitur vera causa, cur arbitrium ad appetendum aliquid moveatur, sit delectatio, qua intrinsecus in ipsa voluntate mulcetur; . . . (*Augustinus*, t. III, p. 310B); whereas according to St. Augustine, *delight* is merely love and this in turn, is but the will's inner weight, which is simply free choice (*liberum arbitrium*).

82 Regnant autem ista bona (*scil.* fructus Spiritus) si tantum delectant, ut ipsa teneant animum in tentationibus ne in peccati consensionem ruat. Quod enim amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est: ut verbi gratia occurrit forma speciosae feminae et movet ad delectationem fornicationis: sed si plus delectat pulchritudo illa intima et sincera species castitatis, per gratiam quae est in fide Christi, secundum hanc vivimus et secundum hanc operamur . . . *Epist. ad Galat. Expos.* 49; *PL* 35, 2140-41. Manifestum est certe secundum id nos vivere quod sectati fuerimus; sectabimur autem quod dilexerimus . . . si tantumdem utrumque diligitur, nihil horum sectabimur; sed aut timore, aut inviti trahemur in alterutram partem. *Ibid.* 54; 2142.

83 Ecce unde liberi, unde condelectamur legi Dei: libertas enim delectat. Nam quamdiu timore facis quod iustum est, non Deus te delectat. Quamdiu adhuc servus facis, te non delectat: delectet te, et liber es. *In Joan. Evang.* 41, 8, 10; *PL* 35, 1698. Jansenius (*Augustinus*, ed. cit. t. III, p. 311) qualifies

this formula as "nobilissima fulgentissimaque," and it is, in fact, just that, provided it is understood correctly. Full liberty is only attained when the soul acts through a love of liberating delight which snatches it away from sin.

84 See, for instance, E. Portalié, *art. cit.* col. 2389a, and J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, p. 186-187. Their precautions seem to us quite justified but ineffective in kind because Jansenius, against whom they are taken, had already taken them before them. The problem appears to us to lie elsewhere. But whichever interpreter is wrong, there will only be those who have not tried to unravel the question so as not to find some excuse for Jansenius.

85 In Augustine's thought there is a perfectly clear distinction between the meaning of *liberum arbitrium* and *libertas*. This distinction is sometimes expressed very precisely, e.g. *Item ne quisquam etsi non de operibus, de ipso gloriatur libero arbitrio voluntatis, tanquam ab ipso incipiat meritum, cui tanquam debitum reddatur praemium, bene operandi ipsa libertas; Enchir.* 32; *PL* 40, 247. It is just as clear in the following text: *Redimuntur autem (scil. homines) in libertatem beatitudinis sempiternam, ubi jam peccato servire non possunt. Nam si, ut dicis, boni malique voluntarii possibilitas sola libertas est, non habet libertatem Deus, in quo peccandi possibilitas non est. Hominis vero liberum arbitrium congenitum et omnino inamissibile si quaerimus, illud est quo beati omnes esse volunt, etiam hi qui ea nolunt quae ad beatitudinem ducunt. Op. Imp. Cont. Jul. VI, 11; PL 45, 1521.*

The contrast is clear, then, between man's free choice, the evil use of which does not destroy nature, and liberty, which is the good use of free choice. In interpreting Augustinian texts on liberty, there are two rules to follow:

(i) In Augustinian language, *liberum arbitrium* in man and in this life implies the possibility of doing evil. Cf. *Liberum itaque arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum confitendum est nos habere (De Corr. et Gratia I, 2; PL 44, 936)*. Of course, in God this is not so (see *Op. Imp. cont. Jul. V, 38; PL 45, 1474*. Cf. Adhémar d'Alès, *Sur la trace de s. Augustin* in *Etudes*, 1930, 85, note), but we should add, along with St. Jerome and P. Lombard (*II Sent.* 25, 2), that when applied to God the word takes on a very different meaning.

(ii) Since Latin has only one adjective, viz. *liber*, to denote both the possession of free choice and of liberty, the texts where it is used are always ambiguous. E.g. *Semper est autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper est bona (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit. 15, 31; PL 44, 899)*. In this case *libera* can only mean "endowed with free choice." Moreover, he adds the adverb, *vere*, to *liber* when he wants to make it clear that he is speaking of liberty (cf. *Epist.* 217, 6, 23; *PL* 33, 987). It is advisable, therefore, to make some attempt to determine the meaning of this adjective in each particular case. Following are some instances: *Posset enim (homo ante peccatum) perseverare si vellet; quod ut nollit, de libero descendit arbitrio (as the power of doing evil); quod tunc ita liberum erat, ut et bene velle posset et male. Quid erit autem liberius (in the sense of libertas) libero*

arbitrio, quando non poterit servire peccato. . . . *De Corr. et Gratia* II, 32; *PL* 44, 936. . . . cum arbitrio voluntatis, ideo *vere libero* (in the sense of *libertas*), quia per ipsam gratiam liberato . . . *Ibid.* 42; 942. . . . arbitrium, inquam, liberum (in the sense of *free choice*), sed non liberatum (through *liberty*); . . . *Ibid.*

(iii) The term *libertas*, in so far as it designates the state of one who is *liberatus*, signifies confirmation of the will in good through grace. Thus, it does not have a fixed value since that confirmation can attain various degrees: Adam's *libertas* consisted in being able not to sin; lost by the fall, it is returned to the soul by the grace of Jesus Christ. But true *libertas* will only exist in beatitude, wherein the will will no longer be able to sin. Prima ergo *libertas voluntatis* erat, posse non peccare; novissima erit multo major, non posse peccare. *De Corr. et Gratia*, 12, 33; *PL* 44, 936. In the meantime *libertas* is the greater in each man according as he is more completely *liberatus*. Some idea of the obscurity of Augustine's terminology can be had from the following statement of *Retract.* I, 15, 4; *PL* 32, 609: In tantum enim libera est, in quantum liberata est, et in tantum appellatur voluntas, alioquin tota cupiditas quam voluntas proprie nuncupanda est. To say that the will is *libera* (in the sense of *libertas*) to the extent that it is *liberata*, is quite clear; but then to reserve the term *voluntas* for the liberated will would be to lapse into further confusion. For a *cupiditas* is still a *voluntas*. The moral sense of "will," i.e. a will which is what it should be, comes into play here along with the

term's psychological meaning defined above, chapter II, note 28.

Augustinian terminology has been clarified and fixed by St. Anselm. He substitutes the expression *libertas arbitrii* for *liberum arbitrium*. Man always has an *arbitrium* but it is not always *liber* (cf. St. Anselm, *De Libero Arbitrio*, cap. 2; *PL* 158, 492 and cap. 3; 494). *Libertas* is, then, synonymous with *potestas non peccandi*. Concerning the disputes over "the liberty of indifference" resulting from these ambiguities, see E. Gilson, *La liberté chez Descartes*, p. 286 ff.

86 Sed tu fortasse quaesiturus es, quoniam movetur voluntas cum se avertit ab incommutabili bono ad mutabile bonum, unde ei iste motus existat; qui profecto malus est, tametsi voluntas libera, quia sine illa nec recte vivi potest, in bonis numeranda sit. Si enim motus iste, id est aversio voluntatis a Domino Deo, sine dubitatione peccatum est, num possumus auctorem peccati Deum dicere? . . . Motus ergo ille aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, quoniam defectivus motus est, omnis autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineat et ad Deum non pertinere ne dubites. Qui tamen defectus quoniam est voluntarius, in nostra est positus potestate. Si enim times illum, oportet ut nolis; si autem nolis, non erit. Quid ergo securius quam esse in ea vita, ubi non possit tibi evenire quod non vis? Sed quoniam non sicut homo sponte cecidit, ita etiam sponte surgere potest, porrectam nobis desuper dexteram Dei, id est Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, fide firma teneamus, et expectemus certa spe, et caritate ardenti consideremus. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 20, 54; *PL* 32, 1269-70. Cf. III, 17, 47-48; 1294-

95. *De Trinitate* XII, 11, 16; *PL* 42, 1007. *De Nat. et Gratia* 23, 25; *PL* 44, 259. On the impossibility, for man, of re-creating the divine order by his own powers: Non vos, sed ego sum Deus: ego creavi, ego recreo; ego formavi, ego reformo; ego feci, ego reficio. Si non potuisti facere te, quomodo potes reficere te? *Enarr. in Ps.* 45, 14; *PL* 36, 524. A te deficere potes, tu teipsum reficere non potes: ille reficit, qui te fecit. *Enarr. in Ps.* 94, 10; *PL* 37, 1224.

87 Desinant ergo sic insanire, et ad hoc se intelligant habere, quantum possunt, liberum arbitrium, non ut superba voluntate respuant adiutorium, sed ut pia voluntate invocent Dominum. Haec enim voluntas libera tanto erit liberior quanto sanior; tanto autem sanior, quanto divinae misericordiae gratiaeque subiectionis. *Epist.* 157, 2, 7-8; *PL* 33, 676.

88 *De Moribus Eccl.* I, 12, 21; *PL* 32, 1320.

89 *In Joan. Evang.* 41, 8, 8; *PL* 35, 1696; *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 15, 31; *PL* 44, 899-900.

90 See preceding chapter, p. 140.

91 *Epist.* 167, 6, 19; *PL* 33, 740. Cf. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 13, 37; *PL* 32, 1261. For its relation to the theory of knowledge, see *De Vera Religione* 31, 58; *PL* 34, 147-148.

92 Sed ut aliquid gustu accipias, *Deus caritas est*. Dicturus es mihi: putas quid est caritas? Caritas est qua diligimus. Quid diligimus? Ineffabile bonum, bonum beneficium, bonum bonorum omnium creatorem. *Sermo* 21, 2; *PL* 38, 143.

93 *De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.* 18, 37; *PL* 44, 903-904; XIX, 40; *PL* 44, 905. Cf. *Sermo* 145, 4; *PL* 38, 793.

94 Caritas autem usque adeo donum Dei est, ut Deus dicatur. *Epist.* 186, 3, 7; *PL* 33, 818.

95 Quisquis habet caritatem, ut quid illum mittimus longe, ut videat Deum? Conscientiam suam attendat, et ibi videt Deum. Si caritas ibi non habitat, non ibi habitat Deus: si autem caritas ibi habitat, Deus ibi habitat. Vult illum forte videre sedentem in caelo: habeat caritatem, et in eo habitat sicut in caelo. *Enarr. in Ps.* 149, 4; *PL* 37, 1951.

96 Cur ergo dictum est: *Diligamus invicem, quia dilectio ex Deo est*, nisi quia praecepto admonitum est liberum arbitrium, ut quaereret Dei donum? Quod quidem sine suo fructu prorsus admoneretur, nisi prius acciperet aliquid dilectionis, ut addi sibi quaereret unde quod jubebatur impleat. *De Gratia et Lib. Arbit.* 18, 37; *PL* 44, 903-904.

97 *De Gratia et Lib. Arbit.* 18, 38; *PL* 44, 904. It is based on John's words (1 John 4, 19): Nos diligimus, quia ipse prior dilexit nos. Whence St. Bernard's striking formulae which are only more profound versions of it: Bonus es, Domine, animae quaerenti te: quid ergo invenienti? Sed enim in hoc est mirum quod nemo quaerere te valet nisi qui prius invenerit. Vis igitur inveniri ut quaeraris, quaeri ut inveniaris. Potest quidem quaeri et inveniri, non tamen praeveniri. *De Diligendo Deo*, cap. 7; ed. W. W. Williams, Cambridge, 1926, p. 41. Cf. St. Augustine, *Confess.* XI, 2, 4; *PL* 32, 810-11. Whence the famous passage in Pascal's *Mystère de Jesus*: "Console-toi, tu ne me chercherais pas, si tu ne m'avais trouvé" (*Pensées*, edit. L. Brunschvicg, ed. minor, p. 576).

CHAPTER IV

1 Frui enim est amore alicui rei inhaerere propter seipsam. Uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est. Nam usus illicitus, abusus potius vel abusio nominandus est. *De Doct. Christ.* I, 4, 4; PL 34, 20.

2 Res ergo aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur. Illae quibus fruendum est, beatos nos faciunt. Istis quibus utendum est, tendentes ad beatitudinem adjuvamus, et quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas quae nos beatos faciunt, pervenire, atque his inhaerere possimus. Nos vero qui fruimur et utimur, inter utrasque constituti, si eis quibus utendum est frui voluerimus, impeditur cursus noster, et aliquando etiam deflectitur, ut ab his rebus quibus fruendum est obtinendis vel retardemur, vel etiam revocemur, inferiorum amore praepediti. *De Doct. Christ.* I, 3, 3; PL 34, 20.

3 Nam cum ille unus cogitatur deorum Deus, ab his etiam qui alios et suspicantur et vocant et colunt deos sive in caelo sive in terra, ita cogitatur ut aliquid quo nihil melius sit atque sublimius illa cogitatio conetur attingere. *De Doct. Christ.* I, 7, 7; PL 34, 22. This formula is one of the probable sources for St. Anselm, *Proslogion*, cap. 2; PL 158, 227.

4 *De Doct. Christ.* I, 22, 20; PL 34, 26.

5 *De Doct. Christ.* I, 27, 28; PL 34, 29.

6 Unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis: ordo est amoris. *De Civit. Dei* XV, 22; PL 41, 467. On the basis of this doctrine, see above, Part II, ch. II, sec. 1, *The Virtues as Rules. The Law of Order.*

7 *Sermo* 50, 5, 7; PL 38, 329.

8 *De Doct. Christ.* I, 28, 29; PL 34, 30.

9 *De Doct. Christ.* I, 22, 21; PL 34, 26-27. For the basis of this doctrine see Part II, ch. II, sec. 3, *Charity.*

10 *Sermo* 156, 13, 14; PL 38, 857.

11 See Part II, ch. III, sec. 2, *Sin and Grace.*

12 Neque enim templum suum sic de vobis aedificat Deus, quasi de lapidibus qui non habent motum suum: levantur, ab structore ponuntur. Non sic sunt lapides vivi: *et vos tanquam lapides vivi coedificamini in templum Dei* (*Ephes.* 2, 22 and *1 Pet.* 2, 5). Ducimini, sed currite et vos; ducimini, sed sequimini: quia cum secuti fueritis, verum erit illud, quia sine illo nihil facere potestis. *Sermo* 156, 12, 13; PL 38, 857. On charity's liberating role in so far as it is substituted for fear, see *Sermo* 53, 10, 11; PL 38, 369. Cf. *Quaest. in Hept.* 5, 15; PL 34, 754-56.

13 Aetas corporis non est in voluntate. Ita nullus secundum carnem crescit quando vult; sicut nullus quando vult nascitur: ubi autem nativitas in voluntate est et clementum in voluntate est. Nemo ex aqua et Spiritu nascitur nisi volens. Ergo si vult, crescit; si vult, decrescit. Quid est crescere? Proficere. Quid est decrescere? Deficere. *In Epist. Joan. ad Parthos* 3, 1; PL 35, 1997-98.

14 Conversa (*scil.* anima) ergo a Domino suo ad servum suum (*scil.* corpus), necessario deficit: conversa item a servo suo ad Dominum suum, necessario proficit. *De Musica* VI, 5, 13; PL 32, 1170.

15 *De Trinitate* XIV, 17, 23; PL 42, 1054. *Enchir.* 121, 32; PL 40, 288.

16 See above, p. 153.

17 In addition to the fact that transgressing a law is a more serious fault than a sin pure and simple, Augustine takes into account the evil pleasure there may be in violating law: quia suasio delectationis ad peccatum vehementior est, cum adest prohibitio. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 66, 5; *PL* 40, 63.

18 Ex quo comprehendimus quatuor esse differentias etiam in uno homine, quibus gradatim peractis in vita aeterna manebitur. *Op. cit.* 3; col. 62.

19 *Op. cit.* 5; col. 64. This is the reason why the Law is a law of death, as opposed to the life of grace: Lex ergo peccati et mortis, id est, quae imposita est peccantibus atque morientibus, jubet tantum ne concupiscamus, et tamen concupiscimus. Lex autem spiritus vitae, quae pertinet ad gratiam, et liberat a lege peccati et mortis, facit ut non concupiscamus . . . *Op. cit.* 1; col. 61.

20 Sed de ista concupiscentia carnis falli eos credo, vel fallere, cum qua necesse est ut etiam baptizatus, et hoc si diligentissime proficit, et Spiritu Dei agitur, pia mente configat. Sed haec etiamsi vocatur peccatum, non utique quia peccatum est, sed quia peccato facta est (on this point see p. 151) sic vocatur: sicut scriptura manus cujusque dicitur, quod manus eam fecerit. Peccata autem sunt, quae secundum carnis concupiscentiam vel ignorantiam illicite fiunt, dicuntur, cogitantur: quae transacta etiam reos tenent, si non remittantur. *Cont. Duas Epist. Pelag.* I, 13, 27; *PL* 44, 563.

21 Tertia actio est, quando jam plenissime credimus Liberatori nostro, nec meritis nostris aliquid tribuimus, sed

ejus misericordiam diligendo, jam non vincimur delectatione consuetudinis malae, cum ad peccatum nos ducere nititur; sed tamen adhuc eam interpellantem patimur, quamvis ei non tradamur. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 66, 3; *PL* 40, 62.

22 Et ille homo nunc describitur esse sub gratia, qui nondum habet perfectam pacem, quae corporis resurrectione et immutatione est futura. *Op. cit.* 6; col. 65-66. This struggle is described in *De Agone Christ.* 1-12; *PL* 40, 289-99.

23 In prima ergo actione, quae est ante Legem, nulla pugna est cum voluptatibus hujus saeculi; in secunda, quae sub Lege est, pugnamus, sed vincimur; in tertia pugnamus et vincimus; in quarta non pugnamus, sed perfecta et aeterna pace requiescimus. Subditur enim nobis quod inferius nostrum est, quod propterea non subdebatur, quia superiorem nobis deserueramus Deum. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 66, 7; *PL* 40, 66.

24 Haec est vita hominis viventis ex corpore, et cupiditatibus rerum temporalium colligati. Hic dicitur vetus homo, et exterior, et terrenus, etiamsi obtineat eam quam vulgus vocat felicitatem, in bene constituta terrena civitate, sive sub regibus, sive sub principibus, sive sub legibus, sive sub his omnibus: aliter enim bene constitui populus non potest, etiam qui terrena sectatur: habet quippe et ipse modum quemdam pulchritudinis suae. *De Vera Religione* 26, 48, *PL* 34, 143. On this doctrine's scriptural sources (*I Cor.* 15, 44-49) see *De Gen. ad Litt.* VI, 19, 30; *PL* 34, 351-352; *Cont. Faust. Manich.* 24, 1-2; *PL* 42, 473-78; *De Trinitate* XIV, 17, 23; *PL* 42,

1054-55. *Op. Imp. Cont. Jul.* VI, 40; *PL* 45, 1601-02.

25 On the meaning of this step, see *De Vera Religione* 29, 52; *PL* 34, 145.

26 *De Vera Religione* 26, 49; *PL* 34, 143-144. Thus, there is only perfect justification and perfect charity in the hereafter. See the treatise *De Perf. Just. Hominis* 7, 18; *PL* 44, 299.

27 Sicut autem isti ambo nullo dubitante ita sunt, ut unum eorum, id est veterem atque terrenum, possit in hac tota vita unus homo agere, novum vero et caelestem nemo in hac vita possit nisi cum veteri; nam et ab ipso incipiat necesse est, et usque ad visibilem mortem cum illo, quamvis eo deficiente, se proficiente, perduret: sic proportionem universum genus humanum, cujus tanquam unius hominis vita est ab Adam usque ad finem hujus saeculi, ita sub divinae providentiae legibus administratur, ut in duo genera distributum appareat. Quorum in uno est turba impiorum . . . in altero, series populi uni Deo dediti . . . *De Vera Religione* 27, 50; *PL* 34, 144. Cf. B. Pascal, ed. L. Brunschvicg, ed. minor, p. 80 and note 1.

28 *De Doct. Christ.* I, 29, 30; *PL* 34, 30. From a theological point of view, the basis of this community of love rests in the fact that at the outset God created only one man, Adam, and that the seminal reasons of all other men were contained in him. Harmony of feelings, then, is but an attempt to restore human nature's primitive unity. See *De Civitate Dei* XIII, 22; *PL* 41, 373; and 27, 1; col. 376; XIII, 14; col. 386; XIV, 1; col. 403.

29 *De Gen. ad Litt.* XI, 15, 20; *PL* 34, 437. Since society has its origin in

each man's love, society is only what the individuals are who go to make it up: nam singulus quisque homo, ut in sermone una littera, ita quasi elementum est civitatis et regni, quantalibet terrarum occupatione latissimi. . . . *De Civitate Dei* IV, 3; *PL* 41, 114.

30 Duas istas civitates faciunt duo amores: Jerusalem facit amor Dei; Babyloniam facit amor saeculi. *Enarr. in Ps.* 64, 2; *PL* 36, 773. Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo; terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 28, *PL* 41, 436. Quas etiam mystice appellamus civitates duas, hoc est duas societates hominum: quarum est una quae praedestinata est in aeternum regnare cum Deo; altera, aeternum supplicium subire cum diabolo. *De Civitate Dei* XV, 1, 1; *PL* 41, 437. On these two cities' common origin in Adam, see *op. cit.* XII, 27, 2; *PL* 41, 376. Ac per hoc factum est, ut cum tot tantaeque gentes per terrarum orbem diversis ritibus moribusque viventes, multiplici linguarum, armorum, vestium sint varietate distinctae, non tamen amplius quam duo quaedam genera humanae societatis existerent, quas civitates duas secundum Scripturas nostras merito appellare possimus. Una quippe est hominum secundum carnem, altera secundum spiritum vivere in sui cujusque generis pace volentium; et cum id quod expetunt assequuntur, in sui cujusque generis pace viventium. *De Civitate Dei* XIV, 1; *PL* 41, 403.

31 See the preceding note, the third text quoted in which *civitates* is presented as the mystical equivalent of *societates*.

32 Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis, rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus: profecto ut videatur qualis quisque populus sit, illa sunt intuenda quae diligit. Quaecumque tamen diligit, si coetus est multitudinis, non pecorum, sed rationalium creaturarum, et eorum quae diligit concordi communione sociatus est, non absurde populus nuncupatur; tanto utique melior, quanto in melioribus; tantoque deterior, quanto est in deterioribus concors. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 24; *PL* 41, 655.

33 *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 12, 1; *PL* 41, 637-38.

34 Pax civitatis, ordinata imperandi atque obediendi concordia civium. Pax caelestis civitatis, ordinatissima et concordissima: societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo. Pax omnium rerum, tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 13, 1; *PL* 41, 640.

35 Quanto magis homo fertur quodammodo naturae suae legibus ad ineundam societatem pacemque cum hominibus, quantum in ipso est, omnibus obtinendam: cum etiam mali pro pace suorum belligerent, omnesque, si possint, suos facere velint, ut uni cuncti et cuncta deserviant; quo pacto, nisi in ejus pacem, vel amando, vel timendo consentiant? Sic enim superbia perverse imitatur Deum. Odit namque cum sociis aequalitatem sub illo, sed imponere vult sociis dominationem suam pro illo. Odit ergo justam pacem Dei et amat iniquam pacem suam: non amare tamen qualemcumque pacem nullo modo potest. Nullum quippe vitium ita contra naturam est, ut naturae deleat etiam extrema vesti-

gia. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 12, 2; *PL* 41, 639. Quid est autem civitas nisi multitudo hominum in quoddam vinculum redacta concordiae? *Epist.* 138, 2, 10; *PL* 33, 529.

36 Quapropter ubi non est ista justitia, ut secundum suam gratiam civitati obedienti Deus imperet unus et summus, ne cuiquam sacrificet, nisi tantum sibi; et per hoc in omnibus hominibus ad eandem civitatem pertinentibus atque obedientibus Deo, animus etiam corpori, atque ratio vitii, ordine legitimo fideliter imperet; ut quemadmodum justus unus, ita coetus populusque justorum vivat ex fide, quae operatur per dilectionem, qua homo diligit Deum, sicut diligendus est Deus, et proximum sicut semetipsum: ubi ergo non est ista justitia, profecto non est coetus hominum juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus. Quod si non est, utique populus non est, si vera est haec populi definitio. Ergo nec respublica est, quia res populi non est, ubi ipse populus non est. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 23, 5; *PL* 41, 655.

37 *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 24; *PL* 41, 655-56.

38 *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 24-25; *PL* 41, 655-56.

39 See Hardy, *Le 'De civitate Dei' source principale du 'Discours sur l'histoire universelle,'* Paris, 1913. See his observations on p. 47-48. It may be added that Augustine not only invents the theology of history here, but he establishes the very notion of *humanity*, as it will be taken up again and again and reinterpreted, down to Auguste Comte, as a society composed of more dead members than living, in-

cluding the future and bound together by purely spiritual ties. Moreover, along with Bossuet's *Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, the *City of God* will form a part of the *Positivist Library* of 158 volumes, a catalogue of which was drawn up by Comte. It is to be found in section 4, that of the *Synthesis*, in fourth place after Aristotle, *Morals and Politics*, the *Bible*, the *Koran*. Cf. A. Comte, *Système de politique positive*, t. IV, p. 560.

40 *De Civitate Dei* XII, 27, 2; PL 41, 376.

41 *De Civitate Dei* XV, 1, 2; PL 41, 437.

42 Miser igitur populus, ab isto alienatus Deo. Diligit tamen ipse etiam quamdam pacem suam non improbandam, quam quidem non habebit in fine, quia non ea bene utitur ante finem. Hanc autem ut interim habeat in hac vita, nostra etiam interest: quoniam, quamdiu permixtae sunt ambae civitates, utimur et nos pace Babylonis, ex qua ita per fidem populus Dei liberatur, ut apud hanc interim peregrinetur. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 26; PL 41, 656.

43 Idcirco rerum vitae huic mortali necessariorum utrisque hominibus et utrique domui communis est usus; sed finis utendi cuique suus proprius, multumque diversus. Ita etiam terrena civitas, quae non vivit ex fide, terrenam pacem appetit; in eoque defigit imperandi obediendique concordiam civium, ut sit eis de rebus ad mortalem vitam pertinentibus humanarum quaedam compositio voluntatum. Civitas autem caelestis, vel potius pars ejus quae in hac mortalitate peregrinatur et vivit ex fide, etiam ista pace necesse est utatur, donec ipsa cui talis pax

necessaria est, mortalitas transeat. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 17; PL 41, 645. On the fundamental opposition between *frui* and *uti* see above, p. 165.

44 Interpretations, oftentimes fantastic, of the Augustinian doctrine on this point have been criticized in an excellent chapter by B. Roland-Gosselin, *La morale de s. Augustin*, pp. 168-218. Concerning the Pelagian communism Augustine opposes, see O. Schilling, *Die Staats-und soziallehre des hl. Augustinus*, Freib. im Breis., 1910. In regard to the problem of slavery, see Nourrisson, *La philosophie de s. Augustin*, t. II, p. 54-56.

45 *Enarr. in Ps.* 49, 17; PL 36, 576.

46 All the references needed on this point will be found in B. Roland-Gosselin, *op. cit.* p. 187-189.

47 According to the Benedictine editors, in the version of the Septuagint, *Prov.* 17, after verse 6: PL 33, 665, note a.

48 This appears to us to be the meaning of the statement: Cernis ergo quam multi debeant reddere aliena, si vel pauci quibus reddantur, reperiantur: . . . which we quote later. It would not be hard to find unjust proprietors forced to restore what they have, but finding just possessors able to use their possessions well would be much more difficult.

49 B. Roland-Gosselin gives a correct résumé of Augustine's thought as follows: "Ici-bas, excepté s'il est nuisible à la paix sociale, ce n'est pas le bon usage des choses, mais leur possession légitime, qui fonde le droit de propriété. Un voleur n'est pas absous parce qu'il distribue en aumônes le produit de ses larcins, et le pire avare

a le droit de posséder le bien paternel" (*Op. cit.* p. 206-207). See the *De Bono Conj.* 14, 16; *PL* 40, 384-5.

50 Jamvero si prudenter intueamur quod scriptum est: *Fidelis hominis totus mundus divitiarum est, infidelis autem nec obolus*; nonne omnes qui sibi videntur gaudere licite conquisitis, eisque uti nesciunt (opposition between *frui* and *uti*), aliena possidere convincimus? Hoc enim certe alienum non est, quod jure possidetur; hoc autem jure, quod juste, et hoc juste quod bene. Omne igitur quod male possidetur, alienum est; male autem possidet qui male utitur. Cernis ergo quam multi debeant reddere aliena, si vel pauci quibus reddantur reperiantur; qui tamen ubiubi sunt, tanto magis ista contemnunt, quanto ea justius possidere potuerunt. Justitiam quippe et nemo male habet et qui non dilexerit non habet. Pecunia vero, et a malis male habetur, et a bonis tanto melius habetur, quanto minus amatur. Sed inter haec toleratur iniquitas male habentium, et quaedam inter eos jura constituuntur, quae appellantur civilia, non quod hinc fiat ut bene utentes sint, sed ut male utentes minus molesti sint, donec fideles et pii, quorum jure sunt omnia . . . , perveniant ad illam civitatem, ubi haereditas aeternitatis est, ubi non habet nisi justus locum, non nisi sapiens principatum, ubi possidebunt quicumque ibi erunt vere sua. *Epist.* 153, 6, 26; *PL* 33, 665.

51 Of course, it is not a matter of overlooking injustices committed against civil law: a good thing evilly acquired should be returned: . . . non intercedimus ut secundum mores legesque terrenas non restituantur aliena. (*Loc. cit.* col. 665); but beyond the fact

that these restitutions should be made in a kindly fashion, in no case can it be a question of taking away from its owner a thing he legally possesses on the ground that he is using it irreligiously. See *Epist.* 157, 39; *PL* 33, 692.

52 *De Lib. Arbit.* I, 15, 32; *PL* 32, col. 1238-39.

53 See Volusianus' letter to Augustine and the objections it contains, *Epist.* 136; *PL* 33, 514-15.

54 *Epist.* 138, 2, 12-15; *PL* 33, 530-32. Regarding the legitimacy of war from a Christian point of view, see B. Roland-Gosselin, *op. cit.* p. 142-49.

55 *Epist.* 138, 3, 17; *PL* 33, 533. This enlightening text specifies as well that, if God preserved a respect for virtue in ancient Rome, it was to prepare the way for the divine city and to make its foundation possible. This is the central historical theme of the *City of God*.

56 The texts have been collected by G. Combès, *La guerre*, p. 83-85.

57 *Epist.* 185, 2, 8; *PL* 33, 795-96.

58 Sicut ergo spe salvi, ita spe beati facti sumus: et sicut salutem, ita beatitudinem, non jam tenemus praesentem, sed exspectamus futuram, et hoc per potentiam; quia in malis sumus, quae patienter tolerare debemus, donec ad illa veniamus bona ubi omnia erunt, quibus ineffabiliter delectemur; . . . *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 4, 5; *PL* 41, 631. Propter quod et Apostolus admonuit Ecclesiam ut oraret pro regibus ejus atque sublimibus, addens et dicens, *ut quietam et tranquillam vitam agamus cum omni pietate et caritate* (1 Tim. 2, 2). Et propheta Jeremias cum populo Dei veteri praeunniaret

captivitatem, et divinitus imperaret ut obedieret in Babyloniam irent, Deo suo etiam ista patientia servientes, monuit et ipse ut oraretur pro illa, dicens, *quia in ejus est pace pax vestra* (*Jerem.* 29, 7), utique interim temporalis, quae bonis malisque communis est. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 26; *PL* 41, 656-57. Cf. *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 19; *PL* 41, 243-44, and the sermons on St. Stephen Martyr, *Sermones* 314-319; *PL* 38, 1425-42. In accordance with these principles, Augustine was always a foe of the death penalty and torture. On this point, see G. Combès, *op. cit.* p. 188-200.

59 *De Lib. Arbit.* I, 6, 14; *PL* 32, 1229. *De Civitate Dei* V, 17; *PL* 41, 160-61, the source for Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.* I, II, 97, art. 1 concl.

60 *De Civitate Dei* V, 24; *PL* 41, 170-171. His main interest is to prove against the pagans by using Constantine as an example, that a Christian emperor's reign can be happy. *De Civitate Dei* V, 25; *PL* 41, 171-72. Cf. *Epist.* 138, 3, 16-17; *PL* 33, 532-33.

61 Note the typical text in *Epist.* 93; *PL* 33, 321 ff, especially the following: O si possem tibi ostendere, ex ipsis Circumcellionibus quam multos jam catholicos manifestos habeamus, damnantes suam pristinam vitam . . . qui tamen ad hanc sanitatem non perducerentur, nisi legum istarum, quae tibi displicent, vinculis tanquam phrenetici ligarentur. *Epist.* 93, 1, 2; *PL* 33, 322. Persecution is lawful if it is the persecution of the wicked by the good: Aliquando ergo et qui eam (*scil.* persecutionem) patitur, injustus est, et qui eam facit, justus est. Sed plane semper et mali persecuti sunt bonos, et boni persecuti sunt malos: illi no-

cendo per injustitiam, illi consulendo per disciplinam. . . . *Op. cit.* 2, 8; *PL* 33, 325. Vides itaque . . . non esse considerandum quod quisque cogitur, sed quale sit illud quo cogitur, utrum bonum an malum. *Op. cit.* 5, 16; col. 330. Whence the legitimacy, even the excellence of laws introduced by Christian emperors against pagan sacrifices (*op. cit.* 3, 10; col. 326). Whence finally Augustine's own evolution towards an attitude sympathetic to the use of force against heretics: His ergo exemplis a collegis meis mihi propositis cessi. Nam mea primitus sententia non erat, nisi neminem ad unitatem Christi esse cogendum, verbo esse agendum, disputatione pugnandum, ratione vincendum, ne fictos catholicos haberemus, quos apertos hereticos noveramus. Sed haec opinio mea, non contradicentium verbis, sed demonstrantium superabatur exemplis. Nam primo mihi opponebatur civitas mea, quae cum tota esset in parte Donati, ad unitatem catholicam timore legum imperialium conversa est; . . . etc. *Op. cit.* 5, 17; col. 330. On this point see Nourrisson, *La philosophie de s. Augustin*, t. II, p. 69-73.

62 *De Civitate Dei* I, 35; *PL* 41, 45-46. See also XVIII, 48; col. 611. Excellent remarks on this point will be found in J. N. Figgis, *The Political Aspects*, especially ch. 3, p. 51-53 and ch. 4, p. 68-70.

63 Reuter thinks this text identifies the Church with the *communio sanctorum*. In his desire to refute Reuter (who almost always misunderstands the Church's hierarchical and concrete aspect), Figgis (*op. cit.* p. 69) ranges the opinions of Scholz and Seidel against him. According to them Augustine would in this case be speaking of the Church as a visible and hierarchically

organized body. Reuter is mistaken, but Figgis also mistakenly concludes that Augustine brings about an "identification of the Church with the *Civitas Dei*." In this passage, Augustine identifies the Church with the kingdom of God, but he distinguishes two kingdoms of God: the first is temporary, and scandals are still to be found in it, precisely the scandals the Son of man will have His angels gather at the end of time when the chaff will be separated from the good grain; the second kingdom is the final kingdom of God which contains only the elect and is really one with the City of God: Alio modo igitur intelligendum est regnum caelorum, ubi ambo sunt, et ille scilicet qui solvit quod docet (*scil.* men who do not practice what they preach), et ille qui facit; . . . alio modo autem regnum caelorum dicitur, quo non intrat nisi ille qui facit. Ac per hoc ubi utrumque genus est (*scil.* the good and evil), Ecclesia est qualis nunc est: ubi autem illud solum erit, Ecclesia est qualis tunc erit, quando malus in ea non erit. Ergo Ecclesia et nunc est regnum Christi, regnumque caelorum. Regnant itaque cum illo etiam nunc sancti ejus, aliter quidem quam tunc regnabunt: nec tamen cum illo regnant zizania, quamvis in Ecclesia cum tritico crescant. *De Civitate Dei* XX, 9, 1; *PL* 41, 673. Therefore, this text confirms rather than weakens the distinction between the concept of the City of God and that of the Church.

64 This is Creighton's formula, quoted by Figgis, *op. cit.* p. 58.

65 Generaliter quippe civitas impiorum, cui non imperat Deus obediendi sibi, ut sacrificium non offerat, nisi tantummodo sibi, et per hoc in

illa et animus corpori, ratioque vitiis recte ac fideliter imperet, caret justitiae veritate. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 24; *PL* 41, 656.

66 Quid autem illi diversi errores inimici Christi *omnes* tantum dicendi sunt? Nonne et *unus*? Plane audeo et unum dicere: quia una civitas et una civitas, unus populus et unus populus, rex et rex. Quid est, una civitas et una civitas? Babylonia una; Jerusalem una. Quibuslibet aliis etiam mysticis nominibus appelletur, una tamen civitas et una civitas; illa rege diabolo; ista rege Christo. *Enarr. in Ps. 61, 6; PL* 36, 733. Babylon civitas dicitur secundum saeculum. Quomodo una civitas sancta, Jerusalem; una civitas iniqua, Babylon; omnes iniqui ad Babyloniā pertinent, quomodo omnes sancti ad Jerusalem. *Enarr. in Ps. 86, 6; PL* 37, 1106.

67 Ein Unterschied zwischen dem heidnischen und dem christianisierten römischen Staate war für Augustin nicht vorhanden. Er sah in diesem wie in jenem nur den auf Sünde beruhenden weltlichen Staat. Die einzige, auf göttlichem Rechte beruhende Ordnung war ihm der Gottesstaat der Kirche. H. V. Eicken, *Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung*, 3rd. ed., 1917, p. 144. It will be clear from the preceding analysis how far V. Eicken is from Augustine's true point of view.

68 This applies only to Augustine's own doctrine, not to what it was to become during the Middle Ages. As to the latter, it may be remarked: i) The doctrine which identifies the City of God with a theocratic empire, although a real misinterpretation, was inevitable as soon as political and so-

cial circumstances favored its appearance. ii) Augustine himself was committed to this development (a) by admitting the legitimacy of recourse to the secular arm against heretics; (b) by imposing on the State, as a duty, subordination to the Church's ends, themselves the ends of the City of God. It is a subordination whose modes and limits could not be determined *a priori*. On this point see Figgis' excellent remarks (*op. cit.* p. 79-80), and also: "Now Augustine (however you interpret him) never identified the *Civitas Dei* with any earthly state. But he had prepared the way for other people to do this" (*op. cit.* p. 84).

69 Haec ergo caelestis civitas dum peregrinatur in terra, ex omnibus gentibus cives evocat, atque in omnibus linguis peregrinam colligit societatem; non curans quidquid in moribus, legibus, institutisque diversum est, quibus pax terrena vel conquiretur, vel teneatur; nihil eorum rescindens, nec destruens, immo etiam servans ac sequens quod, licet diversum in diversis nationibus, ad unum tamen eundemque finem terrenae pacis intenditur, si religionem qua unus summus et verus Deus colendus docetur non impedit. Utitur ergo etiam caelestis civitas in hac sua peregrinatione pace terrena, et de rebus ad mortalem hominum naturam pertinentibus, humanarum voluntatum compositionem, quantum salva pietate ac religione conceditur, tuetur atque appetit, eamque terrenam pacem refert ad caelestem pacem: quae vere ita pax est, ut rationalis dumtaxat creaturae sola pax habenda atque dicenda sit: ordinatissima scilicet et concordissima societas fruendi Deo, et invicem in Deo; quo cum ventum fuerit,

non erit mortalis, sed plane certeque vitalis; nec corpus animale, quod dum corrumpitur, aggravat animam, sed spirituale sine ulla indigentia, ex omni parte subditum voluntati. Hanc pacem, dum peregrinatur in fide, habet; atque ex hac fide juste vivit, cum ad illam pacem adipiscendam refert quidquid bonarum actionum gerit erga Deum et proximum, quoniam vita civitatis utique socialis est. *De Civitate Dei* XIX, 17; PL 41, 646. Some idea of this doctrine's properly philosophical repercussions can be had by reading Leibniz, *Discours de métaphysique*, ch. 25-37, and Malebranche, *Méditations chrétiennes*, XIV, ed. H. Gouhier, Paris 1928, p. 308 ff.

70 G. Combès, *op. cit.* p. 36.

71 Et videte nomina duarum istarum civitatum, Babylonis et Jerusalem. Babylon confusio interpretatur, Jerusalem visio pacis. *Enarr. in Ps. 64*, 2; PL 36, 773. Cf. *Enarr. in Ps. 86*, 6; PL 37, 1105-06 and *De Civitate Dei* XI, 1; PL 41, 315-17. Other possible scriptural sources are suggested by Fr. de Labriolle in his edition of the *Confessions* (XII, 11, 12) t. II, p. 337 note 1. He quite rightly refers to the Apocalypse.

72 See the parallel texts in the edition of the *Rules of Tyconius* by F. C. Burkitt. There is to be found the antithesis *civitas Dei—civitas diaboli*. On this point consult J. N. Figgis, *The Political Aspects*, p. 46-47 and p. 127, note 5. In the same sense, cf. H. Scholz, *Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte*, p. 78, and B. Geyer in *Ueberwegs-Grundriss*, 2nd ed., t. II, p. 114.

73 . . . nos ergo has duas societates

angelicas inter se dispareas atque contrarias, unam et naturam bonam et voluntatem rectam; aliam vero naturam bonam, sed voluntate perversam, aliis manifestioribus divinarum scripturarum testimoniis declaratas, quod etiam in hoc libro, cui nomen est *Genesis*, lucis tenebrarumque vocabulis significatas existimavimus. . . . *De Civitate*

Dei XI, 33; *PL* 41, 347. Angelorum bonorum et malorum inter se contrarios appetitus non naturis principisque diversis, cum Deus omnium substantiarum bonus auctor et conditor utrosque creaverit, sed voluntatibus et cupiditatibus exstitisse dubitare fas non est, . . . *Op. cit.* XII, 1, 2; *PL* 41, 349.

NOTES TO PART THREE

1 Et ideo Deus, quando vult docere, prius dat intellectum, sine quo ea quae ad divinam doctrinam pertinent, homo non potest discere. *Enarr. in Ps.* 118, 17, 3; *PL* 37, 1548.

2 This is the title of the book in which Fr. Fulbert Cayré has for the first time, as far as we know, clearly defined its nature and explored its domain: *La contemplation augustinienne. Principes de la spiritualité de s. Augustin*, Paris 1927. The pages devoted to the *Confessions* (pp. 79-88) and chapter VII, *La recherche de Dieu* (chiefly p. 215, note 1) have been of great assistance in enabling us to grasp the full meaning of the last three books of this central work. Let us add that, as a natural consequence, Fr. Cayré's conclusions will be of assistance for a better understanding of several works of the Middle Ages, e.g., St. Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, for they move on the plane of Augustinian contemplation as he has defined it.

3 . . . primordia illuminationis tuae . . . *Confess.* XI, 2, 2; *PL* 32, 809.

4 Quid autem amo, cum te amo? *Con-*

fess. X, 6, 8; *PL* 32, 782. Quid ergo amo, cum Deum meum amo? *Op. cit.* X, 7, 11; *PL* 32, 784.

5 Interrogatio mea intentio mea, et responsio eorum species eorum. *Confess.* X, 6, 9; *PL* 32, 783. Et vox dicentium est ipsa evidētia. *Op. cit.* XI, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 811.

6 *Confess.* X, 6, 9-10; *PL* 32, 783.

7 *Confess.* XI, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 811.

8 Sometimes these questions are studied by Augustine in purely exegetical form, as in his commentaries on the book of *Genesis*, at other times in the form of meditations and confessions. The last four books of the *Confessions* really contain a record of the state in which Augustine found himself at the time he wrote them (X, 3, 3). Book X considers chiefly his moral condition; Books XI-XIII deal rather with his intellectual state, Augustine confessing in them what he knows and what he does not know of God: . . . scientiam et imperitiam meam . . . (XI, 2, 2). Given the status of the problem of knowledge as we have defined it (Part I, ch. II, *The First Step*:

Faith), for Augustine, to confess his knowledge amounts to confessing what he understands of Scripture: *Ecce vox tua gaudium meum, vox tua super affluentiam voluptatum. Da quod amo:*

amo enim. . . Confitear tibi quidquid invenero in libris tuis. . . Confess. XI, 2, 3. Cf. . . . ut aperiantur pulsanti mihi interiora sermonum tuorum. . . Ibid. 2, 4.

CHAPTER I

9 *De Haeresibus* 46; *PL* 42, 34-35. Cf. Fr. Alfarc, *L'évolution intellectuelle*, p. 95-98.

10 *Confess. III, 7, 12; PL* 32, 688; VII, 1, 1; *PL* 32, 733.

11 *Confess. IV, 16, 31; PL* 32, 706. Cf. 29-30; *PL* 32, 704-706. References to Augustine's texts against "pantheism" are in J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, p. 123, note 1; cf. *ibid.* p. 123-26. We are intentionally avoiding the epithet "pantheism," incorrectly applied to Manichaeism; a radical *dualism* like that of Mani could not be a *pantheism*. It is a confusion of soul and God. As for the texts from the *De Civitate Dei* (IV, 9-12, 29, 30, 31; VII, 5 and 6) which as J. Martin points out are directed against the pagans' pantheism, they would certainly give more justification for the use of the term, especially *De Civitate Dei* IV, 12; *PL* 41, 123.

12 God cannot change, for to change is inevitably to become better or worse. And God is perfect: *Cont. Secund. Manich. 8; PL* 42, 584. *De Civitate Dei* IV, 12; *PL* 41, 123. *Confess. XII, 7, 7; PL* 32, 828. *De Gen. ad Litt. VII, 2, 3; PL* 34, 356-57.

13 Quapropter cum abs te quaero, unde sit facta universa creatura, quamvis in suo genere bona, creatore tamen inferior, atque illo incommutabili permanente ipsa mutabilis; non invenies quid respondeas, nisi de nihilo factam

esse fatearis. *Contra Secund. Manich. 8; PL* 42, 584. . . . ita ut creatura omnis sive intellectualis sive corporalis, . . . non de Dei natura, sed a Deo sit facta de nihilo. . . . *De Gen. ad Litt. Imp. Lib. I, 2; PL* 34, 221.

14 *De Actis cum Fel. Manich. II, 18; PL* 42, 548. These texts, ranged as they are against the Manichaeans, insist on creation *ex nihilo*, for the word "nihil" explains that the creature could do evil by falling into sin.

15 *Confess. XI, 5, 7; PL* 32, 811-12. The text from *De Vera Religione* XI, 22; *PL* 34, 132 (quoted by J. Martin, *op. cit.* p. 127) has a Thomistic ring. But when replaced in its context, it is not certain that Augustine considers God there as the cause of being; in spite of the letter of the text, he seems rather to be thinking of God as the cause of life.

16 Two famous texts will be invoked later in support of this thesis: *Si ergo isti dixerint: quid placuit Deo facere caelum et terram? respondendum est eis, ut prius discant vim voluntatis humanae, qui voluntatem Dei nosse desiderant. Causas enim voluntatis Dei scire quaerunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa. Si enim habet causam voluntas Dei, est aliquid quod antecedit voluntatem Dei, quod nefas est credere. Qui ergo dicit: quare fecit Deus caelum et terram? respondendum est ei: quia voluit.*

Voluntas enim Dei causa est caeli et terrae, et ideo major est voluntas Dei quam caelum et terra. Qui autem dicit: quare voluit facere caelum et terram, majus aliquid quaerit quam est voluntas Dei: nihil autem majus inveniri potest. *De Gen. Cont. Manich. I, 2, 4; PL 34, 175.* Cf. Qui quaerit quare voluerit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei. Sed omnis causa efficiens est. Omne autem efficiens majus est quam id quod efficitur. Nihil autem majus est voluntate Dei. Non ergo ejus causa quaerenda est. *De Div. Quaest. 83, 38; PL 40, 18.*

17 *De Civitate Dei XI, 21-22; PL 41, 333-336. Confess. XIII, 2, 2; PL 32, 845.* Si autem causa creandi quaeritur, nulla citius et melius respondetur, nisi quia omnis creatura Dei bona est. Et quid dignius quam ut bona faciat bonus Deus, quae nemo potest facere nisi Deus? *Epist. 166, 5, 15; PL 33, 727.* In eo vero quod dicitur, *vidit Deus quia bonum est*, satis significatur, Deum nulla necessitate, nulla suae cujusquam utilitatis indigentia, sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est, id est quia bonum est. *De Civ. Dei XI, 24; PL 41, 338.* Reconciling the voluntarism of the preceding texts with Platonism is an easy matter since God is the Good and God's will is God: . . . ut res quae facta est congruere bonitati propter quam facta est indicetur. *Ibid.*

18 Sed quoquo modo hoc se habeat (res enim secretissima est, et humanis conjecturis impenetrabilis), illud certe accipiendum est in fide, etiamsi modum nostrae cogitationis excedit, omnem creaturam habere initium; tempusque ipsum creaturam esse, ac per hoc ipsum habere initium, nec coaeter-

num esse creatori. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp. III, 8; PL 34, 223.*

19 Si autem (Manichaei) . . . dicunt: quid placuit Deo facere caelum et terram? Non enim coaevum Deo mundum istum dicimus, quia non ejus aeternitatis est hic mundus, cujus aeternitatis est Deus. Mundum quippe fecit Deus, et sic cum ipsa creatura quam Deus fecit, tempora esse coeperunt; et ideo dicuntur tempora aeterna. Non tamen sic sunt aeterna tempora quomodo aeternus est Deus, quia Deus est ante tempora, qui fabricator est temporum. *De Gen. Cont. Manich. I, 2, 4; PL 34, 175.* See note 22 below for a much stricter formula reserving eternity to God alone. Cf. *Confess. XI, 13, 15-16; PL 32, 815. De Civitate Dei XI, 4-5; PL 41, 319-21.*

20 Sed etsi in principio temporis Deum fecisse caelum et terram credamus, debemus utique intelligere quod ante principium temporis non erat tempus. Deus enim fecit et tempora: et ideo antequam faceret tempora, non erant tempora. Non ergo possumus dicere fuisse aliquod tempus quando Deus nondum aliquid fecerat. Quomodo enim erat tempus quod Deus non fecerat, cum omnium temporum ipse sit fabricator? Et si tempus cum caelo et terra esse coepit, non potest inveniri tempus quo Deus nondum fecerat caelum et terram. *De Gen. Cont. Manich. I, 2, 3; PL 34, 174-75.* Cf. Nullo ergo tempore non feceras aliquid, quia ipsum tempus tu feceras; *Confess. XI, 14, 17; PL 32, 815. Ibid. XI, 30, 40; PL 32, 825-26.* . . . procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore . . . cum tempore autem factus est mundus, si in ejus conditione factus est mutabilis

motus. . . . *De Civitate Dei* XI, 6; *PL* 41, 321-22.

21 Infinitas itaque numeri, quamvis infinitorum numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei cujus intelligentiae non est numerus. Quapropter si, quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis comprehensione finitur, profecto et omnis infinitas quodam ineffabili modo Deo finita est, quia scientiae ipsius incomprehensibilis non est. *De Civitate Dei* XII, 18; *PL* 41, 368. Cf. XII, 13, 1; col. 360-61 and XII, 20, 1; col. 369.

22 Et nulla tempora tibi coaeterna sunt, quia tu permanes; at illa si permanerent, non essent tempora. *Confess.* XI, 14, 17; *PL* 32, 815-16. . . . ne aliquam (creaturam) creatori coaeternam esse dicamus, quod fides ratioque sana condemnat. . . . *De Civitate Dei* XII, 15, 1; *PL* 41, 363. Non tamen dubito nihil omnino creaturae Creatori esse coaeternum. *Op. cit.* XII, 16; *PL* 41, 365. Ubi enim nulla creatura est, cujus mutabilibus motibus tempora peragantur, tempora omnino esse non possunt. Ac per hoc et si (angeli) semper fuerunt, creati sunt; nec si semper fuerunt, ideo Creatori coaeterni sunt. *Ibid.* 2; col. 364. Quapropter, si Deus semper dominus fuit, semper habuit creaturam suo dominatui servientem; verumtamen non de ipso genitam sed ab ipso de nihilo factam, nec ei coaeternam; erat quippe ante illam, quamvis nullo tempore sine illa, non eam spatio transcurrente, sed manente perpetuitate praecedens. *Ibid.* 3; col. 365.

23 Verum id quomodo intelligant, invenerunt, non esse hoc videlicet temporis, sed substitutionis (*scil.* of existence) initium. Sicut enim, inquirunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in

pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium; quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset: sic, inquirunt, et mundus atque in illo dii creati, et semper fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit, et tamen facti sunt. *De Civitate Dei* X, 31; *PL* 41, 311.

24 Si quid intelligitur temporis, quod in nullas jam vel minutissimas momentorum partes dividi possit, id solum est, quod praesens dicatur; quod tamen ita raptim a futuro in praeteritum transvolat, ut nulla morula extendatur. Nam si extenditur, dividitur in praeteritum et futurum: praesens autem nullum habet spatium. *Confess.* XI, 15, 20; *PL* 32, 817. Cf. XI, 20, 26; *PL* 32, 819. There is scarcely any need to point out that this conception of time will also be that of Descartes.

25 *De Civitate Dei* XII, 15, 2; *PL* 41, 364.

26 For the history of this question, consult Fr. Duhem, *Le système du monde*, t. I, ch. 5.

27 *Confess.* XI, 24, 31; *PL* 32, 821-22.

28 *Confess.* XI, 26, 33; *PL* 32, 822.

29 . . . (tempus) esse quamdam distentionem. . . . *Confess.* XI, 23, 30; *PL* 32, 821. Inde mihi visum est nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem: sed cujus rei, nescio, et mirum, si non ipsius animi. *Confess.* XI, 26, 33; *PL* 32, 822. Cf. J. Martin, *op. cit.* p. 138-40.

30 In te, anime meus, tempora mea metior. *Confess.* XI, 27, 36; *PL* 32, 823.

31 *Confess.* XI, 28, 37; *PL* 32, 824. De Labriolle's translation will be consulted to good advantage on this difficult passage.

32 See above, Part I, ch. IV, *The Fourth Step: Sense Knowledge*, p. 64.

33 Dicturus sum canticum quod novi; antequam incipiam, in totum expectatio mea tenditur; cum autem coepero, quantum ex illa in praeteritum decerpsero, tenditur et memoria mea, atque *distenditur vita hujus actionis meae* in memoriam propter quod dixi et in expectationem propter quod dicturus sum: praesens tamen adest attentio mea, per quam traicitur quod erat futurum, ut fiat praeteritum. *Confess.* XI, 28, 38; *PL* 32, 824. Et quis negat praesens tempus carere spatio, quia in puncto praeterit? Sed tamen perdurat attentio, per quam pergat abesse quod aderit. *Confess.* XI, 28, 37; *PL* 32, 824. There is scarcely any need to indicate the analogies uniting Bergsonism to this psychology of duration.

34 *Confess.* XI, 28, 38; *PL* 32, 824-25.

35 It will be noted that time was not even created with prime matter (caelum et terram. See below, ch. II *Matter and Forms*) because matter, considered apart from the forms it can receive, does not imply the distinction in movement time requires. See *Confess.* XII, 9, 9; *PL* 32, 829 and XII, 12, 15; 831.

36 Quis tenebit illud et figet illud, ut paululum stet et paululum rapiat splendorem semper stantis aeternitatis et comparet cum temporibus nunquam stantibus et videat esse incompara-

bilem et videat longum tempus nisi ex multis praetereuntibus motibus, qui simul extendi non possunt, longum non fieri; non autem praeterire quicquam in aeterno, sed totum esse praesens, nullum vero tempus totum esse praesens: et videat omne praeteritum propelli ex futuro et omne futurum ex praeterito consequi et omne praeteritum ac futurum ab eo, quod semper est praesens, creari et excurrere? Quis tenebit cor hominis, ut stet et videat, quomodo stans dictet futura et praeterita tempora nec futura nec praeterita aeternitas? *Confess.* XI, 11, 13; *PL* 32, 814 and XI, 31, 41; *PL* 32, 826. Cf. XII, 29, 40; *PL* 32, 842, Namque rara visio est etc.

37 Si enim recte discernuntur aeternitas et tempus, quod tempus sine aliqua mobili mutabilitate non est, in aeternitate autem nulla mutatio est; quis non videat quod tempora non fuissent, nisi creatura fieret, quae aliquid aliqua motione mutaret; cujus motionis et mutationis cum aliud atque aliud, *quae simul esse non possunt*, cedit atque succedit in brevioribus vel productionibus morarum intervallis tempus sequeretur. *De Civitate Dei* XI, 6; *PL* 41, 321. . . . in aliquo mutabili motu, cujus aliud prius, aliud posterius praeterierit eo quod simul esse non possunt: . . . *De Civitate Dei* XII, 15, 1; *PL* 41, 363-64.

38 *Confess.* XI, 31, 41; *PL* 32, 826.

CHAPTER II

1 His (Manichaeis) respondemus, Deum in principio fecisse caelum et terram, non in principio, sed in Christo, cum Verbum esset apud Patrem, per quod facta et in quo facta sunt omnia (*John* 1, 1-3). *De Gen.*

Cont. Manich. I, 2, 3; *PL* 34, 174. This creation of things by the Word is symbolized by Christ's (i.e. the Word's) oral teaching, Who made Himself understood by men from without in order that they might seek Him within. In

this sense, the Augustinian doctrine of creation agrees with his doctrine of the Inner Master. See the exposition of this conformity in *Confess.* XI, 8, 10; *PL* 32, 813, where the expression of it has a mystical tone (*loc. cit.* *Ibi audio . . . unde sumus*). Cf. *op. cit.* XI, 9, 11; *PL* 32, 813-14.

2 A very concise discussion of this difficult question is to be found in A. Gardeil, *La structure de l'âme et l'expérience mystique*, Paris 1927, t. I, p. 155-204. Some of his conclusions are contested by B. Romeyer, in *Archives de Philosophie* V, 3 (1928), p. 200.

3 The creative act lasts for an *ictus*: in ictu condendi . . . *De Gen. ad Litt.* IV, 33, 51; *PL* 34, 318. For a commentary on this expression, see *op. cit.* IV, 34, 55; *PL* 34, 320. Sic enim fecit (Deus) quae futura essent, ut non temporaliter faceret temporalia, sed ab eo facta currebant tempora . . . *Ibid.* 35, 56; *PL* 34, 320. Non itaque temporaliter, sed causali ordine prius facta est informis formabilisque materies, et spiritualis et corporalis, de qua fieret quod faciendum esset. *Op. cit.* V, 5, 13; *PL* 34, 326. In this text is to be seen a clear affirmation of the existence of a twofold matter, spiritual and corporeal. We shall return to it later. This doctrine will play an important role among Augustinians of the Middle Ages and will be refuted by St. Thomas Aquinas. Haec enim jam per moras temporum fiunt, quae tunc non erant, cum fecit omnia simul, unde etiam tempora inciperent. *Op. cit.* V, 6, 19; *PL* 34, 328. On this point see an excellent chapter by J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, p. 284-308.

4 *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* VII, 28; *PL* 34, 231.

5 From this doctrine the Middle Ages, in Joachim of Flora for example, will deduce the right to prophesy the world's future history in accordance with that of the past. See *De Gen. Cont. Manich.* II, 3, 4; *PL* 34, 197-198. Cf. *ibid.* I, 23, 35-25, 43; col. 190-94. *De Catech. Rud.* 22, 39; *PL* 40, 338-39. Moreover, against the obvious or real meaning of *Genesis*, Augustine sets another text of Scripture (*Eccli.* 18, 1): Qui manet in aeternum creavit omnia simul, quoted in *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 7, 28; *PL* 34, 231. He even sets chapter 2, 5 of *Genesis* against chapter 1: Factus est ergo dies, quo die fecit Deus caelum et terram et omne viride agri. *Loc. cit.* *PL* 34, 197 and V, 1, 3; *PL* 34, 321-22; V, 3, 6; *PL* 34, 323.

6 Fecit enim Deus omne tempus simul cum omnibus creaturis temporalibus, quae creaturae visibiles caeli et terrae nomine significantur. *De Gen. Cont. Manich.* II, 3, 4; *PL* 34, 198. In the *Confessions* Augustine will, on the contrary, exclude heaven (the angels) and earth (unformed matter) from the realm of time.

7 *De Civitate Dei* XII, 15; *PL* 41, 363-365. *Confess.* XII, 9, 9; *PL* 32, 829. This is presented as one of the various possible interpretations in *De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 1, 3; *PL* 34, 247. It is the only one retained in the *Confessions*. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* IX, 21, 38; *PL* 34, 311. On the matutinal and vespertinal knowledge the angels have of God, see *op. cit.* IV, 29-32; *PL* 34, 315-317. Augustine allows the interpreter considerable freedom in the explanation of *Genesis*. He admits the possibility of interpretations different from his own provided that they keep to the letter of the Sacred Text and make no

claim to be the interpretation Moses had in view when he wrote his account. See *Confess.* XII, 18-23; *PL* 32, 835-39.

8 *Confess.* XII, 11, 12-13, 16; *PL* 32, 830-32.

9 Non quia informis materia formatis rebus tempore prior est, cum sit utrumque simul concreatum, et unde factum est, et quod factum est. Sicut enim vox materia est verborum, verba vero formatam vocem indicant: non autem qui loquitur, prius emittit informem vocem, quam possit postea colligere atque in verba formare: ita creator Deus non priore tempore fecit informem materiam, et eam postea per ordinem quarumque naturarum, quasi secunda consideratione formavit; formatam quippe creavit materiam. Sed quia illud unde fit aliquid, etsi non tempore, tamen quadam origine prius est quam illud quod inde fit, potuit dividere Scriptura loquendi temporibus, quod Deus faciendi temporibus non divisit. *De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 15, 29; *PL* 34, 257. This doctrine is inspired by a text from *Wisdom* (11, 18): Qui fecisti mundum de materia informi. Augustine made frequent use of it. See for example: Informis ergo illa materia quam de nihilo Deus fecit, appellata est primo caelum et terra. *De Gen. Cont. Manich.* I, 7, 11; *PL* 34, 178. Hanc autem adhuc informem materiam, etiam terram invisibilem atque incompositam voluit appellare . . . *Ibid.* 12; col. 179. The biblical equivalents of "informitas" are, according to Augustine, the following: Haec ergo nomina omnia, sive caelum et terra, sive terra invisibilis et incomposita et abyssus cum tenebris, sive aqua super quam Spiritus ferebatur, nomina sunt

informis materiae. *Ibid.* Non itaque temporalis, sed causali ordine prius facta est informis formabilisque materies et spiritualis et corporalis . . . *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 5, 13 and 16; *PL* 34, 326. Another equivalent is the "chaos" of the Greek poets. *De Gen. Cont. Manich.* I, 5, 9; *PL* 34, 178. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 4, 12; *PL* 34, 224. For the influence of these texts on mediaeval cosmogonies, see E. Gilson, "La cosmogonie de Bernardus Silvestris," in *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, III (1928), p. 10-11. It will be especially worthwhile to consult the excellent and clear resumé of Augustine given in a work attributed (incorrectly, it seems to me) to Guigo II the Carthusian, but certainly the work of Adam the Scot, *Liber de quadripartito exercitio cellae*, *PL* 153, 845-46.

10 On the possibility of knowing matter in itself see *Confess.* XII, 5, 5; *PL* 32, 827. Regarding its reality: . . . et intendi in ipsa corpora eorumque mutabilitatem altius inspexi, qua desinunt esse quod fuerant et incipiunt esse quod non erant, eundemque transitum de forma in formam per informe quiddam fieri suspicatus sum, non per omnino nihil. . . . Mutabilitas enim rerum mutabilium ipsa capax est formarum omnium in quas mutantur res mutabiles. Et haec quid est? . . . Si dici posset 'nihil aliquid' et 'est non est,' hoc eam dicerem; et tamen jam utcumque erat, ut species caperet istas visibiles et compositas. *Confess.* XII, 6, 6; *PL* 32, 828. Cf. . . . et tamen hoc paene nihil, in quantum non omnino nihil erat. . . . XII, 15, 22; *PL* 32, 834. Illud autem totum prope nihil erat, quoniam adhuc omnino informe erat; jam tamen erat, quod formari poterat. XII, 8, 8; *PL* 32, 829. . . . in-

formis materia quae, quamvis ex nihilo facta est, est tamen. . . . *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 15, 51; *PL* 34, 240. Augustine's difficulty here is very real because for him everything that is, in so far as it is, is good; and a being is only good and therefore only exists through its form. Hence, if matter differs ever so little from nothingness, it can do so only because of its form, but then we are no longer dealing with matter. Id ergo est, unde fecit Deus omnia, quod nullam speciem habet, nullamque formam; quod nihil est aliud quam nihil. Nam illud quod in comparatione perfectorum informe dicitur, si habet aliquid formae, quamvis exiguum, quamvis inchoatum, nondum est nihil. . . . *De Vera Religione* 18, 35; *PL* 34, 137. On this point see Ch. Boyer, *L'idée de vérité*, p. 117-119; A. Gardeil, *La structure de l'âme*, vol. I, p. 163-68.

For a study of the difficult problem of Augustine's relations with Plato's *Timaeus* on this point, see L. Robin, *Etudes sur la signification et la place de la physique dans la philosophie de Platon*. Paris, F. Alcan, 1919; R. Omez, "La notion platonicienne de $\chi\acute{o}\rho\alpha$," *Revue des sciences phil. et théol.* XIV (Oct. 1925), 433-52; M. J. Lagrange, "Platon théologien," *Revue Thomiste*, May-June 1926, p. 189-218.

11 *De Gen. ad Litt.* II, 11, 24; *PL* 34, 272.

12 Dicant quid te promeruerunt spiritalis corporalisque natura, quas fecisti in sapientia tua, ut inde penderent etiam inchoata et informia quaeque in genere suo vel spiritali vel corporali euntia in immoderationem et in longinquam dissimilitudinem tuam, spiritalis informe praestantius quam si formatum corpus esset, corporale autem

informe praestantius quam si omnino nihil esset, atque ita penderent in tuo verbo informia, nisi per idem verbum revocarentur ad unitatem tuam, et formarentur et essent ab uno te summo bono universa bona valde. *Confess.* XIII, 2, 2; *PL* 32, 845. In this complicated text, which we have purposely kept in its entirety, it will be noted that unformed spiritual matter is superior to unformed corporeal matter. Thus it unquestionably possesses a certain actuality (see A. Gardeil, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 163) that is elsewhere attributed even to unformed corporeal matter. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 4, 9; *PL* 34, 249.

13 See Part I, ch. V, note 52.

14 See text referred to in note 13 above.

15 In *Joan. Evang.* I, 17; *PL* 35, 1387. *De Vera Religione*, 22, 42; *PL* 34, 140. *De Gen. Cont. Manich.* I, 8, 13; *PL* 34, 179.

16 Augustine affirms this of man: *Epist.* 14, 4; *PL* 33, 80. J. Martin (*Saint Augustin*, p. 31) observes that *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 15, 33; *PL* 34, 332 ff. and *De Trinitate* IV, 1, 3; *PL* 42, 888 seem to extend this doctrine to all created beings.

17 *Confess.* VII, 9, 13; *PL* 32, 740.

18 Plotinus, *Enneads* VI, 7, 37.

19 *Confess.* XI, 5, 7; *PL* 32, 811-12.

20 *Confess.* XI, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 811.

21 *Confess.* XI, 3, 5; *PL* 32, 811.

22 *Confess.* XII, 6, 6; *PL* 32, 827-28.

23 *De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 15, 29; *PL* 34, 257.

24 *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 5, 14; *PL* 34, 326.

25 According to Fr. Gardeil, in the production of the world by God it would be advisable to distinguish: (i) creation properly so-called, dealing with the being of the twofold matter, spiritual and corporeal, designated in Genesis by the words *caelum et terra*; (ii) the informing of this matter by the divine ideas. Indeed "unformed creation and the formation of this matter by the ideas, since they are simultaneous, constitute the equivalent of total creation." St. Thomas would have freed metaphysics once and for all from the ambiguity latent within this doctrine by including under creation the formation that Augustine still referred to participation. Cf. *Sum. Theol.* I, 44, 2. On this point see A. Gardeil, *La structure de l'âme*, I, pp. 156-59, and vol. II, App. 2: *St. Thomas et l'illuminisme augustinien*, pp. 313-25. Perhaps Fr. Gardeil gives Augustine credit for a more settled terminology than he has in supposing that in the commentaries on Genesis *formare* is used in contrast to *creare*. When this is admitted, a text like the following becomes quite decisive: Et ideo Deus rectissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia etiamsi omnia formata de ista materia facta sunt, haec ipsa materia tamen de omnino nihilo facta est. *De Gen. Cont. Manich.* I, 6, 10; *PL* 34, 178. In reality, this text only says that formed matter, being the same as unformed matter, was created from nothing as was unformed matter and that for this reason formed things and unformed matter are equally *ex nihilo*. It does not follow that the other part of the operation, i.e. the formation of matter, does not also belong to the order of creation. Actually, in Augustine *formare* is never opposed to *creare*. On

the contrary, In his vero quae jam ex informitate formata sunt, evidentiusque appellantur creata, vel facta, vel condita, primum factus est dies. *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 5, 14; *PL* 34, 326. This is the reason why in his doctrine the formed world and unformed matter result from a single and unique act of God, an act bearing the expressive name "concreation": Nec putandus est Deus informem prius fecisse materiam et intervallo aliquo interposito temporis formasse quod informe prius fecerat, sed sicut a loquente fiunt verba sonantia, ubi non prius vox informis post accipit formam, sed formata profertur, ita intelligendus est Deus de materia quidem informi fecisse mundum, sed simul eam concreasse cum mundo. *Cont. Adver. Legis et Proph.* I, 9, 12; *PL* 42, 610. Cf. text quoted in note 9 above. Indeed, as Fr. Ch. Boyer has shown (*L'idée de vérité*, pp. 118-119) Augustine's thought moves in the opposite direction. He is interested in proving, not that forms also are created, but that matter itself is created: Quoniam de illo et in illo est omnium speciosissima species incommutabilis, et ideo ipse unus est qui cuilibet rei, non solum ut pulchra sit, sed etiam ut pulchra esse possit attribuit. Quapropter rectissime credimus omnia Deum fecisse de nihilo. *De Fide et Sym.* 2, 2; *PL* 40, 182-83 (quoted by Ch. Boyer, pp. 118-119). Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 3, 10; *PL* 34, 223-224. Note the "quanquam enim scriptum legerimus. . . ." In other words, although Scripture teaches that God made everything from matter, He created matter as well. But once we have said this, we can still say that Fr. Gardeil was right in seeing an ambiguity in the thought of Saint Augustine which we have tried

to define. Instead of removing formation from creation, Augustine seems to have conceived creation itself as a kind of formation. And this is certainly the truth which comes to light in Fr. Gardeil's profound remarks on the point.

26 If Augustine's texts are consulted, the creative role of the Verbum's ideas cannot be questioned. An eo ipso quod scriptum est *Fiat firmamentum*, haec ipsa dictio Verbum est Patris, unigenitus Filius, in quo sunt omnia quae creantur, etiam antequam creantur, et quidquid in illo est, vita est; quia quidquid per eum factum est, in ipso vita est, et *vita utique creatrix*, sub illo autem creatura? *De Gen. ad Litt.* II, 6, 12; *PL* 34, 268 (Italics mine). Some lines further on he calls the Idea "creandi ratio" and "causam rei creandae." The wisdom of the angels evidently results from a "formation" of spiritual matter by the ideas, and yet Augustine says it was created: *creatam in illis sapientiam . . . Op. cit.* II, 8, 16; *PL* 34, 269. So, too, a little later both operations are clearly presented as an indivisible act of creation: *sed ipsa creabatur lux, in qua fieret cognitio Verbi Dei per quod creabatur, atque ipsa cognitio illi esset ab informitate sua converti ad formantem Deum, et creari atque formari. Op. cit.* III, 20, 31; *PL* 34, 292. In this case *lux* and not *caelum* is created and *ipsa cognitio* is reduced to *creari atque formari*.

27 An cum primum fiebat informitas materiae sive spiritualis sive corporalis, non erat dicendum *Dixit Deus fiat . . .*; sed tunc imitatur Verbi formam, semper atque incommutabiliter Patri cohaerentem, cum et ipsa pro sui generis conversione ad id quod vere ac semper est, id est ad creatorem suae substantiae, formam capit, et fit per-

fecta creatura . . . : fit autem Filii commemoratio, quod etiam Verbum est, eo quod scriptum est *Dixit Deus, fiat*; ut per id quod principium est, insinuat exordium creaturae existentis ab illo adhuc imperfectae; per id autem quod Verbum est, insinuat perfectionem creaturae revocatae ad eum, ut formaretur inhaerendo Creatori, et pro suo genere imitando formam sempiternae atque incommutabiliter inhaerentem Patri, a quo statim hoc est quod ille. *De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 4, 9; *PL* 34, 249. The use of the following expressions should be noted: *perfecta creatura, perfectionem creaturae revocatae*; they correspond exactly to Augustine's thought on creation. *Informis materia* is not a finished creature; hence, its creation is not finished either. If we bear in mind the fact that *facere* and *formare* are simultaneous, it is at once apparent that the production of the whole being, matter and form, falls under the act of creation. We wholly agree with Fr. Gardeil in admitting, as all the texts indicate, that Saint Augustine distinguishes *creare* and *formare*; but instead of saying that *formatio* is not *creatio* in Augustinism, we think that *formatio* is *creatio* plus *illuminatio*. In a word, formation consists in completing the creation of matter by the creation of form. It goes without saying that the interpretation of the Verbum's first *Fiat* holds good for each following *fiat*. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* II, 1, 1; *PL* 34, 263. The initial conversion of matter effected by God is but the first of the conversions that, in a different order, will lead man step by step to knowledge, then to wisdom and beatitude. See *De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 5, 10; *PL* 34, 249-250. Cf. Part I, *The Search for God through Understanding*.

28 *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 24, 35; *PL* 34, 368. See A. Gardeil, *op. cit.* vol. I, pp. 165-66.

29 *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 3, 6-10; *PL* 34, 222-24. *De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 9, 15; *PL* 34, 251-52; II, 8, 16-19; 269-70.

30 See this "recapitulatio" in *De Gen. ad Litt.* VI, 1, 2; *PL* 34, 339.

31 *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 24, 35; *PL* 34, 368. See A. Gardeil, *op. cit.* I, pp. 160-61.

32 The expressions *semen*, *semina* really apply only to the germs of living things. On the accidental formula used in quite a different sense in *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 3, 10 and 4, 12, see A. Gardeil's well-taken remarks (vol. I, p. 164, n. 4).

33 *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 4, 9-11; *PL* 34, 324-325; V, 7, 20; 328. This is an interesting text because of the internal "numbers" it attributes to seminal reasons.

34 *De Gen. ad Litt.* VI, 6, 10; *PL* 34, 343; VI, 11, 19; *PL* 34, 347.

35 *De Gen. ad Litt.* VI, 6, 10; *PL* 34, 343. Cf. *ibid.* IX, 17, 32; *PL* 34, 406: . . . eorum quasi seminales rationes habent. . . . This is an expression and a notion of Stoic origin, adopted and refurbished by Plotinus with a view to eliminating the fatalism it threatened to introduce. See *Enn.* III, 1, 7. On the other hand, Plotinus also refused to submit these seminal reasons to a particular Providence like the Christian creative Providence (*Enn.* III, 2, 1). Augustine, on the contrary, had to bring the seminal reasons within a Christian conception of creative Providence.

This Augustinian doctrine has often

been studied from an apologetic point of view with the purpose of learning to what extent it would eventually allow Christianity to assimilate Transformism. A bibliography on this question will be found in J. McKeough *The Meaning of the rationes seminales in St. Augustine*, pp. 113-114 and in the article by R. de Sinety, "Saint Augustin et le transformisme" in *Etudes sur s. Augustin (Arch. de Philos.* VII, 2, 1930), pp. 244-72.

36 On the completed or adumbrated state of the universe, see *De Gen. ad Litt.* II, 15, 30; *PL* 34, 275-6, and the explanation developed in VI, 11, 18; *PL* 34, 346; *Ibid.* 19; 347. The most characteristic text on the world pregnant with beings still to come is *De Trinitate* III, 9, 16; *PL* 42, 877-878: Nam sicut matres gravidae sunt fetibus, sic ipse mundus gravidus est causis nascentium, quae in illo non creantur, nisi ab illa summa essentia, ubi nec oritur, nec moritur aliquid, nec incipit esse, nec desinit. J. Martin (*op. cit.* p. 311, note 3) rightly compares Leibniz, *Principes de la nature et de la grâce*, n. 15. Cf. Sicut autem in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia simul quae per tempora in arborem surgerent, ita ipse mundus cogitandus est, cum Deus simul omnia creavit, habuisse simul omnia quae in illo et cum illo facta sunt, quando factus est dies: non solum caelum cum sole et luna et sideribus, quorum species manet motu rotabili, et terram et abyssos, quae velut inconstantes motus patiuntur, atque inferius adjuncta partem alteram mundo conferunt; sed etiam illa quae aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque causaliter, priusquam per temporum moras ita exorirentur, quomodo nobis jam nota sunt in eis operibus,

quae Deus usque nunc operatur. *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 23, 45; *PL* 34, 338.

37 Et recte ab eo coepit (Deus) elemento (aqua), ex quo cuncta genera nascuntur vel animalium, vel herbarum atque lignorum, ut agant temporales numeros suos naturis propriis distributos. Omnia quippe primordia seminum, sive unde omnis caro, sive unde omnia fruteta gignuntur, humida sunt, et ex humore conrescunt. Insunt autem illis efficacissimi numeri, trahentes secum sequaces potentias ex illis perfectis operibus Dei, a quibus in die septimo requievit. *De Gen. ad Litt.* V, 7, 20; *PL* 34, 328. Sed etiam ista secum gerunt tanquam iterum seipsa invisibiliter in occulta quadam vi generandi. . . . *Ibid.* VI, 10, 17; 346.

38 Neque enim et ipsa (sapientia) gradibus attingit aut tanquam gressibus pervenit. Quapropter quam facilis ei efficacissimus motus est, tam facile Deus condidit omnia; quoniam per illam sunt condita: ut hoc quod nunc videmus temporalibus intervallis ea moveri ad peragenda quae suo cuique generi competunt, ex illis insitis rationibus veniat, quas tanquam seminaliter sparsit Deus in ictu condendi. . . . *De Gen. ad Litt.* IV, 33, 51; *PL* 34, 318. On the world's conservation by God, see *op. cit.* IV, 12, 22-16, 28; *PL* 34, 304-307. Cf. V, 11, 27; 330-31; V, 20, 40-23, 46; 335-38.

39 Et elementa mundi hujus corporei habent definitam vim qualitatemque suam quid unumquodque valeat vel non valeat, quid de quo fieri possit vel non possit. Ex his velut primordiis rerum, omnia quae gignuntur, suo quoque tempore exortus processusque sumunt, finesque et decessiones sui cujusque generis. Unde fit ut de grano tritici

non nascatur faba, vel de faba triticum, vel de pecore homo, vel de homine pecus. *De Gen. ad Litt.* IX, 17, 32; *PL* 34, 406. For the theological conception of the miracle connected with it, see J. Martin, *op. cit.* pp. 317-345.

40 *De Gen. ad Litt.* IX, 15, 27; *PL* 34, 404; IX, 16, 29; 405. *De Trinitate* III, 8, 14-15; *PL* 42, 876-77; III, 9, 16; *PL* 42, 878; *Ibid.* 9, 18; 878-79. *De Civitate Dei* XII, 25; *PL* 41, 374-75; XXII, 24, 2; *PL* 41, 788-89. This doctrine will be taken up once again during the Middle Ages by a number of theologians, chiefly St. Bonaventure. Cf. E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, pp. 294-314.

Without any kind of counterbalance, this tendency leads to Malebranche's system wherein secondary causes are completely deprived of any efficacy, since efficacy is reserved to God alone.

41 Homo enim, sicut veteres definirunt, animal est rationale, mortale. . . . *De Trinitate* VII, 4, 7; *PL* 42, 939. For the reason why Augustine insists on *mortale*: . . . sicut homo medium quiddam est, sed inter pecora et Angelos; ut quia pecus est animal irrationale atque mortale, angelus autem rationale et immortale, medius homo esset, inferior Angelis, superior pecoribus, habens cum pecoribus mortalitatem, rationem cum Angelis, animal rationale mortale. *De Civitate Dei* IX, 13, 3; *PL* 41, 267.

42 . . . quoniam homo non est corpus solum, vel anima sola, sed qui ex anima constat et corpore. *De Civitate Dei* XIII, 24, 2; *PL* 41, 399.

43 Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est mortali atque ter-

reno utens corpore. *De Mor. Eccl. Cath.* I, 27, 52; *PL* 32, 1332.

44 *De Gen. ad Litt.* VI, 3, 4; *PL* 34, 340-41; VI, 5, 7; 342.

45 Illud ergo videamus, utrum forsitan verum esse possit, quod certe humanae opinioni tolerabilius mihi videtur, Deum in illis primis operibus quae simul omnia creavit, animam etiam humanam creasse, quam suo tempore membris ex limo formati corporis inspiraret, cujus corporis in illis simul conditis rebus rationem creasset casualiter, secundum quam fieret, cum faciendum esset, corpus humanum. Nam neque illud quod dictum est, *ad imaginem suam*, nisi in anima, neque illud quod dictum est, *masculum et feminam*, nisi in corpore recte intelligimus. Credatur ergo, si nulla scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio casualis in elementis mundi; anima vero jam ipsa crearetur, sicut primitus conditus est dies, et creata lateret in operibus Dei, donec eam suo tempore sufflando, hoc est inspirando, formato ex limo corpori insereret. *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 24, 35; *PL* 34, 368.

46 *De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 19, 38-21, 41; *PL* 34, 260-62; VII, 28, 43; 372; X, 2, 3; 409-10.

47 Sic fortasse potuit et anima, antequam ea ipsa natura fieret, quae anima dicitur . . . habere aliquam materiam pro suo genere spiritualement, quae nondum esset anima. . . . *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 6, 9; *PL* 34, 359. Frustra ergo jam quaeritur ex qua veluti materia facta sit anima, si recte intelligi potest in primis illis operibus facta, cum factus est dies. Sicut enim illa quae non erant, facta sunt, sic et haec inter illa.

Quod si et materies aliqua formabilis fuit, et corporalis et spiritualis, non tamen et ipsa instituta nisi a Deo, ex quo sunt omnia, quae quidem formationem suam non tempore, sed origine praecederet, sicut vox cantum; quid nisi de materia spirituali facta anima congruentius creditur? *De Gen. ad Litt.* VII, 27, 39; *PL* 34, 369-70. Cf. *op. cit.* VII, 21, 31; *PL* 34, 366. What is still a probable hypothesis for Augustine will become a certitude for Augustinians of the Middle Ages under the influence of Ibn Gebirol.

48 For the angels see A. Gardeil, *op. cit.* vol. I, p. 174-97; and particularly the following striking statement: quae (materia spiritualis) nisi ad Creatorem illuminanda converteretur, fluitaret informiter; cum autem conversa et illuminata est, factum est quod in Verbo Dei dictum est: *Fiat lux. De Gen. ad Litt.* I, 9, 17; *PL* 34, 253.

49 . . . satis ostendens ubi sit homo creatus ad imaginem Dei, quia non corporeis lineamentis, sed quadam forma intelligibili mentis illuminatae. *De Gen. ad Litt.* III, 20, 30; *PL* 34, 292.

50 *De Civitate Dei* XIII, 16, 2; *PL* 41, 388-389; XIII, 17, 1; *PL* 41, 389.

51 His final word on this question is found in *Retract.* I, 5, 3; *PL* 32, 591, which corrects *De Immort. Animae* XV, 24, and *Retract.* I, 11, 4; *PL* 32, 602, which corrects *De Musica* VI, 14, 43. Cf. *De Cons. Evan.* I, 23, 35; *PL* 34, 1058. At any rate, if there is a world-soul, it would be a creature (vitalem creaturam) and not God (invisibilis spiritus, qui tamen etiam ipse creatura esset, id est non Deus, sed a Deo facta atque insita natura . . .); and coming

from God it could be what *Genesis* calls the *spiritus Dei* (*Gen.* I, 2). Thus, contrary to what certain philosophers of the 12th century will think, it would

not be the Holy Ghost. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imperf.* 4, 17; *PL* 34, 226. See Ferraz, *La psychologie de s. Augustin*, p. 86-90.

CHAPTER III

1 *De Civitate Dei* XII, 2; *PL* 41, 350. This is why God, the supreme essence, has no contrary.

2 Augustine states in *Confessions* VII, 9, 13; *PL* 32, 740, that he found the prologue of St. John's Gospel in the Platonists, non quidem his verbis, sed hoc idem omnino. The interpretation of this text is difficult. In the first place, the *Logos* of Plotinus, which is usually compared with Augustine's *Verbum*, is entirely different. As E. Bréhier expressly remarks, (*Enneads*, vol. III, p. 21), Plotinus' *Logos* is not a distinct hypostasis and the Christian *Verbum* is. Then, too, it emanates at once from Intelligence and World-Soul, and the *Verbum* does not do so. Even if the *Logos* were a hypostasis, it would be a fourth divine person, and this is contradictory to the dogma of the Trinity. Indeed, the only Plotinian analogue of the Christian *Verbum* is the *Nous*, and it too is a *logos*, the *logos* of the One, as Soul is the *logos* of Intelligence (*Enn.* V, 1, 6; lines 44-48; vol. V, p. 23). This *Nous* is an image of the One (*Enn.* V, 1, 6; *ibid.*), its first born (*Enn.* V, 2, 1; lines 4-13; p. 33); it resembles it as its principle and that of which it is the *Logos* (*Enn.* V, 5, 10; lines 10-14; p. 102). Therefore, Augustine did find a doctrine of the *Nous* like John's doctrine of the Word in Plotinus, and especially in the treatise *On the Three Principal Substances* which he cites (*De Civitate Dei* X, 23; *PL* 41, 300). However, these two hypostases, eter-

nally begotten and copresent to the first principle, are very different. In the first place, the Word is not only the first-born of the Father, He is the only one born of Him, and Plotinus' *Nous* is not so. Moreover, Plotinus' *Nous* is not God in the same sense as the One is God, for the One is above divinity, whereas the Son and the Father are God in the very same sense. And finally, Plotinus' *Nous* is beneath the One whereas the Son in the Christian Trinity is equal to the Father. Hence, if St. Augustine found *John* 1, 1-5, *idem omnino*, in Plotinus, he must have read the *Enneads* as a Christian.

3 Ut autem nihil castius ipsa castitate, et nihil sapientius ipsa sapientia, et nihil pulchrius ipsa pulchritudine, ita nihil similius ipsa similitudine dici aut cogitari aut esse omnino potest. Unde intelligitur ita Patri esse similem similitudinem suam, ut ejus naturam plenissime perfectissimeque impleat. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 58; *PL* 34, 242. De ipsa (*scil.* Veritate) vero nec Pater (judicat), non enim minor est quam ipse, et ideo quae Pater judicat, per ipsam judicat. Omnia enim quae appetunt unitatem, hanc habent regulam, vel formam, vel exemplum, vel si quo alio verbo dici se sinit, quoniam sola ejus similitudinem a quo esse accepit, implevit. *De Vera Religione* 31, 58; *PL* 34, 147-48.

4 *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 57; *PL* 34, 242.

5 Quapropter etiam similitudo Dei,

per quam facta sunt omnia, proprie dicitur similitudo, quia non participatione alicujus similitudinis similis est, sed ipsa est prima similitudo, cujus participatione similia sunt, quaecumque per illam fecit Deus. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 57; *PL* 34, 242. Cf. *Retract.* I, 26; *PL* 32, 626, and *Sermo* 2, 8, 9; *PL* 38, 32.

6 Omnis imago similis est ei cujus imago est; nec tamen omne quod simile est alicui, etiam imago est ejus: sicut in speculo et pictura, quia imagines sunt, etiam similes sunt; tamen si alter ex altero natus non est, nullus eorum imago alterius dici potest. Imago enim tunc est, cum de aliquo exprimitur. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 57; *PL* 34, 242. This definition of image will often be used during the Middle Ages. See E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, p. 220.

7 Imago enim si perfecte implet illud cujus imago est, coaequatur ei, non illud imagini suae. *De Trinitate* VI, 10, 11; *PL* 42, 931. Deus, quem genuit, quoniam meliorem se generare non potuit (nihil enim Deo melius), generare debuit aequalem. Si enim voluit, et non potuit, infirmus est; si potuit, et non voluit, invidus est. Ex quo conficitur aequalem genuisse Filium. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 50; *PL* 40, 31-32. The absence of envy in Plato's God (*Timaeus*, 29c) is recognized in this characteristic, and it will play a decisive role in the problem of the origin of things during the Middle Ages. Note that in Plato's text, this quality of God explains why He made things like Himself. A. Rivaud, in his edition of the *Timaeus* (p. 142), refers to a text of Diogenes Laertius (I, 30) "who quotes a phrase attributed to Thales." Cf. A. E. Taylor,

A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, p. 78

8 . . . datur intelligi esse aliquid . . . , a quo Principio unum est quidquid aliquo modo unum est. . . . *De Vera Religione* 36, 66; *PL* 34, 151. Ubi est prima et summa vita, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud esse, sed idem est esse et vivere; et primus ac summus intellectus, cui non est aliud vivere et aliud intelligere, sed id quod est intelligere, hoc vivere, hoc esse est, unum omnia: tanquam Verbum perfectum, cui non desit aliquid, et ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei, plena omnium rationum viventium incommutabilitium; et omnes unum in ea, sicut ipsa unum de uno, cum quo unum. *De Trinitate* VI, 10, 11; *PL* 42, 931.

9 Haec vero quae tendunt esse, ad ordinem tendunt: quem cum fuerint consecuta, ipsum esse consequuntur, quantum id creatura consequi potest. Ordo enim ad convenientiam quamdam quod ordinat redigit. Nihil est autem esse quam unum esse. Itaque in quantum quidque unitatem adipiscitur, in tantum est. Unitatis est enim operatio, convenientia et concordia, qua sunt in quantum sunt, ea quae composita sunt: nam simplicia per se sunt, quia una sunt; quae autem non sunt simplicia, concordia partium imitantur unitatem, et in tantum sunt in quantum assequuntur. *De Mor. Manich.* II, 6, 8; *PL* 32, 1348. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 59; *PL* 34, 242-243. There is scarcely any need to remark that St. Augustine's political and social ideas find their metaphysical justification here. Order, harmony of the social body's parts, and the peace resulting from them are not only useful that the city may prosper; they are of primary necessity that the city may

exist purely and simply. Harmony among the elements of every complex thing is a substitute for real unity, so that in so far as the city is ordered, it exists. See p. 173 above, and p. 213 below.

10 Nunc vero cum dicit corporibus: vos quidem nisi aliqua unitas contineret, nihil essetis, sed rursus si vos essetis ipsa unitas, corpora non essetis. . . . *De Vera Religione* 32, 60; *PL* 34, 149. Omne quippe corpus verum corpus est, sed falsa unitas. Non enim summe unum est, aut in tantum id imitatur ut impleat; et tamen nec corpus ipsum esset, nisi utcumque unum esset. Porro utcumque unum esse non posset, nisi ab eo quod summe unum est id haberet. *Op. cit.* 34, 63; *PL* 34, 150.

11 Jam vero in singulis rebus, et terram, eo quod similes inter se habeat partes suas, fieri ut terra sit; et aquam qualibet quoque parte similem esse ceteris partibus, nec aliter aquam esse potuisse; et quantumlibet aeris, si cetero esset dissimile, nullo pacto aerem esse potuisse; et ignis lucisve particulam, eo quod non sit dissimilis reliquis partibus, fieri ut sit quod est: ita de unoquoque lapidum vel arborum vel corpore cujuslibet animantis discerni et intelligi potest, quod non solum cum aliis sui generis rebus, sed in seipsis singulis non essent, nisi partes inter se similes haberent. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 59; *PL* 34, 243. In *De Musica* VI, 17, 57; *PL* 32, 1192, the unity of an element like earth is based on the fact that every particle of earth implies dimensions of space that are the same in any given particle of earth.

12 Jam porro animarum, non solum aliarum cum aliis amicitia similibus moribus confit, sed etiam in unaqua-

que anima similes actiones atque virtutes, sine quibus constantia esse non potest, beatam vitam indicant. Similia vero omnia haec, non autem ipsam Similitudinem possumus dicere. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 59; *PL* 34, 243.

13 In qua imagine speciem nominavit (*scil.* Hilarius), credo, propter pulchritudinem, ubi jam est tanta congruentia, et prima aequalitas, et prima similitudo, nulla in re dissidens, et nullo modo inaequalis, et nulla ex parte dissimilis, sed ad identidem respondens ei cujus imago est. *De Trinitate* VI, 10, 11; *PL* 42, 931.

14 Et tanto est pulchrius corpus, quanto similioribus inter se partibus suis constat. *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 59; *PL* 34, 243.

15 Cum autem omne quod esse dicimus, in quantum manet dicamus, et in quantum unum est, omnis porro pulchritudinis forma unitas sit. . . . *Epist.* 18, 2; *PL* 33, 85. Cf. *De Musica* VI, 17, 56; *PL* 32, 1191.

16 *De Gen. ad Litt. Lib. Imp.* 16, 59; *PL* 34, 243: Similia vero omnia haec. . . . Cf. *De Musica* VI, 7, 19; *PL* 32, 1173.

17 *De Vera Religione* 32, 59-60; *PL* 34, 148-49. *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 16, 42; *PL* 32, 1263-64.

18 *De Immort. Animae* 12, 19; *PL* 32, 1031. Cf. *Soliloq.* II, 8, 15; *PL* 32, 891.

19 At si corpora in tantum fallunt, in quantum non implent illud unum quod convincuntur imitari, a quo Principio unum est quidquid est, ad cujus similitudinem quidquid nititur, naturaliter approbamus; quia naturaliter improbamus quidquid ab unitate discedit, atque in ejus dissimilitudinem

tendit: datur intelligi esse aliquid, quod illius unius solius, a quo Principio unum est quidquid aliquo modo unum est, ita simile sit ut hoc omnino impleat ac sit idipsum; et haec est Veritas et Verbum in Principio, et Verbum Deus apud Deum. Si enim falsitas ex iis est quae imitantur unum, non in quantum id imitantur, sed in quantum implere non possunt; illa est Veritas quae id implere potuit, et id esse quod est illud; ipsa est quae illud ostendit sicut est: unde et Verbum ejus et Lux ejus rectissime dicitur (*John* 1, 9). Cetera illius unius similia dici possunt in quantum sunt, in tantum enim et vera sunt: haec est autem ipsa ejus similitudo, et ideo Veritas. Ut enim veritate sunt vera, quae vera sunt, ita similitudine similia sunt, quaecumque similia sunt. Ut ergo veritas forma verorum est, ita similitudo forma similium est. Quapropter vera quoniam in tantum vera sunt, in quantum sunt; in tantum autem sunt, in quantum principalis unius similia sunt, ea forma est omnium quae sunt, quae est summa similitudo Principii, et Veritas est, quia sine ulla dissimilitudine est. *De Vera Religione* 36, 66; *PL* 34, 151-52.

20 See the texts assembled by M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre*, p. 102.

21 Augustine successively proposed the most diverse traces of the Trinity, and yet none of them excludes the others: *mensura, numerus, pondus* in *De Trinitate* XI, 11, 18; *PL* 42, 998; *unitas, species, ordo* in *De Vera Religione* 7, 13; *PL* 34, 129; *esse, forma, manentia*, in *Epist.* 11, 3; *PL* 33, 76; *modus, species, ordo* in *De Nat. Boni Cont. Manich.* 3; *PL* 42, 553; *quo res constat, quo discernitur, quo congruit* in *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 18; *PL* 40, 15; the

three parts of philosophy: *physica, logica, ethica* or *naturalis, rationalis* and *moralis* to which God's three dignities as *causa subsistendi, ratio intelligendi* and *ordo vivendi* are referred in *De Civ. Dei* XI, 25; *PL* 41, 338-39; the trinity of *cogitatio* in the outer man, including *memoria sensibilis, interna visio, voluntas quae utrumque copulat* in *De Trinitate* XI, 3, 6; *PL* 42, 988; this trinity belongs to the outer man in virtue of the sensible character of its initial data; concerning *cogitatio* in this sense see *ibid.* 8, 13-15; *PL* 42, 994-96; more modest sensible analogies like *fons, fluvius, potio* and others will be found in Schmaus' book (*op. cit.* p. 190-94).

22 Non sane omne quod in creaturis aliquo modo simile est Deo, etiam ejus imago dicenda est, sed illa sola qua superior ipse solus est. Ea quippe de illo prorsus exprimitur, inter quam et ipsum nulla interjecta natura est. *De Trinitate* XI, 5, 8; *PL* 42, 991. Quare cum homo possit particeps esse sapientiae secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur; et ideo nihil sit Deo conjunctius. Et sapit enim, et vivit et est: qua creatura nihil est melius. *De Div. Quaest.* 83, 50, 2; *PL* 40, 33.

23 *De Trinitate* XI, 1, 1; *PL* 42, 985.

24 St. Augustine is not speaking here of visual sensation, but of the informed sense or of the form impressed on the sense by the object: Ipsaque visio quid aliud quam sensus ex ea re quae sentitur informatus? . . . corpus quo formatur sensus oculorum, cum idem corpus videtur, et ipsa forma quae ab eodem imprimitur sensui, quae visio vocatur; . . . sensus ergo

vel visio, id est sensus formatus extrinsecus. . . . *De Trinitate* XI, 2, 2; *PL* 42, 985.

25 See preceding note. To prove the reality of the impression produced on the sense by the object, even though for us the sense-impression is not distinguished from the object's form, St. Augustine appeals to the images that remain. *De Trinitate* XI, 2, 4; *PL* 42, 987.

26 *De Trinitate* XI, 2, 5; *PL* 42, 987.

27 The two sensible trinities are compared in the following passage: Quod ergo est ad corporis sensum aliquod corpus in loco, hoc est ad animi aciem similitudo corporis in memoria; et quod est aspicientis visio ad eam speciem corporis ex qua sensus formatur, hoc est visio cogitantis ad imaginem corporis in memoria constitutam ex qua formatur acies animi; et quod est intentio voluntatis ad corpus visum visionemque copulandam, ut fiat ibi quaedam unitas trium, quamvis eorum sit diversa natura (*scil.* in the first trinity), hoc est eadem voluntatis intentio ad copulandam imaginem corporis quae est in memoria, et visionem cogitantis, id est, formam quam cepit acies animi radiens ad memoriam: ut fiat et hic (*scil.* in the second trinity) quaedam unitas ex tribus, non jam naturae diversitate discretis, sed unius

eiusdemque substantiae; quia hoc totum intus est, et totum unus animus. *De Trinitate* XI, 4, 7; *PL* 42, 990. Cf. Quamvis enim haec trinitas, de qua nunc quaeritur, forinsecus invecata est animo, intus tamen agitur, et non est quidquam ejus praeter ipsius animi naturam. *De Trinitate* XI, 7, 12; *PL* 42, 993.

28 *Acies cogitantis* is Augustine's phrase. For him this expression, of which he makes frequent use in the *De Trinitate*, seems to correspond to a genuine faculty: Sensus enim accipit speciem ab eo corpore quod sentimus, et a sensu memoria, a memoria vero acies cogitantis. *De Trin.* XI, 8, 14; *PL* 42, 995. It is a metaphor borrowed from the sensible order of sight. In its strict sense, *acies* signifies the sight which passes through the pupil and distinguishes light from darkness (*Enarr. in Ps.* 16, 8; *PL* 36, 146). By analogy, St. Augustine admits that the mind can fasten upon one idea rather than another. The gaze it thus directs is, thanks to attention (*intentio*), precisely what he calls *acies mentis*.

29 *De Trinitate* XI, 5, 9; *PL* 42, 991-992. On this question see M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre*, p. 201-220. He gives a fine analysis, with comments, of *De Trinitate* XI, as well as a bibliography on the analogy of God in the outer man (p. 220, note 1).

CHAPTER IV

1 . . . de summo illo Deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo. . . . *De Ordine* II, 16, 44; *PL* 32, 1015. . . . et ipsum parentem universitatis; cujus nulla scientia est in anima, nisi scire quomodo eum nesciat. *Ibid.* 18, 47; 1017.

2 Illi enim haec verba horrescunt, qui

nondum viderunt ineffabili majestati nulla verba congruere . . . ; ut inde admonerentur, etiam illa quae cum aliqua dignitate Dei se putant homines dicere, indigna esse illius majestate, cui honorificum potius silentium quam ulla vox humana competeret. *Contra Ada-*

mantum 11; *PL* 42, 142. Ego vero, cum hoc de Deo dicitur, indignum aliquid dici arbitrari, si aliquid dignum inveniretur quod de illo diceretur. *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* II, 2, 1; *PL* 40, 138.

3 Besides the essential points we are going to study, Augustine left many scattered indications concerning God's attributes. On this question consult an excellent chapter of Nourisson's *La philosophie de s. Augustin*, Vol. I, p. 273-99. See, too, the very compact pages in J. Martin's *Saint Augustin*, p. 110-117, and Schmaus' *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre*, p. 82-100, particularly the bibliographical indications given on p. 100, note 3.

4 *De Mor. Eccl.* 14, 24; *PL* 32, 1321. Cf. *De Trinitate* V, 2, 3; *PL* 42, 912, referring to the text of *Exodus* 3, 14: Ego sum qui sum, and qui est misit me ad vos. Regarding the relations between being and eternity, see the interpretation of this text given in *Enarr. in Ps.* 101, 2, 10; *PL* 37, 1310-12. On this question consult Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre* p. 82-85.

5 *De Civitate Dei* XI, 10, 3; *PL* 41, 327. This formula will be one of the sources for the mediaeval doctrine of the distinction between essence and existence, particularly as Boethius will conceive it.

6 Humano quippe animo non hoc est esse quod est fortem esse, aut prudentem, aut justum aut temperantem: potest enim esse animus, et nullam istarum habere virtutem. Deo autem hoc est esse quod est fortem esse, aut justum esse, aut sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate, vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia ejus significetur. *De Trinitate*

VI, 4, 6; *PL* 42, 927. . . . cui non est aliud vivere et aliud esse, sed idem est esse et vivere. . . . *Op. cit.* VI, 10, 11; *PL* 42, 931. Una ergo eademque res dicitur, sive dicatur aeternus Deus, sive immortalis, sive incorruptibilis, sive immutabilis; itemque cum dicitur vivens, et intelligens, quod est utique sapiens. . . . *Op. cit.* XV, 5, 7; *PL* 42, 1062. Cf. XV, 6, 9; 1063. For this reason, we should not say that God is *substance* because this term would suppose that God is a subject whose attributes are accidents. The proper term to use to designate God is *essence*. *De Trinitate* V, 2, 3; *PL* 42, 912 and VII, 5, 10; 942.

7 *De Div. Quaest. ad Simp.* II, 2, 3; *PL* 40, 140.

8 *Ibid.* and 4; 141. This whole theory tends to show the sense in which divine "foreknowledge" truly merits the name "knowledge." Cf. *De Trinitate* V, 1, 2; *PL* 42, 911-12.

9 Ergo intelligimus habere nos aliquid ubi imago Dei est, mentem scilicet atque rationem. Ipsa mens invocabat lucem Dei et veritatem Dei. Ipsa est qua capimus justum et injustum; ipsa est qua discernimus verum a falso; ipsa est quae vocatur intellectus, quo intellectu carent bestiae; quem intellectum quisquis in se negligit, et postponit ceteris, et ita abjicit quasi non habeat, audit ex Psalmo: *nolite esse sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est intellectus* (*Psal.* 31, 9). *Enarr. in Ps.* 42, 6; *PL* 36, 480. An analogous text will be found in Berengar of Tours, *De Sacra Coena adversus Lanfrancum*, ed. A.F. and F. Th. Vischer (Berlin 1834) p. 10, and it is doubtful therefore, that it can be interpreted as a declaration of rationalism. Cf. *Fecit* (Deus) et homi-

nem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam in mente: ibi est enim imago Dei; ideo mens ipsa non potest comprehendere nec a seipsa, ubi est imago Dei. *De Symbolo* 1, 2; *PL* 40, 628.

10 The origin of this terminology is to be found in St. Paul, *Ephes.* 4, 23: . . . spiritu mentis vestrae . . . , a text that was commented upon by St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, 16, 22; *PL* 42, 1052-54. Augustine again refers to St. Paul, *Rom.* 12, 2, and *1 Cor.* 14, 14. He admits that both terms are synonymous in St. Paul's text: . . . spiritum mentis dicere voluit eum spiritum, quae mens vocatur. *Loc. cit.*; 1053. They are synonyms in this case because every *mens* is *spiritus*; but they are not always so because every *spiritus* is not *mens*. There is a *spiritus* superior to the mind, i.e. God; there are other *spiritus* inferior to it, i.e. soul, imagination, etc. Actually, *mens* is the higher part of the *spiritus* that is the human soul. *De Trinitate* IX, 2, 2; *PL* 42, 962; and XIV, 16, 22; *PL* 42, 1053. On this question, consult especially Fr. Gardeil's profound explanation in *La structure de l'âme et l'expérience mystique*, Paris 1927, t. I, p. 50-130; t. II, p. 281-312. This is the best starting point for a study of Augustine's difficult texts regarding the image of God in the human mind. Consult also the very careful and complete inventory of the *De Trinitate* in M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre*, p. 195-416. And finally, one may derive great pleasure from reading Augustine's analyses in Bossuet's language, *Élévations à Dieu sur tous les mystères de la vie chrétienne*.

11 The first trinity: *mens*, *notitia*, *amor* is analysed in *De Trinitate* IX, 2, 2-5, 8; *PL* 42, 961-65. The second:

memoria, *intelligentia*, *voluntas* is found in *De Trinitate* X, 11, 17-12, 19; *PL* 42, 982-984. The third: *memoria Dei*, *intelligentia*, *amor* is in *De Trinitate* XIV, 8, 11-12, 16; *PL* 42, 1044-49.

12 Detracto etiam corpore, si sola anima cogitetur, aliquid ejus est mens, tanquam caput ejus, vel oculus, vel facies: sed non haec ut corpora cogitanda sunt. Non igitur anima, sed quod excellit in anima mens vocatur. *De Trinitate* XV, 7, 11; *PL* 42, 1065. . . . in eo quod ipse homo in sua natura melius ceteris animalibus, melius etiam ceteris animae suae partibus habet, quod est ipsa mens: cui quidam rerum invisibilium tributus est visus, et cui tanquam in loco superiore atque interiore honorabiliter praesidenti, judicanda omnia nuntiant etiam corporis sensus; et qua non est superior, cui subdita regenda est, nisi Deus. *De Trinitate* XV, 27, 49; *PL* 42, 1096.

13 Quamvis enim mens humana non sit ejus naturae cujus est Deus, imago tamen naturae ejus qua natura melior nulla est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est in nobis, quo etiam natura nostra nihil habet melius. Sed prius mens in seipsa consideranda est antequam sit particeps Dei, et in ea reperienda est imago ejus. Diximus enim eam etsi amissa Dei participatione obsoletam atque deformem, Dei tamen imaginem permanere. Eo quippe ipso imago ejus est, quo ejus capax est, ejusque particeps esse potest. *De Trinitate* XIV, 8, 11; *PL* 42, 1044.

14 The fundamental Augustinian text that will be opposed to any real distinction between the faculties of the soul is this: Haec igitur tria: memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non

sunt tres vitae, sed una vita, nec tres mentes, sed una mens, consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia. Memoria quippe, quae vita et mens et substantia dicitur, ad se ipsam dicitur; quod vero memoria dicitur ad aliquid relative dicitur. Hoc de intelligentia quoque et de voluntate dixerim: et intelligentia quippe et voluntas ad aliquid dicuntur. Vita est autem unaquaeque ad se ipsam, et mens, et essentia. Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia, et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicuntur. . . . Quapropter quando invicem a singulis et tota omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis, et tota singula simul omnibus totis; et haec tria unum, una vita, una mens, una essentia. *De Trinitate* X, 11, 18; *PL* 42, 983-984. This text will come to be known especially through the apocryphal *De Spiritu et Anima*, a work of the Cistercian Alcher of Clairvaux (*PL* 40, 779). See especially ch. 13. Cf. ch. 19.

15 Fortassis ergo mens totum est, et ejus quasi partes amor quo se amat, et scientia qua se novit, quibus duabus partibus illud totum constat? An tres sunt aequales partes, quibus totum unum completur? Sed nulla pars totum, cujus pars est, complectitur: mens vero cum se totam novit, hoc est perfecte novit, per totum ejus est notitia ejus; et cum se perfecte amat, totam se amat, et per totum ejus est amor ejus. . . . Quomodo autem illa tria non sint ejusdem substantiae, non video, cum mens ipsa se amet, atque ipsa se noverit; atque ita sint haec tria, ut non alteri alicui rerum mens vel amata vel nota sit. Unius ergo ejusdemque essen-

tiae necesse est haec tria sint: ideo si tanquam commixtione confusa essent, nullo modo essent tria, nec referri ad invicem possent. Quemadmodum si ex uno eodemque auro tres anulos similes facias, quamvis connexos sibi, referuntur ad invicem, quod similes sunt; omnis enim similis alicui similis est; et trinitas anulorum est, et unum aurum: at si misceantur sibi, et per totam singuli massam suam conspergantur, intercidet illa trinitas, et omnino non erit; ac non solum unum aurum dicitur, sicut in illis tribus anulis dicebatur, sed jam nulla aurea tria. *De Trinitate* IX, 4, 7; *PL* 42, 964-65. This metaphor heralds that of Dante, *Parad.* XXXIII, 115-20. Cf. *De Trinitate* IX, 5, 8; *PL* 42, 965.

16 *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum*, 2nd ed. Quarrachi, 1916, Bk. I, dist. 3, ch. 2 and 3; t. I, p. 33-38. The trinity Peter Lombard insists on is the second: *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas* (ed. cit., p. 33-36).

17 Mens vero et spiritus non relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant. *De Trinitate* IX, 2, 2; *PL* 42, 962. . . . Mens vero aut spiritus (quamvis) non sint relativa. . . . *Op. cit.* IX, 4, 6; *PL* 42, 964.

18 Mens igitur cum amat se ipsam, duo quaedam ostendit, mentem et amorem. Quid est autem amare se, nisi sibi praesto esse velle ad fruendum se? Et cum tantum se vult esse, quantum est, par menti voluntas est, et amanti amor aequalis. *De Trinitate* IX, 2, 2; *PL* 42, 962.

19 Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor ejus, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt, mens et notitia ejus, cum se novit. Igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia ejus tria quaedam sunt

et haec tria unum sunt; et cum perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt. *De Trinitate* IX, 4, 4; PL 42, 963. Cf. *Sermo* 52, 7, 18-10, 23; PL 38, 361-64. *De Civitate Dei* XI, 26; PL 41, 339-40.

20 Simul etiam admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere, et tanquam involuta evolvi ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tanquam in subjecto, ut color, aut figura in corpore, aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas. Quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subjectum in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura hujus corporis potest esse et alterius corporis. Mens autem amore quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se. Item non se solam cognoscit mens, sed et alia multa. Quamobrem non amor et cognitio tanquam in subjecto insunt menti; sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt, sicut ipsa mens; quia et si relative dicuntur ad invicem, in sua tamen sunt singula quaeque substantia. Nec sicut color et coloratum relative ita dicuntur ad invicem, ut color in subjecto colorato sit, non habens in seipso propriam substantiam; quoniam coloratum corpus substantia est, ille autem in substantia: sed sicut duo amici etiam duo sunt homines, quae sunt substantiae, cum homines non relative dicantur, amici autem relative. *De Trinitate* IX, 4, 5; PL 42, 963-64.

21 In nono (libro), ad imaginem Dei, quod est homo secundum mentem, pervenit disputatio: et in ea quaedam trinitas invenitur, id est, mens, et notitia qua se novit, et amor quo se notitiamque suam diligit; et haec tria aequalia inter se, et unius ostenduntur esse essentiae. In decimo hoc idem diligentius subtiliusque tractatum est, atque ad id perductum, ut inveniretur

in mente evidentior trinitas ejus, in memoria scilicet et intelligentia et voluntate. *De Trinitate* XV, 3, 5; PL 42, 1060. Cf. XIV, 7, 10; PL 42, 1043-44.

M. Schmaus proposes a different interpretation of the relations between the first two trinities, and he bases it on very strong arguments (*Die psychologische Trinitätslehre*, p. 250-53, cf. p. 268). According to him, Augustine's thought developed between the writing of Book IX and Book XIV of the *De Trinitate*. In writing Book XIV Augustine understood *notitia* in the sense of an actual knowledge (see especially the arguments on p. 251). It is only as an afterthought, when a second more explicit trinity occurred to him, that he reduced the meaning of *notitia* to an habitual knowledge and thus made the first trinity virtual. The question can be settled, in so far as this is possible, only by a scrupulous exegesis of the texts. It would be strange of St. Augustine not to correct the exposition of Book IX and adapt it to that of Book XIV, if he had changed his opinion in the meantime. This would have been an easy thing to do. Moreover, although Schmaus quotes weighty texts in support of his thesis, he does not discuss those which go, or seem to go, against him, especially in Book IX. Thus, for example, the text he interprets later (page 256), in which *notitia* and *amor* are defined as substances, hardly agrees with his interpretation of them as acts. At any rate, our explanation corresponds to the last interpretation St. Augustine gave of his thought.

22 Tanta est tamen cogitationis vis, ut nec ipsa mens quodammodo se in conspectu suo ponat, nisi quando se cogitat: ac per hoc ita nihil in conspectu

mentis est, nisi unde cogitatur, ut nec ipsa mens, qua cogitatur quidquid cogitatur, aliter possit esse in conspectu suo, nisi se ipsam cogitando. . . . Proinde restat ut aliquid pertinens ad ejus naturam sit conspectus ejus, et in eam, quando se cogitat, non quasi per loci spatium, sed incorporea conversione revocetur: cum vero non se cogitat, non sit quidem in conspectu suo, nec de illa suus formetur obtutus, sed tamen noverit se tanquam ipsa sit sibi memoria sui. Sicut multarum disciplinarum peritus ea quae novit, ejus memoria continentur, nec est inde aliquid in conspectu mentis ejus, nisi unde cogitat; cetera in arcana quadam notitia sunt recondita, quae memoria nuncupatur. Ideo trinitatem sic commendabamus, ut illud unde formatur cogitantis obtutus, in memoria ponere-mus; ipsam vero conformationem, tanquam imaginem quae inde imprimitur; et illud quo utrumque conjungitur, amorem seu voluntatem. Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intelligit se et recognoscit: gignit ergo hunc intellectum et cognitionem suam. *De Trinitate* XIV, 6, 8; *PL* 42, 1041-42.

This second trinity's actual character is quite apparent in this text. M. Schmaus is also of this opinion (*op. cit.* p. 271). He contends, however, that in this instance also Augustine is thinking of an unconscious trinity, because it is simply a habitual one (p. 269; p. 271). The fact that is beyond any doubt is that every actual presence of three terms presupposes their habitual pre-existence (this is the sense in which we should interpret the texts quoted in *op. cit.* p. 271, note 7). We should say, then, that in this case St. Augustine is speaking explicitly of a

trinity of acts (but he sometimes does so by recalling its habitual conditions), rather than attribute to him the continual uncertainty with which Schmaus reproaches him ("Beide Auffassungen ziehen sich sonach durch das ganze Werk hindurch. Jedoch kommt dem in der Tageshelle des Bewusstseins sich bewegenden Ternar ein gewisser Vorrang zu," *op. cit.* p. 271-272). Perhaps we are both trying to find more precision in Augustine's thought than it has, or even a kind of abstract precision it precludes.

23 In illa igitur aeterna Veritate, ex qua temporalia facta sunt omnia, formam secundum quam sumus, et secundum quam vel in nobis, vel in corporibus vera et recta ratione aliquid operamur, visu mentis aspicimus: atque inde conceptam rerum veracem notitiam, tanquam verbum apud nos habemus, et dicendo intus gignimus; nec a nobis nascendo discedit. Cum autem ad alios loquimur, verbo intus manenti ministerium vocis adhibemus, aut alicujus signi corporalis, ut per quamdam commemorationem sensibilem tale aliquid fiat etiam in animo audientis, quale de loquentis animo non recedit. *De Trinitate* IX, 7, 12; *PL* 42, 967. Cf. the important text *In Joan. Evang.* 1, 8; *PL* 35, 1383. This remark may be extended, *mutatis mutandis*, from intellectual knowledge to sensible knowledge. The production of sensation by the soul is a *dictio*, and the analogy with the Verbum's generation by the Father, although more remote, is no less real. Et quemadmodum cum per sensum corporis *dicimus* corpora, fit eorum aliqua similitudo in animo nostro. . . . *De Trinitate* IX, 11, 16; *PL* 42, 969. See above, p. 63.

24 Nemo enim volens aliquid facit, quod non in corde suo prius dixerit. Quod verbum amore concipitur, sive creaturae, sive Creatoris, id est, aut naturae mutabilis, aut incommutabilis veritatis. *De Trinitate* IX, 7, 12-13; *PL* 42, 967. Verbum ergo nostrum et mentem de qua gignitur, quasi medius amor conjungit, seque cum eis tertium complexu incorporeo, sine ulla confusione constringit. *Ibid*; 968.

25 *De Trinitate* IX, 10, 15; *PL* 42, 969.

26 *Op. cit.* IX, 11, 16; *PL* 42, 969-970. St. Augustine strongly emphasizes that this trinity's terms condition one another reciprocally: for intelligence is contained in memory, but in turn has memory, whereas will has knowledge of the thing it wills. *De Trinitate* XV, 21, 41; *PL* 42, 1089. Absence of any real distinction between the soul's faculties necessarily involves this consequence.

27 *De Trinitate* IX, 12, 17; *PL* 42, 970.

28 Qui appetitus, id est inquisitio, quamvis amor esse non videatur, quo id quod notum est amatur; hoc enim adhuc, ut cognoscatur, agitur: tamen ex eodem genere quiddam est. Nam voluntas jam dici potest, quia omnis qui quaerit invenire vult; . . . Partum ergo mentis antecedit appetitus quidam, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniando, nascitur proles ipsa notitia: ac per hoc appetitus ille quo concipitur pariturque notitia, partus et proles recte dici non potest; idemque appetitus quo inhiatur rei cognoscendae, fit amor cognitae, dum tenet atque amplectitur placitam prolem, id est, notitiam, gignentique conjungit. Et est quaedam imago

Trinitatis, ipsa mens, et notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus ac de se ipsa verbum ejus, et amor tertius, et haec tria unum atque una substantia. Nec minor proles, dum tantam se novit mens quanta est; nec minor amor, dum tantum se diligit quantum novit et quanta est. *De Trinitate* IX, 12, 18; *PL* 42, 972. Cf. *op. cit.* XI, 7, 11-12; *PL* 42, 993-994; and XI, 8, 15; *PL* 42, 995-996.

29 Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago, quia sui meminit mens, et intelligit ac diligit se: sed quia potest etiam meminisse, et intelligere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit, sapiens ipsa fit. Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit, seseque intelligit ac diligit, stulta est. Meminerit itaque Dei sui, ad cujus imaginem facta est, eumque intelligat atque diligit. *De Trinitate* XIV, 12, 15; *PL* 42, 1048. Cf. 14, 20; 1051.

30 Indeed, the *image* is never completely destroyed by sin, since it is con-natural to man. On this question see Schmaus, *op. cit.* p. 293-94 and above p. 213.

31 Illa autem ceteris natura praestantior Deus est. Et quidem *non longe positus ab unoquoque nostrum*, sicut Apostolus dicit, adjungens, *In illo enim vivimus, et movemur et sumus* (*Acts* 17, 27-28). Quod si secundum corpus diceret, etiam de isto corporeo mundo posset intelligi. Nam et in illo secundum corpus vivimus, movemur et sumus. Unde secundum mentem quae facta est ad ejus imaginem, debet hoc accipi, excellentiore quodam, eodemque non visibili, sed intelligibili modo. . . . Proinde si in ipso sunt omnia, in quo tandem possunt vivere quae vivunt, et moveri quae moventur, nisi in

quo sunt? Non tamen omnes cum illo sunt eo modo quo ei dictum est: *ego semper tecum* (Ps. 72, 23). Nec ipse cum omnibus eo modo quo dicimus, Dominus vobiscum. Magna itaque hominis miseria est cum illo non esse, sine quo non potest esse. In quo enim est, procul dubio sine illo non est: et tamen si ejus non meminit, eumque non intelligit nec diligit, cum illo non est. *De Trinitate* XIV, 12, 16; *PL* 42, 1048-49. On grace's role in renovating the image, see *op. cit.* XIV, 17, 23; 1054. Cf. on this point A. Gardeil, *op. cit.* t. I, p. 121-22.

32 *De Trinitate* XV, 5, 7-8; *PL* 42, 1061-63. Cf. XV, 7, 11-13; *PL* 42, 1065-67; XV, 22, 42; 1089-90; XV, 23, 43-44; 1090-91; *Epist.* 169, 2, 5-6; *PL* 33, 744-

745. On the differences between the divine Word and human words, see *De Trinitate* XV, 9, 16-15, 25; *PL* 42, 1069-79.

33 *De Trinitate* V, 2, 3; *PL* 42, 912 (refers to *Exodus* 3, 14). Cf. V, 8, 9 (the end of the section); 917; VII, 5, 10; 942-943.

34 *Op. cit.* V, 9, 10; *PL* 42, 917-18. Cf. VII, 4, 7-9; *PL* 42, 939-42.

35 Tamen, cum quaeritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen: tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur. *De Trinitate* V, 9, 10; *PL* 42, 918. See other texts and references in J. Martin, *Saint Augustin*, p. 121, note 4.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1 . . . primum autem peccatum, hoc est primum voluntarium defectum, esse gaudere ad propriam potestatem. *Epist.* 118, 3, 15; *PL* 33, 439.

2 Once Augustine had been converted his formula was humility, humility first, last and always. Ea est autem (*scil.* via ad obtinendam veritatem) prima humilitas; secunda humilitas; tertia humilitas. *Epist.* 118, 3, 22; *PL* 33, 442.

3 *Confess.* I, 11, 17; *PL* 32, 669. Monica postponed baptism so as to keep in reserve a complete remission of all the sins he would commit as an adult. Note, however, that during a childhood illness Augustine asked for baptism.

4 See the texts in Ch. Boyer, *Christianisme et néo-platonisme dans la formation de s. Augustin*, 1920, pp. 24-25.

5 Ego vero aliud putabam tantumque

sentiebam de Domino Christo meo, quantum de excellentis sapientiae viro, cui nullus posset aequari, praesertim quia mirabiliter natus ex virgine ad exemplum contemnendorum temporalium pro adipiscenda immortalitate divina pro nobis cura tantam auctoritatem magisterii meruisse videbatur. Quid autem sacramenti haberet Verbum caro factum est, ne suspicari quidem poteram. *Confess.* VII, 19, 25; *PL* 32, 746.

6 *Confess. ibid.*, *PL* 32, 746.

7 . . . et hoc solum me in tanta flagrantia refrangebat, quod nomen Christi non erat ibi, quoniam hoc nomen . . . filii tui, in ipso adhuc lacte matris tenerum cor meum pie biberat et alte retinebat. . . . *Confess.* III, 4, 8; III, 5, 9; *PL* 32, 686. On this event see Fr. Alfarc, *L'évolution intellectuelle*, p. 70; Ch. Boyer, *Christianisme*, p. 34, note 1.

8 Incidi in homines . . . *Confess.* III, 6, 10; *PL* 32, 686.

9 *Confess.* III, 6, 10; *PL* 32, 686. *Cont. Epist. Manich.* 5, 6; *PL* 42, 176. Concerning the Christian elements in Manichaeism see F. Burkitt, *The Religion of the Manichaeans*, Cambridge, 1925.

10 See Fr. Alfarić's excellent pages in *L'évolution intellectuelle*, pp. 70-73, with this accurate conclusion: "Seulement, il sentait désormais le besoin de rencontrer une doctrine qui lui permit d'être chrétien tout en faisant un libre usage de sa raison. En ce moment-là même, le Manichéisme vint fort opportunément lui en offrir le moyen."

11 *De Util. Credendi* I, 2; *PL* 42, 66.

12 For a detailed exposition, see Fr. Alfarić's substantial chapter in *L'évolution intellectuelle*, pp. 79-158. Also his *Les écritures manichéennes*, 2 vols. Paris, 1918. Consult also G. Bardy's equally important article, "Manichéisme," in *Dict. de théologie cath.*, t. IX, col. 1841-95; on Manichaean dogma see particularly col. 1872-79. Saint Augustine has given a brief summary of his interpretation of Manicheism in *De Haeresibus*, ch. 46; *PL* 42, 33-38.

13 G. Bardy, *art. cit.* col. 1873, seems to us mistaken on this point. Fr. Alfarić, *op. cit.* p. 97, note 7, seems to admit, on the other hand, and quite rightly it seems, that Mani did not teach a real metaphysical spiritualism and only eliminated from the idea of God a gross, anthropomorphic materialism.

14 *De Haeresibus* 46; *PL* 42, 34-35. Lucemque istam corpoream . . . , Dei dicunt esse naturam. *Loc. cit.* 35. In

accordance with Augustine's belief, . . . qui cogitare aliquid substantiae nisi tale non poteram, quale per hos oculos videri solet. *Confess.* VII, 1, 1; *PL* 32, 733.

15 Sed quid mihi hoc proderat putanti, quod tu, Domine Deus veritas, corpus esse lucidum et immensum, et ego frustum de illo corpore. *Confess.* IV, 16, 31; *PL* 32, 706. The epithet "pantheism," so often applied to this doctrine, is quite out of order. A dualism cannot be pantheist. Mani only held for a mingling together of man's luminous part and God.

16 See the analysis Augustine gives of his first writing (a work now lost), *De Pulchro et Apto*, in *Confess.* IV, 15, 24-27; *PL* 32, 703-04. It was an essay in materialistic aesthetics.

17 Hinc enim et mali substantiam quandam credebam esse talem et habere suam molem tetram et deformem, sive crassam, quam terram dicebant, sive tenuem atque subtilem, sicuti est aeris corpus: quam malignam mentem per illam terram repentem imaginantur. . . . Et melius mihi videbar credere nullum malum te creasse—quod mihi nescienti non solum aliqua substantia sed etiam corporea videbatur quia et mentem cogitare non noveram nisi eam subtile corpus esse, quod tamen per loci spatia diffunderetur—quam credere abs te esse qualem putabam naturam mali. *Confess.* V, 10, 20; *PL* 32, 715-16.

18 . . . quia non noveram malum non esse nisi privationem boni usque ad quod omnino non est. Quod unde viderem, cujus videre usque ad corpus erat oculis et animo usque ad phantasma? *Confess.* III, 7, 12; *PL* 32, 688.

19 *Confess.* VII, 5, 7; *PL* 32, 736.

20 Et quoniam cum de Deo meo cogitare vellem, cogitare nisi moles corporum non noveram—neque enim videbatur mihi esse quicquam, quod tale non esset—ea maxime et prope sola causa erat inevitabilis erroris mei. *Confess.* V, 10, 19; *PL* 32, 715. Tunc vero fortiter intendi animum, si quo modo possem certis aliquibus documentis Manichaeos convincere falsitatis. Quod si possem spiritalem substantiam cogitare, statim machinamenta illa omnia solverentur et abjicerentur ex animo meo: sed non poteram. *Confess.* V, 14, 25; *PL* 32, 718.

21 *Confess.* V, 3, 3; V, 5, 9; *PL* 32, 707, 709. Concerning the philosophical reading done by Augustine at that time, as well as his criticism of Manichaeism, see Fr. Alfarić, *L'évolution intellectuelle*, pp. 229-58.

22 *Confess.* V, 10, 19; *PL* 32, 715.

23 *Confess. loc. cit.* Cf. *De Civitate Dei*, IV, 30. He later considered them Platonists hiding their teachings behind a façade of scepticism.

24 Tenebam cor meum ab omni assensione timens praecipitium et suspensio magis necabar. Volebam enim eorum quae non viderem ita me certum fieri, ut certus essem quod septem et tria decem sint. Neque enim tam insanus eram, ut ne hoc quidem putarem posse comprehendere, sed sicut hoc, ita cetera cupiebam sive corporalia, quae coram sensibus meis non adessent, sive spiritalia, de quibus cogitare nisi corporaliter nesciebam. *Confess.* VI, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 722. There is scarcely any need to point out that we have here one of the bonds of affinity linking Augustine's thought to that of Descartes.

25 Cf. the anecdote about the drunken beggar in *Confess.* VI, 6, 9-10; *PL* 32, 724.

26 A good sample of St. Ambrose's exegesis may be had in Fr. de Labriolle's *Saint Ambroise*, p. 181.

27 *Confess.* VI, 4, 6; *PL* 32, 722.

28 *De Util. Credendi* 6, 13; *PL* 42, 74.

29 *Confess.* VI, 5, 7; *PL* 32, 722-23.

30 *Confess.* VI, 5, 8; *PL* 32, 723.

31 *Ibid.* and *De Lib. Arbit.* II, 1, 15; *PL* 32, 1242.

32 An aspect of his doctrine brought out clearly in Fr. Batiffol's *Le catholicisme de s. Augustin*, t. I, p. 14.

33 Auctoritas fidem flagitat, et rationi praeparat hominem. Ratio ad intellectum cognitionemque perducit. Quamquam neque auctoritatem ratio penitus deserit, cum consideratur cui sit credendum . . . *De Util. Credendi* 24, 45; *PL* 34, 141. Nullus quippe credit aliquid nisi prius cogitaverit esse credendum. *De Praedest. Sanct.* 2, 5; *PL* 44, 962. Let us add, however, that faith's priority over reason is purely chronological. Whenever a person wants to learn he must always start with believing before he knows (*De Mor. Eccl.* 2, 3; *PL* 32, 1311-12). But this does not prevent rational knowledge, as knowledge, from being of an order superior to the order of faith. Ad discendum item necessario dupliciter ducimur auctoritate atque ratione. Tempore auctoritas, re autem ratio prior est. See the whole article in *De Ordine* II, 9, 26; *PL* 32, 1007. Certain philosophers of the Middle Ages, in whom this formula reappeared, have been designated as "rationalists" by some who have failed to recognize the

Augustinian origin of the formula. On this misunderstanding see Jacquin, "Le rationalisme de Jean Scot," in *Revue des sciences philos. et théologiques*, 1908, t. II, p. 747-748.

34 *Confess.* Books VI and VII. For the formula that follows see *op. cit.* VII, 7, 11; *PL* 32, 739.

35 In our opinion this is the mistake made in a work otherwise very useful, Fr. Alfarié's *L'évolution intellectuelle de s. Augustin*, pp. 380-381. To deny the obvious meaning of expressions as clear as Augustine's something more than his historian's exegesis and personal psychology would be needed. See Fr. Monceaux in *Journal des savants*, Nov., Dec., 1920, and A. Loisy in *Revue d'histoire et de litt. religieuse*, 1920, p. 568.

36 . . . et surgere coeperam ut ad te redirem. *Confess.* III, 4, 7; *PL* 32, 685.

37 This situation has been clearly described by Augustine in *Confess.* VII, 5, 7; *PL* 32, 736-37. Note the conclusion: . . . stabiliter tamen haerebat in corde meo in catholica ecclesia fides Christi tui, Domini et Salvatoris nostri, in multis quidem adhuc informis et praeter doctrinae normam fluitans, sed tamen non eam relinquebat animus, immo in dies magis magisque imbibeat.

38 *Confess.* VII, 1, 1; *PL* 32, 733; VII, 3, 5; *PL* 32, 735.

39 *Confess.* VII, 9, 13; *PL* 32, 740. Later Augustine specifies that the translator of these Platonic books was Marius Victorinus. Cf. *Confess.* VIII, 2, 3; *PL* 32, 750. Unfortunately, Victorinus' translations, which were probably made before his conversion to Christianity, are now lost, so we do not

actually know which Platonic writings are meant. The word "platoniorum" suggests several authors. Since Augustine quoted Jamblicus, Porphyry, Hermes Trismegistus and Apuleius in addition to Plotinus, we may well hesitate among these names (*De Civitate Dei* VIII, 12; *PL* 41, 237 and VIII, 23-24; 247-53), but Plotinus was very likely his main source (on the disputed reading in *De Beata Vita* 4, *Platonis, platonici* or *Plotini*, see J. Barion, *Plotin und Augustinus*, Berlin 1935, pp. 39-40 and note 16). To complete the testimony of Book VII of the *Confessions* on this point, see *De Civitate Dei* IX, 7; *PL* 41, 271; X, 2; 279-80; X, 14; 292-93; X, 16; 293-94; X, 23; 300 and 24; 300-302.

Concerning Victorinus' writings see Fr. Monceaux, *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu'à l'invasion arabe*, Paris, 1905; t. III, pp. 373-422. Victorinus' writings are collected in Migne, *Pat. Lat.* t. VIII, col. 993-1510. On the relations between Augustine's thought and that of Victorinus, see R. Schmid, *Marius Victorinus Rhetor unde seine Beziehungen zu Augustin*, Kiel, 1895. In general it would seem that the Platonism of Victorinus' extant Christian writings has been somewhat exaggerated, especially in the case of his *Adversus Arium*. It is to be hoped that the question will be reopened by a historian of theology.

40 It should not be forgotten that Augustine already professed the Christian faith when he read these doctrines "not in these same terms but in exactly the same sense" in the Platonists, nor that at this period his idea of the faith was still somewhat vague and indefinite. It is an exaggeration to hold either

that he was converted to Plotinus before being converted to Christ, or that his discovery of Plotinus had no influence on his conversion to Christ. As Augustine himself said, he gathered in all these truths when he found them among the pagans, like the gold God had commanded his people to bring with them when they left Egypt (*Confess.* V, 9, 15), for all truth belongs to God no matter where it is found. See *De Doct. Christ.* II, 18, 28; *PL* 34, 49; and II, 40; *PL* 34, 63. Cf. *Epist.* 166, 9; *PL* 33, 724. To say that when he discovered Plotinus he no longer thought or did not yet think as a Christian, is to adopt a point of view on Augustine's development that differs from Augustine's own. The result is that while pretending to be critical, we claim to have a better knowledge of his history than Augustine himself, thereby disqualifying the only witness who has told us about it.

41 Concerning the agreement between Neoplatonism and the Prologue of St. John's Gospel, see *Confess.* VII, 9, 13; *PL* 32, 740. On the doctrine of God as subsistent Truth and Being, see *op. cit.* VII, 10, 16 and 11, 17; *PL* 32, 742-43. The problems raised by the relations between Augustine's doctrine and that of Plotinus still await thorough treatment by a historian. On the question as a whole, see especially Jakob Barion, *Plotin und Augustinus*.

42 *Confess.* VII, 12, 18; *PL* 32, 743. On this doctrine see above, Part II, ch. III, sec. 1.

43 *Confess.* VII, 14, 20; *PL* 32, 744.

44 *Cont. Acad.* II, 2, 5; *PL* 32, 921-922.

45 Respexi tantum, confiteor, quasi de itinere in illam religionem, quae pueris nobis insita est, et medullitus impli-

cata: verum autem ipsa me ad se nascentem rapiebat. Itaque titubans, properans, haesitans, arripio apostolum Paulum. Neque enim vere isti, inquam, tanta potuissent, vixissentque ita ut eos vixisse manifestum est, si eorum Litterae atque rationes huic tanto bono adversarentur. Perlegi totum intentissime atque cautissime. *Cont. Acad. loc. cit.*; 921-922. Cf. *Confess.* VII, 21, 27; *PL* 32, 747-48.

Augustine's first enthusiasm for Platonism and Neoplatonism gradually cools with the years. Throughout his life he looks upon Plato as the philosopher *par excellence* and Platonism as the philosophical introduction to Christianity (*De Vera Religione* I, 4, 7; *PL* 34, 126; *Epist.* 118, 3, 21; *PL* 33, 442; *De Civitate Dei* VII, 9-10; *PL* 41, 233-35), but if the Platonists are as near Christianity as it is possible for philosophers to be, they are still far away from it. And Augustine later reproached himself for having praised them so extravagantly in his early works (See *Retract.* I, 1, 4; *PL* 32, 587). For a list of errors for which Augustine will blame them, see Nourrisson, *op. cit.* pp. 62-75.

46 *Cont. Acad.* III, 19, 42; *PL* 32, 956-57. *De Ordine* II, 5, 16; *PL* 32, 1002. *Epist.* 118, 3, 17; *PL* 33, 440-41 (where he insists on the fact that Christ's example was one of humility).

47 *Confess.* VII, 16-18, 22-24; *PL* 32, 744-46, and 21, 27; *PL* 32, 747-48.

48 . . . tanta se mihi philosophiae facies aperuit, . . . *Cont. Acad.* II, 2, 6; *PL* 32, 922.

49 In the synthesis attempted here—even less than in the body of our work—we do not take into account the changes which appear in St. Augustine.

Since we are trying to pick out the system's main theses and note their connections, the stable element in Augustinism is our chief concern. In a review of Fr. Ch. Boyer's book, *L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de s. Augustin*, we criticised him for not having studied the doctrine from the standpoint of its evolution. The present work was done since then, and we must retract our criticism as ill-founded. There was a psychological evolution in St. Augustine; there were many variations of detail and a great number of these we have pointed out, but we have never discovered the slightest philosophical change in any of his essential theses. St. Augustine fixed his main ideas from the time of his conversion—even, we believe, regarding grace—and he always drew on the capital he had acquired. It goes without saying that a study of changes in Augustine, wherever they occurred, has its importance, but its point of view is different from, and complementary to ours.

50 B. Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. L. Brunschvicg, n. 283. In following this order, St. Augustine was aided, like Pascal, by his admirable style or rather, according to an expert, by his styles, "because he has every style, as he knows how to assume every tone." P. Monceaux, *Histoire de la littérature latine chrétienne*, Paris 1924, p. 137.

51 See the works of W. Kahl and Otto Zaenker listed in the Bibliography.

52 Max Scheler, *Moralia*, Leipzig, 1923, p. 140. See M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre*, p. 376.

53 That is all Schmaus succeeds in proving against W. Kahl, O. Zaenker

and M. Scheler (*op. cit.* p. 376-80); but neither he nor A. Harnack (*op. cit.* p. 376, note 5) has met his opponents on their own ground. This is the reason they do not carry the day, even though they are right.

54 *De Civitate Dei* VII, 30; *PL* 41, 220. Cf. *De Gen. ad Litt.* IV, 12, 23; *PL* 34, 305; VIII, 23, 44; *PL* 34, 389-90; VIII, 25, 46; 390-91: . . . naturas ut sunt . . . ; . . . fiunt, ut naturae sint; . . .

55 Cf., for example, . . . convenientissimum et ordinatissimum apparet ut malum meritum prioris, natura sequentis sit; et bonum meritum sequentis, natura prioris sit. *De Lib. Arbit.* III, 20, 56; *PL* 32, 1298. Stabilizing a state into a nature always depends on the wise will of the Creator.

56 W. Windelband, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 5th ed., Tübingen, 1910, p. 230 ff. See also H. Siebeck's expressive formula (also quoted by J. Hessen, *Die Begründung der Erkenntnis*, p. 54): "Nicht das Verhältnis des Inneren zum Aeusseren, sondern das des Inneren zum Innersten, zum Fühlen und Schauen Gottes im Herzen, sind die eigentlichen Objekte und treibenden Kräfte seiner Spekulation" (H. Siebeck, "Die Anfänge der neueren Psychologie," in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, XCII (1888), p. 189. It cannot be put better.

57 Fr. B. Romeyer (*art. cit.* in *Archives de Philosophie* VII, 2; 1930, p. 212) commends this revision of the conclusion reached in our essay in *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, 1926-1927, p. 126. The praise is undeserved because our position is still the same. Our article in the *Archives* was a study of Augustinianism in the 13th

century; the present volume is a study of Augustinism. They differ on many points and particularly on the point in question.

58 The marked preference in Augustinianism for the doctrine of seminal reasons is largely due to this. Every other conception of causality is felt to be a kind of creative activity bestowed upon creatures. This feeling is strong in St. Bonaventure, and reaches its greatest intensity in Malebranche's Occasionalism. For the same reason, the doctrine of illumination will remain characteristic of the Augustinian tradition: it guarantees the maximum dependence of the intellect on God in the act of knowing. Neither St. Thomas nor Duns Scotus is Augustinian on either of these two points; St. Bonaventure, Roger Bacon, Raymond Lull and Malebranche are authentic representatives of this tradition.

59 See Fr. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant (Les philosophes belges, t. VI)*, Louvain, 1911, p. 55. Note 2 corrects the text quite forcibly and happily. On the other hand, the same author is surprised that we could present St. Bonaventure's doctrine "as a unified system and call it a philosophical system" (*Bulletin Thomiste*, March 1926, p. 54). On the notion of "Christian philosophy," see E. Gilson, *Christianisme et philosophie*, Paris, J. Vrin, 1936. And on the recent controversies concerning this topic, see the whole exposition of Bernard Baudoux, *Quaestio de Philosophia Christiana in Antonianum XI* (1936), pp. 486-552.

60 In connection with the theological problem raised by this attitude, see J. Maritain's penetrating essay, "De la sagesse augustinienne," in *Revue de Philosophie*, 1930, pp. 715-741.

61 In the *Bulletin Thomiste*, January 1928, p. 244, Fr. Chenu raises this objection: a philosophy is not Christian "because the theological order is imposed on its rational content from the outside, but because it conceives nature and reason as open to the supernatural." We agree that the theological order does not confer, and would not confer, any Christian characteristic on a philosophy as such. But we do believe that in St. Thomas this is the outward sign of the Christian character of his philosophy. Moreover, we do not think a Christian philosophy should be deduced from a theology but should move within a faith, and this is an entirely different matter. As for the criterion proposed by Fr. Chenu, it seems to us that, pending a more thorough examination, he is defining a philosophy compatible with Christianity rather than a Christian philosophy, and it would seem advisable to distinguish the two.

62 From the fact that there is a true primacy of charity in Augustinism, it does not follow that it is correct to speak of a primacy of action, because charity is not an action distinct from contemplation, and still less is it opposed to it. Like all love, charity is at once knowledge and willing; we have seen that it is the inexhaustible source of action, and consequently cannot be reduced to it. See above, p. 141.

63 *De Trinitate* XI, 6, 10; *PL* 42, 992.

64 *De Civitate Dei* X, 29, 1-2; *PL* 41, 307-309; X, 32, 1-3; 312-16; XI, 2; 317-18.

65 Important fragments of Kant's critique became integral parts of the doctrines of Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer, although the fundamental in-

spiration of these doctrines often moves in a different direction. Littré, Durkheim and contemporary French sociologists rightly invoke Comte, and they make use of certain principles of his even though Comte has or had communicated them from his church.

66 E. Baudin has brought out this truth with the utmost discernment: "... on peut discerner, tout le long de la spéculation augustinienne, la présence constante et le développement parallèle de deux augustinismes philosophiques, celui de l'ontologisme des vérités rationnelles, qui vient précisément s'épanouir chez Descartes, et celui de l'expérimentation des vérités religieuses, qui a son apogée chez Pascal. Augustinismes différents, qui engendrent deux intuitionismes différents, celui de la raison pure et celui du coeur" (*Recherches de sciences religieuses*, 1924, p. 345). See also, *ibid.*, 1923, p. 132. Regarding Descartes, see E. Gilson, "La pensée religieuse de Descartes," in *Revue de Méta. et de morale*, 1925, p. 518-533.

67 For the role played by St. Augustine as an intermediary and interpreter of the Platonic tradition, consult the book of a historian who is at the same time a philosopher, A. E. Taylor, *Platonism and its Influence*, G. G. Harrap, London, n.d.

68 See above, p. 7-8. It is interesting to compare Descartes, à *Elisabeth*, Sept. 15, 1645; ed. Adam-Tannery, t. IV, p. 292, lines 5-12, where the same connection is found between spiritualist metaphysics and morality.

69 See his *Réponse au placard de Régis*; ed. Adam-Tannery, t. VII, 2nd part, p. 358, line 20 ff. Cf. O. Hamelin, *Le système de Descartes*, 2nd ed. Paris 1911, p. 177.

70 We use the phrase "better known" in the sense of the Latin "notior." See E. Gilson, *Index scolastico-cartésien*, Paris, F. Alcan, 1913, p. 203-204. In the references to Descartes' texts given there, delete III, 444, 10 in lines 1-2 and 5; in line 2 correct the reference VI, 23 to read VI, 33.

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ANALYTICAL INDEX

- Ab exterioribus ad interiora*, 20, 256 n.38.
- Abditum mentis*, 300 n.120.
- Abstraction, nature of, 85.
- Acies animi*, 352 n.28.
- Action, for the sake of contemplation, 118; pertains to science, 122.
- Adjuvat, ut faciat cui jubet*, 161.
- Admonitio*, of God to the soul, 300 n.122.
- Agent intellect, not God, 294 n.72.
- Agreement, between minds, 73-74, 128.
- Amor*, more general than *dilectio*, 311 n.40.
- Angels, called "heaven," 197-198, 340 n.7; see sensible objects in God, 292 n.60; not coeternal with God, 338 n.22; matutinal and vespertinal knowledge of, 340 n.7.
- Animatio*, a stage in the soul's life, 304 n.24.
- Animus*, distinct from *anima*, 29 n.1; identical with *anima*, 270 n.3; unable to grasp itself entirely, 300 n.117; remembers itself, 300 n.118.
- Art, beauty of, 213-214; a stage in the soul's life, 304 n.24.
- Attention (*intentio*), of soul to body, 48-49, 61-63; fixes the sense on the object, 133, 215; question put to things by the soul, 187-188.
- Attributes of God, God is His attributes, 217-218; immutability, 143, 258 n.49; foreknowledge, 155; immateriality, 189; creator, 189-190; freedom, 190; timelessness, 190-191; unknowable, 218; method of arriving at, 218.
- Augustine, and the *Hortensius*, 3, 4, 227, 228; and scepticism, 13, 38-39, 229; personal experience of, 28-29, 34, 38-39, 65, 227-235.
- Augustinism, not a theoretism, 8, 9; and theocentrism, 9-10; and philosophy, 34-37, 235, 241-242; based on the Ideas, 48-49; unsettled questions in, 47-48, 105-111; unity of, 54-55; not an occasionalism, 56; mediaeval, 85, 296 n.82; general character of, 235-246; and Christianity, 250 n.25.
- Authority, divine and human, 260 n.14; precedes reason, 262 n.19.
- Avarice, *radix omnium malorum*, 119; associated with pride, 119, 151.
- Beatitude, *see* Happiness.
- Beauty, based on unity, 213.
- Being, *vere esse*, 21; and eternity, 22; degrees of, 52; and essence, 54; based on truth, 54; to be *with*, 104, 258 n.31; participation of essences in, 210-211; is to be one, 211-212.
- Belief, necessary to life, 27-28.
- Believe, God and in God, 31.
- Bible, interpretation of, 340 n.7.
- Body, implies extension, 45, 271 n.8; shares in the Ideas through the soul, 49; divisible to infinity, 52; to be loved for the sake of the soul, 167; created after the soul, 208-209.
- Call, of God through grace, 155-156.
- Charity, definition of, 136; gift of self to God, 139; and love of God, 138-

- 139; principle of the moral life, 140; fruitful in works, 141; God circulating within us, 141-142; *Deus est et Dei donum*, 141, 237, 325 n.94; well ordered, 166; *seu dilectio*, 303 n.12, 311 n.40, 313 n.55; incompatible with avarice, 303 n.12; implies a good love, 311 n.40; illicit charities, 311 n.40; various meanings of the term, 311 n.40; not incompatible with justice, 312 n.45; *radix omnium bonorum*, 312 n.52; *caritas consummata*, 313 n.55.
- Christ, eternal wisdom of God, 6, 74; truth, 6; measure, 6; and happiness, 9; authority of, 29, 31; as mediator, 32; our only master, 74; merits of, 159; faith in, 252 n.4, 261 n.17, 265 n.40; sensible object of faith, 262 n.20; grace of, 324 n.86; *Mystère de Jésus*, 325 n.97.
- Christian liberty, definition of, 161; spirit of, 167-168; foundation of, 153, 163, 249 n.12.
- Christianity, is wisdom, 37.
- Church, in what sense the City of God, 180-181.
- Cities, the two, 171-184; two orders of the two, 174, 330 n.43; present mingling of the two, 176, 180-181; difference of the two, 176; sources of the doctrine of the two, 182-183; two peoples of the two, 328 n.27; origin in Adam of the two, 328 n.30.
- City, definition of, 173, 329 n.35; mystical name for society, 180, 328 n.30; of God described, 334 n.69.
- Cogitatio*, meaning of, 75, 221, 277 n.3, 286 n.28; in Augustine and in Descartes, 286 n.28.
- Cogito*, meaning of, 286 n.28; formulations of, 13, 18, 41-43, 46, 53-54, 65; conditions the proof of God's existence, 13, 41-42; *si fallor sum*, 42, 43; and proof of the soul's immortality, 53-54; in Augustine and in Descartes, 267 n.14, 268 n.17 n.19 n.21, 269 n.22.
- Concept, none between image and judgement, 89, 90-91, 294 n.72.
- Conception, *conceptam rerum notitiam*, 292 n.55.
- Concupiscence, result and not cause of original sin, 151, 317 n.36; and delight, 162; diminishes as charity grows, 169; not destroyed, 169-170; and *reatus*, 317 n.36.
- Confessions*, meaning of the, 335 n.2 n.8.
- Conjugium, contemplationis et actionis*, 302 n.9.
- Conscience, moral, 130; first evidence of, 307 n.8.
- Conservation, of the world, 346 n.38.
- Consilium*, a stage in the life of the soul, 304 n.24.
- Contemplation, definition of, 187; guided by the Ideas, 118; joy in, 125-126; a stage in the life of the soul, 304 n.24.
- Coronat, Deus dona sua*, 161.
- Creation, *ex nihilo*, 143-144, 189-190, 313 n.2; nothing produces itself, 52; continuous, 53; will of God only cause of, 190; *in principio*, 190, 197; in time, 190-191, 192-193; simultaneous, 197; and informing, 205; modelled on the Ideas, 210, 291 n.52; goodness of God the cause of, 337 n.17; *non ut pes ex aeternitate in pulvere*, 338 n.23.
- Creatures, exist through God but are not of Him, 143, 313 n.2, 336 n.13; between being and nothingness, 144; corruptible because created from nothing, 145, 148; good in so far as they exist, 145; not coeternal with God, 192, 338 n.22.
- Credo, ut intelligam, see Faith.*

Cupiditas, as avarice, 119; definition of, 303 n.12, 311 n.34; *radix omnium malorum*, 312 n.52; distinct from will, 323 n.85.

Curiosity, 124

Da, quod jubes et jube quod vis, 160.

Delight, *quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est*, 162; not distinct from will, 162; in grace, 155, 162; *quasi pondus est animae*, 162, 310 n.29; its relationship to will, 321 n.81.

Dependence, of man on God, *see* Man.

Dialectic, necessity of, 124.

Digression, method of Augustinism, 235-237.

Dilectio, dilige et quod vis fac, 140; *ordinata*, 166; *amor rerum amandarum*, 303 n.12; an intense will, 310 n.29.

Divine concurrence, and grace, 155, 156.

Doubt, proof of existence, 18.

Ecstasy, of Ostia, 251 n.31.

Election, and calling, 319 n.61.

Elements, qualities of, 346 n.39.

Encyclopedias of the middle ages, Augustinian origin of, 305 n.26.

Ends, order of, 166-167.

Enjoy (*frui*), definition of, 165; temporal goods, 304 n.20; and use, 167, 176, 326 n.2, 331 n.50.

Error, only in the judgement, 41; absence of being, 314 n.7.

Essence, and existence, 21, 54, 353 n.5 n.6; indestructible, 52; *essentia* the act of *esse*, 54, 210; and truth, 54; inequality of essences, 210.

Eternity, *ipsa Dei substantia est*, 22.

Eudaemonism, 3, 8, 45, 50, 115.

Evil, a privation, 144; bound up with creation *ex nihilo*, 145; exists only in the good, 314 n.7.

Faith, in God's existence, 12-13, 34; influence of Manichaeism on Augustine's doctrine of, 27, 38; and reason, 29-37, 187; agrees with reason, 74-75, 77-78, 128, 129, 183; motives of credibility, 30; purifies and enlightens, 31; and charity, 31; to believe God and to believe in God, 31; ecstasy and happiness, 32-34; and works, 154; the beginning of grace, 154; *inchoat cognitionem*, 263 n.24; *gradus intelligendi*, 266 n.41.

Fear, beginning of wisdom, 123, 312 n.49; cast out by charity, 168; a stage in the soul's life, 304 n.24.

Fire, instrument of sensation, 277 n.6.

Force, used against heretics, 180, 332 n.61.

Foreknowledge, respects liberty, 155-156; and predestination, 156, 320 n.62.

Forgetfulness, of self by the soul, 99.

Forma, omnium Verbum, 214, 350 n.19; synonym of creative truth, 292 n.55; synonym of *idea*, 291 n.52.

Fortitude, a cardinal virtue, 131, 136; a stage in the soul's life, 304 n.24.

Free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), an intermediate good, 146, 317 n.43; its consent to grace, 155-156; intact under grace, 160, 162; powerless without grace, 160; receives grace, 161-162; inseparable from the will, 157, 319 n.60; attested by Scripture, 321 n.73 n.74; distinct from liberty, 323 n.85; implies the power to do evil, 323 n.85.

Fructification, of the mind by God, 104.

Fullness, implies measure, 5-6; and wisdom, 6.

Gestures, visual signs, 67.

Gifts, of the Holy Ghost, 304 n.24.

God, possession of, 5; search for, 5, 6-7; His nature unknowable, 11, 217-218; *esse*, 217; *essentia*, 22-23, 210; eternity, 22; *Ego sum qui sum*, 22, 353 n.4; immutability, 22; sought to be found and found to be sought again, 34; truth, 54; the good, 77; the sovereign good, 6, 9-10, 143, 148, 190; intelligible sun, 78; *pater intelligibilis lucis*, 78, 288 n.38; presides in the soul *nulla natura interposita*, 80; bestows being and operation, 81, 152; life of the soul, 96-105; present to the soul, 103-104; sought as happiness, 104; *interior intimo meo*, 104; power bringing thought to fruition, 104; vivifies the soul by infusing virtues, 131-132; triune, 214; object of enjoyment, 166, 251 n.29; *substantia*, 258 n.47; *intelligentiae dator*, 288 n.34; alone truly immortal, 313 n.2; *id quo nihil melius cogitari possit*, 326 n.3; not a substance, 353 n.6.

Good, everything created is good, 51, 130; itself is God, 138, 141, 143, 166, 172, 313 n.2; love of it makes all else unnecessary, 139; all that exists is good, 144.

Grace, definition of, 160; of adoption, 149, 153, 315 n.26; sanctifying, 149-150; actual, 150; and nature, 148, 152-153; necessary for salvation, 152-153, 154; re-creates man, 153, 324 n.86; the result of an election, 154, 161; cause of merit, 154-155, 161; influences the will,

155-156, 162; brings liberty, 161, 163-164; gives the will delight in God, 162; does not destroy concupiscence, 169; of Jesus Christ, 159; Pelagian doctrine of, 158; evangelical, 318 n.54.

Happiness, object and definition of, 3-10; God the object of, 4, 6, 7; implies truth, 3, 5, 8-9, 101-102; a fullness, 5; a good of the soul, 5, 7; *gadium de veritate*, 6, 8, 9, 101-102, 115; not knowledge, 8; inseparable from knowledge, 8-9; goal of philosophy, 33-34, 115-116; sought by the soul when seeking itself, 100; life of the soul, 104; and society, 172; a natural inborn desire, 249 n.3; object of enjoyment, 250 n.22; *cohaerere Deo*, 301 n.127.

Hardening, of the sinner by God, 156.

Heaven, means the angels, 197-198, 340 n.7.

Helplessness, of man without God, 92, 240.

History, Augustine's synthesis of, 175-176; prophesied by that of the past, 340 n.5.

Hortensius, the, 3, 227.

Humility, and knowledge of God, 31, 234, 359 n.2.

Ideas, definition of, 291 n.52; various terms for, 80, 199; intelligibility of, 80; timelessness and immutability of, 80, 297 n.88; regulative function of, 91-92, 127; source of knowledge, 118; participated by things, 210; *principales formae*, 199, 291 n.52; how related to the laws, 297 n.83; *ratio creandi*, 344 n.26; inform matter, 344 n.26.

- Ignorance, definition of, 303 n.19; a result of original sin, 151.
- Illumination, 16-17, 20, 38-39, 72-73, 77-88, 127; sources of the doctrine of, 77-78; and purification of heart, 31; metaphorical character of, 78-79, 81; distinct from the natural light, 79-80; immediacy of, 80; to see in God, 80-81, 93, 94; not a sight of God, 81-82, 85, 94; does not dispense with sensation, 82; continuous, 81; accounts for the judgement rather than concepts, 84-92; has to do with faculty of judgement, 91; illumination—truth and illumination—abstraction, 86; essentially regulative, 91, 128; of the virtues, 89, 131-132, 307 n.5; *participatio Verbi*, 105, 350 n.19; moral, 130; metaphysical basis of, 221-222; *in quadam luce sui generis*, 289 n.46; angels merely let it enter, 291 n.51; of nature and of grace, 292 n.58, 297 n.91; formulated as a direct intuition, 93, 294 n.72, 296 n.78; an impression, 297 n.89; creative, 205, 339 n.1, 347 n.48 n.49.
- Image, definition of, 211; of God in the reason, 29, 151-152, 217-224, 317 n.41; is the Word, 211, 212, 214; *imago sensibilis*, 215, 277 n.3.
- Imaginatio, plaga inflicta per sensus*, 276 n.2.
- Immortality of the soul, 51-55; proved by incompatibility of contraries, 51; proved by the soul's life, 52, 53; proved by the *Cogito*, 53-54; bestowed by God, 54, 313 n.2; in the state of nature, 150.
- Infinite, intelligible to God, 191-192; number, 192.
- Informing of matter, 341 n.9; by the Ideas, 198-199; embraced by the creative act, 199, 205, 344 n.27.
- Ingressio*, a stage in the soul's life, 304 n.24; the soul directs its gaze towards God, 125.
- Innatism, in Augustine, 71, 75-76, 88, 89; or intrinsicism, 76; the sensible not innate, 72, 82, 286 n.26.
- Inner master, 66-76, 339 n.1; present to the memory, 102, 103-104; teaches the rules of action, 128; *verbum de Deo in corde tuo*, 258 n.49.
- Inquiry, conditions of, 96-97.
- Inscitia*, definition of, 303 n.19.
- Instinct for preservation, 50.
- Intellectualism in Augustinism, 8, 250 n.25.
- Intellectus*, definition of, 35-36, 259 n.10, 269 n.1, 290 n.47; not pure reason, 29, 33; *invenit*, 32, 263 n.24; between *fides* and *species*, 264 n.28; *merces fidei*, 36, 261 n.17; *est quaedam visio*, 289 n.45; *conficitur ex intelligente et eo quod intelligitur*, 289 n.45; a gift of God, 187.
- Intelligentia*, definition of, 79, 269 n.1; and faith, 33-34, 35-36; a power of the soul, 222; *movet ad fidem*, 320 n.62; *munus intelligentiae*, 320 n.62.
- Intelligere, menti est quod sensui videre*, 77.
- Intuition, or simple *intelligentia*, 296 n.78.
- Invisibilia Dei*, 19, 35, 36.
- Judgement (*judicium*), the judge superior to matter judged, 15; of truth, 87.
- Justice, a cardinal virtue, 131, 136; corresponds to love, 140; bestowed by God, 154; servile, 170.
- Justification, a free gift of God, 154-157; precedes election, 154; by the

continuous influence of God, 292 n.58; not accomplished without us, 321 n.77.

Kingdom of God, and City of God, 180-182.

Knowledge, degrees of, 14, 15-16; and possession, 8; and love, 8, 96-98; and illumination, 79-96.

Language, its relation to thought, 66-76.

Languages, study of, 124.

Law, civil, 178-179; the eternal, 130, 307 n.7; order prescribed by the eternal, 130-131; the eternal alone immutable, 180; the Jewish reveals and increases sin, 153-154; the Jewish impossible to carry out, 159, 162, 169; grace needed to carry out the Jewish, 162, 169; the natural, 130; the natural is the effect of an impression of the Ideas, 297 n.89; of sin, 159; of death, 327 n.19.

Liberty, meaning of *liber*, 323 n.85; a matter of ability, 152, 160; given by grace, 160, 326 n.12; a good use of free choice, 163; perfect in the life to come, 169-170; distinct from free choice, 323 n.85; state of the will *liberata*, 323 n.85; the inability to sin, 323 n.85.

***Liberum arbitrium*, see** Free choice.

Life, the good life, 6; bestowed by the soul on the body, 47, 49-50; bestowed on the soul by God, 104; as *anima*, 104; periods of the natural, 170; beauty and order of the natural, 170; the active and contemplative, 118; the Christian, 165; periods of the Christian, 170-171; will gives birth to the Christian, 168; of the Christian born of grace, 170; of the Christian is transitory,

169; the moral and social, 171-172; everlasting, 9, 171, 263 n.24.

Light, spiritual and corporeal, 65; the natural, 79-80, 130; of the rules for action, 128; is God, 78; its role in sensation, 277 n.6; a subtle body and akin to soul, 277 n.6; *omne quod manifestatur lumen est*, 289 n.40; the spiritual is true, 289 n.45; *lumina virtutum*, 307 n.5, 308 n.13.

Likeness, 277 n.3.

Love, definition of, 138; transforming power of, 8; presupposes knowledge, 96-98; an intense will, 133, 162, 310 n.29; weight of the will, 134, 136, 162; moves man, 135; principle of action, 135, 141, 165; determines value of actions, 135-136; human love insufficient, 104-105; demands reciprocity, 138; ambiguity of, 137; for God without measure, 139, 167; of neighbor, 166-167; the origin of society, 171-172; image of the Trinity in us, 219-223; implied in the concept, 222; disinterested, 312 n.43; increase of justice with, 312 n.49.

***Lumen, et alia demonstrat et seipsum*,** 288 n.39.

Man, definition of, 7, 44, 45, 208; a mystery, 47-48; threefold insufficiency of, 81, 105, 130, 143; exterior and interior, 116-117, 304 n.21; cannot raise himself, 153, 324 n.86; the old man, 170; praise of fallen man, 152; greatness of, 167; *magna quaedam res est*, 167; how created, 208-209; the image of God, 167, 218-219, 347 n.45; has only falsehood and sin as his own, 318 n.44; and sin, 321 n.76.

Manichaeism, criticized by Augustine, 65, 189, 278 n.9, 289 n.41, 336 n.11, 339 n.1.

Massa, sinful throng, 156; *perditionis*, 320 n.62.

Materialism, refuted by analysis of sensation, 63-65.

Matter, causally anterior to form, 198; not pure nothingness, 198; as purely passive, 277 n.6; spiritual and corporeal, 340 n.3, 341 n.9, 342 n.12; *materia informis*, 198, 205, 340 n.3, 342 n.12.

Measure (*modus*), equivalent to God the Father, 6; in things, 144.

Memory, its role in sensation, 64, 133; its role in visual sensation, 282 n.29, 309 n.24; of the present, 75, 82, 102-103; Platonic and Augustinian, 74-75; presupposes the presence of forgotten remembrances, 100, 102; contains bodies in a non-spatial mode, 102; depends on the will, 133; of God, 103-104, 219-223; of self, 221; *lumen temporalium spatiorum*, 194-195, 281 n.27; equivalent to the subconscious, 299 n.110; intellectual, 300 n.117.

Mens, definition of, 269 n.1; knows itself and the incorporeal, 76; by nature subject to the Ideas, 80; *intellectualis*, 79; *est sensus et mentis*, 75; is the man, 117; image of God, 219, 220; image of the Trinity, 219-221; Pauline origin of, 354 n.10.

Mentalism, of Augustine, 280 n.21, 287 n.29.

Mind, law of innerness, 71, 243; how spontaneous, 71; how active, 87; how one, 117; communication between minds, 73-74, 128.

Morality, dominates Augustine's doctrine, 45.

Mysticism, Augustinian, 20.

Nature, and perfection, 144, 147-148; state of, 149-150; state of nature a kind of grace, 149-150; corrupted

by sin, 151-152; is good as nature, 314 n.7.

Nominalism, and Augustinism, 294 n.70.

Non latere, a genus embracing sensation and science, 278 n.7.

Nosce te ipsum, meaning of, 3.

Notio, foundation of true judgments, 89.

Notitia, fruit of mind fructified by will, 310 n.28.

Number, non-empirical origin of, 16; classes of numbers, 59-60; intelligible and sensible, 128-130; and wisdom, 128-130, 192; is to bodies what wisdom is to souls, 129-130; infinite, 192, 338 n.21; eternal, 257 n.43; and seminal reason, 206, 345 n.33; *efficacissimi numeri*, 346 n.37.

Nutus, things are *nutus*, 257 n.41.

Occasionalism, and sense knowledge, 56.

Order, definition of, 329 n.34; subjects lower to higher, 130, 131, 132, 166, 174; a perfection, 144; and beauty of the universe, 145-146; overthrown by sin, 151; the place of the soul, 99; man's place in the universe, 119; foundation of peace, 173-174; in social life, 174; the well-ordered man, 308 n.11 n.12.

Original sin, nature of, 150-151; preceded temptation by the devil, 150; merits punishment, 151; Pelagian explanation of, 158; and will, 309 n.22; a spontaneous defection, 153, 316 n.31, 324 n.86; its origin in nothingness, 153, 324 n.86.

Ownership, lawful right of, 176-177.

Pantheism, criticism of, 336 n.11.

Participation, in the Ideas, 210-211.

Passions, depend on the will, 132-133;

- their worth determined by the will, 135-136.
- Peace, definition of, 329 n.34; end of the city, 173, 178; based on order, 173-174; proper to each city, 328 n.30.
- People, definition of, 329 n.32 n.36; worthy of the name, 174; the two peoples, 328 n.30; each determined by its love, 328 n.30.
- Phantasia, seu imago rei quam vidi*, 277 n.3, 309 n.27.
- Phantasma, seu imago rei quam non vidi*, 277 n.3, 309 n.27.
- Philosophy, love of wisdom, 33, 116; practical aim of, 3; Augustinian, 34, 235-246; Augustinism contradicts notion of, 241; God and the soul the subjects of, 98; happiness its chief aim, 115; Christian, 37, 235, 241-242; and theology, 35-37, 240-242; and religion, 37.
- Piety, a stage in the soul's life, 304 n.24.
- Pleasure and pain, 61-62.
- Predestination, definition of, 320 n.62; a mystery, 156; rests on an inscrutable justice, 156.
- Pre-existence, possibility of, 71-72.
- Pride, *initium peccati*, 119; *perversae celsitudinis appetitus*, 316 n.31.
- Progress, spiritual, 326 n.13 n.14.
- Proof of God's existence, 11-24; natural evidence for, 11-12; unknown to the *insipiens*, 11-12; subject to the *Credo ut intelligam*, 12-13, 27-28; built on truth, 13-18; rests on analysis of pure thought, 23-24, 74; built on the *Cogito*, 18; different from that of St. Thomas, 21-22; dependent on the problem of knowledge, 18; betokens that of Anselm, 21; an organic whole, 23-24; moves on the plane of essence, 21; assumes God is present to the soul, 104; a *contingentia mundi*, 19-20, 52-53, 188; role of the sensible in, 18-20.
- Prudence, a cardinal virtue, 131, 136.
- Purification, of the soul, 124.
- Quietism, not Augustinian, 141.
- Rational knowledge, the incorporeal known through the soul, 76; intermediate between faith and beatific vision, 9, 33.
- Reason (*ratio*), definition of, 269 n.1; functions of, 117-118, 118-119; judges the senses, 15; precedes faith, 29; existence of pure reason, 33; relation of *rationes* to *leges*, 88; eternal reasons, 117, 119; submits to the Ideas, 118-119; superior and inferior, 117, 269 n.1; is to the mind what sight is to the eye, 287 n.32, 303 n.19; the Greek *lógos*, 291 n.52; *ratio et ratiocinatio*, 303 n.19; makes order rule in us, 308 n.11; image of God, 317 n.41.
- Recurrence, eternal, 191-192.
- Regulae*, as the Ideas, 180; *numerosum*, 91; *sapientiae*, 91; *virtutum*, 131, 307 n.5; impressed on man's heart, 297 n.89.
- Reminiscence, Platonic, 71-72, 82; Augustinian, 71-72, 74-75, 82.
- Repose, of contemplation, 118.
- Research (*studere*), 134.
- Resemblance (*similitudo*), itself, 211; not an image, 211; of the Word, 211, 213-214.
- Restlessness, or desire of God, 101-102; expression of man's insufficiency, 104-105; *inquietum est cor nostrum*, 301 n.129.
- Resurrection, necessary for happiness, 279 n.16; betokened by the soul's love of the body, 61.

- Scepticism**, *desperatio verum inveniendi*, 33, 38; based on sensualism, 41, 43; refutation of the Academicians, 39-40.
- Science**, definition of, 116, 302 n.4; opposite of ignorance, 303 n.19; distinct from wisdom, 118-119, 122-123; subordinated to wisdom, 306 n.33; pertains to action, 122, 123, 302 n.5, 304 n.20; natural sciences, 124; transformed by faith, 123, 124.
- Scintilla, rationis**, 317 n.41.
- Secondary causes**, limits of their efficacy, 207-208, 240; *omnis causa efficiens est*, 336 n.16.
- Semen**, meaning of, 345 n.32.
- Seminal reasons**, nature of, 206-208; terms for, 206, 345 n.36; role of humidity in, 346 n.37; metaphysical considerations underlying, 207; religious considerations underlying, 365 n.58.
- Sensation**, 56-65, 70-71; definition of, 48, 57; presupposes an object which acts on the body, 56; meaning of *non latet*, 57, 63, 218; appertains to the soul, 57; an act of the soul's attention, 48, 61-63, 83; created by the soul, 63-64; the result of the soul's function as animating principle, 61, 63; a higher form of life, 123; not produced by the body, 60-61; an action of the soul on itself, 61-63; an act of the mind, 63-64; perceived by the soul where produced, 48; acquired like ideas, 70-71; generation of *species*, 215-216; pertains to the will, 133; and unperceived sense impressions, 133; moral consequences of the psychology of, 63, 99-100, 119-120.
- Sense knowledge**, value of, 41, 75-76; and intelligible knowledge, 288 n.35.
- Senses**, internal and external, 14; external, 277 n.6; errors of the, 41; the judgement responsible for error of the, 41; the eyes of the soul, 287 n.33; do not attain pure truth, 16, 254 n.24.
- Sensible**, changeableness of the, 16; merely informs us, 70-71; Augustinian and Aristotelian, 83, 84-85; proper and common, 14.
- Signs**, *signa et significabilia*, 283 n.2.
- Sin**, or voluntary evil, 144-145; not inevitable, 146-147; a privation, 148.
- Sinners**, contribute to the beauty of the universe, 314 n.10.
- Slavery**, spirit of, 168.
- Society**, origin of, 171-172; is what the individuals are, 328 n.29; the social life, 182; and happiness, 172.
- Socratism**, 3.
- Soul**, definition of, 44-45, 47, 61, 117; unity of, 212, 219; and its faculties, 219, 354 n.14; functions of, 61, 117; is not God, 49, 50; a substance, 45, 48; a *natura intelligibilis*, 286 n.26; individuality of, 49; origin of, 50-51, 71-72, 251 n.26; its origin a mystery, 50; created before the body, 208-209; distinct from the body, 45-47; united to the body, 48; has a spiritual matter, 209; continually active in the body, 61-63, 85; acts through the brain, 273 n.18; superior to the body, 45, 52-55, 58; is a mind, 46; in contact with the Ideas, 49; intermediary between the Ideas and the body, 49; spontaneity of, 71; immortality of, 51-55; knows itself directly, 75; why it looks for itself, 99-100, 222; to be loved only for God, 167; of the world, 209, 288 n.35, 347 n.51.
- Species, sensibilis**, 277 n.3; four sensible species, 215; as *idea*, 291 n.52;

- as form, 144; as vision of God, 264 n.28.
- Spiritus*, definition of, 269 n.1, 354 n.10; *mentis*, 354 n.10.
- State, relations of church with the, 177-178, 179, 180-182.
- Studium*, research, 134.
- Sun, *est fulget illuminat*, 288 n.39.
- Symbolism, of the sensible world, 20.
- T**eaching, in what sense possible, 69-71, 286 n.28; *nusquam discere*, 70, 74; the Word the only master, 74.
- Temperance, a cardinal virtue, 131, 136.
- Things, are signs, 257 n.41.
- Time, general view of, 189-196; begins with things, 190-191; divisions of, 339 n.36; a creature, 190; fragmentary existence of, 193; a distention of the soul, 194-195, 339 n.33; presupposes memory, 64; measurement of, 193-194.
- Totum, exigit te qui fecit te*, 140.
- Traces, of God, 210-216, 351 n.21; of the Trinity, 214-216, 218-223.
- Tranquillitas*, a stage in the soul's life, 304 n.24; perseverance in purity of soul, 125; *ordinis*, 329 n.34.
- Transformism, foreign to Augustinism, 207, 345 n.35.
- Trinity, known by faith alone, 34; formulation of the, 223-224; images of the, 214-216, 218-223.
- Truth, truths are necessary, 16; the essence of essences, 54; is God, 6, 54; and happiness, 8; indispensable to happiness, 101; based on unity and being, 213-214; our real master, 74; marks of, 15-18; object of illumination, 87-88; judges and guides the mind, 17; not produced by the mind, 16-17, 72-73; transcends the mind, 17-18; in the moral order, 128.
- U**nion of soul and body, 47-48, 51; caused by desire of the soul for the body, 49-50, 61; refutation of Origen, 50; and the Ideas, 49.
- Unity, and multiplicity, 16; and existence, 211-212; of bodies, 212; of species, 212; of the soul, 212.
- Universe, an image of God, 214.
- Use (*uti*), definition of, 165.
- V**ain glory, 4.
- Vice, definition of, 166; cannot destroy nature, 329 n.35.
- Virtue, definition of, 135; *ordo est amoris*, 166; perfect virtue, 167-168; a good of the soul, 7; a stage in the soul's life, 304 n.24; the rules of, 128, 131; theological virtues, 313 n.57; cardinal virtues, 131; unity of the virtues, 136; active and contemplative, 118; of the pagans, 152.
- Visio, corporalis et spiritualis*, 277 n.3, 287 n.30; meaning of, 351 n.24; a trace of the Trinity, 215; definition of intellectual, 289 n.45; of things in God, 81-82; theory of emission, 277 n.6.
- Vita*, as *anima*, 104; as God light of men, 105; causes perfection of life, 308 n.9; center of Augustinism, 9-10; is charity, 141-142.
- Vital movement, replaces the soul in plants, 61, 274 n.23.
- Vocation, which predestines, 320 n.62.
- Voluntarism, 237-238, 337 n.17.
- W**ar, desired for peace, 173; justifiable, 178.

- Wax, the Ideas act as a ring on wax, 297 n.89.
- Weight, of bodies, 134; of the will, 134.
- Will, definition of, 309 n.22; is a love, 134, 162; a fact beyond dispute, 157; controls the life of the soul, 132-134; how its control is exercised, 310 n.30; free, 146; *rectae voluntates sunt connexae*, 310 n.33; a good will the work of God, 316 n.35; of God without cause, 190.
- Wisdom, definition of, 120, 303 n.18; Greek definition of, 122-123; a species of the genus science, 116; *sapientia* derived from *sapere*, 210; pertains to contemplation, 302 n.5; appertains to intellect and superior reason, 122; submission to the Ideas, 120-121; steps towards, 123-124; a terminus rather than a step, 125; identical with Christ, 6; identical with Christianity, 31, 37, 242-243; a knowledge which brings happiness, 7, 16, 73, 118, 121; God the object of, 9; rules of, 129; needs science, 121; includes the sciences, 124-126; its relation to virtue, 8; and number, 129-130.
- Word, definition of, 221; a conception of the mind, 292 n.55; implies knowledge and love, 222, 358 n.28.
- Word of God, image of God, 211, 221; perfect image, 214; form of everything that exists, 214, 357 n.23; source of all truth, 350 n.19.
- Works, follow faith, 154; do not merit grace, 154.
- World, *Mundus gravidus causis nascentium*, 345 n.36.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

- Abraham**, 203
Adam, 47, 51, 151, 158, 171, 175, 227, 323 n.85, 328 n.28.
Adam the Scot, 341 n.9.
Alcher of Clairvaux, 354 n.14.
Alfaric, Prosper, 249 n.4, 266 n.1, 283 n.1, 284 n.11, 287 n.32, 336 n.9, 359 n.7, 360 n.10 n.12 n.13, 361 n.21.
Ambrose (Saint), 35, 59, 230, 231, 279 n.11, 361 n.26.
Anselm (Saint), 21, 23, 241, 252 n.8, 262 n.22, 264 n.28, 319 n.60, 323 n.85, 326 n.3.
Anthony (Saint), 231.
Apuleius, 362 n.39.
Aristotle, 82, 83, 86, 110, 234, 290 n.47, 293 n.63 n.64, 296 n.82, 329 n.39.
Arnauld, 268 n.19.
Avicenna, 88.

Bacon, Roger, 294 n.72, 296 n.82, 305 n.25, 365 n.58.
Baeumker, Clemens, 256 n.36, 277 n.6.
Bardy, Gustave, 360 n.12 n.13.
Barion, Jakob, 301 n.139, 362 n.39.
Batiffol, Pierre, 260 n.12.
Baudin, E., 302 n.1, 366 n.66.
Baudoux, Bernard, 365 n.59.
Baumgartner, M., 255 n.35.
Bede (Saint), 305 n.26.
Berengarius of Tours, 353 n.9.
Bernard (Saint), 311 n.34, 313 n.55.
Blanchet, L., 268 n.19.
Boethius, 353 n.5.
Bonaventure (Saint), 23, 241, 278 n.10, 335 n.2, 365 n.58 n.59.

Bossuet, 292 n.62, 354 n.10.
Boyer, Charles, 255 n.35, 266 n.1, 268 n.19, 269 n.23, 281 n.22, 289 n.46, 290 n.48, 292 n.59 n.60 n.61, 293 n.64, 294 n.72, 301 n.135, 341 n.10, 343 n.25, 359 n.4, 363 n.49.
Bréhier, E., 348 n.2.
Brunschvicg, L., 273 n.14, 325 n.97, 364 n.50.
Burkitt, F. C., 334 n.72, 360 n.9.

Carneades, 39, 40, 41.
Cayré, Fulbert, 250 n.21, 251 n.31 n.32, 259 n.1, 303 n.10, 335 n.2.
Chenu, M. D., 306 n.34, 365 n.61.
Cicero, 3, 4, 39, 227, 229, 234.
Clement of Alexandria, 262 n.23.
Combès, G., 331 n.56 n.58, 334 n.70.
Comte, A., 329 n.39, 365 n.65.
Constantine, 332 n.60.
Creighton, 333 n.64.
Cyprian (Saint), 125.

D'Alès, Adhémar, 323 n.85.
Daniel, 69.
Dante, 355 n.15.
de Bouïard, Michel, 305 n.26.
de Corte, M., 257 n.39, 301 n.138.
Democritus, 280 n.21.
Descartes, R., 23, 41, 42, 243, 267 n.14, 268 n.17 n.19 n.21, 269 n.22, 271 n.8, 338 n.24, 361 n.24, 366 n.68 n.70.
de Sinéty, R., 345 n.35.
Diogenes Laertius, 349 n.7.
Duhem, P. M., 338 n.26.
Durkheim, E., 365 n.65.

Epictetus, 67, 280 n.21.
Eriugena, Scotus, 95, 264 n.28.
Eve, 208.

Ferraz, M., 268 n.19, 275 n.30, 280 n.21, 281 n.22, 309 n.20, 347 n.51.
Fichte, 365 n.65.
Figgis, J. N., 332 n.62, 333 n.64 n.68, 334 n.72.
Fontenius, 287 n.32.
Francis de Sales (Saint), 250 n.24.

Gardeil, A., 340 n.2, 341 n.10, 342 n.12, 343 n.25, 344 n.27, 345 n.28 n.31 n.32, 347 n.48, 354 n.10, 358 n.31.

Geyer, B., 334 n.72.
Gilson, E., 251 n.1, 258 n.45, 266 n.1, 268 n.19, 277 n.6, 296 n.81, 301 n.135 n.139, 302 n.8, 304 n.22, 306 n.34, 313 n.2, 314 n.9, 323 n.85, 341 n.9, 346 n.40, 349 n.6, 365 n.59, 366 n.66 n.70.

Gouhier, H., 334 n.69.
Grabmann, M., 301 n.139.
Grunwald, G., 257 n.41 n.44.
Guigo the Carthusian, 341 n.9.

Hamelin, O., 366 n.69.
Hardy, G., 329 n.39.
Harnack, A., 364 n.53.
Hegel, 365 n.65.
Heitz, T., 306 n.34.
Hermes Trismegistus, 362 n.39.
Hessen, J., 95, 255 n.35, 284 n.11, 287 n.32, 294 n.67, 297 n.86, 298 n.98 n.99 n.100 n.101.
Hilary (Saint), 125.
Hrabanus Maurus, 305 n.26.
Hugh of Saint Victor, 251 n.1.

Ibn Gebirol, 347 n.47.
Isaac, 203.

Isaias, 32, 262 n.21, 263 n.24, 265 n.40, 266 n.41.
Isidore of Seville (Saint), 305 n.26.

Jacob, 203.
Jacquín, M., 361 n.33.
Jamblicus, 362 n.39.
James (Saint), 108, 301 n.136.
Jansenius, 321 n.81, 322 n.83, 323 n.84.
Jerome (Saint), 323 n.85.
Jesus Christ, 9, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 158, 159, 160, 181, 182, 227, 228, 233, 235, 236, 238, 242.
Joachim of Flora, 340 n.5.
John (Saint), 9, 23, 31, 77, 164, 200, 207, 233, 234, 237, 249 n.14, 261 n.17 n.18, 263 n.24, 265 n.40, 288 n.36, 301 n.130, 313 n.55, 325 n.97, 339 n.1, 348 n.2.
Jolivet, R., 283 n.1, 287 n.32, 298 n.102, 313 n.1.
Justin (Saint), 234.

Kahl, W., 309 n.24, 364 n.51 n.53.
Kälin, B., 296 n.80, 301 n.139.
Kant, E., 365 n.65.
Keeler, L. W., 298 n.93 n.94 n.99, 301 n.135.
Kleutgen, 292 n.62.
Kors, J. B., 315 n.25, 317 n.36.

Laberthonnière, L., 250 n.25.
Lactantius, 125, 234.
Lagrange, J. M., 341 n.10.
Leder, H., 266 n.1.
Leibniz, 345 n.36.
Lepidi, 292 n.62.
Litré, E., 365 n.65.
Loisy, A., 362 n.35.

McKeough, J., 345 n.35.
Malebranche, N., 85, 235, 241, 243,

274 n.23, 291 n.52, 292 n.60, 334 n.69, 346 n.40, 365 n.58.
Mandonnet, P., 365 n.59.
Mani, 65, 183, 189, 228, 234, 336 n.11, 360 n.13.
Maréchal, J., 298 n.95.
Maritain, J., 365 n.60.
Marius Victorinus, 362 n.39.
Martin, A., 283 n.1, 287 n.32.
Martin, J., 262 n.22, 266 n.1, 273 n.16, 274 n.23, 276 n.39, 283 n.1, 285 n.15, 292 n.61, 320 n.68 n.71, 336 n.11 n.15, 338 n.29, 340 n.3, 342 n.16, 345 n.36, 346 n.39, 353 n.3, 359 n.35.
Matthew of Aquasparta, 289 n.46.
Matthew (Saint), 9, 32, 238, 263 n.24, 307 n.8, 310 n.29.
Mausbach, J., 303 n.18, 317 n.42.
Minucius Felix, 234.
Monceaux, P., 362 n.35 n.39, 364 n.50.
Mondadon, 255 n.35.
Monica (Saint), 359 n.3.
Montaigne, 229, 273 n.14.
Moses, 22, 125, 203, 210, 224, 340 n.7.
Müller, Walter, 302 n.9.
Nourison, J. F., 259 n.1, 265 n.32, 268 n.19, 272 n.11, 275 n.30, 332 n.61, 353 n.3.
Omez, R., 341 n.10.
Origen, 35, 50, 51, 262 n.23, 274 n.20.
Ott, W., 283 n.1.
Pascal, B., 235, 236, 273 n.14, 325 n.97, 328 n.27, 364 n.50, 366 n.66.
Paul (Saint), 6, 12, 19, 32, 35, 36, 117, 122, 159, 160, 161, 207, 232, 233, 234, 249 n.13, 255 n.34, 256 n.37, 263 n.24 n.25, 264 n.26 n.28, 297 n.57, 302 n.5, 313 n.57, 321 n.74, 331 n.58, 354 n.10.

Pelagius, 158-159, 160.
Perler, O., 301 n.133.
Peter Lombard, 219, 323 n.85, 355 n.16.
Peter (Saint), 260 n.13, 263 n.25.
Plato, 21, 51, 54, 69, 71, 72, 75, 82, 86, 190, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 209, 264 n.27, 269 n.23, 271 n.5, 288 n.34, 294 n.69, 341 n.10.
Plotinus, 47, 56, 77, 78, 105-111, 199-201, 202, 232, 233, 234-235, 242, 254 n.29, 256 n.36, 257 n.39, 264 n.27, 269 n.23, 271 n.5, 273 n.17, 274 n.19, 277 n.5, 280 n.20, 281 n.22 n.23, 294 n.69, 342 n.18, 348 n.2, 362 n.40.
Porphyry, 242, 269 n.1, 284 n.12, 362 n.39.
Portalié, E., 275 n.30, 294 n.72, 297 n.91, 315 n.26, 317 n.36 n.38 n.42, 318 n.47, 319 n.61, 323 n.84.
Pythagoras, 72.
Raymond Lull, 365 n.58.
Reuter, 332 n.63.
Rivaud, A., 349 n.7.
Robin, L., 341 n.10.
Rohmer, J., 294 n.71 n.72, 302 n.8.
Roland-Gosselin, B., 307 n.8, 311 n.36, 330 n.44 n.46 n.49, 331 n.54.
Romeyer, B., 260 n.12, 279 n.15, 294 n.68 n.72, 320 n.66, 340 n.2, 364 n.57.
Scheler, M., 364 n.52 n.53.
Schilling, O., 330 n.44.
Schmaus, M., 351 n.20 n.21, 352 n.29, 353 n.3 n.4, 354 n.10, 356 n.21 n.22, 358 n.30, 364 n.52 n.53.
Schmidt, R., 362 n.39.
Scholz, H., 332 n.63, 334 n.72.
Schopenhauer, 365 n.65.
Scotus, Duns, 23, 365 n.58.
Seidel, 332 n.63.

Sestili, J., 292 n.58 n.59 n.62, 294
n.68 n.72, 295 n.75.
Severus, 312 n.47.
Siebeck, H., 364 n.56.
Socrates, 69, 72.
Stephen (Saint), 331 n.58.

Taylor, A. E., 349 n.7, 336 n.67.

Tertullian, 275 n.30.

Thales, 349 n.7.

Thomas Aquinas (Saint), 21, 48, 83,
86, 110, 111, 208, 234, 235, 239,
240, 289 n.46, 293 n.63 n.64, 295
n.74 n.75, 332 n.59, 340 n.3, 365
n.58.

Tyconius, 183, 334 n.72.

Van Endert, C., 255 n.35, 257 n.44,
294 n.67.

Varro, 116, 269 n.1.

Volusianus, 331 n.53.

Von Eicken, H., 333 n.67.

Von Hertling, G., 255 n.35.

Weinand, H., 251 n.32.

William of Auvergne, 88, 294 n.72,
296 n.82.

Williams, W. W., 312 n.47, 325 n.97.

Willmann, O., 294 n.67.

Windelband, W., 364 n.56.

Zaenker, O., 364 n.51 n.53.

Zeno, 39, 41.

Zigliara, 292 n.62.

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